

JINNAH PAPERS

THE STATES:
HYDERABAD, JAMMU AND KASHMIR



FIRST SERIES
Volume IX

Editor-in-Chief


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QUAID-I-AZAM PAPERS PROJECT
CULTURE DIVISION
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

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MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH
PAPERS**

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Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir**



Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

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Foreword

Volume VIII dealt with the historical and policy perspectives as well as the accession to Pakistan of 15 States located within its geographical limits, including the Kathiawar States of Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol.

The present volume gives an authentic account, underpinned by historical evidence, of the valiant struggle of the Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir and Hyderabad States for a future of their own choosing, which was frustrated by Indian intrigue, violence and military occupation.

The State of Jammu & Kashmir presents a classic case of Indian sophistry and chicanery to gain its objectives. Kashmir, with an eighty-five per cent Muslim population and contiguous to Pakistan, had an unassailable claim to accede to Pakistan for compelling geographical, religious, cultural, economic and other cogent reasons. But India usurped it on 27 October 1947 by force, relying entirely on captious and fallacious reasoning for holding on to it. Ironically enough, India moved the United Nations Security Council against Pakistan in January 1948. The Security Council decided on a free and fair plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir. On one pretext or another, no plebiscite has been held and the dispute has remained unresolved since. Three wars have been fought over the issue, which has blighted Indo-Pakistan relations for over fifty years. In the meantime, both countries have gone nuclear, underscoring the imperative of a solution to the dispute to the detriment of socio-economic progress of the two countries.

The ongoing epic struggle for liberation was launched by the people of Kashmir in 1989 in order to end the Indian occupation and wrest their basic right, recognized by the United Nations to determine their own destiny. India has had to deploy over 700,000 troops to quell the popular uprising, which has already resulted in the death of some 80,000 Muslims. Massive and appalling human rights violations have been committed by the Indian troops against innocent men, women and children. The freedom struggle, nevertheless, continues unabated.

In the case of Hyderabad, the Nizam, who had toyed with the idea of independence, unsuccessfully insisted on a treaty relationship with India during negotiations with Mountbatten, whereas the Indian leadership demanded outright accession. The gruelling negotiations, punctuated by threats, lasted for some four months, leading to a Standstill Agreement signed on 29 November 1947 for a period of one year.

An attempt has been made in this volume to marshal documentary evidence on how India bludgeoned Hyderabad into accession by threats and intimidation, eventually invading and annexing it on 17 September 1948.

The *Governor-General Papers*, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, *Mountbatten Papers*, etc., which constitute primary source material for this volume, have been supplemented by a variety of sources such as the Oriental and India Office Collection of the British Library; the *Transfer of Power 1942-7*; the United States National Archives; the National Documentation Centre, Islamabad; the *Foreign Office Archives*; the *Official Records of the Security Council, 1948*. Other sources include the Indian Government *White Papers* on Kashmir and Hyderabad, the *Memorandum of Hyderabad Government* submitted to the Security Council in 1948, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, and the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, etc.

Documents from the *Transfer of Power 1942-7* volumes have been referred to, for example, as No. 242, TP, XII, 360-1, i.e. the document number, volume number, and page number(s). Others have been identified by quoting their source, viz. *IOR* or *Mountbatten Papers*. Cross-references to the documents included in the previous volumes of the *Jinnah Papers* have been given by mentioning the document number, volume number, and page number(s), e.g. No. 464, Vol. I, Part I, 842-5 or Appendix III. 1, Vol. I, Part II, 32-42.

References to notes at the end of the documents have been identified by the document number, with the prefix KR for Jammu & Kashmir and H for Hyderabad State. Document Nos 1-251 were included in Volume VIII, documents No. 252-486 have been included in the present volume.

The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank David Blake of the Oriental and India Office Collections of the British Library and the Resident Representative of the U.N. at Islamabad for their valuable assistance in providing access to the archival material.

Mention may also be gratefully made of the unstinting assistance received from Fauzia Abbas, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who helped provide copies of a number of documents required by the Project.

The dedication of the Project staff, particularly Mr. M. H. Khan who has worked diligently and unremittingly on this volume, is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to Mr. A. A. Hanafi and Mr. Aftab Ahmad for their unstinting assistance.

Z. H. ZAIDI

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20 October 2003

THE STATES: LEGAL STATUS

The Indian Independence Act 1947 carved two independent Dominions, Pakistan and India, out of British India on 15 August 1947.¹ The Act simultaneously released 565-odd princely States, with an aggregate population equal to one-third of British India, from all obligations imposed by British suzerainty. Their future was to be determined in accordance with the terms of the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946² which provided that the "void created by the lapse of paramountcy and the cessation of political and other arrangements between the States and the British Crown was to be filled by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments."³

Mountbatten stated that the accession of a State to one or the other Dominion was a matter of free choice but ruled out sovereign independent status for the States.⁴

The Congress was opposed to "the right of any State in India to declare its independence"⁵. Jinnah, on the contrary, was of the view that "constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign States..."⁶ and could join either India or Pakistan or declare independence.

There were 565-odd States, of which 537 which were contiguous to India had acceded to that Dominion even before 15 August 1947. Twelve States were contiguous to Pakistan, and their accession to that Dominion presented no difficulty.

India and Pakistan could both claim accession by certain states, particularly Kashmir and Hyderabad. Pakistan stood for the accession of Kashmir for geographical, religious, and other pertinent reasons. The overwhelming majority of the State population was Muslim and the Maharaja was under obligation to decide the question of accession on the principle of sovereign will of the people.⁷

Admittedly, Pakistan had no political ambitions as far as Hyderabad was concerned, except for a strong desire to maintain the centuries-old cultural and religious bonds that had existed between the Muslims of India and Hyderabad.

On the contrary, India insisted that both Hyderabad and Kashmir accede to that country and for this they had the tacit support of both the Whitehall and the Viceroy. Buoyed up by this support, Nehru declared on 24 June 1948: "India could never tolerate an independent Hyderabad becoming a thorn in India's side, nor could India let it grow into a base for any foreign power".⁸ To him, its accession to India was the only option.⁹ India also wanted Kashmir to accede. Mountbatten, as an apologist of the Indian stance, defended this

aggressive approach in an aide memoire of 25 February 1948 to the King: "From the strategic and economic point of view... India had considerable interest in Kashmir. Taking into account 'other factors', the accession of Kashmir to India is, at the very lowest arguable".¹⁰

No wonder, then, that the British policy had unmistakably veered round to a pro-India position. In July 1948, Winston Churchill, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, strongly protested at the ruling that Premier Attlee sought to the effect that the "affairs of Kashmir or Hyderabad must not be discussed in the House..." "If a grave catastrophe arises there," asked Churchill wryly, "or in any other Dominion... is the House of Commons to be the only place in the world where it may not be discussed".¹¹

It was against this political backdrop that Jinnah had to tackle the grave issues of Hyderabad and Kashmir.

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HYDERABAD STATE

Ever since the British policy towards the States was enunciated by the Cabinet Mission in its Memorandum of 12 May 1946¹ and reaffirmed in the 3 June Plan, the Nizam of Hyderabad had been toying with the idea of independence.²

On 11 June 1947, the Nizam declared that he did not contemplate joining either Dominion. However, he offered India a Standstill Agreement³ and expressed willingness to assign an agreed number of troops to India for defence, providing that if India and Pakistan pursued mutually hostile policies, Hyderabad would remain neutral. India, however, insisted that Hyderabad accede to India first.

In deciding on accession, the Nizam faced a dilemma: "If he accedes to the Dominion of India he will have trouble with the Muslims in his State... If he accedes to Pakistan, he would be going counter to the compulsions of geography, the Hindu majority in the State would be stimulated by the Congress Party into rebellion, and the State would probably be subjected to considerable economic pressure from the Dominion of India."⁴

Jinnah understood the Nizam's predicament. While discussing the issue with a State delegation on 4 August 1947, Jinnah had slammed the position taken by Mountbatten, which he thought was contrary to the stated British policy. He did not mince his words, declaring that "the Viceroy and the Congress were following a policy totally contrary to the declared policy" of the British Government and that if that Government "had a shred of conscience, they would put a stop to the

threats which were now being given both by the Viceroy and the Congress.”⁵ As to the Nizam’s future course of action, Jinnah suggested that he plainly tell the Congress:

You may do what you like and you may threaten as you like but I shall never agree to sign any Instrument of Accession or join the Union unless my conscience says that I should do so.⁶

To Jinnah it was not a matter of political expediency but of principle. Citing “the greatest martyrdom in history” of Imam Hussain, grandson of the holy Prophet, to preserve and protect the pristine purity of Islam, Jinnah declared that one should die fighting rather than yield on a point of fundamental principle. He went on:

All the sanctions in the world then existing were applied against him [Imam Husain] and his followers but they withstood them and suffered wholesale butchery. It was a moral triumph and they gave their lives for it. That should be the attitude which the Nizam and his advisers and people should adopt. If it came to the worst, rather than yield to coercion or to the surrender of what was right, he should be prepared to abdicate...⁷

Again, while talking to Mountbatten about Hyderabad on 1 November 1947 at Lahore, Jinnah said he had told the Nizam “that he was between the devil and the deep blue sea. If he acceded to India, there would be bloodshed in Hyderabad, and if he did not accede, there would equally be bloodshed.”⁸

Mountbatten kept pressuring the Nizam to make up his mind either to accede to India right away or agree to a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of his people.⁹ The Nizam refused, but offered, under remorseless Indian pressure, to continue negotiations on the basis of an “agreement of association as proposed by Mountbatten”.¹⁰

STORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

In July 1947, the Nizam constituted a 4-member committee, headed by the State Premier Ahmed Said Chhatari,¹¹ to negotiate a treaty of “relationship” with India that recognized Hyderabad’s “full sovereignty and autonomy.”¹² The Indian side was represented by Sardar Patel and V. P. Menon and Mountbatten, who actively participated in negotiations as Crown Representative up to 14 August 1947 and later as Governor General of India.¹³

Formal negotiations were begun on 8 August but could make little headway, for Hyderabad insisted on a “treaty” and India on “accession”. However, in a meeting with Mountbatten on 8 September 1947, Walter Monckton, the Nizam’s constitutional adviser, and the Nawab of Chhatari agreed to try and “bring H.E.H. around to the point of offering an agreement in terms far more like the Instrument of Accession than the original offer of a treaty.”¹⁴ On 18 September 1947, the Nizam sent to

Mountbatten a draft of the "Heads of Agreement upon which such a treaty... could eventually be based".¹⁵ On 24 September, Mountbatten informed the Nizam that his proposals were not acceptable to India on the ground that the "Instrument of Accession contains terms most generous to the States."¹⁶

On 3 October, the Hyderabad delegation met with Mountbatten, and it was agreed that the terms offered by India for accession were by and large fair and reasonable.¹⁷

But the Nizam refused under intense pressure from the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* leadership, which demanded that the negotiating team be reconstituted.¹⁸ Accordingly a new team was formed under Moin Nawaz Jung, the Home Member for renegotiating the terms of the Agreement with India.¹⁹

On 31 October, the new delegation discussed with Mountbatten the points of difference.²⁰ After protracted negotiations, the Standstill Agreement was finally concluded on 29 November 1947.²¹

Mountbatten said he was in no way prejudicing the Nizam's rights as an independent sovereign and referred, *inter alia*, to the needs of the Hyderabad forces, in respect of both troops and equipment, following the exit of the Paramount Power. He further expressed his desire to maintain diplomatic and trade representatives of Hyderabad in other countries, though offering to instruct them to work in collaboration with the representatives of India. He also wanted that the State issue its own passports, to be only countersigned by India, and looked forward to the withdrawal of the last Indian troops from Hyderabad; specific mention was also made by him of the sovereign rights of Hyderabad in regard to currency and coinage.²²

Noting with satisfaction that the Nizam had "no intention of acceding to Pakistan" and regretting at the same time that he had not decided on accession to India either, Mountbatten declared: Placed as Hyderabad is, its interests were inextricably bound up with those of India and that the Indian Government, therefore, hoped that before the present agreement expired, Hyderabad would accede to the Dominion.²³ The Nizam was further assured that India could supply enough arms and equipment to meet the State's "legitimate requirements" and also had no objection to the State maintaining diplomatic and other representatives in London and elsewhere.²⁴

Once the Standstill Agreement was signed, India began to tighten the noose around Hyderabad on one pretext or another. During the months of January and May 1948, they demanded that the Nizam (i) refuse a loan of 200 million rupees to Pakistan; (ii) repeal the Ordinance which had made the circulation of Indian currency illegal; (iii) disband the *Razakar* organisation; (iv) resume negotiations regarding accession;

and (v) set up a fully representative and responsible government.²⁵ Hyderabad responded to most of the demands positively,²⁶ while drawing India's attention to the continuing economic blockade.

Given the hardening Indian attitude, the Nizam had to remind Mountbatten of his assurance that he would not countenance any undue or improper pressure on the State.²⁷ He confronted Mountbatten with the question: "Will Your Excellency not keep faith with me now? To break faith with the weak causes perhaps less immediate disadvantage than to break faith with the strong, but assuredly in the end it brings its retribution."²⁸ Mountbatten, however, was unmoved; he had in fact reneged on his assurances to the Nizam without compunction.

Even in the face of exponentially growing Indian hostility, Hyderabad preferred to follow a policy of moderation and reconciliation. Laik Ali wrote to Nehru that Hyderabad wanted to maintain the most friendly relations with India and was anxious to settle differences by negotiation, or failing that by arbitration.²⁹

India continued to pressure Hyderabad into conceding its demands. On 7 June 1948, Laik Ali offered to hold a plebiscite on the issue of accession to India or independence, under the auspices of the U.N. or any other impartial body.³⁰ V.P. Menon, however, dismissed the offer, demanding that the State first accede to India and devolve powers of legislation in respect of Defence, External Affairs and Communications.³¹ Later, India offered new Heads of Agreement and a policy package to Hyderabad which the State did not accept.³²

The negotiations foundered as Nehru refused the State's request for the talks to continue. He intended to stifle Hyderabad into acquiescence and eventual submission when he said: "We are just going ahead to do whatever we wish to do in the matter. During the interval, the Government of India will tighten up the blockade in respect of arms, ammunitions and other commodities which can be used for military purposes..."³³

ROLE OF ITTEHAD-UL-MUSLIMEEN

The *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, an influential political party of the State Muslims, stood for an independent Hyderabad³⁴ and was opposed to accession to India in any case. Its leaders, in particular Qasim Rizvi, resisted negotiations with India, organising protest demonstrations against the Standstill Agreement.³⁵

On 26 October 1947, the *Ittehad* decided on direct action for achievement of independence for Hyderabad.³⁶ On 27 October, Qasim Rizvi advised the Nizam to enter into "relations with Pakistan before it was too late."³⁷ India could not possibly brook an independent Hyderabad,

given that the State had an overwhelming majority of Hindus and that it was not contiguous to Pakistan either.

The ill-conceived policy of the *Ittehad* leadership sparked angry and bitter reactions not only from India but even from the Nizam, who lashed out against Qasim Rizvi, lampooning him as “mad” and a “blackguard”³⁸. India demanded a ban on the activities of the *Ittehad*³⁹

In a curious volte-face, not uncharacteristic of him, the Nizam wrote to Mountbatten, on 6 September, that “all these people [*Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*] are the followers of a certain gentleman [Jinnah] who used to be in Delhi and who has now made Karachi his headquarters. They consult him in all matters and are his disciples.”⁴⁰ Mountbatten expostulated with Jinnah about his having influenced the Nizam’s decision to reject the Standstill Agreement with India through the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* delegates who had met him in Karachi in October. Jinnah explained that he had received the delegates only out of courtesy and told them “that it was only a question for the Nizam and his own Government to decide.”⁴¹

On 1 June 1948, Jinnah issued a statement that “Hyderabad was an independent sovereign State and it was for its duly constituted authority to accede to India or remain an independent dominion.”⁴²

VIRULENT INDIAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

Nehru insisted that “Hyderabad must ... necessarily form part of the Indian Union”⁴³ and threatened that “Hyderabad would only be independent if India died and not before.”⁴⁴ Earlier, Mountbatten had warned the Nizam that India was contemplating military action.

On 21 June, Nehru instructed his Govt. to consider cessation of all financial transactions with the State and suspending communication services.⁴⁵ Mountbatten warned the Nizam that “there was no means whatsoever of preventing the Indian army from taking possession of Hyderabad... it would be the end of the Nizam’s rule... and there would doubtless be terrible repercussions all over the sub-continent.”⁴⁶

UN INTERVENTION

Towards the end of August, the U.N. Security Council notified that Hyderabad had requested the Council to consider “the grave dispute between Hyderabad and India, which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security.”⁴⁷ The State averred that it had been exposed “to violent intimidation and threats of invasion” and “a crippling economic blockade which has inflicted cruel hardships on the people of Hyderabad and which is intended to coerce Hyderabad into a renunciation of its independence.”⁴⁸

India, however, challenged the right of Hyderabad to refer “a purely

domestic issue" to the United Nations.⁴⁹

MILITARY OCCUPATION

On 13 September, the Indian army invaded Hyderabad.⁵⁰ Despite the resistance put up by the Nizam's forces, on 17 September the State forces surrendered. The Nizam declared a cease-fire announcing that Hyderabad's representatives at the United Nations would not pursue the State's appeal against India and that the *Razakars* would be disbanded.⁵¹

Hyderabad's surrender demonstrated the ineptitude of the Nizam and his failure to properly assess the political situation. Attractive concessions had been offered by Mountbatten such as (i) right of Hyderabad State to remain within the Commonwealth; (ii) joint development of a port in the Indian territory for special use of the State; (iii) Nizam's sovereignty over Berar, etc.⁵² But these failed to induce the Nizam into signing the Instrument of Accession with India. The tragedy that befell Hyderabad might have been averted by a pragmatic handling of the situation though only for a short time.

BERAR

Another bone of contention between Hyderabad and India was Berar. The Nizam claimed sovereignty over and retrocession of Berar on the lapse of British paramountcy.

India intended to annex Berar,⁵³ regardless of Hyderabad's claim.⁵⁴ The Indian negotiators initially refused to discuss Berar⁵⁵ but later appeared ready to treat it as separate and distinct from the Central Provinces in India, subject to the Nizam signing the Instrument of Accession⁵⁶

On 15 August 1947, the Nizam agreed to Berar continuing to be administered as part of the Central Provinces till a permanent arrangement was negotiated with that country.⁵⁷ With the fall of Hyderabad, however, Berar became a part of India.

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JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE

As regards Jammu and Kashmir, the Congress and the Muslim League had both been vying with each other for gaining control over the State. At one end of the political spectrum was the Muslim League with scarcely a structured policy towards the States. The League position, mired rather in legalism, was that on the lapse of British suzerainty on 15 August 1947, the states would be free to accede to one or the other Dominion or to opt for independence. The Congress, fearing that the option of independence, if conceded, would lead to the

balkanization of India, insisted that each State must accede to India or Pakistan.¹

In July 1947, the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, through the Muslim Conference which had emerged as the largest party in the Legislative Assembly, passed a resolution advocating accession of the State to Pakistan.²

A number of letters were sent by leaders of the Muslim Conference to K. H. Khurshid, Jinnah's Private Secretary, about the political situation in Kashmir, regretting that the Muslims felt neglected and abandoned by the Muslim League and requesting Jinnah's advice and intervention. On 23 February 1947, Ch. Hamidullah, Acting President, Muslim Conference, wrote to Khurshid enclosing a letter from his Secretary-General which described the predicament of the Kashmiri Muslims:

Personally, I am convinced that if it were not for the League's non-interventionist policy vis-a-vis the States, we would not have found ourselves so desperately alone. I am not unmindful of the higher political strategy which necessitates such a course of action, but I think it could still be reconciled with a slightly more practical interest in the affairs of Kashmir, even indirectly. Mamdot, Daultana, Nishtar, Qaiyum, etc., all agree with me, but they are powerless without Quaid-i-Azam's permission.³

But the chronic malaise of squabbling and infighting among the Muslim Conference leadership as well as its rank and file, and subsequently their somewhat precipitate launch of Direct Action in October 1946, had already harmed the cause of Muslims of Kashmir. In their misplaced zeal "to give a revolutionary lead to the Muslims of Kashmir,"⁴ the Muslim Conference had done no service to them. The *Kashmir Times* of 2 November 1946 called them "a group of wrangling political novices aspiring for leadership." They had unwittingly provided the malevolent State administration with the opportunity of incarcerating their leadership, leaving the field open to the Congress and the National Conference to act in concert with a view to forestalling Kashmir acceding to Pakistan.

Yet the Muslim Conference thought fit to blame their own follies on the AIML. On 25 August 1947, the party complained to Pakistan's Premier that the League had been impervious, by and large, to the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims and their struggle against State repression. When the Muslim Conference leadership was under detention, they bemoaned, no League leader had bothered to inquire after their welfare.⁵ They warned Liaquat: "If God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League does not act, Kashmir might be lost to them and the responsibility for this would be theirs."⁷

Jinnah was, none the less, sure that the Muslim majority would

never acquiesce in the accession of Kashmir to India, and if by some "manoeuvre and machinations... some sort of an artificial verdict is obtained in favour of Hindustan, there will be no peace in Kashmir"... "or peace between the two Dominions".⁸

Little did the Muslim League know that the Congress leadership was fully committed to forging enduring links with Kashmir by precluding the State from acceding to Pakistan. Providing Kashmir with physical access to India was clearly a pre-requisite to the State acceding to that Dominion. In February 1946, Wavell wrote, as a sequel to a study undertaken by V.P. Menon to demarcate notional Pakistan areas, that "Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons... Fact that much of Lahore District is irrigated from Upper Bari Doab canal with headworks in Gurdaspur district is awkward but there is no solution that avoids all difficulties".⁹ This demarche was just a smokescreen for giving Kashmir an exit to India through Pathankot in Gurdaspur. This was confirmed by V.P. Menon in his note of 17 July 1947 to the Viceroy: "It is possible that a predominantly Muslim State like Kashmir cannot be kept away from Pakistan for long and we may leave this matter to find its natural solution. Unlike Hyderabad [which lies in the bosom of India], it does not lie in the bosom of Pakistan and it can claim an exit to India, especially if a portion of the Gurdaspur District goes to East Punjab."¹⁰

The fate of Kashmir had, thus, been virtually decided long before the Radcliffe award was announced on 16 August 1947.¹¹ It gave India three of the four *tehsils* of Gurdaspur, including Pathankot, enabling that country to gain access to Kashmir and pave the way for its illegal and fraudulent accession.¹²

Assured of the desired link with Kashmir, Indian leaders concentrated on influencing developments in the State conducive to accession. Sure of Mountbatten going along with him, Nehru wrote to the former:

If any attempt is made to push Kashmir into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble because the National Conference is not in favour of it and the Maharaja's position would also become very difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India.¹³

Congress had secured considerable leverage in the new States Department created by the Government of India on 5 July 1947 to deal with the Indian States. It was important for the Muslim League to be closely associated with the work of the States Department to keep abreast of the developments in Kashmir. Abdur Rab Nishtar, nominated as the League representative, was scarcely conversant with the working of the

Political Department which was manned largely by Hindu officers under Congress influence.

In order to secure political legitimacy, Congress had Sheikh Abdullah freed from detention and secured his induction into the State administration to facilitate the prospective decision of the Maharaja to accede to India. To this end, the Congress leaders got in touch with the Maharaja and his Prime Minister directly.

On 3 July 1947, Sardar Patel sought to cultivate the Maharaja and reassured him that "the Congress is not only not your enemy, as you happen to believe, but there are in the Congress many strong supporters of your State". With a view to persuading the Maharaja that "the interest of Kashmir lies in joining Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without delay," Patel told him that, given the "past history and traditions" of Kashmir, "...all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision".¹⁴

Patel assigned two influential intermediaries, Ramadhar, Secretary, All-India Spinners Association, and Gopaldas, a prominent Hindu of Lahore, to win over the Maharaja. On 14 July 1947, Ramadhar informed Patel that the Maharaja had promised general amnesty, as well as sending the controversial R. C. Kak, his Prime Minister, packing as soon as possible. Ramadhar also assured Patel that the Maharaja would join India soon after the National Conference had suspended its political agitation.¹⁵

In October 1947, Charles W. Lewis, Charge d' Affaires of the US Embassy in Delhi, reported to the Secretary of State, George Marshall, that the Maharaja had been intending for some time "to bring the State into the Indian Union, if possible, but at all costs to prevent it from adhering to Pakistan, possibly because he may feel that his position as a Hindu ruler in a Muslim Dominion would be precarious".¹⁶

Nehru's passion for, and emotional obsession with, Kashmir are unmistakably reflected in his letter to the Maharaja:

Nothing has exercised our minds so much during recent weeks as the problem of Kashmir. I have an intimate and personal interest in it and the mere thought that Kashmir join Pakistan and become a kind of foreign territory for us is hateful to me. I want to do everything that is reasonably possible to prevent.¹⁷

Repressive measures against the Muslim Conference and other elements opposed to Kashmir joining India were stepped up as pressure to accede to Pakistan intensified. According to Charles Lewis, the Maharaja demonstrated partiality towards the National Conference and other pro-India elements with a view to "faking popular support for an anti-popular and anti-democratic decision amounting to the political murder of the State's majority community."¹⁸

Despite the natural urge of the Muslims of Kashmir to join Pakistan, they were filled with forebodings of trouble ahead, dismayed at the burgeoning collusion between the National Conference and Indian leaders.

PHYSICAL LINKS

The Maharaja needed some time for establishing physical links with India, as well as creating a favourable political ambience in Kashmir itself. The State Government, therefore, entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 15 August 1947¹⁹ with the twofold objective of (i) safeguarding, for the time being, the interests of the State, which depended on Pakistan for supply of essential goods, its economy being bound up with that of its closest neighbour, and (ii) using the Agreement as a smokescreen for the State's preparations for accession to India.

The State Premier asked India to take over control of post offices, telegraph offices, telephone exchanges and wireless stations from Pakistan.

During July-October 1947, Kashmir and India prioritized the construction of roads and bridges and telecommunication infrastructure with a view to facilitating their eventual link-up. By the end of October 1947, the State had bridged the Ravi at Pathankot, while the construction of roads to connect it with Jammu, and Jammu to Poonch, Baramulla and Srinagar, had proceeded apace.²⁰

On 27 September 1947, Nehru had told Patel he was anxious "to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible".²¹ For this purpose, Nehru advised that the co-operation of both the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah, who was "very anxious to keep out of Pakistan", was highly desirable. Nehru suggested early release of Abdullah from prison and his reconciliation with the Maharaja. In fact he succeeded in arranging a deal with Abdullah, who was reported to "have decided for the Indian Union,"²² provided that he was released and "transfer of power to a substantial degree" to his party was effected.²³ By 12 October, Abdullah had risen to the bait and most of his Party associates were released from detention.

Abdullah, after his release, declared that "the issue of accession cannot be decided by religious sentiment and that the friends and sympathisers of Kashmiris... have been Gandhiji, Jawaharlalji and the Congress, and not the Muslims or the League or Mr. Jinnah".²⁴ Jinnah and the League were to be demonised as it were, to be maliciously portrayed as having scuttled the popular movement in Kashmir.

MAHARAJA ON COLLISION COURSE WITH PAKISTAN

Encouraged by the success of the clandestine deal with India, and actuated by hostility towards Pakistan, armed bands of Sikhs and

RSS gangs killed thousands of Kashmiri Muslims, abducted their women, and burnt their villages with the help of Dogra troops and State police. The army personnel were even involved in armed forays into Pakistan territory. Pakistan lodged a protest against the incursions and atrocities on 12 October 1947.²⁵ Mehr Chand Mahajan, the new Premier of Kashmir,²⁶ denied the allegations and counter-charged that thousands of Pakistanis had infiltrated into Kashmir and “committed horrors on non-Muslims in the Poonch area”.²⁷ He threatened that unless Pakistan agreed to an impartial inquiry, he would have to ask for outside assistance.²⁸ With a view to reducing tensions, Pakistan made repeated attempts to hold discussions on various issues. The Kashmir Government, however, spurned these overtures. Pakistan even sent a representative to Srinagar to discuss contentious matters but the State Premier turned him back on the pretext that “at the moment he was too busy to discuss these matters”.²⁹

As well as refuting the baseless allegations made by Mahajan, Liaquat Ali Khan reacted strongly to his threat:

The only object of this intervention by an outside power secured by you would be to complete the process of suppressing the Musalmans to enable you to join the Indian Dominion as a *coup d'état* against the declared and well known will of the Musalmans and others who form 85% of the population of your State. We must earnestly draw your attention to the fact that if this policy is not changed... the gravest consequences will follow.³⁰

Jinnah wrote to Maharaja that the threat to call in outside help was tantamount to an ultimatum and “that the real aim of your Government’s policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Dominion as a *coup d'état*.”³¹ However, Jinnah invited the Maharaja to send his Prime Minister to Karachi to discuss all contentious issues, but there was no response from the latter.

PROVISIONAL AZAD KASHMIR GOVERNMENT

In the last week of August 1947, a series of public meetings were organised by Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan in Poonch district, which demanded that the State accede to Pakistan. The simmering tensions rapidly reached the flashpoint, and an armed revolt by several thousand local Muslim peasants ensued. They were soon joined by a large number of Indian Army ex-servicemen.³² The Maharaja’s efforts to quell the uprising were resolutely thwarted.

The rulers of Chilas, Hunza, Chitral, and Gilgit, revolted against the Maharaja because of savage repression of Muslims and acceded to Pakistan.³³

Determined to fight to the bitter end, Kashmiris formed a provisional government of Azad Kashmir, based at Pulandari in Poonch and headed

by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, a member of the State Assembly.³⁴ The Azad Kashmir forces, joined by tribesmen, took Baramula and reached the precincts of Srinagar on 27 October 1947. The aim of the Azad Kashmir Government was twofold: securing the right to self-determination and accession of the state to Pakistan.

These developments fuelled popular support in Pakistan for extending all manner of aid to the freedom-fighters in Kashmir. The Dogra atrocities against the Muslims in Poonch and Jammu, as elsewhere in the State, led to a large exodus of Muslims into Pakistan. Alastair Lamb, the British historian, estimates that during September to mid-October 1947, no less than half a million Muslims had been displaced from Jammu alone.³⁵ The people of the State had their kith and kin in certain parts of West Pakistan. Consequently, people from the NWFP and the tribal areas, overwhelmed with anxiety and grief over the unspeakable horrors let loose by the Dogra troops in Kashmir, rushed to the aid of their brethren. The first incursion of the Frontier tribesmen into Kashmir took place on 22 October 1947.³⁶

In terms of the surreptitious deal over Kashmir, Nehru had advised Sardar Patel "to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the cooperation of Sheikh Abdullah".³⁷ Within a few weeks, on 27 October 1947, Indian troops landed in Srinagar after getting the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession in a highly dubious fashion.

Pakistan declared that the accession was predicated "on fraud and violence"³⁸ and, therefore, could not be recognised.³⁹ Jinnah bluntly told Mountbatten that he "felt that from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long worked out, deep laid plot to secure Kashmir's permanent accession".⁴⁰

The decision to accede to India was blatantly illegal and grossly violative of the unexceptionable general principle governing the accession of States to one or the other Dominion, namely geographical contiguity and the wishes of majority of the people. Even the legal advisers at the Foreign Office in London and the State Department in Washington were inclined to impugn the legality of the accession.⁴¹

The Maharaja as well as the Indian Government had alleged, that Pakistan knew of the tribal movement into Kashmir but did little to stop it. On 1 November 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan told Mountbatten that "if they had made any attempt to interfere with the movement of tribes ... this would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the Frontier".⁴² "The wholesale massacre of Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas and across the border of Jammu," he emphasised, had been "more than the tribes could stand and this was the origin of

their raid on Srinagar".⁴³

India accused Jinnah of planning tribal incursions into Kashmir. The allegation was, however, discounted by an impartial agency—the U.S. Embassy in Delhi—in a report forwarded to the State Department on 14 November, 1947. It said: "It seems unlikely that Mr. Jinnah would have been able to stop the tribesmen from entering Kashmir even if he had wanted to... It would seem that if Mr. Jinnah had conceived a definite plan for taking Kashmir by force, he would have waited until weather conditions had made it impossible for the Government of India to fly in troops". "It also seems likely", the report continued, "that if Mr. Jinnah had planned the invasion, he would have managed it in such a way that the raiders would have avoided killing Kashmir Muslims and looting and burning their property".⁴⁴

On 17 March 1948, Jinnah told US Ambassador Paul Alling that there was "only one way to attempt to prevent such incursions and that was to order Pakistan troops to fire on the tribesmen. Any such action, however, would have precipitated such a widespread conflict that no one could have foreseen the outcome."⁴⁵ "As a matter of fact", Jinnah added, "it was to avoid such possibilities of conflict that Pakistan troops had been withdrawn from the frontier provinces". Concluding, he warned that the tribesmen had to be convinced that a fair plebiscite would be held in Kashmir, or else they would refuse to lay down their arms, "and once they broke the bounds there was no telling where they would stop".⁴⁶

The facts regarding the tribal *lashkars*, released by the West Punjab Government in 1948,⁴⁷ revealed that since August 1947, the tribesmen had been outraged by the mass killings of Muslims in East Punjab. In October, there was a ground swell of tribal sympathy and support for the oppressed Kashmiri Muslims. The tribesmen had, indeed, been raring to strike a blow against the tyrannical Dogra regime in Kashmir.

In fact, the Frontier officials had orders to spare no effort to prevent *jihad*. "A word of encouragement to the waiting tribal *lashkars*," noted Governor Cunningham,⁴⁸ "and 50,000 men would have instantly marched to the Punjab". On 19 October, when the first news of the tribal march reached Peshawar, the Political Resident and others attempted to stem it. But the tribesmen had already crossed into the Punjab. "If in the last resort an effort had been made to apply extreme force and if Muslim Police and Constabulary could have been brought to shoot down Muslim tribesmen proceeding on *jihad*, the result would have been such an outburst that not one of the 50,000 or so Hindus and Sikhs still living in the Province would have survived."⁴⁹

Kashmiri Muslims in general, and those who had revolted against the Dogra regime in particular, had to face the combined might of the State army, the Sikh infiltrators from East Punjab, the Patiala State forces, and the Indian army.⁵⁰ In Poonch and Jammu, "over a lakh of Muslim men, women and children were killed in cold-blood and several lakhs were forced to leave their hearths and homes and seek refuge in Pakistan."⁵¹ The British High Commission reported that the State Government's plan to create a belt of devastation three miles deep on its side of the border with Pakistan seemed to have been implemented with brute force and violence.⁵² Terrible crimes, such as "murder, rape, arson and loot", were committed against the hapless unarmed people, "in a diabolical bid to liquidate the Muslim majority in Kashmir".⁵³

BILATERAL TALKS

In the aftermath of the events of 27 October, Jinnah proposed an immediate conference in Lahore, to be attended by the Governors-General and Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan as well as the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Prime Minister. The invitation to the conference, scheduled for 30 October, was accepted by India and Kashmir. Nehru, however, chose to abstain from the conference on the pretext of illness.⁵⁴

Following the meeting of Joint Defence Council at Lahore on 1 November, Mountbatten and Jinnah discussed the Kashmir imbroglio. Pakistan made the following proposals:

1. The two Governors-General issue a proclamation of cease-fire within 48 hours and get the Indian troops as well as the tribesmen to withdraw simultaneously from Kashmir.
2. The two Governors-General arrange for a plebiscite to be held under their joint control.⁵⁵

On 8 November 1947, while terming the Pakistan proposals as unacceptable, Nehru demanded that Pakistan pull back the "raiders" from Kashmir and offered to withdraw Indian troops soon thereafter. He also suggested a plebiscite, under the auspices of the UN, to clinch the issue of accession.⁵⁶

Jinnah had told Mountbatten on 1 November that "it was redundant... to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according to their majority population".⁵⁷ He rightly feared that "with the troops of the Indian dominion in military occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in power," the ordinary Muslim voter would not dare to vote for Pakistan".⁵⁸

The Nehru proposals of 8 November were rejected by Liaquat Ali Khan, suggesting that the whole dispute be brought instead before the United

Nations. He informed Nehru that Pakistan "was ready to request the UNO immediately... to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession".⁵⁹

In the meantime, the British Premier suggested that the International Court of Justice be requested to help resolve the dispute.⁶⁰ Liaquat Ali Khan, however, sought British support for the United Nations appointing an impartial administrator to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir.⁶¹

India continued to act upon the opportunistic and unscrupulous dictum, "the end justifies the means," rather than choosing the path of restraint and moderation. In a statement before the Indian Parliament on 25 November 1947, Nehru had no qualms about opting for confrontation with Pakistan, spilling the beans, as it were, as he articulated the casuistical Indian stance: "Kashmir and India have been bound together in many ways from ages past. These last few weeks have formed a new link which none can sunder".⁶² Later, India arbitrarily withheld Rs. 550 million payable to Pakistan, out of the cash balances of British India on the eve of the partition,⁶³ on the pretext that such funds might be used to intensify operations against India.

On 12 December 1947, Nehru informed Liaquat that India was "prepared to invite UNO observers to advise us as to the proposed plebiscite".⁶⁴ Liaquat replied that "Pakistan was interested in peaceful conditions for the people of Kashmir so that, freed from all pressure external or internal they might of their own free will decide to which Dominion they wish to accede".⁶⁵ But Nehru insisted that Pakistan⁶⁶ halt military operations from its territory against Kashmir and expressed India's desire for friendly relations with Pakistan.

Liaquat deplored the bitter Indian hostility towards Pakistan saying that Indian leaders had never reconciled themselves to the partition and wanted to undo Pakistan. He charged India with having forcibly seized Junagadh and other Kathiawar States, which had acceded to Pakistan, and secured the accession of Kashmir through fraud, intrigue and violence.⁶⁷

KASHMIR DISPUTE BEFORE THE U.N.

On 31 December 1947, India took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Indian Minister, represented his country, while Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister, appeared for Pakistan.

Ayyangar reasoned that Kashmir was of "vital importance to the security and international contacts" of India, charging Pakistan with economic blockade of the State, followed by armed raids into Kashmir

from the West Punjab."⁶⁸ Ayyangar accused Pakistan of aiding the "raiders", adding that the "situation in Kashmir grows graver every day... For 3 months thousands of tribesmen crossed Pakistan territory and continued to pour into Kashmir."⁶⁹

Zafrulla Khan retorted that Kashmir's accession to India was the sequel to the Maharaja's collaboration with India. The Maharaja organised mass killings of Muslims leading to their revolt against the monstrous tyranny of the Dogra despot. Zafrulla Khan reasoned that Pakistan could not acquiesce in the accession of Kashmir to India because India had encouraged the genocide of Muslims in Kashmir. Tens of thousands of Muslims had been massacred and many more maimed. Over 500,000 men, women and children had been driven from their homes. As for the plebiscite, he was of the view that, given the strong Indian military presence in Kashmir, it would be a farce, and urged the Security Council to appoint a Commission to arrange for cessation of fighting, repatriation of displaced Muslims, setting up an impartial administration, and then holding a free and fair plebiscite.⁷⁰

On 20 January 1948, the representatives of India and Pakistan agreed to the appointment of a U.N. Commission to mediate in the Kashmir dispute.⁷¹

On 25 February 1948, Mountbatten wrote to the King justifying Kashmir's accession to India. "From the strategic and economic point of view, ...while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India has considerable interest in Kashmir"⁷². He was of the view that "the accession of [Junagadh] to Pakistan was wholly frivolous while that of Kashmir to India is, at the very lowest, arguable."⁷³

It was, therefore, scarcely surprising that Mountbatten persuaded the King to believe that India had "put no pressure to bear on the Maharaja to cause him to accede"⁷⁴, while there was overwhelming evidence that India had dragooned the Maharaja into accession.

On 21 April 1948, the Security Council directed the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to proceed to the Indian subcontinent to facilitate the restoration of peace and recommend steps for holding a plebiscite.⁷⁵

The Governments of India and Pakistan notified the UN that while they were ready to assist the Commission, they could not commit themselves to accepting its specific recommendations. India opposed the recommendation of the Security Council for withdrawal of the Indian troops, control of the State forces by the Plebiscite Administrator, and expansion of the Kashmir administration by inclusion of representatives of other parties.⁷⁶ Pakistan protested that neither the Resolution provided for an impartial administration in Kashmir during the

plebiscite, nor it envisaged complete withdrawal of the Indian troops. Liaquat also opposed the presence of Sheikh Abdullah at the helm of affairs in Kashmir, adding that Pakistan failed to see how a Government headed by such a man could "create conditions which will enable the people of Kashmir to express their will freely and without fear."⁷⁷

On 13 August 1948, the Commission called for a cease-fire at the earliest, besides conclusion of a truce agreement between India and Pakistan for simultaneous withdrawal of the forces of both countries. This was a necessary prelude to creating conditions for holding a plebiscite.⁷⁸

On 20 August 1948, Nehru accepted the U. N. proposals with conditions which were wholly unacceptable to Pakistan.⁷⁹

Pakistan also laid down their own conditions for accepting the Commission's proposals,⁸⁰ in particular the Indian commitment to the modalities for holding a plebiscite as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948.⁸¹ India in turn rejected these conditions. The Commission presented its report to the Security Council on 23 November 1948, admitting to its failure to secure an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir.⁸²

The Commission, however, noted that with no means of enforcement at its disposal, it had for the time being exhausted the possibilities of further negotiations between India and Pakistan, commenting: "The Security Council never contemplated... that the Commission... should deal with a situation involving military action between two Regular Armies."⁸³ It stressed that while India regarded Pakistan's military presence in Kashmir as an act of aggression and insisted on its termination before the negotiations could resume, Pakistan demanded withdrawal of Indian forces and participation of Azad Kashmir government in the negotiations for a cease-fire. As for a plebiscite, the Commission observed that no recommendations had been made because it wished to leave the way open for alternative solutions acceptable to both countries with the proviso that the will of the Kashmiri people would be ascertained and respected.

The Security Council instructed the Commission to continue seeking a solution to the dispute, urging both nations to cease military operations and do nothing that might scupper negotiations for a final settlement.⁸⁴

On 31 December 1948, India and Pakistan ordered a cease-fire. Later, on 5 January 1949, the Security Council adopted a resolution mandating a plebiscite to determine which Dominion the Kashmiris wished to accede to. The Security Council was to nominate a person of

international eminence to hold the plebiscite.⁸⁵

The U. N. Resolutions remain unimplemented to this day because of the Indian obduracy and the reluctance of the international community, influenced by the misleading and insidious Indian diplomatic and media propaganda campaign, to bring pressure to bear on that country for putting them into effect.

In 1989, the oppressed people of Kashmir rose in open revolt against the Indian occupation to wrest their fundamental right to self-determination from an intransigent India. Kashmir is occupied by well over 700,000 Indian troops, which have vainly tried, for some fifteen years now, to brutally suppress the indigenous struggle for freedom, which has already claimed close to 80,000 lives, with infinitely more maimed or rendered homeless. Indian state terrorism, however, not only continues unabated but has been stepped up. Tensions between India and Pakistan came precariously close to the flash-point in 2002. The Kashmir dispute holds the key to durable peace in South Asia as well as to socio-economic development for a more prosperous future for the peoples of both Pakistan and India.

Z. H. ZAIDI

Notes

STATES: LEGAL STATUS

- ¹The Indian Independence Act 1947, No. 164, *TP*, XII, 233-49.
- ²Cabinet Mission Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy, 12 May 1946, No. 2, Vol. VIII, 5-8.
- ³*Ibid.*
- ⁴Viceroy's Meeting with Members of the States Negotiating Committee, 3 June 1947, Enclosure to No. 3, Vol. VIII, 10.
- ⁵Resolution of the All India Congress Committee on the States, 15 June 1947, No. 7, para 7, Vol. VIII, 29.
- ⁶The *Pakistan Times*, 18 June 1947, No. 8, Vol. VIII, 31.
- ⁷See note 5, para 5.
- ⁸*Memorandum on the Case of Hyderabad for U. N* [undated August] 1948, para 50, FOA, F. 1(I) 7/9/52.
- ⁹Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel, 27 September 1947, KR-369, para 6
- ¹⁰Louis Mountbatten to King George VI, 25 February 1948, Enclosure to KR-479, para 38 (a).
- ¹¹Report by Pakistan High Commission, London to Foreign Office Karachi, 7 July 1948, H-317.

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HYDERABAD STATE

- ¹Cabinet Mission's Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy, 12 May 1946, No. 2, Vol. VIII, 5-8.
- ²The argument for independence was as convincing in July 1947 as a year later when Winston Churchill asked his Parliament during a debate on Hyderabad State: "If Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Austria could exist as independent," even as landlocked entities, "why not Hyderabad." See Report of Pakistan High Commission, London to Foreign Office, 7 July 1948, H-317. In August 1948 *White Paper on Hyderabad State*, India retorted: "To compare Hyderabad to Switzerland or Austria ... is to turn one's back on elementary history and geography. Switzerland and Austria have common frontiers with more than one State and their politics and economy have developed on a different basis." See *Keating's Contemporary Archives 1948-50*, Vol. VII, London, 9522.
- ³Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 8 August 1947, H-268.
- ⁴Memorandum by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, 12 September 1947. See No. 15, para 3, Vol. VIII, 47-51.
- ⁵Note by Nawab Ali Yavar Jung about an interview with M. A. Jinnah, 4 August 1947, H-267.
- ⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁸Note of Discussion by Louis Mountbatten with M. A. Jinnah, 1 November 1947, H-295.
- ⁹R. V. Brockman to V. P. Menon, 24 September 1947, F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed But when Mir Laik Ali offered to hold a plebiscite (on 7 June 1948) under the supervision of the U. N., the proposal was rejected by India. See *Memorandum on the case of Hyderabad*, paras 46-7, 27. Not printed.
- ¹⁰Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 26 September 1947, H-284.
- ¹¹The Committee included Mohammad Ahmed Said Khan Chhatari, Prime Minister, as leader, and Walter Monckton, Constitutional Adviser to Nizam, Ali Yavar Jung and S. Abdur Rahim as Members. See H-261.
- ¹²For detailed terms of reference and programme, see Annex II to No. 19, Vol. IV, 46.
- ¹³Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India on Hyderabad, 25 July 1947, H-261, para 2.
- ¹⁴Note by Louis Mountbatten of an interview with Walter Monckton and Nawab of Chhatari, 10 September 1947, H-278.
- ¹⁵*White Paper on Hyderabad*, issued by India on 1 September 1948. FOA, IB-2/3/48. No. 7, 6.

¹⁶Ibid., No. 8, 7.

¹⁷Note by Louis Mountbatten on meeting with Walter Monckton, Sultan Ahmed and V.P. Menon, 3 October 1947, H-286.

¹⁸Note by Louis Mountbatten of an interview with Sultan Ahmed, 31 October 1947, H-294.

¹⁹Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, Telegram, 30 October 1947, H-290.

²⁰Note by Erskine Crum on Mountbatten's Interview with Moin Nawaz Jung, 31 October 1947, H-293.

²¹Louis Mountbatten to Walter Monckton, 29 November 1947, H-301. Also see H-302.

²²Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 29 November 1947, H-302.

²³Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad, 29 November 1947, H-303. In the same communication Mountbatten offered the Nizam the following concessions: negotiations on devolution of posts, telegraphs and telephone, besides future strength of State forces; Indian assistance for the State's foreign trade; withdrawal of Indian troops by end of February 1948; and acceding to Nizam's request in regard to currency and coinage.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵See Additional Secretary, Ministry of States to Zain Yar Jung, 28 January 1948, *White Paper on Hyderabad*, No. 20, 17. Also see *Memorandum On the Case of Hyderabad*. Not printed

²⁶Mir Laik Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru, 5 April 1948, H-307.

²⁷Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 5 April 1948, H-308, para 6.

²⁸Ibid., para 10.

²⁹*Memorandum on the Case of Hyderabad*, para 42, 26.

³⁰Ibid., para 46, 27.

³¹Ibid., para 47, 27.

³²Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad, 15 June 1948, H-313.

³³Press Interview by Jawaharlal Nehru, S. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* (second series), Vol. VI, New Delhi, 1987, 236.

³⁴Roy E. B. Bower to George Marshall, 10 November 1947, Annex to H-294.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Main Points of Qasim Rizvi's Speech, 27 October 1947, Enclosure to H-294.

³⁸See note 18 above.

³⁹V. P. Menon to Mir Laik Ali, 15 May 1948, H-311.

⁴⁰Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 6 September 1947, H-276.

⁴¹Note of Discussion by Louis Mountbatten with M. A. Jinnah, 1 November 1947, H-295.

⁴²Press Note by Governor-General's Camp Office, Quetta, 1 June 1948, H-312

⁴³*Memorandum on the Case of Hyderabad*, para 40, 25.

⁴⁴Ibid., 28.

⁴⁵Note by Jawaharlal Nehru to Ministry of States, 20-21 June 1948, H-316, note 3.

⁴⁶*Memorandum on the Case of Hyderabad*, para 48, 27.

⁴⁷*Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1948-50*, VII, 9523.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., 9524.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Record of Louis Mountbatten's Interview with Sultan Ahmed and V. P. Menon, 1 October 1947. H-285.

⁵³*White Paper on Hyderabad*, No. 24, 27.

⁵⁴Statement by British Government on Indian Policy, 20 February 1947. See No. 1, Vol. I, Part I, 3.

⁵⁵See note 53 above.

⁵⁶Extract from a letter from Hyderabad, 13 September 1947, Enclosure to H 280

⁵⁷R. E. B. Bower to George Marshall, 23 August 1947, see Annexure to Annex to H-270.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE

- ¹Minutes of Viceroy's Meeting with Congress and Muslim League Leaders, 13 June 1947, No. 5, Vol. VIII, 15.
- ²The *Pakistan Times*, 24 July 1947, KR-336.
- ³Shoukat Ali to K. H. Khurshid, 23 February 1947, Enclosure to KR-318.
- ⁴Editorial, *The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1946, Appendix I. 39.
- ⁵Summary of Agha Shaukat Ali's talk with AIML Committee of Action, 13 October 1946, Enclosure to Appendix I. 36.
- ⁶Note by All-Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference, 25 August 1947, Enclosure to KR-355
- ⁷Ibid
- ⁸Text of Interview given by M. A. Jinnah to Robert Stimson, B.B.C. Correspondent, 16 December 1947, Annex to No. 281, Vol. VI, 471.
- ⁹Archibald Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, 5 February 1946, Appendix XII. 50, Vol. I, Part II, 562.
- ¹⁰V.P Menon to C P Scott, 17 July 1947, Appendix VII. 10, Vol. III, 978-9.
- ¹¹In order to ensure that the truth about manipulation made in the Boundary Commission Awards of 1947, might never come to light, Radcliffe had destroyed his papers. His reason for doing so, however, manifested itself in the reply to a question by Prof. Z. H. Zaidi at a London seminar in 1967 that he did it in order "to keep the validity of the Award." See Radcliffe's reply to question by Z. H. Zaidi, quoted in Victoria Schofield, *India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, London, 2000, 38. Also see Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, London, 1994, 96.
- ¹²Annex I to No. 30, Vol. V, 37-42.
- ¹³Jawaharlal Nehru's Note on Kashmir, 17 June 1947, Enclosure to KR-324.
- ¹⁴Vallabhbhai Patel to Maharaja of Kashmir, 3 July 1947, KR-327.
- ¹⁵Ramadhar to Vallabhbhai Patel, 14 July 1947, KR-334.
- ¹⁶Charles W. Lewis to George Marshall, 27 October 1947, Annex II to KR-407.
- ¹⁷Jawaharlal Nehru to Maharaja of Kashmir, 12 December 1947, See S. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. IV, New Delhi, 1987, 373.
- ¹⁸Arthur Lewis to George Marshall, 29 October 1947, *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/10-2947. Not printed.
- ¹⁹M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh, 15 August 1947, KR-346.
- ²⁰M. A. Said Ansari to M. A. Jinnah, 1 October 1947, KR-372.
- ²¹Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel, 27 September 1947, KR-369.
- ²²Dwarkanath to Jawaharlal Nehru, 4 October 1947, Annexure to Enclosure to KR-380.
- ²³The *Dawn*, in an editorial, criticized Sh. Abdullah for this unholy bargain and asked him if he "would like to be remembered in history as Mir Jaffar who sold away four million Muslims of the State for a mess of pottage." See the *Dawn*, 19 October 1947, Annex III to KR-388.
- ²⁴See note 22 above.
- ²⁵M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh, Telegram, 12 October 1947, KR-384.
- ²⁶The exit of R. C. Kak, Prime Minister, was contrived by one Swami Santdev, "properly tutored at New Delhi " See J. L. K. Jalali to Sardar Sampuran Singh, Deputy High Commissioner of India, Lahore, 18 January 1948. F. 19-111 (4)/PMS Not printed.
- ²⁷M. C. Mahajan to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, 18 October 1947, KR-391
- ²⁸M. C. Mahajan to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, 15 October 1947, Enclosure to KR-389
- ²⁹M. Ikramullah to M. A. Hasan Ispahani, Telegram, 19 November 1947, KR-448.
- ³⁰Liaquat Ali Khan to M. C. Mahajan, 18 October 1947. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed
- ³¹M. A. Jinnah to Maharaja of Kashmir, Telegram, 20 October 1947, KR-394.
- ³²See note 29 above
- ³³R. D. Gatewood to George Marshall, 4 November 1947, *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/11-447. Not printed.
- ³⁴See note 29 above.
- ³⁵Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990*, Karachi, 1992, 123

- ³⁶See note 29 above.
- ³⁷See note 21 above.
- ³⁸The *Civil and Military Gazette*, 31 October 1947, Annex I to KR-416
- ³⁹Ibid. Also see U. S. Embassy, Karachi report of 4 November to the Department of state which said: There were "little legal grounds for such an announcement, as the consent of the Pakistan Government was not required to make such an accession binding on any other Government... The Government of India took the same view of the accession to Pakistan of Junagadh in Kathiawar." The report added. "The Pakistan Government will obviously champion the cause of the Kashmiris who have been attacked and killed by Dogra troops, in somewhat the same way as the Indian Government has been attempting to protect the Indians in South Africa." See *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/11-447. Not printed.
- ⁴⁰Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 November 1947, KR-427.
- ⁴¹Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, 150.
- ⁴²Note of a talk with Liaquat Ali Khan, 1 November 1947, Enclosure 1 to KR-427.
- ⁴³Ibid.
- ⁴⁴Henry Grady to George Marshall, 14 November 1947. See *US National Archives*, F. 745.00, 11-1447 Not printed. The *Dawn* also termed the allegation of Jinnah's involvement in the tribal incursion as "absurd". It warned that if atrocities against the Kashmiri Muslims continued, "neither the Government nor the people of Pakistan can remain idle spectators." See editorial, the *Dawn*, 23 October 1947.
- ⁴⁵Paul H. Alling's interview with M. A. Jinnah, 22 March 1948, KR-481
- ⁴⁶Ibid.
- ⁴⁷Government of Punjab, *Intelligence Reports Concerning Tribal Repercussions to the Events in the Punjab, Kashmir and India*, Lahore, 1948, 3.
- ⁴⁸Ibid. In fact, tribal *Jirgas* complained to the N.W.F.P. Governor, early in November 1947, that they had been prevented from joining the holy war.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., 4.
- ⁵⁰Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan to Liaquat Ali Khan, 23 November 1947, KR-456.
- ⁵¹Ibid.
- ⁵²C. B. Duke to Grafftey-Smith, 3 November 1947, KR-431.
- ⁵³See note 29 above.
- ⁵⁴Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee, Telegram, 30 October 1947, note 2, KR-420.
- ⁵⁵Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee, Telegram, 4 November 1947, KR-432.
- ⁵⁶Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, Telegram, 8 November 1947, KR-441.
- ⁵⁷Note of a Discussion with Jinnah in the presence of Lord Ismay at Government House, , November 1947, Enclosure 2, para 3, KR-427.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., para 37.
- ⁵⁹Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Telegram, 16 November 1947, KR-446.
- ⁶⁰Clement Attlee to Liaquat Ali Khan, Telegram, 22 November 1947, KR-455
- ⁶¹Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee, Telegram, 24 November 1947, KR-457
- ⁶²Statement by Jawaharlal Nehru in Indian Parliament, 25 November 1947, KR-458
- ⁶³Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, 5 January 1948, KR-478.
- ⁶⁴Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, 12 December 1947, KR-469.
- ⁶⁵Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Telegram, 16 December 1947, KR-470.
- ⁶⁶Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, 22 December 1947, KR 472
- ⁶⁷Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 December 1947, KR-475.
- ⁶⁸See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1948 50, VII, 9662. Also see Report of Security Council on Jammu and Kashmir Question, KR-484.
- ⁶⁹See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, VII, 9662.
- ⁷⁰Ibid.
- ⁷¹Report of Security Council on Jammu and Kashmir Question, item 5, KR-484.
- ⁷²Louis Mountbatten to King George VI, 26 February 1948, Enclosure to KR-479.
- ⁷³Ibid
- ⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵See note 71, Annex III.

⁷⁶See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1948-50*, VII, 9663. Also see S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, VI, 166-71.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 9663.

⁷⁸See Annexures I-IV to Annex VII, and Annexures I-V to Annex VIII, KR-484.

⁷⁹Jawaharlal Nehru to Josef Korbel, 20 August 1948, Annexure I to Annex VII to KR-484.

⁸⁰M. Zafrulla Khan to Josef Korbel, 6 September 1948, Annexure III to Annex VIII to KR-484.

⁸¹Security Council Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948 [S/726]. Annex III to KR-484.

⁸²See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, VII, 9665.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 9666.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---------------------------------------|
| ADC | Aide-de-Camp |
| AICC | All-India Congress Committee |
| AISA | All-India Spinners' Association |
| API | Associated Press of India |
| ASP | Assistant Superintendent of Police |
| BOAC | British Overseas Airlines Corporation |
| CA | Constituent Assembly |
| C-in-C | Commander-in-Chief |
| CID | Criminal Investigation Department |
| CP | Central Provinces |
| DGP | Director General Posts |
| FOA | <i>Foreign Office Archives</i> |
| GOI | Government of India |
| GOP | Government of Pakistan |
| HE | His Excellency |
| HEH | His Exalted Highness |
| HH | His Highness |
| HM | His Majesty |
| HMG | His Majesty Government |
| IGP | Inspector General of Police |
| INA | Indian National Army |
| IOR | <i>India Office Records</i> |
| JDC | Joint Defence Council |
| MC | Muslim Conference |
| MLA | Member Legislative Assembly |
| NC | National Conference |
| PA | Personal Assistant |
| PS | Private Secretary |
| P&T | Post & Telegraph |
| PMG | Post Master General |
| PWD | Public Works Department |
| QMG | Quarter Master General |
| RAF | Royal Air Force |
| RB | Rai Bahadur |
| RI | Royal Indian |
| RIAF | Royal Indian Air Force |
| RSS[S] | Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh |
| SHC | <i>Shamsul Hasan Collections</i> |
| TP | <i>Transfer of Power 1942-47</i> |

Chronology of Important Events
11 June 1947 to 19 September 1948

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| 1947 | A: HYDERABAD |
| June 11 | The Nizam decides to stand out of either Dominion, holding that the lapse of British Paramountcy on 15 August 1947 would leave him free to opt for independence. |
| July 25 | The Hyderabad Negotiating Committee opens negotiations with Mountbatten on the basis of treaty relationship, rather than accession to or a standstill agreement with one or the other Dominion. |
| August 11 | The Negotiating Committee meets Mountbatten amid misgivings about the future, India demanding accession or at least a standstill agreement. No progress made. |
| 21 | The Nizam announces his intent to introduce political reforms from October next to provide for greater public participation in the State Executive Council. |
| September 10 | The Nizam's Negotiating Team proposes a special standstill agreement since accession to India was not acceptable to him. |
| October 1 | <p>The Negotiating Committee reiterates that Hyderabad would not accede to India but would consider entering into some agreement embracing External Affairs, Defence and Communications with certain assurances.</p> <p>India, on the other hand, offers a new Instrument of Accession with such concessions as (i) relieving the State of the obligation to leave the Commonwealth if India did so; (ii) joint development of a port in the Indian territory for special use of Hyderabad; (iii) recognition of the Nizam's sovereignty over Berar; and any other points which the Nizam might press for.</p> |
| 20 | Counter-proposals for a comprehensive standstill agreement are made by the Nizam following rejection by him of the recommendations of the negotiators for drafting Heads of Agreement. |

- 22-25 The State Executive Council holds a 3-day session to consider the draft agreement finalized after talks with India. When placed before the Nizam for final approval, he refuses to endorse it.
- 26 The *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, a leading Muslim political organisation in the State, announces launching a movement for complete independence, organizing a strong demonstration against the proposed agreement as well as the members of the Negotiating Committee itself.
- 30 The Nizam dissolves the Negotiating Committee and appoints a new one headed by Moin Nawaz Jung.
- November
5 The new Committee, in a bid to revive the stalled negotiation, offers to consider the Indian draft of standstill agreement subject to certain amendments in its accompanying collateral letter. The offer is rejected by India and the Nizam warned to sign the standstill agreement without delay.
- 29 Hyderabad signs a standstill agreement valid for one year, the salient features being:
 (i) Until new arrangements are made, India to take over responsibility for External Affairs, Defence and Communications.
 (ii) India to station its troops in Hyderabad to help law and order.
 (iii) Both India and Hyderabad to appoint their Agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively.
 (iv) Any dispute relating to the agreement to be referred to arbitrators, one appointed by each party, and an umpire appointed by the arbitrators.
- 1948
January–May India tightens the noose around Hyderabad to dragoon it into accession and demands of the State to (i) refuse a loan of Rs. 20 crore to Pakistan; (ii) disband the *Razakar* organisation as it posed a threat to the adjoining Indian Provinces; (iii) revoke the ordinance which had made the circulation of Indian currency illegal; and (iv) resolve the issue of accession.

June

- 15 At the conclusion of negotiations, an agreed Heads of Agreement, a draft *Firman* for holding plebiscite, and certain assurances from India are placed before the Nizam for approval.
- 17 The proposals formulated by the Negotiating Committee and the Government of India on 15 June 1948 are rejected by Hyderabad and the negotiations collapse.
- 21 India starts bracing itself for eventual occupation of Hyderabad.

August

- 10 Indian Home Minister Sardar Patel declares in Parliament that an independent Hyderabad constituted a threat to the progress and prosperity of India and that accession to India was the only answer to the problem.
- 24 Hyderabad formally complains to the Security Council that it had been exposed to threat of aggression and a crippling economic blockade by India with a view to coercing it into accession. It requested the Secretary General, under Article 32 of the U.N. Charter, to consider the grave dispute between Hyderabad and India, which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, was likely to endanger international peace and security.

September

- 13 Indian Armed Forces invade Hyderabad, facing tough resistance for four days from the Nizam's Forces and the *Razakar* formations.
- 17 The State Forces surrender to India. The count-down to integration of Hyderabad into the Dominion of India begins.

B: Jammu & Kashmir State

- 1946
October
24 The Muslim Conference leadership court arrest in support of "Quit Kashmir Movement" of Sh. Mohammad Abdullah, much against the advice of M. A. Jinnah.
- 1947
March
11 Mohiuddin, an advocate of Kashmir, complains to Jinnah about the adverse impact of Muslim League policy of complete non-interference in the affairs of the states.
- July
3 Vallabhbhai Patel advises Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir that the interest of Kashmir lies in joining Indian Union.
- 14 Ramadhar, an emissary of Patel, sent to woo the Maharaja into joining India, reports that he would respond positively once the agitation against him was suspended and Gandhi paid a visit to Kashmir.
- 24 The Muslim Conference, the largest parliamentary party in the State Assembly formed after the elections in January 1947, passes a resolution to accede to Pakistan.
- August
15 Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir State sign the standstill agreement to maintain the *status quo* in matters concerning the economy, communications, and other areas of common interest between the State and Pakistan.
- 16 The Radcliffe Award gives three *Tehsils* of Gurdaspur, two of them having a Muslim majority, to India enabling that country to gain physical access to the key frontier region.
- 17 The State government requests India to approach Pakistan for transfer of control of posts & telegraph offices, telephone exchanges, and wireless stations in the State from Postmaster General, West Punjab, to his counterpart in the Indian East Punjab.

- 25 The All-Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference, Srinagar, invites Jinnah's attention to the negative fall-out of the Muslim League's policy of non-interference in the affairs of the States. The Conference points out that while Congress had continued to utilize all human, material and financial resources in furtherance of the cause of accession of Kashmir to India, Muslim League remained inert and disinterested in general, and indifferent towards the continuing detention of their leadership in particular.
- 27 Poonch Muslims demand accession of Kashmir to Pakistan at Nila But, Bagh *Tehsil*. The demand is turned down by the Maharaja and a reign of terror let loose against the so-called rebels.
- Undated
August Nasira Siddiqui, a Punjab Muslim League working Committee member, reports to Jinnah that the Muslim Conference, in the absence of their jailed leadership, has become a house divided and that unless they work in real earnest, all the State Muslims are doomed to a sell-out at the hands of a few selfish people.
- September
21 Patel offers full Indian support to the Maharaja on matters affecting the interests of Kashmir.
- 27 Jawaharlal Nehru conveys his deep concern to Patel over the Kashmir situation and advises him that accession of the State to the Indian Union be arranged as rapidly as possible.
- 30 Reports of military atrocities against the Muslim population of Poonch and the bordering areas of Jammu-Sialkot start pouring into Pakistan.
- October
1 Kashmir requests India for arms assistance to meet their immediate defence needs. A request for wireless equipment is also made for "conveying certain secret messages to Delhi in special code."
Patel informs the Maharaja that India was doing all it could to link up the State with the Indian Dominion by road, telegraph, telephone and wireless.

- 3 The State requests Indian Defence Minister for deployment of some Indian forces at Madhopur or nearer to the State frontiers for assistance when needed.
- 4 Nehru strikes a deal with Sh. Abdullah through his special emissary, Dwarkanath Kachru, Secretary, All-India States Peoples' Conference whereby Abdullah consents to join India on condition that he is appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir and the National Conference leaders, long detained, are released.
- 12 Armed bands of Sikhs and RSS gangs kill thousands of Kashmiri Muslims, abduct their women, and burn their villages with the help of the state troops in Poonch and Jammu and bordering areas with Pakistan.
- 15 The State Premier threatens to seek outside assistance if alleged "horrors" committed against non-Muslims in Poonch by Pakistan nationals are not probed.
- 18 Liaquat Ali Khan warns Kashmir Premier that the outside assistance is tantamount to the repression of Muslims to precipitate accession to India against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.
- 20 Jinnah terms the State Premier's threat of enlisting outside assistance as an ultimatum which showed that the real aim of the State Government was to accede to India. He counsels negotiations between Pakistan and Kashmir to resolve the issue of accession peacefully.
- 22 The Kashmiri freedom-fighters, aided by tribesmen, liberate Poonch and assume control of Muzaffarabad.
- 24 Kashmiri freedom fighters establish a government at Poonch with Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan as President.

R.L. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister, and Sh. Abdullah urge Delhi to rush both arms and men on the one hand and to negotiate a political settlement on the other.

- 25 The Maharaja abandons Srinagar and flees to Jammu, late in the night.
- 26 At a meeting in Delhi attended by Nehru, Patel, V.P. Menon, R.L. Batra and Sh. Abdullah, M.C. Mahajan presses for Indian military assistance, including troops, while threatening to settle terms of accession to Pakistan. Nehru immediately agrees to Sh. Abdullah heading the state administration and proclaiming accession to India.
Orders for movement of Indian troops to Kashmir are issued at 1300 hours.
Around 100 Dakota transport aircraft are assembled at various air fields around Delhi, signalling advanced preparations for military action.
- 27 Mahajan, Batra and Menon travel to Jammu and return the same day after getting the Maharaja's signature on a letter requesting accession to India, addressed to Mountbatten.
These papers, though actually signed on 27 October 1947, are backdated to 26 October 1947. The letter to Mountbatten confirms association of Sh. Abdullah with the interim state administration.
Indian troops land at Srinagar airport early in the morning even before the Mahajan-Menon team had actually contacted the Maharaja at Jammu.
Mountbatten informs Maharaja that India had accepted the accession provisionally and that the question would finally be settled through a plebiscite in the State. Mahajan conveys his deep sense of gratitude to Patel for extending military assistance and accepting Kashmir's accession to India.
Britain is informed by India of their intervention in Kashmir as a result, ostensibly, of the situation there, which constituted a "threat of international implications".
- 29 Pakistan informs Britain that Kashmir's accession to India, brought about as it had been by fraud and violence, could not be recognized.
- 30 Liaquat Ali Khan says the accession was engineered by fraud and violence, and was contrary to all canons of justice and fair play.
A summit meeting at Lahore, scheduled for 30 October 1947, proposed by the British Prime Minister and to be attended by the

Governors-General and Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, is aborted by Nehru, officially on the pretext that he was ill.

November

- 1 At a meeting in Lahore with Mountbatten, Jinnah makes the following suggestions:
1. To put an end to hostilities in Kashmir, the two Governors-Generals would be empowered by their respective Dominions to issue a cease-fire proclamation within forty-eight hours. Jinnah would warn the tribesmen to cease fire immediately or else the forces of both Dominions would make war on them;
 2. The Indian forces as well as the tribesmen would withdraw simultaneously from Kashmir;
 3. The two Governors-General would be empowered also to restore peace, undertake the administration of the State, and arrange for a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision.
- 8 India agrees to withdraw troops from Kashmir as soon as the tribesmen had withdrawn and order been restored, provided that Pakistan undertakes publicly to compel the tribesmen to withdraw. India suggests that both governments jointly request the U.N. to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir as soon as possible.
- 16 Pakistan informs India of its willingness to request the U.N. to appoint a representative in Kashmir to put an end to fighting and repression of Muslims, arrange withdrawal of outside forces, set up an impartial administration till a plebiscite is held for ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession.
- 25 Speaking in Parliament, Nehru declares that Kashmir and India were bound together in many ways from time immemorial and that no one could tear apart the new link forged by the accession.
- ## December
- 8 Inconclusive talks are held at Delhi, India deciding that further direct talks with Pakistan were pointless.
- 31 India takes the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations with a raft of allegations against Pakistan, requesting the Security

- Council to prevent Pakistan from assisting and participating in the invasion of Kashmir and to deny the tribesmen access to and use of territory for operations in Kashmir.
- 1948
January
5
- India arbitrarily withholds Rs. 550 million from Pakistan out of the latter's share of British India's cash balances on the pretext that such funds might be used to intensify operations in Kashmir against India.
- 15-16
- The Security Council takes up the Kashmir dispute for consideration. The Indian allegations are effectively refuted by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, who invites the Council to appoint a commission to arrange for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of outside forces, repatriation and rehabilitation of the displaced Kashmiris, an impartial state administration, and a free and fair plebiscite.
- 20
- The Security Council appoints a 5-member Commission to attempt mediation, investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the U.N. Charter, and report to the Council.
- February
26
- Mountbatten presents an aide-memoire to the King of England on India's policy and actions in Junagadh and Kashmir. He reasons that from the strategic and economic standpoints while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India had real interest in Kashmir that the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was, at best, frivolous while that of Kashmir to India was, at worst, arguable.
- March
5
- Sheikh Abdullah takes over as head of Interim Government of Jammu & Kashmir, replacing M.C. Mahajan.
- April
21
- Security Council adopts a resolution directing the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan to proceed to the subcontinent at once to facilitate restoration of peace and recommend steps for holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.

August

13 The U.N. Commission adopts a resolution embracing proposals for (a) cease-fire orders for the fighting forces in Kashmir, (b) a truce agreement between India and Pakistan, and (c) determination of the future of Jammu & Kashmir, to serve as a basis for agreement between the two contending parties.

19 Pakistan communicates its response to the Commission's proposals, after discussions with its Chairman, on 14 August. Clarification and elucidation of certain points emerging from exchange of notes between the Commission and Pakistan are issued during 2-6 September.

20 India replies to U.N. Commission's proposals, of 13 August, followed by discussion between its Chairman and Indian leaders, on 17-18 August.

November

23 The U.N. Commission submits its report to the Security Council in line with the Council resolution of 21 April. The Report concludes that while India had accepted its resolution of 13 August 1948 as a whole, Pakistan had made its acceptance conditional to certain conditions being met, which went beyond the scope of the resolution. This precluded an immediate cease-fire as well as subsequent negotiations to bring about a peaceful and final settlement in Kashmir.

25 The Council directs the Commission to continue its efforts at resolving the Kashmir dispute, appealing to India and Pakistan to cease military operations and create conditions conducive to negotiations for a final settlement.

1949

January

1 Cease-fire orders are issued by India and Pakistan in anticipation of a resolution by the U.N. Commission to that effect. The resolution, released on 5 January, states that the question of accession is to be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite and that all Kashmiris who had left the State on account of disturbances should be permitted to return. Further, to facilitate their repatriation, two commissions should be appointed, one comprising nominees of India and the other those of Pakistan. The U.N. should nominate a Plebiscite Administrator to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir in collaboration with the governments of India and Pakistan.

HYDERABAD STATE

H-252¹*Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar² to M. A. Jinnah**F. 696/118*

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
12 May 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

I want to take your opinion as to my joining the Constituent Assembly³ and what attitude I should adopt as to my sovereignty over Berar when the British Government leaves India in June 1948. As regards my State, joining any Unit in British India is out of the question; this is the opinion of the Muslims of the Deccan, as they think doing that will mean giving up Hyderabad's independent position which cannot be let go under any circumstances—an opinion with which I entirely agree.

2. I trust you will give me your friendly and frank advice as regards these matters as soon as possible. Monckton⁴ will see you in Delhi next week, where he is going on State business and will have a talk with you regarding this problem.⁵

3. I may add that I intend to announce my independence the day the British leave the shore[s] of India. What do you think of this step, since Travancore has already done it, though it cannot be compared with Hyderabad in any way?

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN¹Documents No 1 to 251 have been included in Vol. VIII.²Hereafter referred to as Nizam of Hyderabad.³In a *Firman* issued on 11 June, 1947, the Nizam declared that he had decided not to send representatives to either of the Constituent Assemblies. See Enclosure to H-256⁴Walter Monckton, Constitutional Adviser to Nizam of Hyderabad.⁵Jinnah acknowledged the letter, delivered to him by a special messenger on 13 May, 1947 and promised a further communication on the subject after the proposed meeting with Monckton. See F. 696/117, QAP. Not printed. Also see H-253.

H-253

*M. A. Jinnah to Nizam of Hyderabad**F. 395/10*

6 June 1947

Your Exalted Highness,

In continuation of my letter dated 23rd May,¹ I beg to inform you

that I have had a talk with Monckton on 4th June and he will tell you everything. We discussed tentatively all the points and I think that when I meet you personally we may further discuss these points, and [sic for as] it is very difficult to explain matters in correspondence.

I hope I shall be able to meet you very soon, and I am looking forward to see[ing] you.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH

¹Jinnah had, in this letter, promised to see Walter Monckton. He also thanked the Nizam for the invitation to visit Hyderabad, the date of which was to be fixed later on. See F 696, 113, QAP. Not printed.

H-254

Walter Monckton to H. L. Ismay¹

PRIVATE

GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
9 June 1947

My dear Pug,

I am worried about the way the States are being handled. There is considerable resentment among the Muslims here and, although the Hindus are in a great majority, there are more than 1/2 million Muslims in the city and more than 2 million in the State—they have the dynasty, the administration, the army and the tradition of 200 years' rule plus the treaties. I have tried in the accompanying note to summarize in an orderly and less vehement manner what they say and feel. I am bound to say, I think there's a good deal in it and I should like to be sure that the points are considered even if they have to be rejected. Can you ensure this and also have the document treated as entirely confidential? The reason is that, in my view, our most important, immediate negotiations (however little we like it) must be with Hindustan and H.E.H. genuinely intends them to be real and effective. They would be ruined in advance if this document were disclosed to Congress.

I think the main issues raised by the Note are short and could be discussed when I return to Delhi with Chhatari² in the near future. I am desperately anxious to avoid a political conflict in all this with H.M.G. and above all with H.E. whom I want wholeheartedly to help. But if nothing can be done, I shall, in a short time, be compelled by pressure here to raise the hypothetical question about relations with the British Government which H.E. indicated³ he would refer to H.M.G.

and go back and pursue the matter in London. But I honestly loathe the idea of ventilating our grievance through political channels and I think reference home would inevitably lead to that.

It is being difficult to avoid a declaration of independence but I think we shall hold the folks here to an announcement very much on the lines I showed you about the C.A only, and that probably on Wednesday. Jinnah and H.H. of Bhopal will be disappointed and annoyed.

I don't want to have to go to England because I think I am needed here—that may be a false sense of one's own importance, which is easily engendered. But I do believe I know my Nizam better than the others and he trusts me. And he will have to make up his mind quickly and often in the next 3 months.

Life's not being easy—for me anymore than for you!

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

¹No. 112, TP, XI, 214-5.

²Nawab Muhammad Ahmed Said Khan Chhatari, President, Executive Council of the Nizam of Hyderabad, 1941-6, 1947.

³On 3 June Mountbatten stated in his meeting with the States Negotiating Committee that no alteration had been made in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May 1946 as a result of his negotiations with Indian leaders but he admitted that "the outcome of these negotiations could but have a certain effect on the position of the States". See Enclosure to No 27, Vol. II, 66. Answering a question at a Press Conference on 4 June, Mountbatten said. "States are free agents to enter either Constituent Assembly or make such other arrangements as they deem necessary" He further observed that the States could not enter the Commonwealth as Dominions. See No. 60, TP, XI, 116.

Enclosure to H-254

NOTE ON THE POSITION OF HYDERABAD¹

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1947

In the chorus of well-merited approval which H.M.G's present efforts in India are receiving, there is a danger that the way in which some of the major States, and in particular Hyderabad, are being treated, will be overlooked. Success in handling British India has been triumphant up to now and the triumph is quite certainly a personal triumph for H.E. But this means that his personal views, interests and sympathies assume a first class importance. Naturally, his main interest has been concentrated hitherto on British India.

He has on all subjects (including those principally affecting the States) been in full and constant consultation with Mr Nehru and his

associates. But until after his recent announcement of 3 June² he had not been in similar consultation with representatives of Hyderabad or indeed the other major States on the points in the announcement specially affecting their future. The States are regarded by the British Indian leaders, whom he has mainly consulted, as an inconvenient and anachronistic heritage to be pressed or cajoled, whether they wish it or not, into the pattern which British India has chosen—a pattern which no one would regard as ideal for themselves, much less for any one else.

But the States cannot in fairness be so regarded. They represent more than 1/3 of India in area and more than a fourth in population. They have a culture and tradition of their own. In many cases and in many ways their administration compares favourably with British India. It is interesting that in spite of grave shortages in, e.g. Mysore, the food famine in Bengal, with its appalling consequences, found no parallel in the Indian States. I have known many of the States [for] long and Hyderabad in particular well for many years. I honestly believe that, if fairly treated, they have sounder hope of survival than the brittle political structure of the Congress party after they have attained independence. There is a real, personal loyalty to the Ruler even if of a different faith and even if sometimes he does not wholly deserve it. This is a point of stability which in part accounts for the fact that there has been less acute communal division so far in Indian, than in British, India: though the poison is gradually seeping in from British India. How little bloodshed there has been in the States. Contrast the Punjab, Bihar and Bengal. It is perfectly true that it is high time that the people were more actively associated in Government, but there is a great deal of nonsense talked about this. In local administration, in *Panchayats*, in the villages the people are associated in administration now. It is ridiculous to assume that it is automatically wise and expedient to introduce into the States, Western ideas of responsible government on the British model. What sort of democracy on these standards exists in British India? I suppose not more than 6 or 7 per cent of the population is represented in the Legislature of Bengal.

Let me now consider the case of the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar. Hyderabad has more inhabitants than any British Dominion, including Canada; in area it roughly approximates to France. It has been the Faithful Ally of the British Government for more than a century. In the two world wars the Nizam at critical moments proclaimed and proved his loyalty to the British, when Congress took a very different line.

He is now being told that he cannot have dominion status and that

he can only have relations with the British through one or other of the proposed new Dominions. Moreover he is in effect being urged on geographical grounds to join Hindustan. No sort of opportunity for discussion was afforded to him before these decisions were taken and made public, though at no stage was any step taken without full prior discussion with Congress who (as everybody knows) are urging the Viceroy to press Hyderabad into Hindustan whether the Nizam wishes it or not.

The dynasty, a Muslim one with a predominantly Hindu population, would in my judgment commit suicide by joining Hindustan. Congress leaders have repeatedly said that the days of the Princes are numbered, though they are cynically postponing the day of execution. Some of them individually have told me in the recent past that there will soon be a day of reckoning for H.E.H.

The treaties, which entitle Hyderabad to call upon the British Crown for effective defence of the State and dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder, are indisputable. They were made more than a hundred years ago, but have been reaffirmed as "inviolable and inviolable", times without number, during recent years. In 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps,³ and in 1943 Lord Wavell⁴ each solemnly reaffirmed the sanctity of the treaties. Hyderabad was thus taught to rely upon British arms and the British word. Moreover, she was prevented, and still is, from raising an army adequate to protect herself in the event of the withdrawal of the British troops. She was equally prevented from making provision for the arms and equipment without which such an army is valueless. She has, moreover, been compelled to keep her industrial development within the limits prescribed by the Central Government.

Hyderabad is being told, in common with the other Princes, that Paramountcy will go with the British and will not be inherited by the successor Government or Governments. But, with the limited military resources to which she has been restricted and with access denied to H.M.G., and probably with large Indian Army contingents within her dominions against her will, Hyderabad is being left to her own resources. She is, in effect, driven to accept the fact that, though Paramountcy technically and *de jure* goes, all the rights of interference, direct or indirect, hitherto associated with Paramountcy will remain in the hands of one or the other of the new Dominion Governments.

You will have noticed how eager Congress are to make sure that they can (if they wish) get out of the British Commonwealth and, if possible, drag Pakistan out with them. The policy of the Nizam has always been and still is to retain and increase the ties which bind him

to the British. Can you be surprised if, in these circumstances, he cannot bring himself to trust in Hindustan for his future, for they have proved themselves no friends of his or ours? He asks: Am I really to be kicked out of the British family without discussion? Will you really just denounce the treaties, refuse me political and economic arrangements with H.M.G. and otherwise leave me to my fate?

I think this rather a shameful performance. How ready we are to appease our enemies at the expense of our friends. Is it because the latter have no nuisance value?

WALTER MONCKTON

¹Enclosure to No. 112, TP, XI, 215-7.

²See No. 1, Vol. II, 1.

³Cripps had committed HMG on 2 April 1942 to "provide for everything necessary to implement our treaty obligations to the non-adhering States". See Enclosure to No. 527, TP, I, 649.

⁴Refers to Secretary to Crown Representative's letter of 25 June 1943 to the Resident in Hyderabad. Linlithgow, not Wavell, was Crown Representative then. See No. 20, para 3, TP, IV, 34

H-255

*Walter Monckton to Louis Mountbatten*¹

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

H.E.H. THE NIZAM'S PALACE,
NEW DELHI,
14 June 1947

My dear Dickie,

In the hope that you will have time to see me on Tuesday, I am writing this letter to tell you how very troubled I am about the way in which my Hyderabad clients are being treated. I have made it plain to them that you told me that H.M.G. would not consider their entering the British Commonwealth of Nations as a dominion. This came as a disappointment to the Nizam but your statement at the Press Conference went much further and certainly gave the impression that no relations with H.M.G., even on economic questions, would be possible, save through one of the two new Dominions. You will remember the passage: "There can be no negotiations between H.M.G. and the States. We hand back Paramountcy and in the process we offer our services for enabling them to make the necessary contact with the Government of India and with the respective Constituent Assemblies to come together and make their agreement. But we (meaning H.M.G.) are not actually going to enter into fresh negotiations. We will come out of all commitments".² I cannot believe that you really intended to bar Hyderabad from all access to

H.M.G.³ If I am right in this, I wonder if you would consider making a *dementi* at the first convenient opportunity. Meantime, you can imagine that this statement, seized on, as it has been, by all the Hindu press, and never contradicted, has caused great indignation in Hyderabad. They point out to me that there was no prior consultation with them nor any opportunity for discussion before these decisions were announced publicly. They contrast this with what you said about British India, namely that you had made and announced no decision without full discussion with them beforehand. Moreover, your observations about geographical considerations⁴ appeared to the Nizam to mean that in your judgment he had no real choice: he must join the Hindustan Union. He feels that he will be kept in a very unsatisfactory state of suspense till the 15th August, or whatever date Paramountcy ceases, and will then be abandoned to his own resources. He asks me what reason he has to trust the Congress. At one moment, their leaders say that they will not exercise pressure on the States to join the Constituent Assembly: at the next, they let it be known that they will do what they can to create disorder in States which elect not to join. At one moment, they profess readiness to permit the Princes to remain, at another and in private conversations, they say that the days of the Nizam are numbered.

He points out that even a casual survey of the Hindu papers shows the eagerness with which they wish to make sure that they can get out of the British Commonwealth as soon as they want to, and their anger when they learn that they cannot drag Pakistan out with them.

The policy of the Nizam has always been, and still is, to retain and increase the ties which bind him to the British. (I need not remind you how strictly the treaties, solemnly repeated by Cripps and Wavell⁵ oblige the British to protect the State and the dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder, not how the State has been prevented right up till now from raising forces or procuring equipment adequate even for the maintenance of internal order, because they have been taught and compelled to rely on British arms and the British word). Can you be surprised if the Nizam cannot bring himself to trust in Hindustan for his future? He asks: Am I really to be kicked out of the British family without discussion? Will you really just denounce the treaties, refuse me any political and economic arrangements with H.M.G. and then leave me to my fate? Have I any assurance, if I do join them, that if they walk out of the British Commonwealth they will not be able to drag me with them?

I have written all this to you, because H.E.H. is pressing me to return at once to England, since action is urgent and he understands

you to have said that there is no more you can do to maintain for him a tie or even any direct access to H.M.G. I shall feel bound to go. That means that the one prospect I wanted to avoid cannot be avoided. I cannot give proper service to my clients (and I have never yet refused to give a hundred per cent service) without making my own protest to members of the Cabinet and seeing to it, by my own speeches and writings, and through my old colleagues, that, before it is too late, the British public at least understand that, however justifiable may be the ultimate end, they have treated, and are treating, their old friends and allies shamefully. I shall hate doing this, because I came out here with a wholehearted wish to help you and I know this will have the opposite effect. Moreover, I shall hate it because I think, if I had been able to stay, I could have helped to some extent by my friendship with Jinnah and, above all, because H.E.H. will be making decisions almost day by day in my absence and I firmly believe that if I could stay with him I might still have been able to guide him into a course of friendly co-operation with the Hindustan Union as well as with Pakistan. But I cannot stand by silently and see him automatically cut off from H.M.G. or allow him to drift until August when we practically walk out and leave him to his fate. My present plan is to return to England between 23rd and 30th June and I suppose that, if once I go away, it is very improbable I shall come back again. For I only just manage to hold the Nizam when I see him daily. The extreme Muslims, the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, are attacking me in the Press and in private and will undermine me if I am away three weeks.

Sorry to be a nuisance, but I don't want to go behind your back.

Yours ever,
WALTER MONCKTON

¹No. 199, TP, XI, 386-8.

²This particular answer is not included in the report of the Press Conference. See the *Times of India*, 5 June 1947.

³See Enclosure to H-254.

⁴Mountbatten was reported to have said that the States were at liberty to send their representatives to either Constituent Assembly and continued: "They were absolutely free to choose, but he supposed that geography would play a large part in their decisions." See the *Times of India*, 5 June 1947.

⁵See Enclosure to H-254, notes 3 and 4.

H-256

Nizam of Hyderabad to M. A. Jinnah

F. 696/125

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
14 June 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

I received your letter of 6th June.¹ Will you please inform me which date will suit you for your visit to Hyderabad, however short it may be, either by the end of this month or failing that, in the first week of July; as we must meet together to discuss certain things without further delay as fresh developments are constantly arising from day to day: so this is not the time to sit quiet and do nothing since our enemies are bent on making all kinds of mischief. So we must be ready to cope with the situation in a just and proper manner.

2. I enclose copy of my *Firman* issued recently for your perusal.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN¹H-253.*Enclosure to H-256*

F. 1263/1-2

*Firman*¹

11 June 1947

At the time when the Cabinet Mission issued the Statement of May 16, 1946,² the States were invited to join one representative Constituent Assembly for the whole of India. I thought it wise then to wait before making my decision till I saw how the political situation would develop. His Excellency the Viceroy's recent Announcement of 3rd June 1947³ makes it clear that in all probability British India will now be divided into two parts and there will accordingly be not one Constituent Assembly but two. I have now, therefore, to consider whether my State should send representatives to one or other of these Assemblies.

2. The basis of the division of British India is communal. In my State, however, the two major communities live side by side and I have sought, since I became Ruler, to promote by every means good and friendly relations between them. My ancestors and I have always

regarded the Muslims and the Hindus as two eyes of the State and the State itself to be the indivisible asset of all the communities inhabiting it. I am happy to say that there has not been in my State the same acute cleavage as has led to the recent events in British India. The subjects of my State have affinities and common interest with both the contemplated new Unions. By sending representatives to either of the Constituent Assemblies, Hyderabad would seem to be taking one side or the other.

I am sure I am consulting the best interests of my subjects by declining to take such a course. I have, therefore, decided not to send representatives to either of the Constituent Assemblies.

3. The result in law of the departure of the Paramount Power in the near future will be that I shall become entitled to resume the status of an independent Sovereign. But the question of the nature and extent of the association or relationship between my State and the units in British India remains for decision at a later stage, when their constitution and powers have been determined. Whatever form of constitution they ultimately adopt, it will be the desire of Hyderabad to live in the closest friendship and amity with both. Meantime, I and my Government will lose no opportunity of reaching, by active negotiation, working agreements on matters of common interest for the mutual benefit of all. When the time comes to decide on the nature of the State's association or relationship with the new Units, after they have settled their constitutions, I shall continue to be guided by a consideration of the best interests both of Hyderabad and of India as a whole.

4. The political and constitutional picture in India has, in the past few years, been changing rapidly and who can say whether the two Units now contemplated for British India represent the final solution, or whether there will be still further divisions, or whether, after all, unity may eventually be achieved by mutual agreement? In these rapid changes, I am satisfied that the course of political wisdom lies in not taking sides, in concentrating on the maintenance of the integrity of my dominions and in fostering the welfare of my people. The achievement of that object depends upon the continuance of mutual goodwill between the two communities in my State and, in the unsettled conditions all around, upon ensuring for all my subjects the benefits of peace and security.

5. Before making this declaration, I have taken into consideration the divergent views of local political opinion, and I feel confident that

the best solution is to follow the policy which I have adopted in this *Firman*.

¹In the 40th Staff meeting of 9 June, 1947, Mountbatten had directed the Residents in Hyderabad and Kashmir to ensure that the Rulers of these States did not make any public announcement, before he visited them, as their States were going to be independent and join neither Constituent Assembly. See F. 200/70-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

²See Appendix III, Vol. I, Part II, 32-44.

³See No. 2, Vol. II, 13.

H-257

Nizam of Hyderabad to M. A. Jinnah

F. 696/123

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
18 June 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

I am enclosing herewith a copy of Ali Yavar Jung's letter addressed to Kazim Yar Jung¹ regarding his recent visit to Delhi in connection with the State business, which speaks for itself. Also, Sir Walter Monckton gave me the gist of his talk with you in Delhi about State matters, where he had gone with other officers of mine. Still I should be grateful if you express your own views regarding the contents of the letter referred to above so that I may chalk out my programme accordingly, and trust you will reply in due course as time is pressing and fresh developments are coming up in quick succession.

2. I may add that Sir Mirza Ismail has retired from service and the Nawab of Chhatari has assumed the post of the President of the Council at least for a year to begin with. Since he has already rendered faithful service for a period of 5 years during the last war, he is not anxious to be in service for a longer period in view of his declining health and years.

3. Since you were busy with your important matters, I had deferred our meeting till some time in June, or failing that in July, for personally I considered that it was not advisable for you to come here at a time when our enemies (I mean the Hindus) were bent on making all kinds of mischief for this or that in order to gain their own ends; still we are ready to cope with any situation that may arise.

However, we must meet now without further delay as times are critical.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹*Sadrul Moham, Peshu Mubarak.*

Enclosure to H-257
Ali Yavar Jung to Kazim Yar Jung

F. 696/124

7 June 1947

My dear Kazim Yar Jung Bahadur,

With reference to your question which you put to me verbally today, the position as I understand it is as follows:

The Congress would like us to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly and of course also the Union. But they would not mind our not joining the Assembly while joining ultimately the Union in one of the three ways, namely, organically or as a federated State or by an agency agreement for the three Union subjects. Mr Jinnah was quite clear, on the other hand, that we should declare forthwith that we would not join either of the Constituent Assemblies and that we would stand out for independence.

2. As against the above, the Viceroy, while he would like us to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, appears to understand, perhaps even to appreciate, that we are likely immediately to announce our intention to stand out of the Constituent Assembly. As regards declaring independence, he was apprehensive of the dangers of isolation when the British go, and of the pressure, economic and political, from within and outside the State. He was for our not taking any definite stand on that issue except by way of opening negotiations with the Interim Government on matters of common concern. On the issue of dominion status, the present official attitude of H.M.G. was against the balkanisation of India or the recognition of more than two Dominions. However, if a State insisted on separate political or commercial relations, the question would have to be put to H.M.G.

Yours sincerely,
ALI YAVAR JUNG

H-258

*Walter Monckton to H. L. Ismay
Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-A*

[*Extract*]

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

LAKE VIEW HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
22 June 1947

My dear Pug,

I am by no means at the end of troubles here. The State has been pressing the Political Department for the removal of Indian Army troops from our cantonments. There are 7[000] or 8000 Indian Army fighting troops in the State, including armoured formations. The Nizam thinks it quite intolerable that they should remain here after the 15th August. They would in effect be an Army of Occupation. But such pressure, as the Political Department has been able to exert, has been quite ineffective. Whether the Defence Member is stalling or not, I don't know; but it does look as if those who will form the Government of the Indian Union would not be unwilling to find themselves with an Army of Occupation here. I spoke to the C-in-C about it and he said (privately) we should have nothing to worry about while he was directing the Army. This is cold comfort.

The Crown Representative is still the Crown Representative and he could direct the Government to take steps to move the troops out of State territory by the 15 August.

The State is writing a further letter asking for information about the dates and stages of the programme by which the troops will be removed, in view of the acceleration of the departure of the British. The letter will ask for a reply within a specified time. If no reply is forthcoming, a question will be asked in the House giving the steps taken by the State and the result and asking whether this Army of Occupation will be permitted to remain.

I wish the States had not been so persistently overlooked, for then it would not be necessary to risk throwing a spanner.

[*Rest of para 1 and para 2 omitted*]

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

H-259

Ali Yavar Jung to M. A. Jinnah

F. 318/1-4

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

4 July 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

Sir Walter [Monckton] and I were both hoping to be in Delhi today but have had to alter our plans. I thought I would be able to mention two things personally to you, gathered by way of information, but as we will not be leaving until next week, I am writing.

The first thing is that I know that in his heart of hearts the Viceroy is not in favour of Pakistan and is (as completely as possible) under the influence of Congress (not necessarily Nehru). I am sure of this information. Of course you know best.

The second thing is that Congress will try its best (and has in fact produced a formula to that effect) that the contemplated Standstill Agreements should not be with both the successor governments but only with the one which falls in the zone to which the particular State belongs (thus Hyderabad with Hindustan or India only). I hope this will not come about and it cannot, only if the Muslim League insists the other way about. We would of course also refuse to negotiate with Hindustan alone.

Sir Walter may have told you of the troops stationed here¹ which are likely to continue after August 15—virtually a Congress Army of Occupation (with an Armoured Brigade) in State territory. We are not going to accept it, but technical difficulties in the way of evacuation at such short notice are likely to be raised, and Patel had the cheek to say that our demand for evacuation was an "affront". Actually it is an "affront" to keep the troops here after August 15. If there could be joint Muslim League-Congress control over those troops until evacuation, we might not object, but our first line is going to be immediate evacuation. I am sure Mr Nishtar² will help us in that, but a word from you to acquaint him with the situation will go a long way.

We are coming into the pool with Colonel Williams³ publicity organization and are also negotiating for an air service between Hyderabad and the Middle East (via Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Kohat). When we go to Delhi we shall be taking with us a further proposition (which Chhatari⁴ will mention to you) which will be of help both to Pakistan

and Hyderabad.

With my respects and regards,

Yours sincerely,
ALI YAVAR JUNG

PS. Please do not bother to reply as I know you will be busy.

¹H-258.

²Member for Communications in the Interim Government

³Probably refers to Geoffrey Williams of the Indian Political Service.

⁴President, Executive Council of the Nizam of Hyderabad.

H-260

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten¹

R/3/1/138

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
9 July 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have during the last few days seen Clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill² as reported in the Press. I regret that (as has so often happened in recent months) the clause, though it was closely discussed with British Indian leaders, was never disclosed to, much less discussed with me or any representative of my State. I am distressed to see that that clause not only contains a unilateral repudiation by the British Government of the treaties which have for so many years bound my State and my dynasty to the British, but also appears to contemplate that, unless I join one or other of the two new Dominions, my State will no longer form part of the British Commonwealth. The treaties, by which the British Government many years ago guaranteed the protection of my State and my dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder, have been constantly and solemnly reaffirmed in recent years, notably by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942. I have been taught that I could safely rely on British arms and the British word and I have been persuaded, in consequence, right up to the present to refrain from increasing my army³ and from establishing in my State factories for the manufacture of arms and equipment. Nevertheless, the repudiation in Clause 7 of the Bill has been made not only without my consent but without any consultation with me or with my Government.

2. As Your Excellency knows, both before you went to England and while you were there, I asked that my State should be accorded dominion

status when the British should leave India. I have always hitherto felt assured that after more than a century of faithful alliance, during which I have reposed all my confidence in the British, I should certainly be able to remain without question within the family of the British Commonwealth. Clause 7 appears to deny me even that. I still hope that no difficulty will be allowed to impede direct relations between me and His Majesty's Government. I was recently informed that Your Excellency had undertaken to ensure a pronouncement in Parliament to establish that such relations can be entertained. My hope is that, once established, these relations will develop into closer union between my State and the British Crown to which, for so many years, I have been tied in faithful alliance.

3. Meantime, I shall undertake and continue active negotiations with the new Dominions in order to reach sensible, practical arrangements for the transition period, so that the future of Indian States and India generally can be assured, so far as possible, in an orderly fashion.

4. I feel bound to make this protest to Your Excellency against the way in which my State is being abandoned by its old ally, the British Government, and the ties which have bound me in loyal devotion to the King Emperor are being severed. I hope that Your Excellency will place my letter before His Majesty's Government. I shall, for the present, refrain from publishing it, lest I should in any way embarrass my old friends and allies in the eyes of the world. I must, nevertheless, retain my right to publish it at a later stage, if it should become necessary in the interests of my State.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹No. 33, *TP*, XII, 31-2.

²See Enclosure 1 to No. 1, Vol. III, 3.

³According to the minutes of the Viceroy's 46th Staff meeting of 23 June 1947, the emissary of the Nizam of Hyderabad in London approached Air Chief Marshal Christopher Courtney to go to Hyderabad and advise on the organization of the Hyderabad State Air Force. The India Office advised the Air Chief Marshal that the matter should be left over for three or four months at least. See No. 308, *TP*, XI, item 11, 577. A report by the Joint Planning Staff containing an examination of a memorandum by Christopher Courtney on the question of the provision of British aircraft and personnel for Hyderabad Air Force was also considered in the meeting of 16 July 1947 and it was decided that no action be taken in the matter. See F 200/70-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-261

*Cabinet**India and Burma Committee Paper I. B. (47) 146¹**L/P&S/13/1843*

HYDERABAD

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, [LONDON,]

25 July 1947

I circulate, for the information of the Committee, a letter dated 9th July² from the Nizam to the Viceroy, in which the Nizam:

(a) protests against our unilateral repudiation without consultation of our Treaties with Hyderabad in Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act,³

(b) expresses the hope that a link between Hyderabad and the British Crown is still possible;

(c) declares his intention to negotiate with the new Dominions practical arrangements covering Hyderabad's relations with them for a transition period;

(d) asks that his letter be placed before His Majesty's Government and reserves his right to publish it.

2. On 11th July the Viceroy, with the assistance of officials, met a Delegation from Hyderabad led by the Prime Minister of the State, the Nawab of Chhatari, and including Sir W. Monckton.⁴ At this meeting:

(i) The Viceroy explained that, although Hyderabad is a country the size of France with a population bigger than that of any existing Dominion, it was surrounded by British Indian territory and His Majesty's Government could not undertake the defence commitment which acceptance of Hyderabad as a separate Dominion might involve. Hyderabad could remain part of the Commonwealth only by adherence to one of the new Dominions. The Hyderabad Delegation replied that Hyderabad had affinities with Pakistan as well as with the Union of India and would have difficulty in compromising its independent sovereignty. If it had to join one of the new Dominions it might prefer Pakistan. The State would be in a difficult position in the event of disputes between Pakistan and India and would favour arrangements for the peaceful settlement of such disputes and for joint defence.

(ii) The Viceroy explained that the Union of India are ready to

accept the adherence of States even if this is confined to defence, external affairs and communications, and that, if Hyderabad accepted this offer, her representatives in the Dominion Legislature would give her a voice in the future of that Dominion.' The Viceroy suggested that it might help Hyderabad if the Nizam sent him a letter,⁶ not for publication, making any necessary reservations to his adherence to the Union of India, such as that Hyderabad would remain neutral in the event of hostilities between Pakistan and India, and that she would have the right of secession.

- (iii) On Berar (which cannot legally continue to be administered as part of British India after 15th August without a new agreement between Hyderabad and the Union of India), the Hyderabad Delegation said that the Nizam would agree to a temporary standstill arrangement, provided that this was regarded as a transition to the transfer of Berar to Hyderabad administration. The Nizam would agree to give Berar a free and responsible Government with a Governor appointed by him. The Viceroy replied that Congress would ask for a referendum if the proposal for the transfer of administration was pressed. He suggested a standstill arrangement of indefinite duration, liable to denunciation by either side at 12 months' notice.
- (iv) On Secunderabad, agreement was reached on the retrocession of the Cantonment Area, and on the principle that Indian troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible, but that withdrawal could not be completed by 15th August.

3. The Hyderabad Delegation have returned to Hyderabad for consultation with the Nizam and are [?] due back at Delhi for further discussions with the Viceroy on 24th July,⁷ preliminary to the Conference between Sardar Patel⁸ and representatives of all States on 25th July.⁹

4. The Viceroy considers that he was able to bring the Hyderabad Delegation much further along the road to agreement than anybody could possibly have hoped, and that if he can once get Hyderabad to stop talking of complete independence, this would set an example which no other State, not even Travancore, could resist.¹⁰

5. I have also received a proposal from the Viceroy, to which the King has been pleased to agree, that, in the event of Hyderabad adhering to the Union of India, the title of "His Highness" should be given to the second son of the Nizam. Lord Mountbatten understands

that this may have a real influence on the Nizam's decision.¹¹

¹No. 232, TP, XII, 344-6.

²H-260.

³No. 164, TP, XII, 237-8.

⁴See No. 61, TP, XII, 79-88.

⁵H.L. Ismay had informed the Viceroy in a meeting on 23 July 1947, that the Nizam had declared that he would not accede formally to the Dominion of India on the three Central subjects without being satisfied on India-Pakistan relations. See F. 200/70-A, item 2, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

⁶The Nizam did not write to Mountbatten again till 8 August. See H-268.

⁷See Appendix VI. 4, paras 20-1, Vol. III, 957.

⁸It had in fact been decided that Mountbatten would meet representatives of the States separately and Sardar Patel would not be present at the Conference. See Appendix VII. 15, para 2, Vol. III, 987.

⁹No. 14, Vol. VIII, 42-7.

¹⁰See Appendix VI. 2, para 32, Vol. III, 948.

¹¹The minutes of the Viceroy's 63rd Staff meeting of 24 July 1947 on this particular point read: "It was possible that this grant of title of His Highness might tip the scales in favour of the Nizam's cooperation". See F. 200/70-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-262

Minutes of Viceroy's Sixty-fifth Staff Meeting¹

[*Extract*]

SECRET

[THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
28 July 1947]

Item 4

THE STATES

His Excellency the Viceroy said that he was still confident that Hyderabad and Travancore would accede to the Dominion on the three Central subjects. Rao Bahadur Menon said that, so far as Hyderabad was concerned, he was more pessimistic. However, it was probable that sufficient States would join for the purpose in view. So far as Indore was concerned, he advised that the Viceroy should take no steps towards summoning the Maharaja² in order to induce him to join. He considered it extremely probable that the Maharaja himself would approach the Viceroy on the subject before the end of July. However, a useful link in this connection might be the Maharaja of Kolhapur.³

¹No. 256, TP, XII, 375.

²Yashwant Rao Holkar.

³Shri Shivaji VI.

H-263

Walter Monckton to Louis Mountbatten¹

SECRET/PERSONAL

LAKE VIEW GUEST HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
28 July 1947

My Dear Dickie,

I have had long and intimate talks with H.E.H. [Nizam of Hyderabad] on the question which you discussed with me, namely, what chance there was of Hyderabad acceding to the Dominion of India before the 15th August. The whole subject has been discussed from every point of view and I am quite satisfied that H.E.H. has definitely made up his mind not to accede. I am sure that nothing—not even a visit by you—has the smallest hope of modifying this attitude. The truth is that the Muslims in the State would undoubtedly revolt if he acceded now. On the other hand, I do think that, in spite of great opposition from influential quarters within the State and outside it, he is quite likely to be willing to offer by treaty substantially all that could reasonably be asked of him. I cannot, of course, commit him to this by a casual letter but I am faithfully recording my own appreciation of the position. The local *Ittehad*, supported by our mutual friend² from Delhi, are attacking me hard. But so far H.E.H. is not moved by it.

I shall probably be returning to Delhi about Wednesday [30 July] and will ask for an interview. But I honestly cannot advise you to come here. I think the association of Hyderabad with the Indian Dominion is inevitable in the interests of both, but I believe it can't be rushed. The difficulties, as I am discovering to my cost, are real and intractable.

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

No. 257, TP, XII, 377-8.

²Not identified.

H-264

Nizam of Hyderabad to M. A. Jinnah

F. 696/145

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
28 July 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

The President of my Executive Council, my Constitutional Adviser¹

and some members of the Hyderabad Delegation, on their return from Delhi, have informed me of the substance of their talk with you on Hyderabad affairs. I should like to have your considered views on certain matters before I reconsider my present programme.² I am, therefore, enclosing with this letter a note for your consideration and reply. After I have learn your views in black and white, I shall be in a better position to make my decision in the light of what you say. Before you send a reply, I hope you will give an opportunity to my Prime Minister,³ Constitutional Adviser and one or two Members of my delegation to have a talk with you about the contents of the note, so that you may be in a still better position to consider the questions in their proper perspective. The matter is urgent and I shall be grateful for an answer as early as possible, say within a week.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹Walter Monckton.

²For programme procedure and instructions given to the Delegation, see Annex I & II to No. 19, Vol. IV, 44-8.

³Mohammad Ahmad Said Khan Chhatari.

Enclosure to H-264

F. 696/146-8

CONFIDENTIAL

28 July 1947

NOTE FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF MR JINNAH¹

His Exalted Highness would of course much prefer to have close treaty relations with Pakistan rather than with the Dominion of India. It is the land-locked position of Hyderabad in the belly of the most Hindu part of Hindustan which makes it inevitable for His Exalted Highness with his vast Hindu population to make, if possible, some friendly arrangement with Hindustan.

2. His Exalted Highness has definitely made up his mind not to accede but he may be driven to closer unity by treaty in regard to External Affairs than he would have wished. But a treaty, as the British have shown, can be denounced. If and when Pakistan and Hyderabad are in a strong enough position to enable Hyderabad to resist political and economic pressure by the surrounding Hindustan, His Exalted Highness would review the position to make his ties closer with Pakistan and less close with the Dominion of India.

3. So far as Defence and Communications are concerned, it is difficult to resist the view that Hyderabad must, at least by treaty, accommodate itself to the policy of the Dominion of India. Communications are inextricably intermingled and all he is asked by way of Defence is that

Hyderabad should make the sort of contribution in men to the defence of the borders of the area in which it is contained as it now makes to the British. A provision can be arranged to preserve neutrality if Pakistan and Hindustan fall out. His Exalted Highness appreciates that an arrangement of this kind would not leave him free to assist Pakistan in arms against the Indian Union, but he does not understand in what way he could come to the help of Pakistan in such an event.

4. With regard to External Affairs, in the light of Mr Jinnah's criticism, the draft letter has been modified.² It is of course difficult to dissociate External Affairs from Defence but it is no longer the case that Hyderabad will agree to the Dominion of India conducting its External Affairs as part of the foreign policy of the Dominion. His Exalted Highness would instead agree to conduct the External Affairs of his State in conformity with the foreign policy of the Dominion of India. Mr Jinnah will see that this leaves the conduct of Foreign Affairs in the hands of the State, although the direction of this policy will be similar to that of the Dominion of India. Moreover, His Exalted Highness will insist by another amendment to the draft letter on the right to appoint representatives of Hyderabad wherever he wishes. Mr Jinnah will appreciate that it is always difficult to draw the line which separates commercial from political activities. Hyderabad has never had the conduct of its External Affairs in the sense in which that term is being used in these discussions and His Exalted Highness feels that, as the draft is now modified, it is difficult reasonably to resist the conclusion that he is offering to give no more than in practice he cannot help giving.

5. In many ways, His Exalted Highness would be glad to postpone discussion of treaty arrangements with the Dominion of India till after the 15th August, but he feels that in the particular position of Hyderabad this would be dangerous. It is important that the Nizam's line of policy should be made known to the parties in the State who are in an excited condition. It is very doubtful if His Exalted Highness' offer outlined in the draft letter will be accepted now. If it is rejected, His Exalted Highness will have the advantage that his reasonable attitude can be made public to the world in advance of the efforts of the Viceroy and the Congress to make him appear uncooperative. But it is, in His Exalted Highness' view, certain that when the British go, that is to say on and after the 15th August, there would be no chance of making anything like so favourable an arrangement with the government of the Dominion of India as would be probable on the present basis. If a settlement could be reached now, His Exalted Highness would be likely to get good terms in relation to Berar, a customs agreement, the use of a port and full recognition of his internal autonomy in all respects. Otherwise, His Exalted Highness feels

sure that Congress will make every effort by means that are indirect and not manifestly provocative, to make the economic and political position of Hyderabad intolerable and, as Mr Jinnah knows, with a large Hindu population there would be limits to the State's power of resistance to such a pressure.

6. In these circumstances, before making up his mind what attitude to adopt at this vital juncture, His Exalted Highness must know in black and white what steps Mr Jinnah could take to assist and rescue Hyderabad if this pressure were adopted. Could Mr Jinnah guarantee to get supplies of food, salt and kerosene oil and other goods, in which Hyderabad could be made a deficit area, introduced into the State? To what extent could Mr Jinnah provide the State with arms and equipment and, if necessary, with troops? If economic pressure can be shown to be used against Hyderabad, what effective steps could be taken by Pakistan in time to rescue the State from its predicament? If Congress supporters inside the State revolted and were indirectly assisted by Congress forces in the Dominion of India, what assistance could His Exalted Highness expect from Pakistan? How could Hyderabad hope to get an outlet to the sea without the co-operation of the Dominion of India?

¹Each page of the note was initialled by the Nizam.

²Modified draft not traceable.

H-265

Nawab of Chhatari to Louis Mountbatten¹

IOR, R/3/1/139

PRIME MINISTER, HYDERABAD,
CAMP NEW DELHI,
31 July 1947

Your Excellency,

I thank Your Excellency for your letter No. 592/89 of the 29th July 1947.²

The Hyderabad Delegation has given full consideration to the matter and feel that no useful purpose would be served by my presence in the Negotiating Committee appointed by Your Excellency. For the reasons I have indicated in my previous letter,³ Hyderabad wishes to negotiate its Standstill Agreements along with those States only which, like Hyderabad, have kept out of the Constituent Assembly. Also, the State does not wish to discuss the problem of accession, having

chosen the alternative of political relations permitted by the Memorandum of May 12,⁴ and accepted by the political parties under Your Excellency's Plan of 3rd June.⁵ I suggest for Your Excellency's consideration appointment of a second Negotiating Committee⁶ consisting of such States only as have decided to remain out of the Constituent Assembly.

It is assumed that the negotiations will be, as has throughout been understood, with the representatives of both Successor Governments and that the Agreements will be of a tripartite nature.

Yours sincerely,
AHMED SAID

¹No. 296, TP, XII, 435-6.

²Not traceable.

³Appendix VII, 2, Vol. IV, 488-9.

⁴No. 2, Vol. VIII, 5-8.

⁵No. 2, Vol. II, 13.

⁶The Viceroy had proposed a Negotiating Committee for States during the Conference of Rulers and Representatives of Indian States on 25 July 1947. See No. 14, Vol. VIII, 42-7.

H-266

Nizam of Hyderabad to M. A. Jinnah

F. 595/4

CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
2 August 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

I have been considering further terms of the draft letter which I was suggesting sending to the Viceroy. You will remember I sent you a copy¹ some time ago. A further alteration of it has occurred to me which the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Walter Monckton will show you. I should be grateful if you would fix an appointment for this purpose.

I must have your final views² in writing next Monday as my people are returning to Hyderabad on Tuesday morning [5 August]. On the other hand, there is very little time for me to consider all these matters in their proper light as the 15th August is close at hand.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹See F. 511/6 & F. 1264/2-6, QAP. Not printed.

²See Jinnah's note at the end of H-267.

H-267

Note by Nawab Ali Yavar Jung about an interview with M. A. Jinnah

F. 908/128 & F. 1264/13-6

ASOKA HOUSE,
NEW DELHI,
4 August 1947

The Prime Minister, the Constitutional Affairs member¹ and the Local Government Member² interviewed Mr Jinnah on the afternoon of 4th August, the subject of the interview being the note sent by His Exalted Highness to Mr Jinnah on 28 July.³ In the course of a separate interview, which Sir Walter Monckton had the same day with Mr Jinnah, Mr Jinnah was apprised of the discussion the previous night with the Viceroy.⁴

Mr Jinnah said that the Viceroy and the Congress were following a policy totally contrary to the declared policy of H.M.G. H.M.G. had definitely offered the two alternatives, of accession or political relations, and had also said that time would be given and that the choice would be free and voluntary. If H.M.G. had a shred of conscience, they would put a stop to the threats which were now being given both by the Viceroy and the Congress. It was highly probable that at least the Conservative Party would rebel.

What had been said by the Viceroy about Berar was tantamount to daylight dacoity. It amounted to holding a pistol at a person and making him sign the Instrument of Accession. H.M.G. had admitted the legal and constitutional claim of the Nizam over Berar; the Nizam had all the right on his side and what was being now threatened was the exercise of might. If, even the little that was necessary to continue the Nizam's legal title to Berar was not done, it would not be much of a loss but the world would know the standard of morality which governed the conscience and acts of the Congress Party. Mr Jinnah said that he could not believe that this could be supported by the sense of honour and conscience of the British people.

Mr Jinnah said that he thought if H.E.H. and his advisers had really made up their mind against accession they should stick to it, firmly and loyally. He did not believe that threats of economic sanction would be carried out but even if they were, His Exalted Highness' line should be as follows:

You may do what you like and you may threaten as you like but I shall never agree to sign any Instrument of Accession or join the Union

unless my conscience says that I should do so. You have no right to coerce me and I have the right to make a free choice.

He said that after all there was some such thing as standing for one's own right, despite every threat or provocation. If it came to the worst, one should die fighting rather than yield on a point of fundamental principle. Mr Jinnah gave the illustration of what he called the greatest martyrdom in history, the example of Imam Hussain standing for what was right and giving his life for it. All the sanctions in the world then existing were applied against him and his followers but they withstood them and suffered wholesale butchery. It was a moral triumph and they gave their lives for it. That should be the attitude which the Nizam and his advisers and people should adopt. If it came to the worst, rather than yield to coercion or to the surrender of what was right, he should be prepared to abdicate and go in the last resort and show to the world that he had fought uncompromisingly for right as against might. Mr Jinnah said that, in our own times, England had done the same against the heaviest odds. Her people had fought till the end and had reversed the position, by perseverance and conviction, from defeat to victory.

This immoral aspect of threats and coercion on the part of the Viceroy and the Congress, despite the declared policy of H.M.G. to the contrary, should be broadcast to the world and be supported by propaganda so as to convince the man in the street of the wrongness of their position and the rectitude of Hyderabad's stand for her rights. But any such declaration or announcement should contain a firm indication of absolute willingness to enter into Standstill Arrangements which are necessary for the advantage of both to avoid a breakdown of the administrative machinery or the prevalence of chaos. It must be stated that Hyderabad desires to help India and herself in producing the conditions necessary for stability. If, by the time of such announcement, the Congress persist in refusing to negotiate Standstill Agreements, the entire responsibility of the consequences would rest with them. The above declaration may mention the fact that, while accession was never understood to be a condition for the conclusion of Standstill Agreements and had in fact nothing to do with them, even such agreements had been refused because the State had declined to accede and had chosen the other alternative offered to the State both by His Majesty's Government and by the political parties through their acceptance of the Plan of June 3.⁵

As regards His Exalted Highness' question as to how far Pakistan would be able to assist Hyderabad economically or politically or with troops or arms and equipment and the like, Mr Jinnah said that it was

not possible for him at present to give any specific undertaking but that, generally speaking, he was confident that he and Pakistan would come to the help of Hyderabad in every way possible. There should be no doubt on that point. He said that even countries with long-established Governments could not give specific undertakings of the nature desired except by reference to the situation as it developed. The United States could not give any such undertaking when it was first approached by the United Kingdom for help during the last war,⁶ but the United States gradually began helping on different fronts until they ultimately came into the war itself. England was very nearly booted when, to her good fortune, Hitler diverted himself from England and attacked Russia, thus bringing the latter into a natural alliance with England and saving England from the concentrated attack which might otherwise have centred upon her. Then, America which had till then kept out of the war except by way of moral and material help, entered the struggle as a result of the Japanese attack upon her. These were providential developments without which all the odds were against England. They brought about Allied victory. If Hyderabad was short of petrol or kerosene, it would not matter if, on the other hand Hyderabad had abundance of firmness, perseverance and courage. The Russians were threatened by a blockade against them but they won the war. If Hyderabad was similarly threatened, there would be other ways to fight, not necessarily with guns if there were no guns, and not necessarily with mechanised transport if there was no petrol.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr Jinnah for the interview and for the elucidation of his views on the different points raised by His Exalted Highness; he also said that H.E.H. would expect a written reply as he had made request in his letter to Mr Jinnah. Mr Jinnah said that, with all the volume of work which had been thrust upon him and the short time left between now and the establishment of Pakistan, it would be most difficult for him to write a detailed letter answering each of the points raised by His Exalted Highness. He said, however, that the best way would be to have a record prepared of the interview. The record could then be shown to Mr Jinnah the same night at 9:30 and, if he had any modifications to make, he would make them after which he could sign the record and give it back for submission to His Exalted Highness. The Prime Minister agreed with this suggestion and the Constitutional Affairs Member was requested to prepare a record of the interviews.

[NAWAB ALI YAVAR JUNG]

The above notes are correct [version] of the interview and represent my views and I hope that H.E.H. will be firm and accept them and act

accordingly and I most fervently pray to God that He would help us all as our cause is righteous.

M. A. JINNAH

¹Nawab Ali Yavar Jung

²Syed Abdur Rahim.

³Enclosure to H-264.

⁴Monckton had urged Mountbatten that the Nizam should not be rushed or coerced so that he might decide to make a satisfactory offer of treaty. On the other hand, Mountbatten emphasized that if the Nizam did not accede to India, Hyderabad would be ruined and he would lose his throne. See No. 329, para 5, *TP*, XII, 497.

⁵See No. 1, Vol. II, 1-6.

⁶World War II.

H-268

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
8 August 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am writing to you to make plain the position of my State in the negotiations which are in progress at Delhi. It has always been my desire and the desire of Hyderabad to make the fullest contribution to the prosperity and welfare of India as a whole. Indeed I recognize that the States have a great opportunity to exercise a stabilising influence, both because of their relative freedom from communal strife and because the States represent the section of India which at present has the greatest experience of administration. When it was contemplated that India, on gaining its independence, would become a single Union, I was quite ready to take my share in the defence of the sub-continent and to make arrangements for the foreign policy of Hyderabad to be directed in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. The partition of India, however, has gravely complicated the problem for my State. As Your Excellency knows, while Hyderabad is necessarily closely concerned in various ways with what will now become the Dominion of India, there are also many ties between my State and the future Pakistan Dominion. It will be within Your Excellency's knowledge also that in this State, which my ancestors and I have ruled for more than two centuries, there has been little communal disturbance and the cleavage on religious grounds has always been much less acute than in British India. It is my earnest wish to pursue a policy which

will enable this freedom from discord and disorder to continue, and for this purpose I must take into account the importance of maintaining good relations with both the new Dominions. It is not yet clear how far or in what manner the Indian Dominion and the Pakistan Dominion will consult and co-operate on matters of common concern or how closely their policies can be integrated on the essential subjects¹ of External Affairs and Defence. I understand that this is a matter which, it is recognized, cannot be resolved before the 15th August. It is not possible for me to contemplate an organic union with either of the Dominions until I am more fully informed on these matters. I am bound at this stage to wait and see how the relations between the two Dominions are regulated and developed.

2. I was happy to observe that in the recent debates in Parliament on the Indian Independence Bill the difficulties of the immediate position for such States as Hyderabad did not pass unnoticed. I need only remind Your Excellency, by way of illustration, of three speeches for the Government which recognized that the States ought not to be asked for hurried decisions at this juncture and that a treaty rather than a federal relationship might be the solution in present circumstances. Lord Listowel in the House of Lords stated that from the date when the new Dominions are set up "the appointments and functions of the Crown Representative and his officers will terminate and the States will be the masters of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Governments or to stand alone and His Majesty's Government will not use the slightest pressure to influence their momentous and voluntary decision". A little later he observed: "Whatever the future relationship between the new Dominions and the States may be, it will require prolonged consideration and discussion before the final adjustment can be made." The Prime Minister, Mr Attlee, in the House of Commons, pointed out that "until the constitution of the Dominion has been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners, there must be a less organic form of relationship between them and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out." Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General, in the course of the same debates, while expressing the hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out would be taken prematurely, said that the Government realized that "it is bound to be sometime before the States will have all the information before them to make their final decision."

3. In a later and, as I think, a most helpful passage in his speech the Attorney-General said: "We hope ... that the States will associate themselves with one or other of the new Dominions in a federal or treaty

relationship on fair terms fairly and amicably negotiated." I am fully in accord with the spirit of this suggestion. For I have always been resolutely opposed to a policy of isolation for my State and although in present circumstances I cannot contemplate bringing Hyderabad into organic union with either of the two new Dominions, I am still ready and willing to see Hyderabad play its proper part in the defence of the Indian sub-continent and to have the conduct of the External Affairs of my State undertaken in general conformity with the Foreign Affairs of the whole sub-continent. My difficulty is how to accomplish this purpose in friendly co-operation with both the new Dominions. I have naturally and necessarily taken into account the fact that the Dominion of India is my neighbour and I am fully prepared (in accordance with the Attorney-General's suggestion) to enter into a treaty with them whereby a suitable arrangement is made in respect of land communication, so that all-India standards are recognized, and through communications and mutual interchange facilities are assured, and Hyderabad contributes an agreed number of troops to the defence of the Dominion. Moreover, I should be willing to agree in this treaty to conduct the External Affairs of my State in general conformity with the foreign policy of the Dominion of India. But it would be necessary for me to provide against the possibility, which I earnestly hope will never arise in fact, that the two new Dominions might pursue a mutually hostile policy. In that case, it would be unthinkable for my State to pursue a hostile policy towards the Dominion of Pakistan and it would have to be provided that Hyderabad in such an event would remain neutral. Further, Hyderabad already has an Agent-General in the United Kingdom and must reserve the right to appoint representatives to act for Hyderabad elsewhere if and when it wishes to do so.

4. It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that both the new Dominions will be within the family of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I should want a provision inserted in the Treaty whereby if unhappily either party should at some future date decide to secede from the Commonwealth, the other party should be free to review the provisions of the Treaty. For, in spite of the provisions of Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, I cannot believe that, after more than a century of faithful alliance, it is the intention of the British Government to throw my State out of the Empire against my will.

5. Before I turn to other provisions which would need to be included in such a Treaty, I must record my astonishment and regret that though Hyderabad's Negotiating Committee was available in Delhi for a fortnight until the 5th August, those who will be responsible for the Dominion of India refused to negotiate with them on any subject,

even including Standstill Agreements and Berar, unless as an essential preliminary Hyderabad was prepared to agree to accede. It was made absolutely plain by my Committee that, short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into Treaty relationship. Political relationship other than accession was expressly included as an alternative open to States, in the Memorandum of the 12th May 1946² which was reaffirmed in the Statement of the 3rd June 1947, accepted both by Congress and the Muslim League. The reason why Standstill arrangements were recommended by the Government of India was to avoid administrative chaos. It is recognized that Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act³ does not cover the whole ground. For this very reason Hyderabad was anxious to negotiate a Standstill Agreement but those responsible for the Dominion of India entirely declined to take part in such negotiations. My State will nevertheless do its best, even without such an agreement, to avoid any administrative deadlock which is bound to cause inconvenience to both. If any such deadlock or inconvenience should occur the fault will rest squarely on the Dominion of India.

6. It is even more surprising that negotiations should be refused on the subject of Berar. His Majesty's Government and the new States Department have unequivocally recognized my sovereignty over Berar and also my legal right to the reversion of administration over that territory on the 15th August 1947. I should be prepared to arrange for the continuance of the status quo for the time being to enable the whole problem to be reasonably and amicably settled. But those responsible for the new Dominion wholly refuse to negotiate in the matter, unless I first agree to accede and this, for reasons which I have already explained, I decline to do. I learn (though I find it hard to believe) that in defiance of my admitted rights the new Dominion of India mean to start their career by seizing my territory.

7. I cannot but regard this refusal to negotiate except on terms that Hyderabad first agrees to accede as coercion and pressure to join and a compulsion to a hurried decision. And I hope that even at this late hour, through the good offices of Your Excellency as Crown Representative with special responsibilities to see that His Majesty's Government's pledges to the States are honourably fulfilled this policy may be reversed. For it is utterly inconsistent with the declared pledges and policy of His Majesty's Government.

8. Such a Treaty as I have suggested would have to cover various other matters, among them a Customs Agreement which would take into account the provisions of the Commercial Treaty of 1802⁴ which has long been a matter of dispute between His Majesty's Government and myself. But it is not necessary to elaborate such provisions in this

letter, because if the principle of a treaty on the basis of my proposals in this letter is accepted, I do not doubt that with anxiety on both sides to resolve our difficulties in a spirit of reasonable accommodation, we shall be able to reach a concluded [*sic*] agreement without undue difficulty or delay.

9. If, however, those who will be responsible for the Government of the Indian Dominion are unwilling to enter into negotiations⁵ on the basis of such a treaty as I am proposing, I shall nevertheless deem it necessary to publish this offer,⁶ in order that the policy which I feel bound to adopt and which I have no desire to hide, may be fully understood both within my State and outside it.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹See H-269 for reply.

²No. 2, Vol. VIII, 5-8.

³See No. 164, *TP*, XII, 237-8.

⁴Not traceable.

⁵H. L. Ismay reported, in the Viceroy's 69th Staff meeting on 9 August, 1947, that the Hyderabad negotiations had entered a critical stage. Mountbatten stated that he had persuaded the India Cabinet to extend the time limit for Hyderabad to accede. See F. 200/70-B, item 3, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

⁶The Nizam informed him on 9 August, that he had decided to publish the offer by 12th or 13th August to clear his position "before the whole world". Monckton was instructed to communicate this decision to the Viceroy. See No. 388, *TP*, XII, 610. Monckton sent a telegram to the Nizam on 12 August explaining that Mountbatten understood that Hyderabad must be free to publish the Nizam's letter of 8 August 1947 and added: "We are already free to publish letter of 9 July, when we wish." Monckton also stated that while he did not expect Mountbatten to accept a treaty, he (Mountbatten) appreciated the Nizam's readiness to co-operate in the three essential fields and thought it worthwhile to continue negotiations for two months more. *Monckton Trustees* No. 30:66. No. 434, note 4, *TP*, XII, 671.

H-269

*Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad*¹

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

[NEW DELHI,]
12 August 1947

I have received Your Exalted Highness' letter of 8th August 1947² in which you offer to negotiate with the Dominion of India for a treaty in which you would make provision for the conduct of Hyderabad's foreign policy in general conformity with that of the Dominion of India and for the contribution of troops to the defence of the Dominion

and for suitable agreements about Communications. I recognize Your Exalted Highness' special problems in Hyderabad and your willingness to co-operate with the Dominion of India in these three essential fields. As you know, the anxiety of the Dominion is to achieve stability which they feel cannot be adequately secured unless all the States which are situated within their borders are prepared to come into organic union with them. I myself, as I have told your Negotiating Committee and your Adviser, believe that accession to the Union would be to the mutual advantage of the Dominion and your State.³ But I fully understand your difficulties and I have no wish to hurry you to a decision. In the circumstances, although I shall cease to be Crown Representative on the 15th August, I have secured the assent of those who will be responsible for the Government of the Dominion to my continuing negotiations with Your Exalted Highness for a further period of two months, during which I hope we shall be able to reconcile our views.⁴ During this period the offer to accede on the terms which I have already proposed will (as a special exception) remain open in the case of Hyderabad.

2. I have noted what Your Exalted Highness writes about Standstill Agreements and Berar and I am in a position to assure you that the Dominion of India are quite agreeable to the continuance of the status quo in Berar for the time being, while negotiations continue, and to the continuance of existing administrative arrangements, whether or not a formal agreement is reached dealing with this subject. I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile act by the Dominion and your State might be subjected to blockade, but I am satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying such pressure.

[Para 3 omitted]

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

¹The Nizam acknowledged receipt of this letter on 14 August, 1947 and thanked the Viceroy for his appreciation of Nizam's readiness to cooperate with the Dominion of India in the three essential fields of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. However, Nizam made it clear that he was not prepared to execute an Instrument of Accession. See Appendix VII. 17, Vol. IV, 519.

²H-268.

³See Annexure I to Enclosure to No. 178, para 9, Vol. III, 450.

⁴See No. 385, para 18, TP, XII, 594.

H-270

Note by S. Abdur Rahim for Ahmed Said Khan Chhatari¹

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

16 August 1947

His Excellency Prime Minister,

During the last two visits of the Negotiating Committee to Delhi we noted the coercive and degrading behaviour of the prospective Administrators of the Indian Union. Moreover, attitude of the Viceroy also was entirely in conformity with that of the Congress leaders. Ultimately, H.E.H. made up his mind to address him the historic letter of the 9th [8th] August.² Before getting the reply, Sir Walter Monckton and myself had the interview with the Viceroy on the 11th instant³ (notes of which have already been submitted to you). It is evident from the interview notes that there has been a marked change in his behaviour and he appeared to be disgusted with the Congress leaders. He has, however, prevailed upon them to get us an extension of two months during which period the negotiations will be continued.

Taking all the circumstances and the atmosphere in Delhi I am not at all confident of the success of our future negotiations during the stipulated period. Even with the most liberal point of view, I may mark the chances to be 50:50. This is however the "breathing time" when we should make up our mind with unshaken determination, and make all possible arrangements internally and externally. As regards the interim administrative arrangements, I have already submitted a note to you,⁴ which, I hope, will receive the attention of the Government and give an immediate sanction.

As regards our external activity, I strongly suggest one thing which should be taken in hand without any further loss of time: A delegation under your leadership should be sent to U.K. and U.S.A. to negotiate diplomatic treaties with His Majesty's Government and the Government of U.S.A. If we succeed in this attempt, I am sure that the Indian Union will be forced to recognize our independence and the pressure which is exerted over us by the Indian Union will be very much diminished. I had brought this point to your notice in my last note also, but I consider this of immense importance at this juncture. This work may be finished within a period of 15 or 20 days provided that necessary arrangements for the tour are made beforehand.

In view of the urgency of the proposal, Your Excellency may kindly

order it to be placed before the Council tomorrow.

[S. ABDUR RAHIM]

Minister for Commerce & Industries, Local Govt. Etc.

Mountbatten received a copy of this letter and directed his PS to keep it in a secret and personal file on Hyderabad. See F. 200/70 B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

²H-268.

³Annex.

⁴Not traceable.

Annex to H-270

*Record of Interview between Walter Monckton and
Louis Mountbatten¹*

Monckton Trustees No. 39:ff 130-2

SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]

11 August 1947

During part of my discussion, Lord Ismay was present: during a further part Mr Rahim was present in addition. Later V.P. Menon came in. In the early part of the discussion, I told H.E how genuinely afraid I was that either now or in two months time the Government of Indian Dominion might blockade Hyderabad and even make it incommunicado. I made it plain in Lord Ismay's presence that, if anything like that occurred, I should go in for the Dominion Government beginning with H.E in that event. H.E told me that, though he would not deal with this matter in writing, because he felt he could not in fairness to the future Government of the Dominion, I could assure H.E.H. that he (the Viceroy), even when he ceased to be Crown Representative, would never be a party to improper pressure or coercion of the kind I had indicated being applied to Hyderabad. He added and repeated in Mr Rahim's presence that the Dominion Government would be extremely foolish to indulge in such action which would put them wrong in the eyes of the whole world. On the other hand, both the Viceroy and Lord Ismay pointed out that a more dangerous and likely event would be that, on the Russian model, not the Dominion Government, but the Congress party might spend time and money in creating disorderly movements inside the State and this the Governor-General could not guard against. H.E gave the instance to Mr Rahim of Rs. 5 lakhs having been poured into Travancore. He further added that the Congress might adopt the same measures and start the subversive movement in Hyderabad. Mr Rahim pointed out to the Viceroy that the Congress movement in Hyderabad

was not so effective, organized and on such a scale as it was in Travancore. The Viceroy replied that they would now organize and overthrow the Government. He repeated, however, that he did not think that the Indian Cabinet would have selected him as Governor-General if they wished to indulge themselves in the practice which I had described.

2. He said that in his speech on the 15th August he would say that Hyderabad as the premier State, had a unique position by reason of its size, population and resources and that it had its special problems. He would go on to say that the Nizam, while not proposing to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan had not upto the present felt able to accede to the Dominion of India but that H.E.H. had assured him of his anxiety to co-operate with the Dominion in which his State lay. He would add that, with the assent of his Government, he was continuing negotiations and hoped that a solution would be found satisfactory to all. He did not seem quite certain whether he would mention in his speech that extra period would be roughly two months.

3. In his letter² to H.E.H. which he would have to compose after discussion with the States Department, he expected to take the line that he welcomed the Nizam's offer to co-operate by treaty with the Dominion of India in the three essential fields. He would point out that the Dominion felt that they could get stability only if all the States within their borders were prepared to accede and he (the Viceroy) as he had already explained to the Hyderabad Negotiating Committee and the Nizam's Adviser, was of opinion that accession would be to the mutual advantage of the Dominion and Hyderabad. He would go on to say that negotiations would continue in the hope of finding a reconciliation of the views of the Dominion and the Nizam and that the Dominion Government had agreed as a single exception to the terms offered in the proposed Instrument of Accession remaining open for a further two months. I think he will also deal with our criticism of the Congress attitude to Berar by referring to the consultation of the Nizam on the recent appointment of a new Governor in C.P. and Berar which he will suggest is inconsistent with the threat to annex that territory on the 15th August. In the same sense, he will show that the Dominion Government will prepare adaptations of the 1935 Act in respect of Berar which do not, I gather, flout constitutional law. I do not quite see how he is going to handle the question of Standstill Agreements except by expressing readiness for the continuance of existing administrative arrangements. Mr Rahim made it clear in the course of the discussion that H.E.H. was not prepared to execute an Instrument of Accession³ and the Viceroy said that he understood that from the letter but that he still hoped we should find a mutually satisfactory solution.

4. The Viceroy is still anxious to go to Hyderabad and see H.E.H.

His behaviour was more sympathetic as compared with the interviews that we had on the last occasion. He (the Viceroy) at the same time feels helpless after the 15th. We felt that the Viceroy appeared to be disgusted with the behaviour which we thought the Congress would adopt. He suggested that H.E.H. should take all sections of the public into his confidence.

¹No. 434, TP, XII, 669.

²H-269.

³Annexure

Annexure to Annex to H-270
R. E. B. Bower to George Marshall

US National Archives, 845.00/8-2347
[Extract]

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, MADRAS,
23 August 1947

Subject: Non-Accession of Hyderabad to the Indian Union

Sir,

[Paras 1 to 8 omitted]

[9]. The Nizam on August 15 issued a *firman* continuing the status quo of Berar, i.e., its continued administration as a unit with the Central Provinces, and announced that he was negotiating with the Dominion of India for other permanent arrangements. There seems little else that he could do.

[10]. "The Nizam's 'freedom from discord'" did not entirely materialize in Hyderabad State on the occasion of Independence Day and the days following. Reports of disturbances, shootings, and arrests throughout the State have slowly been published and it now appears that approximately a dozen people were killed and at least a hundred injured. Even before the 15th attempt of the State Congress to hold meetings in defiance of the Public Meetings Regulation resulted in police action and arrests. In one case, the police solved the problem by cordoning off the area in which the meeting was to be held and directing traffic by other roads.

[11]. There were celebrations in Hyderabad State on the 15th, as in the rest of India. However, these were for the emergence of the Nizam's Dominions as a sovereign state. By Government edict, the only places on which the Indian Union flag could be flown were those institutions still under the control of the Government of India, such as the Post and

Telegraph offices. Even in these instances it was required that the Nizam's flag be flown side by side with that of India. Many of the disorders were caused by attempts of Congress in defiance of this Regulation. The State Congress President, Swami Ramanand Tirth and others were arrested in Hyderabad city for such attempts. There were several reported desecrations of Indian flags by Muslims and even by the police. This was officially denied by the Nizam's Government, but has been widely publicized by Congress leaders, made the subject of protest telegrams to Nehru and Sardar Patel, and raised in the Constituent Assembly in Delhi. Telegrams protesting the partisan spirit of a unit of the Nizam's military forces, who were reported to have passed through Hyderabad city in lorries shouting *Pakistan Zindabad*, *Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad* and *Congress Murdabad* (Long Live Pakistan, Long live Jinnah, Down with Congress), were sent by H.C Hedda, a prominent Congress leader, to Sardar Patel and to the Nizam himself.

[12]. Disorders and arrests have occurred in at least a dozen places throughout the State, but as far as is known to date the worst disturbances occurred in Secunderabad, where communal tension was high. On several occasions the police opened fire to disperse mobs, with a total of ten reported killed in the city. A 24-hour curfew was imposed on the city and by the 20th the city was again quiet, although bearing the appearance of a deserted town according to the press accounts. It was announced that the curfew would continue until the 24th.

[13]. On the 21st, the Nizam issued a *firman* announcing that he intended to "associate my people of all classes and creeds with my Government". With this in view, reforms are to be introduced by October 1947, "whereby the number of public members in the Executive Council will be increased and the Legislative Assembly will be invested with further powers". That such reforms are needed is obvious, but they will probably not be sufficiently far-reaching to satisfy anyone.

[14]. A late news item of the 21st, appearing in yesterday's *Hindu*, reports that the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, the Muslim party organization, has passed a resolution expressing lack of confidence in the Nawab of Chhatari, the Prime Minister, and demanding the resignation of Nawab Ali Yar [Yavar] Jung Bahadur,² Minister for Constitutional Affairs, and Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Adviser to the Government. Under the present regime, if the Congress is right in its estimate of the power of the Muslim organization, this would mean that the ministers will be replaced. That Congress is right is evidenced by reports in today's Madras morning papers that all three ministers have resigned. It was not an official announcement and no mention was made of possible successor.

[15]. There can be no conclusion to these events, unless it is agreement with the Congress Party's assertion that it finally wrested India from the British and can take care of the Nizam by the same methods. The Nizam's Dominions will probably remain a troubled spot, in or out of the Dominion of India. Its people no doubt feel as a native of Travancore expressed himself in the Consulate General recently: "We're not interested in whether or not the State joins the Dominion. Give us representative Government and we will decide such things for ourselves".

Respectfully yours,
ROY E. B. BOWER
American Consul

H-268.

He resigned on 22 August. See the *Pakistan Times* 24 August 1947.

H-271

Vallabhbhai Patel to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

STATES DEPARTMENT [NEW DELHI,]
24 August 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have been thinking very seriously about the Hyderabad position and I wish to let Your Excellency know my mind before you meet the Delegation.

2. I see no alternative but to insist on the Nizam's accession to the Dominion of India. The least variations in the Instrument of Accession or arrangement regarding the States' association with the Dominion in regard to the three subjects would not only expose me to the charge of breach of faith with the States that have already joined the Dominion, but would create the impression that advantage lay in holding out rather than coming in and that while no special merit attached to accession, beneficial position could be secured by keeping out. This is bound to have most unfortunate consequences in our future negotiations for accession to the Union.

3. We have also to recognize that the State has not sent any representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly, although mere representation of a State in the Constituent Assembly did not commit it to accession to the Union. Popular demand for such representation has been systematically stifled. The affairs of the State, at least in regard to the

constitutional association with the Indian Dominion, are being conducted in utter disregard of the sympathies and natural inclination of the majority community in the State. On the other hand, the minority which is the Ruling Class is allowed to have more or less its own way and that way clearly is of coercion and violent agitation. I have authentic information that the recent activities of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* are designed almost to create a feeling of terror amongst the non-Muslim population, so that its agitation in favour of the independence of Hyderabad with possible alliance with Pakistan should flourish. It is a militant organization with an intensely communal appeal and there are indications that it receives active support from responsible Muslims, both inside and outside Government. Indeed there are what seem to be fairly reliable reports that it is being sponsored by H.E.H. himself. I have also had very reliable reports from Hyderabad that the period of two months, which we have agreed to give to the State to make up its mind, is being utilized for preparations rather than for negotiations. The publication of the Nizam's letter of the 8th August,¹ the *firman*s issued relating to 15th August, and the events in the State on that day and since then seem to be designed with the sole object of establishing independent status, as soon as possible, so that at the end of this stipulated period of two months we should be faced with facts either accomplished or as nearly accomplished as possible.

4. In these circumstances, I am convinced that it would neither be proper nor politic for us to agree to any arrangement other than the Instrument of Accession already settled between us and the other States. If the intentions of His Exalted Highness are bona fide and friendly, and if he is minded to translate the true expression, the will and the interests of his people into action, there is no doubt at all that he should without hesitation adopt the course which all other States have chosen. As Your Excellency is aware, among those States there are some Muslim Rulers, who, in their sympathies, apart from those of their subjects are not differently placed from His Exalted Highness.

5. If, however, the Nizam's Government are still unable to decide their course in the only right direction in which it lies, His Exalted Highness must agree to submit the issue to the judgment of his people and abide by their decision. We, on our side, will be content to accept whatever might be the result of such a referendum and should be prepared to include Berar in the plans for referendum.²

6. There is, however, one thing which is quite clear and should be

beyond dispute and that is that a decision on the issue cannot, in my judgement, be postponed any longer.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹H-268.

²When Mir Laik Ali offered to hold a plebiscite in a meeting with Mountbatten on 7 June 1948, under the supervision of the UN, the proposal was rejected by India. See FOA, 1(1)/51-27, paras 46-7, *Memorandum on the Hyderabad Case*, submitted by Hyderabad Government to the UN in August 1948.

H-272

Louis Mountbatten to Walter Monckton

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI,
25 August 1947

Since despatch of my private telegram which is now cancelled Nizam has telegraphed¹ to me that you enjoy his full confidence and he wishes you to go on as his Constitutional Adviser, as if you retire at this juncture there will be great difficulty to find someone to take your place in current negotiations. His Exalted Highness pays handsome tribute to the useful and faithful service you have given to Hyderabad not only as Constitutional Adviser but also as a true friend of Hyderabad for a period of fifteen years.

The Nizam asks me to invite you to come to Delhi to continue discussions.

I therefore earnestly request you and your wife to come as soon as possible and stay with me at Government House.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

¹The Nizam of Hyderabad had requested Mountbatten on 24 August 1947 to persuade Monckton to withdraw his resignation and participate in the Hyderabad negotiations. See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*, and telegram of the same date from Monckton to Mountbatten, see *ibid.* Not printed.

H-273

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

HYDERABAD DECCAN,
28 August 1947

I am grateful to Your Excellency for your telegram of twenty-seventh [twenty-sixth] August.¹ Necessary assurance is being conveyed to Sir Walter Monckton which will enable him to continue negotiations on my behalf. I am myself keen on negotiations being continued without delay on the basis of my letters and telegrams to you. I should also like to point out that the problem and the constitutional position of Hyderabad are such that the question of referendum does not arise.

NIZAM

See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-274

Walter Monckton to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

SECRET AND PERSONAL

LAKE VIEW HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
[Undated] August 1947

My dear Dickie,

The next stage in Hyderabad negotiations is a little tricky. I am anxious that there shall be no breakdown through intransigence on either side or stupidity on ours. If one side shouts "Treaty" and the other "Accession",¹ we shall get nowhere.

I am satisfied, as you know, that the interests of Hyderabad and the Dominion alike demand a close association. The fruitful discussions will be between you and me, but the Hyderabad Committee will have to have discussions with V.P. [Menon] also and perhaps with Sardar Patel. I hope in these latter discussions you can discourage the Dominion representatives from insisting at the outset on accession as a necessary prerequisite to any detailed talks on subjects which will need negotiation whatever the form of association. Can we not, in the first stages, use (as Krishna Menon

suggested) the neutral term "agreement" and see how far integration can be pushed? A big step towards integration has already been taken by Hyderabad accepting, in effect, direction from the Dominion in the three essential fields of policy. Can't we hammer out the implications of this in the sub-division of these subjects for a start? My idea would be for the State to accept Dominion Legislation in these fields as "normative", i.e. we should have to pass legislation in the State which followed the line or standard of the Dominion legislation, but with the power to make changes in detail (but not in principle) to suit local conditions. (This is the line taken with regard to legislation made necessary by the retrocession of railway jurisdiction).

I believe that a friendly partnership association over our port problem would do more to tie Hyderabad permanently to the Dominion than anything else. If, for instance, the Dominion and Hyderabad mutually agreed to develop the port of Marmagoa, not only would this involve an identification of interest from which extrication would be extremely difficult, but observe that implications of the fact that Hyderabad can never get to Marmagoa except through Dominion territory. (Nobody will seriously suggest a corridor and, if such a suggestion were made, the corridor would be permanently indefensible). The point can be put in a sentence. Hyderabad needs an outlet to the sea but, on this solution, it would always hold it on sufferance from the Dominion.

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

¹The Nizam telegraphed Mountbatten on 23 August to say that he was not prepared to negotiate accession but ready to negotiate some agreement. See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-275

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
1 September 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Your Excellency probably knows how critical the political situation has now become in Hyderabad. A body of Muslims, which is known as the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, has a man as its President¹ who is somewhat demented. Anyway he is very far from being a statesman. Whatever he

does, he does in a blind and thoughtless manner often causing complications. As a recent example of this, I may mention that only two months ago this man had expressed the fullest confidence in the Negotiating Committee which includes the President of the Council and Sir Walter Monckton; but by his folly he caused obstruction in the work of this Committee which till then had been going on smoothly. The result was that Sir Walter Monckton left the Committee.² His next attack was on Ali Yavar Jang³ who had been doing satisfactory work for a long time as Member of the Council. Matters went so far that this man made a condition that if Ali Yavar Jang resigned from the Committee, the Muslim community would have confidence in the President of the Council and in Sir Walter Monckton for carrying on the negotiations. He then had a talk with these two gentlemen and after some discussion declared that his misunderstanding had been removed and promised to get a Resolution of Confidence in them passed by his community.⁴ But all this resulted in nothing as he did not keep his promise but, on the contrary, said that he could not get such a resolution passed due, of course, to his dirty tactics played behind the back of some of the members of his association who did not approve his objectionable behaviour in this connection. In fact, I am told, a split has already occurred among the members who, I believe, are going to pass a vote of no-confidence in this fellow soon. In fact, his present object is that Sir Walter Monckton and the President of the Council should be removed from office, and replaced by persons, ignorant of law and administration, as President of the Council and as Constitutional Adviser. These are the preposterous ideas entertained by this stupid person who is a man of low station. Apart from this, the persons who are members of the body including its head, are either *vakils* of ordinary standing or men who were at one time employed in private service or legal practitioners in the High Court here. It is not possible for such men to understand difficult political questions, so all they do is to make a clamour or raise an outcry, not being able to achieve anything more solid or substantial.

2. To sum up, I have informed this man, whose name is Qasim Rizvi, that the administration of the State cannot be made a child's play. Nor can I, as a Ruler, act upon the suggestions of an irresponsible and worthless person such as he and that I must use my own discretion and responsibility. The Council of Ministers comes next which looks to the administration and works under the guidance of the Nizam. But it is necessary that the Council should be composed of able and experienced men and not persons of small position or calibre who carry no weight with the public at all.

3. Anyway, my desire is that I and my Council should together carry out the negotiations, with due wisdom and statesmanship in view of the present critical time. I, therefore, want the President of the Council and the Constitutional Adviser only to take part in the negotiations. It is not necessary for a third person to join the Committee who instead of being able to do a service to the State may only prove to be a hindrance. The Committee can afterwards inform me of the progress of the negotiations so that I may know how matters stand, to enable me to arrive at a final decision after consultation with my Council. Unless this course is followed, I am afraid only waste of time will result, while complications may be added every day.

4. I hope Your Excellency is in agreement with the views expressed by me above and that the method of work I have suggested meets with your approval; for my only object is to bring the negotiations to as speedy a conclusion as possible with desired effects.

5. In conclusion, I trust Your Excellency, not only as the Governor-General of India but also a distinguished member of the Royal Family of England, will help the Faithful Ally of the British Government in all the important affairs of the State which are on the arrival now, so that they may be settled in a manner satisfactory to all concerned without unnecessary delay.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹Qasim Rizvi.

²Monckton informed the Hyderabad Executive Council on 15 September, 1947 that he was returning to England due to lack of confidence of the State's Muslims in him. See H-279, para 10.

³Member, Negotiating Committee.

⁴Nizam immediately issued a *Firman* expressing his displeasure over these ill-informed attacks and criticism by the *Ittehad-ul Muslimeen's* leaders against these members of negotiating team and warned them to refrain from such conduct in future. See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-276

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten
Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
6 September 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

In continuation of my letter dated 1st September 1947,¹ marked Personal and Confidential, I wish to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge

one more matter. It is that besides Qasim Rizvi who is the head of the Muslim body known as the "*Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*", there is another man belonging to the same body, known as Abdur Rahim, who is an elected Member of the Council of Ministers. Your Excellency must have met the latter sometime ago when he went to Delhi as a member of my Negotiating Committee.² This man is also a *Vakil* of ordinary standing who is totally unacquainted with political affairs. As he is connected with this body, he is like a puppet who dances when his leader pulls the strings. He fears that if he were not to do this he would be removed from the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* by a vote of no confidence and be compelled to resign from the Council of Ministers—a fat job which he never enjoyed in his life before. Anyway, this man, like the other members of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, is a person of no consequence; they take a narrow-minded view of things, that is to say, they are not far-sighted at all, and lack vision completely. It was through the gross folly of these people that a most unjustified resolution of no confidence was passed by the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* against my President of the Council, Sir Walter Monckton and Ali Yavar Jung and thus the course of negotiations was obstructed. Some time ago, in connection with a letter which Sir Walter Monckton wrote to him, he submitted a lengthy communication to me, an English translation of which I handed over personally to Sir Walter so that he may not be unacquainted with the duplicity of this man. If Your Excellency wishes to know the facts you may ask Sir Walter Monckton, who, I am sure, will explain to you what it is.³ In short, all these people are the followers of a certain gentleman⁴ who used to be in Delhi and who has now made Karachi his headquarters. They consult him in all matters and are his disciples.⁵

2. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I should add that I have had friendly relations with this gentleman for a long time. I have, however, told him plainly that whenever necessary I will consult him from time to time as a friend with regard to Hyderabad's political affairs but that the ultimate decision will be mine as I know full well that Pakistan is separated from Hyderabad by a great distance and that he can give me only moral but not material support. I cannot thus rely on his verbal assurances and he recognizes this position thoroughly.

3. Finally, I hope that Your Excellency will help me. If so, your period of Governor-Generalship will always be remembered in Hyderabad, in fact in my family. For Your Excellency is connected with the Royal Family of England and the Nizams have been Faithful Allies of the British Government for a long time.

4. I hope Your Excellency and Lady Mountbatten are well and that you will both be able to pay a visit to Hyderabad in the near future and thus will give me the pleasure of entertaining you as the exalted guests of the Ruler of the Premier State in India.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹H-275.

²See H-270.

³The Nizam wrote another letter to Mountbatten on 18 September 1947, about the activities of Qasim Rizvi and Abdur Rahim. Nizam criticized them for first passing resolution expressing no-confidence against Nawab Chhatari and Walter Monckton for their mishandling of Delhi negotiations, and then withdrawing it. At the end of the letter, Nizam apologized for using "somewhat strong and unvarnished language" against these "unscrupulous politicians and their mean and unworthy behaviour". See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

⁴Possibly refers to Jinnah.

⁵See H-312.

H-277

*Nizam of Hyderabad to Clement Attlee*¹

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

PERSONAL

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
8 September 1947

Dear Mr Attlee,

I hope you will excuse me for taking a rather unusual course in addressing this letter. On my part, I feel justified in view of the privilege that I and my ancestors have had of associating with the British Empire for about a century and a half, and my earnest desire at the moment to avoid recurrence in my State of the unparalleled disorders and mass bloodshed and misery prevalent all over the Punjab and other parts of India.

2. The political events in the sub-continent of India, during the past three months, have moved with a swiftness beyond all anticipation and estimation. I fully appreciate that the issues at stake were so grave and so numerous that proper attention in details could naturally not be given to all of them. Nevertheless, I and my people feel disappointed that a mutually satisfactory formula in regard to future relationship between the new Dominions and Great Britain and Hyderabad had not been evolved prior to the conferring of Dominion status to India and Pakistan. I do not wish in this letter to

dilate upon the history, events, treaties, and traditions which gave Hyderabad a place peculiar to itself in the British Empire, but I am really sorry to find that with the change of events all these obligations have unilaterally been brought to a sudden end.

3. I do appreciate that His Majesty's Government find that the discharge of mutual obligations of such long standing is beyond practical possibility but, I still firmly believe that, your Government through the good offices of Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General, can exert sufficient moral and material influence to bring about an honourable and amicable settlement between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad without impairing the dignity of my House and my people and without putting my State to material disadvantage. In the absence of such a settlement, I foresee a great deal of internal and external disorders, bloodshed and chaos such as are now prevalent in the East and West Punjab and other parts of India and which can indeed even now be avoided in Hyderabad. I would here like to make clear that I do not for a moment wish to place the Government of India in any really difficult position by terms and conditions which are likely to embarrass them or create serious complications in the future administration and working of that Dominion. I feel certain that without going to that extent a satisfactory solution can be found which would still maintain the honour and prestige so dear to myself and my people.

4. I am sure you would appreciate my views and would extend your generous support in keeping with your noble traditions.

5. I am forwarding this letter through Mir Laik Ali whom I have instructed to submit it to you and to convey to you my very deep and sincere regards.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹Under an authorization of British Prime Minister, copies of this letter and subsequent two documents, H-281 and H-282 were supplied to Mountbatten through British High Commissioner in Delhi on 1 October 1947. See F. 200/71-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-278

*Note by Louis Mountbatten of an Interview with Walter Monckton
and Nawab of Chhatari*

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]
10 September 1947

I told the Nawab Chhatari [on 8 September] that I had been having

some extremely useful talks with Sir Walter Monckton during his stay here as my guest; and I invited the Nawab to move over to Government House in view of the risk, in the present riotous conditions, of his staying at Hyderabad House. He gratefully accepted.

I told the Nawab that it was my considered opinion that all the Indian States had been offered such excellent terms in the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement that it was not possible to imagine a more advantageous arrangement. Hyderabad could not hope to look after their External Affairs or their Defence by themselves, and they were cut off from the rest of the world except by communication through India. It would be a positive disadvantage to Hyderabad to have to try and deal with these three subjects on their own.

The Nawab entirely agreed, but he thought that H.E.H. still wanted a treaty. I told him that Sardar Patel had sent me written instructions that he would only [*sic*] to agree to the Instrument of Accession.

We all agreed that it would be disastrous if this intransigence of our respective principals meant that no agreement was to be reached between them.

Sir Walter expressed the view that he could probably bring H.E.H. round to the point of offering an agreement in terms far more like the Instrument of Accession than the original offer of a treaty. The Nawab agreed.

I told them that in view of all the troubles and riots with which the Central Government now had to deal, Hyderabad was a problem of much less pressing moment, and, therefore, there was a better chance than at any time of obtaining their consent to some variation in the Instrument of Accession. I did not propose to worry Sardar Patel with the various intermediate steps still required in Hyderabad, since it was quite clear that the next document would in itself not be acceptable.

We agreed, therefore, that they should go back and attempt to obtain the next document from H.E.H. as soon as possible. They agreed it would require a further visit in order to obtain the final document. I told them that my view was that the final document should be presented to the Government of India in the form of the printed Instrument of Accession with the minimum possible changes indicated in red ink; e.g. the title might well be "Agreement of Association", etc.

I suggested that for H.E.H.'s benefit the document should be typed out afresh, paragraphed differently and arranged in such a way that it would appear to be a document specially drawn up for H.E.H. of Hyderabad.

By this means it appeared to me that both sides would be most likely to agree.

I tackled the Nawab on the question of having placed an order for £ 3,000,000 worth of arms in Czechoslovakia.¹

He said that this order had been placed without his knowledge by the Minister of War, but could, of course, only be of a provisional nature since it required the Prime Minister's approval which he had no intention of giving. The order, however, was not for £3, 000,000, but for a quite small amount. The figure £3,000,000 represented the total sterling balances available to Hyderabad in London.

He agreed that the order should not be proceeded with, but pointed out that the Government of India had stopped the normal supply of arms to Hyderabad. I replied that this was a Standstill Agreement arrangement in force for all Provinces and States, but that it was now in process of being lifted. By the time that the Hyderabad agreement was reached, I had no doubt that the ban would be lifted and that they would be able to obtain the arms they required.

Finally, I attacked the Nawab on the rumour that he had thrown out the A.P.I.² correspondent; and he replied that this was quite untrue, but that the Muslim Press in Hyderabad had decided to boycott A.P.I news although the Government continued to be subscribers to the news and were on good terms.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

Mountbatten had, on 29 August 1947, brought to the knowledge of Walter Monckton, that Government of India would protest on the proposed purchase of defence equipment worth £ 3 million from Czech Government by Hyderabad. See F 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

²Associated Press of India.

H-279

Note by Walter Monckton for Executive Council, Hyderabad

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
15 September 1947

I wanted an opportunity before my departure to England to explain my policy and give a final opinion on the situation.

1. My object has been to advise a course calculated to obtain for Hyderabad the maximum degree of real, practical independence, compatible with its prosperity and security.

2. In working for that object we have to recognize and take into account the facts as they are and remember that they may not all be permanent.

3. The overmastering immediate facts include the facts:

- a. that Hyderabad is landlocked in the belly of Hindustan;
- b. that Pakistan is not yet in a sufficiently established state to be able to give effective help;
- c. that, therefore, if Hyderabad is to remain independent, she must stand on her own feet.

4. I have, therefore, been in favour of the policy which H.E.H. has adopted in the *firmans*, speeches and letters which I have drafted on his instructions. They will be printed in the brochure¹ shortly to be published to which I have also contributed a foreword. I am content that my work over the past five months should be judged on the basis of that brochure.

5. The guiding principle has been to avoid executing an Instrument of Accession. But our geographical and economic position manifestly calls for a policy ensuring, short of accession, the goodwill and co-operation and not the hostility of the Dominion which surrounds us. I have, therefore, advised an attempt to negotiate a Treaty of Association with that Dominion.

6. The main reasons for preferring a treaty or, if the word proved an impregnable obstacle in negotiations, an Agreement of Association are:

- a. that a treaty or agreement, short of accession, preserves independence in law, whereas accession destroys it and involves merger or organic union;
- b. that, when circumstances change, e.g., if Pakistan and Hyderabad grew strong enough to warrant it, the treaty can be denounced or the agreement determined, and fresh arrangements can be made, e.g., (if desired) strengthening ties with the other Dominion and [loosening] the association with the Dominion of India. But once a State has acceded to the Dominion, it will find it hard to extricate itself.

7. I wanted the negotiations to continue for Hyderabad as long as possible after 15 August. I thought (and think) the longer they continue the better for us for:

- a. we have a breathing space to get ready for the economic and political conflict if it comes;
- b. we may find that the Dominion of India itself is in its early months in too great difficulties to encourage it to take too intransigent a line with Hyderabad. The troubles in the Punjab and New Delhi may illustrate this.

8. I know that Mr Patel was and is against any extension of time to Hyderabad and that the Viceroy prevailed over the Cabinet of the Dominion to allow him personally two months' time to see whether he

and I, who had known each other intimately for many years publicly and privately, could find a compromise satisfactory to both sides. The Viceroy, now the Governor-General, has himself informed the President [Nawab of Chhatari] orally and H.E.H. by telegram of this.

9. Unfortunately before I saw him last time I had (together with the President and the Constitutional Member) lost the confidence of organized Muslim opinion in the State. The Governor-General pointed out to me that the Hindus in the State would naturally wish to accede and it was not much good his trying to satisfy me with concessions because I could not speak for the Muslims. He added that H.E.H. had expressed by telegram and letter in emphatic terms his complete confidence in me but that the days, when this would be enough, were over.

10. The present situation is of course that the Muslim[s'] lack of confidence in me has been reaffirmed and I am returning to England. But H.E.H. has asked me to see the Governor-General with the President before I go and to deliver his letter, declining to continue negotiations unless accession is treated as out of the question. He wants me, if possible, to keep the negotiations alive on a treaty basis.

11. I shall do my best but I think the chances of success are remote. I regret, though only from the point of view of tactics, the passage in this last letter from H.E.H. which in effect rules out negotiations unless it is first agreed that Hyderabad will not accede. I should have preferred, while maintaining the decision not to accede, not to make acceptance of this position a condition precedent to further negotiations. Most of the Congress Ministers, including Mr Patel, would be glad to see negotiations ended. And this gives them their chance, especially as the Governor-General no longer attends Cabinet meetings.

12. The Council should, therefore, in my opinion, assume that there will be a breakdown in negotiations. I think that the situation, if this happens, is better than it would have been on 15 August, in one respect at least. I do not think that the Dominion Government will now indulge in an open economic boycott. I have pressed the Governor-General hard about this and he has informed H.E.H. through me that he will not be a party to any improper pressure on the State, and that he has received the necessary assurances from his Ministers.

13. What I think Hyderabad must be prepared to meet is:

- a. a violent propaganda campaign against the State inside India and in England and the US;
- b. a recrudescence of trouble from the State Congress who are likely to get financial help from the Congress Party (not of course from Dominion Government as such);

c. a great deal of covert economic, financial and business pressure and obstacles.

14. There is, moreover, the fear that at a later stage, if it becomes necessary to deal severely with hostile Hindu elements in the State, the Dominion Government might find an excuse (however specious) to say they cannot stand by and see the Hindus oppressed and ill-treated in the State, which is wholly within their borders; they might then ultimately intervene by force. Or again, if there were interruptions in railway, telegraphic or telephonic communications in the State, the Dominion might make an opportunity to intervene on the ground that these are through communications vital to the security of the Dominion.

15. H.E.H. has asked me to continue to serve his interests in England, and I propose to do my best to see that the most influential political and press circles in the United Kingdom, the USA and Europe are fully acquainted with H.E.H.'s policy as set out in the forthcoming brochure. I shall hope that for this purpose the Hyderabad Government will from time to time keep me informed of major changes in the political situation.

[WALTER MONCKTON]

Not traceable.

H-280

Vallabhbhai Patel to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B

SECRET

NEW DELHI,
19 September 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Herewith I am sending you the latest information which I have received from Hyderabad. I gave a copy to Menon yesterday to be delivered to you, but it is possible that, in the hurry of his departure, he could not do so. I am, therefore, sending you another copy. This makes it quite clear what the next approach of Hyderabad to you is going to be and how the Nizam has mortgaged his future to his own Frankenstein, *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*.

[Para 2 omitted]

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

Enclosure to H-280
*Extract from a letter from Hyderabad*¹

SECRET

13 September 1947

I saw Sir Walter Monckton today and this is what he said: That V.P. Menon had told him that if only Hyderabad would accede, the States Department would be very very liberal towards the State. They grant them a port and construct a railway sharing the cost as per mileage and would not levy extra customs. Currency, postage and other indicia that are now being enjoyed would be continued. As regards Berar, he would retain his titular sovereignty, the sum of [Rs] 25 lacs would be paid and he would be consulted as before in the appointment of the Governor of C.P. His flag would fly, which is now no longer flying, and it is just possible that the Indian Union may even agree to separate Berar from C.P. but the condition precedent for all this would be (a) acceding to the Union; and (b) responsible Government in the State.

It may even take the shape of Agreement of Association so long as the substance of the items is agreed to.

[2] H.E.H. would not look at it. He said "come what may I am not going to accede".²

[3] H.E.H. is very much disappointed and angry with Jinnah that in spite of his asking for the services of Zafrulla Khan, Jinnah preferred to send him to the U.N.O. He has, therefore, wired to Sir Sultan Ahmed to come. Sir Sultan will now take the place of Monckton.

[Paras 4 to 7 omitted]

[8] The *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* passed a resolution reiterating its previous resolution on want of confidence in Monckton, Chhatari and Ali Yavar Jung.

Monckton informed me that he told H.E.H. that he is entirely mistaken in being led by Jinnah for after all whatever advice Jinnah tendered would always be coloured by that, which will be beneficial to Pakistan and not to his State. He will merely make him the instrument for achieving something good for Pakistan.

¹The source of information or name of the correspondent was not disclosed by V.P. Menon, Secretary States Department, who had received the letter on 17 September, 1947. See F. 200/70-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

²Mountbatten had an impression that Pakistan influence was in the ascendant in Hyderabad as confirmed by Monckton. In a letter of 26 September 1947 to Monckton, he was apprehensive that though Hyderabad would not accede to Pakistan, "but with H. E. H.'s extreme advisers one cannot predict where things will lead to". See F. 200/71-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-281

*Clement Attlee to Nizam of Hyderabad**Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-A*10 DOWNING STREET,
WHITE HALL [LONDON,]

21 September 1947

My dear Nizam,

I have received your personal letter of 8 September,¹ brought by the hand of Mir Laik Ali with whom I had an interesting talk.

I and my colleagues felt a very real regret at the severance on August 15 of the relations which had so long existed between this country and the Indian States and notably Hyderabad, and I would assure you that this inevitable constitutional change implies no diminution in our feelings of friendship.

We realize that the establishment of the two separate Dominions of India and Pakistan has confronted Your Exalted Highness with a grave and perplexing problem, the solution of which has undoubtedly been made all the more difficult by the tragic outbursts of communal violence which have strained relations between the two new Dominions.

I do not think my Government is in a position to tender advice to the Indian Government or to Your Exalted Highness as to the precise constitutional relationship which it would be best to establish between Hyderabad and India. I welcome very warmly your assurance that you are anxious to enter into such a relationship. I cannot, however, judge whether the Indian Government will find it possible to recognize the position of Hyderabad by adopting some special form of association differing fundamentally from that governing its relationship with other Indian States.

I believe it to be the case that the Indian Government have agreed that Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General should continue to play a part in the negotiations between India and Hyderabad, and I am confident that he will use every endeavour to bring about an honourable and lasting settlement.

Yours sincerely,
C. R. ATTLEE

¹H-277.

H-282

Commonwealth Relations Office to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/70-B
[Extract]

[LONDON,]

21 September 1947

Mir Laik Ali, second delegate from Pakistan to United Nations, called to see the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 17th September. [Rest of the para omitted]

Mr Ali then turned to Hyderabad, of which State he is a subject. After conveying personal greetings from the Nizam, he told Mr Bevin¹ that the Nizam was afraid that if India kept up present economic pressure against Hyderabad, disorders would break out as bad as or worse than those in Punjab. No arms act was enforced in the State, and there were estimated to be over a million weapons in private hands. Southern India had been relatively quiet hitherto, but if communal disorders broke out in Hyderabad they would rapidly spread through Southern and Central India. Nizam was willing to concede to Government of India all rights in Defence, External Affairs and Communications which had been conceded by (? large majority) of States but he was reluctant to surrender independence of his State and wanted to reserve his freedom of action if India withdrew from Commonwealth. Mr Bevin promised to give thought to this matter also.

Above is for your information, it is being repeated to Shone.²

[CRO, LONDON]

¹Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, Britain.

²Terence Allen Shone, British High Commissioner in India.

H-283

Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

24 September 1947

My dear Nizam,

I have received Your Exalted Highness's letter of the 18th September

1947 and have been supplied with a copy of the Heads of Agreement referred to therein. I have further held a conference with the Hyderabad Negotiating Committee at which the views entertained by my Government and yours were once again fully discussed.

I promised at that conference that I would have the Heads of Agreement carefully examined. This has been done and I have received the views of my Ministry. They remain of the opinion that the Instrument of Accession contains terms most generous to the States and that the Dominion has not asked for anything which would deprive the States of any rights or powers which they have hitherto enjoyed. Moreover, in view of what they have said to other States which have acceded, my Government would find it very difficult to offer any other Instrument to any State. Nevertheless, they recognize to the full the unique position of Hyderabad and would be prepared to go to any reasonable length to smooth away any difficulties which impede Your Exalted Highness's accession.

But the Heads of Agreement do not afford a satisfactory solution. My Government observe that these give no legislative power to the Dominion; and this is an arrangement which they cannot accept. Moreover, it is to be noted that in External Affairs, Hyderabad, while disclaiming any immediate intention of pursuing an extensive foreign policy, demands the right to enter into direct political relations with any foreign power. Hyderabad has never exercised any such right in the past and the claim to exercise it for the future removes much of the substance from the promise that Hyderabad will ensure that its foreign policy is in general conformity with the foreign policy of the Dominion.

It would serve no useful purpose for me in this letter to enter into a more detailed examination of the Heads of Agreement, but it has been observed that they refer to Hyderabad's stamps and currency. I am able to assure you that, if Hyderabad accedes, there will be no difficulty in securing the continuance of all existing rights of this character. Indeed, if Your Exalted Highness is prepared to accede, you will receive the fullest co-operation from the Dominion in obtaining for your State any arrangements which you may reasonably suggest for the advantage and prosperity of Hyderabad. Nor need Your Exalted Highness apprehend any interference with your internal sovereignty and autonomy within Hyderabad.

In these circumstances, I earnestly hope that Your Exalted Highness will feel ready to reconsider the position in the interests both of Hyderabad and

the Dominion and to execute the Instrument of Accession.

Yours very Sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-284

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-A
[Extract]

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
26 September 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have had a full report from the Hyderabad Negotiating Committee of their interview with Your Excellency of 22nd September 1947.¹ I have now received Your Excellency's letter of the 24th September 1947.² I am disappointed to see that your Ministers do not find in my letter to you of the 18th September³ and the Heads of Agreement referred to in it a basis for compromise or even for discussion. It is of course true that my proposals do not give the Dominion legislative power in respect of my State but, as Your Excellency will have understood, this is implicit in the decision that Hyderabad cannot accede, of which (together with my reasons for it) I have informed you in my previous letters. I have always been ready and willing to discuss any form of association between the Dominion and Hyderabad, short of accession. I hoped that, if we put our proposals in the form of concrete terms and provisions, the Government of the Dominion would be prepared to discuss them in details as a practical contribution towards a reasonable settlement and that, if they were not satisfied with them, they would make counter-suggestions for their improvement which we should (as I said in my letter to you) have been glad to consider with them.

[Paras 2 and 3 omitted]

4. Finally, let me assure Your Excellency once more, as I have assured you in previous letters that, short of accession, I am ready now, and shall remain ready at any future time when the Dominion of India wishes to reopen negotiations, to enter into a treaty or agreement

about the three subjects of External Affairs, Defence and Communications.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹See H-283.

²Ibid.

³F. 200/70-B, para 5, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-285

*Record of Louis Mountbatten Interview with Sultan Ahmed and
V. P. Menon*

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-A

[NEW DELHI,]
1 October 1947

[First two paragraphs omitted¹]

He [Sultan Ahmed] had informed H.E.H. that he was not prepared to conduct any major negotiations on behalf of Hyderabad except with the original team i.e. Monckton and Chhatari, and all three had accepted this position and Sir Walter had offered to return from England at two days' notice if necessary.

In the meanwhile, Sir Sultan said that the Nizam had noted that my letter² did not entirely slam the door in his face, and he was most anxious that there should be no breakdown in the negotiations, and this was the reason for Sir Sultan's present visit to Delhi.

I told him that my Government were still insistent that H.E.H. must accede, and that they would not accept the present treaty or agreement.

Sir Sultan told me that H.E.H. would not accede, but would accept the Heads of Agreement,³ and was prepared to discuss this amendment to suit the Government of India.

I asked him whether he thought that it would be profitable to try and follow the line of obtaining agreement for a limited period so that the Heads of Agreement could be tried out on both sides on the understanding that after four months, fresh negotiations should be started which must be completed within six months. Sir Sultan said he thought this quite hopeful though Mr V.P. Menon was not sure that Patel would accept this.

In any case, we all agreed that this was a profitable line to pursue. I pointed to Sir Sultan that there were at least two things in the Heads of Agreement which my Government would never look at, firstly the

idea of Hyderabad not being compelled to pass the same legislation within Hyderabad on the Central subjects which were passed by the Central Government, i.e. normative legislation. The second was the Nizam's claim to be allowed to appoint his own diplomatic representatives abroad. Sir Sultan said, and I entirely agreed, that this was a ridiculous plan.

Here again, I told him that I could see a solution along the lines which the Dutch and Indonesians had worked out before the recent breakdown in their negotiations. I pointed out that the Dutch Ambassador had informed me that the post of First Secretary was to have been held by an Indonesian, thus representing Indonesian interests within the framework of the Dutch Embassy. I suggested that an Assistant High Commissioner might be appointed in London and Karachi (the two towns in which H.E.H. apparently wanted representation) and that this Assistant High Commissioner could be nominated by H.E.H., but would have to serve on the High Commissioner's Staff and be part of his team, though specializing on Hyderabad matters. Sir Sultan thought this a promising line to pursue.

Finally, I told him that I would urge my Government to authorize the preparation of a new Instrument of Accession which would contain certain unique features for the benefit of Hyderabad alone, such as possibly a clause relieving them of the obligation to secede from the Commonwealth if the Dominion of India proposed to secede in the new constitution. I pointed out that it would not be actually practicable to remain within the Commonwealth, but it would be a good bargaining counter both with the Dominion and the Commonwealth, provided my Government would pass it which was by no means certain; (b) a clause arranged for the joint development of a port in the Dominion of India territory outside Hyderabad for the special use of Hyderabad; (c) a legal acknowledgment of the Nizam's sovereignty over Berar, and any other points which might please H.E.H.

I told him that although my Government at present insisted on the original Instrument of Accession being signed, I felt it would be possible to reach the position in which they would accept the new Instrument of Accession, as long as it was really accession. I also felt it would be made so attractive for the Nizam that at the end of the trial period of the Heads of Agreement, he might positively prefer the Instrument of Accession to the Heads of Agreement, and in any case, would probably be offered no alternative but to get out and stay out of the Dominion, which Sir Sultan agreed with me would be the end of the Nizam's dynasty within a few years if not months.

Sir Sultan pointed out that there was one grave difficulty about

negotiating any further on the Heads of Agreement and that was that both Sir Walter Monckton and the Nawab of Chhatari would be required to attend the negotiations. On asking where Sir Walter was, he replied that he was in Bombay, and would probably be returning the following day to Hyderabad before finally leaving on Monday, and the Nawab of Chhatari, he thought, would remain in Hyderabad after Sir Walter Monckton had left.

I asked if he thought they could be brought up here, but that, Sir Sultan said, was too difficult at the moment.

I, therefore, suggested that I should send, with the concurrence of his Minister [Patel], Mr V.P. Menon to negotiate the Heads of Agreement in Hyderabad. Mr V.P. Menon thought his Minister would give him the necessary permission, and they could go on Friday morning and have the weekend for the negotiations. Sir Sultan did not seem to think this was a very brilliant idea, but the more I thought of it, the more I liked it.

I pointed out that every time the Monckton-Chhatari team had come to Delhi, their position had been undermined in Hyderabad, and whenever they had made progress in Delhi, they always appeared to have lost ground in Hyderabad. I said I had a hunch that this would be the right way of conducting the negotiations. Sir Walter Monckton and the Nawab of Chhatari could hold their ground in Hyderabad, and Mr V.P. Menon could slip in and might succeed in getting the present Instrument of Accession signed, with a few additional clauses.

Sir Sultan said that H.E.H. would never see Mr V.P. Menon, and that the negotiations would still have to be between the Monckton-Chhatari team and H.E.H. on one side, and Mr V.P. Menon on the other.

I replied "Nonsense, I'll send H.E.H. a letter saying that Mr V.P. Menon is my personal representative as well as the representative of the Government of India and that I shall be most grateful if H.E.H. would receive him and allow him to put forward the views of the Government of India direct to him."

Mr V.P. Menon and Sir Sultan left together to go through the Heads of Agreement.

These paragraphs dealt with the apology tendered by Mountbatten on behalf of Government of India to Sultan Ahmed, over the failure of Indian Airlines in providing a seat from Delhi to Hyderabad which had delayed urgent consultation with the Nizam and Walter Monckton in connection with Hyderabad negotiations.

²H 283

See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-286

*Note by Louis Mountbatten of his meeting with Walter Monckton,
Sultan Ahmed and V. P. Menon*

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-A

SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]

3 October 1947

Sir Walter explained that he was back completely in favour with the Nizam, who had insisted that any further negotiations with me must be carried out by him, the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Sultan Ahmed. He had, nevertheless, been on the point of leaving for England, since the Nizam had agreed that there was little point in his staying if negotiations were not going to continue or at least were not going to continue effectively.

I gave them the views which Sardar Patel had expressed at the immediately preceding interview, and Mr V. P. Menon agreed that I had correctly represented his views.

I went further and gave my view that my original idea of having a temporary agreement for four to six months was suggested at a time when I thought the situation would be as favourable six months hence as then. Mr V. P. Menon pointed out that this was very unlikely to be the case, as no one could tell what the situation would be in six months' time. I agreed and expressed the view that the situation was as favourable now as it was ever likely to be, and that if we failed to get a permanent solution now, there was a good chance of a permanent breakdown with all the incalculable consequences.

We agreed that the four of us, and indeed the five of us, since the Nawab of Chhatari was to continue to be one of the team, were and indeed had been for a considerable time in complete agreement: we all felt that it was as much in the interests of India as of Hyderabad that a permanent satisfactory solution should be found as soon as possible. We all agreed that the terms offered by India for accession were both fair and reasonable so far as Hyderabad was concerned, provided the Nizam would accept the word "accession", since he had come such a very long way in agreeing to the "Heads of Agreement".

This gave me a brainwave: I said: "Since all the negotiators are agreed that terms can be found which could be accepted by both Sardar Patel and the Nizam, then we are boggling at the word "accession". I suggest that we draw up a document which has no heading and which has a somewhat ambiguous beginning of the

“Know all men by these presents” type, and that this should be prepared on an expensive hand written scroll designed in such a way that it would not be apparent that there was no heading.

I suggested that Mr Menon should stay and endeavour to draft the terms of such a document in a manner that would be acceptable to Sardar Patel. He would then go to Hyderabad where he would meet Sir Walter Monckton and Sir Sultan Ahmed, and would try and amend the wording as necessary to meet the Nizam’s wishes, and finally that they should insist on the Nizam signing at once; for I felt that the sight of the Nizam’s signature on a document which gave India everything they wanted excepting the word “accession” would be almost too much for Sardar Patel to resist and he would doubtless authorize me to put my signature to it. I would then write “I accept this Instrument on behalf of the Government of India”, and then it would become an Instrument; and India could look upon it as Accession and Hyderabad upon it as Agreement; the fact remained that the terms would be quite clear and acceptable to both.

The meeting concluded by agreement to follow up this plan.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

[PS]

Mr V. P. Menon informed me the following day that he had managed to “sell” this idea to Sardar Patel who was willing at least to give this scheme a fair chance.

H-287

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-A

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
15 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I regret that we have not been able to reach a final agreement as to the eventual nature of the association between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India. But, as Your Excellency knows, I have always been ready to negotiate upon any basis, short of accession. And I am now enclosing a draft Standstill Agreement in a form in which I am prepared to execute it, but I am only prepared to do so on the understanding:

i. that in the event of war (which God forbid) between Pakistan

- and India, Hyderabad would be neutral; and
- ii. that the position between us would be reconsidered if the Dominion of India were to secede from the British Commonwealth of Nations;
 - iii. that each party implicitly undertakes not to encourage or permit within its borders movements or propaganda calculated to subvert or disturb the peace and order or the established Government of the other party.

I have not inserted provisions to cover any of these points in the Standstill Agreement, because, as to the first two, I do not want in a formal Agreement even to contemplate the possibility of hostilities between the two new Dominions or of the Indian Dominion leaving the British Commonwealth, and, as to the third, the inclusion of such a provision might seem to imply that one or other of the parties might act in a manner inconsistent with the whole basis of the Agreement.

2. It is of course manifest that my rights in regard to such matters as currency, coinage and postal rights are in no way impaired by the Standstill Agreement, but I should be glad if, in addition to assurances in respect of the matters dealt with in paragraph 1 of this letter, Your Excellency would make it clear that the rights to which I have just referred continue undiminished.

3. I should like to take this opportunity of suggesting that, in relation to passports, the Dominion of India should agree, as a matter of convenience in a question which is becoming urgent, to the Chief Secretary of my Government or some other appropriate officer issuing passports to Hyderabad subjects which would be countersigned by the Dominion.

4. I know well Your Excellency's interest in all steps taken to abate communal antagonism. It may, therefore, be of interest to you to know that, in conformity with earlier declarations on my part, I propose to issue a *Firman* in the immediate future expressing my firm resolve to protect the lives, rights and interests of all my subjects alike, irrespective of caste or creed.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

*Enclosure to H-287**Draft Standstill Agreement between the Government of the Dominion of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar*

WHEREAS it is the aim and policy of both parties to work together in close association and amity for the mutual benefit of both, and so to contribute to the stability of India as a whole; but they have not yet succeeded in reaching a final agreement as to the form and nature of such association.

AND WHEREAS it is to the benefit and advantage of the Dominion of India as well as of Hyderabad that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in matters of common concern should continue for the time being between the Dominion of India or any part thereof and Hyderabad:

AND WHEREAS pending such final agreement as aforesaid the parties have reached a Standstill Agreement in which provision is made in respect of External Affairs, Defence and Communications and administrative arrangements generally:

NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS AS FOLLOWS:-

In the Field of External Affairs:

1. The Nizam undertakes to adopt the following arrangements:-

a. The Nizam will maintain his Agent-General in the United Kingdom and will, if and when he so desires, appoint representatives in any Dominion of the British Commonwealth.

b. The Nizam will, if and when he so desires, appoint trade representatives in any country.

c. The Nizam will not, during the currency of this Agreement, exercise his right to appoint representatives otherwise than as aforesaid.

2. The subjects of the Nizam will be entitled as well to the services and protection of the Dominion of India and its representatives as to the services of the Nizam's representatives appointed as aforesaid.

3. The Dominion of India will facilitate freedom of transit between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad and assist Hyderabad in respect of passports, extradition and naturalization.

In the Field of Defence:

4. a. The Dominion of India will come to the aid of Hyderabad in defence of her territories against external aggression. Hyderabad will afford to the Dominion of India all facilities necessary for this purpose.

b. Should the Dominion of India become involved in hostilities, Hyderabad will immediately come to its aid. In the event of an imminent threat of hostilities, the parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence.

c. Hyderabad will raise and maintain in peace and contribute towards

the common defence of India in war a Hyderabad force in accordance with the following conditions:-

i. The size of the Force shall be agreed between the parties but shall not be less than the Force available for a similar purpose on the 15th August 1947 and not greater than one Brigade group.

ii. Hyderabad will bear the cost of recruiting, maintaining and equipping the Force. The Dominion will provide arms, ammunition and equipment at fair cost. The standard of armament, equipment and ammunition will be the standard for the time being applicable to the striking forces of the Indian armies.

iii. The force will be based on Hyderabad but may be trained with the Indian Army; Hyderabad will however be at liberty to relieve units of the Force periodically in order to spread the advantage of such training.

iv. If the Dominion is engaged in external warfare, the Force will be available for the common defence and to operate with the Indian Army.

v. Commanders of the Force will be appointed by the Nizam and all officers will be commissioned by him. Discipline will be maintained in his name and under his authority. When the Force is operating outside Hyderabad, the Force, with its own Commanding Officers, may be placed under the orders of appropriate officers of the Indian Army, generally in accordance with the procedure adopted during the last war.

vi. When the Force is operating outside Hyderabad, it will be administered in accordance with the Indian Army Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder, such Act, Rules and Regulations being adopted (with suitable adaptations where necessary) by the Nizam.

vii. The Nizam will invite the Dominion Government at regular intervals to inspect the Force in order to ensure that the standards mentioned in this paragraph are maintained.

viii. If, at any time (except in war) when the Force is for the time being outside Hyderabad, the Nizam requires the return of the Force to Hyderabad, it will be returned forthwith.

ix. The Force will not be sent outside the territories of Greater India (i.e. all territories comprised in the Empire of India before 15th August, 1947) without the Nizam's consent which consent, however, will not, in time of war, be unreasonably refused.

d. The Dominion will provide Hyderabad with arms, ammunition and equipment for its remaining troops and Police forces at fair cost. If the Dominion do not fulfil the requirements of Hyderabad within a reasonable time, Hyderabad will be at liberty to import arms, ammunition and equipment from other sources.

e. In time of war, the Dominion of India will be entitled to station

troops within the borders of Hyderabad, with the consent of the Nizam which will not be unreasonably withheld, such troops to be withdrawn from the State within six months of the termination of the war.

In the field of other matters of common concern (including Communications):

5. Until new arrangements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern which on the 15th day of August 1947 existed between the Crown and the Nizam shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India (or, as the case may be, the part thereof) and the Nizam.

6. The parties will forthwith negotiate arrangements for the posts, telegraphs and telephones within Hyderabad to be worked as a Hyderabad system in harmony with the Dominion system.

7. The parties undertake to continue and to use their best endeavours to improve the smooth running of the existing administrative arrangements between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad.

In general:

8. The parties agree for the better execution of the purposes of this Agreement to appoint Agents in Delhi and Hyderabad, respectively. Every facility shall be given to such Agents for the discussion of matters of common concern including External Affairs.

9. i. Nothing herein contained shall include or introduce Paramountcy functions.

ii. Nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of either party, any right continuing after the date of termination of this agreement and nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for this agreement, would have been exercisable by either party to it after the date of termination hereof.

10. Any dispute or difference between the parties arising hereout or touching any matter connected herewith shall unless settled by mutual adjustment be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by such arbitrators.

11. This Agreement shall continue in force for one year and at the expiration of that period shall be subject to review by the parties and shall continue in force with such modifications, if any, as may be agreed on such review for a further period of one year but shall at any time be liable to be superseded by the terms of the document in which the final relationship established between the parties is set out.

(Signatures of the Governor-General of the Dominion of India, and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar)

H-288

Note by Louis Mountbatten of an interview with V. P. Menon

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[NEW DELHI,]
20 October 1947

Mr V. P. Menon, Secretary, States Department, came in a distressed mood [on 19 October] to see me concerning the Hyderabad negotiations. He told me that his Minister, Sardar Patel, had rejected the Standstill Agreement¹ prepared by the Hyderabad Delegation on three grounds.

When Mr Menon went to Sir Walter Monckton at 6 o'clock to inform him of this, he reported that Sir Walter blew completely off the handle, and had remarked that this last minute breakdown was outrageous, that I had kept him out here for three months under false pretences, that he would go to London and expose the Government of India for their monstrous handling of this matter.

Nothing Mr Menon could do would soothe Sir Walter Monckton.

I sent a message for Sir Walter Monckton to come and see me, but was informed he had just left Government House to go to Hyderabad House.

However, shortly after 7, he returned and was shown into my room.

I explained to him the circumstances of the breakdown. I pointed out that at no time until the last meeting, had Sardar Patel or any member of the Government of India even contemplated any other step than complete accession by Hyderabad. I pointed out that if I had taken their instructions quite literally, there would have been no point in my asking for the two months' extension just before the transfer of power, in which to conclude negotiations with Hyderabad, nor would there have been any point in continuing those negotiations at any stage, since all the way through everyone had made it clear that Hyderabad would not accede.

The question might therefore be asked why had I continued the negotiations, and the reply of course was that by continuing the negotiations I felt certain that we could eventually arrive at a compromise

acceptable to both sides. The alternative was a breakdown, which could not fail to have fatal results for Hyderabad, and serious results for the Dominion of India, unless the breakdown were of so temporary a nature that it were not regarded as final.

I pointed out that at the time that I was engaged in trying to find a formula on which all the States would accede, I had practically never had any discussions with Sardar Patel, but had used Mr V. P. Menon as my adviser, and together we had decided on the terms which we felt all the States would accede.

Had I put the terms before Sardar Patel or the Cabinet at any time before it was clear that the majority of the States were going to accept them, I had no doubt that they would have been turned down by the Government. It was only the fact that more than 99% of the States accepted these terms, that made the terms acceptable to the Government of India.

It was only the fact that I was confident we should end up by getting the Nizam's signature to terms which so nearly corresponded to accession, that I felt confident we should eventually get the Government of India to agree to something less than accession.

It was only at the previous meetings that I was able to get the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to agree to the idea of a Standstill Agreement, but then only provided it substantially gave the same terms as accession.

I said that Mr Menon had made it clear that the three points on which Sardar Patel absolutely refused to accept the Standstill Agreement were:

a. No mention had been made of normative legislation, and since it was a big sacrifice on the part of India to accept even this (since they had really wanted to be able to legislate for Hyderabad), I consider that the Hyderabad Delegation should accept this, and try and persuade H.E.H. to do likewise. Sir Walter agreed that this could probably be managed.

b. That instead of referring to the Nizam inviting the Dominion of India to inspect his forces periodically, reference should be much more in the form of "the Dominion of India will inspect the Nizam's forces periodically with H.E.H.'s concurrence". Sir Walter thought that this was a little more difficult but could be managed.

c. The whole question of foreign relations, however, was by far the most difficult. The Nizam had never conducted any foreign policy under Paramountcy, and had agreed to make it clear that during the currency of the agreement, he would not conduct any foreign policy; but no mention had been made that he would either entrust, or delegate to

the Government of India the conduct of his foreign policy.

Sir Walter pointed out that this was a matter on which the Hyderabad Delegation and H.E.H. felt strongly. With the lapse of Paramountcy he would not wish to entrust his foreign policy to the Government of India in writing, though his agreement not to conduct any of his own, was a tacit acceptance of the situation.

I disagreed with this view; it was not on account of Paramountcy that the Nizam had been unable to conduct foreign policy but on account of the geographical situation in which his country found itself. Hyderabad was a land-locked State completely surrounded by Indian territory, and what possible foreign policy could the Ruler conduct?

Sir Walter pointed out that Switzerland was a land-locked State that very definitely conducted its own foreign policy. I pointed out that in the case of Switzerland, three separate nationalities, the French, Germans and Italians, formed the confederation, and that their country bordered on the three countries of origin. In the case of Hyderabad, the only country with which they had to carry on any form of foreign policy was the Dominion of India, since India completely surrounds it, and 85% of the inhabitants of Hyderabad were Hindus. I admitted that if Hyderabad had land boundaries contiguous to both Pakistan and India, there might be some justification for the analogy; indeed this was precisely the situation of Kashmir, and for this very reason, Kashmir was not being pressed by either India or Pakistan to accede to either Dominion quickly. Both Dominions were in favour of some form of plebiscite or at least of ascertaining the will of the people before the Maharaja made a decision.

Sir Walter admitted that this was so, and asked what we wanted. Mr Menon said that he wanted a positive statement entrusting the foreign policy of Hyderabad to the Dominion of India within this agreement.

Sir Walter said it would be very difficult to obtain, but he would do his best.

I offered to see the Hyderabad Delegation the following day, and Sir Walter said the later the better, for they were in such an upset condition after hearing Mr Menon's news [*sic* for views], that they would take some time to get back into an amenable frame of mind.

It was agreed that Mr Menon should arrange for Mr Sundaram² to re-draft these three points in the shortest possible manner that night. The following morning Mr Menon would show the re-draft to Sir Walter. Having cleared it with Sir Walter, he would show it to Sardar

Patel. When ready, I was prepared to see the Hyderabad Delegation again.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

¹Enclosure to H-287.

²K.V.K Sundaram, Joint Secretary, Legislative Department, Government of India, later Secretary, Law Department.

H-289

Walter Monckton to H. L. Ismay

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

28 October 1947

[First four lines omitted]

When I left Delhi with Sir Sultan, Chhatari and Ali Nawaz Jung (the last of whom has been specially loyal and helpful, though the others were of course completely with me) I took for the consideration of the Nizam a draft Standstill Agreement and accompanying collateral letters passing between H.E and H.E.H. As far as the Negotiating Committee and Menon were concerned, we had reached a position in which we were told that Patel and Nehru would accept the drafts which had been prepared. We were prepared to recommend their acceptance to the Nizam and his Government. We always recognized that we might have a tough fight because the Muslims here would dislike the provision which prevented the Nizam from sending a political representative in any capacity to Pakistan. They also disliked the suggestion that arms and equipment should only be obtained from or through the Dominion of India. When we got here, we were able to persuade the Council¹ by a majority of 6 to 3 to approve the drafts with some trivial changes, none of them to the Agreement itself. The Nizam himself was extremely realistic and was in fact in favour of signing the Agreement in duplicate and the letter from himself and sending them by me on Monday to Delhi in the hope that the Governor-General would be able to sign them the same day. Unfortunately, the *Ittehad* took a hand during the night of Sunday-Monday and assembled in thousands outside the President's House and mine in which Sir Sultan was also staying. [Eleven lines deleted²]. The Nizam,

after considerable hesitation and against his better judgment, decided to bow, at least temporarily, to the storm. I, with the concurrence of all my colleagues on the Negotiating Committee, declined to have anything to do with the negotiations which the *Ittehad* party was insisting upon. The idea was that the Nizam ought to revert to the draft which I took up last time and which was rejected by Patel and Nehru. The complaint of the *Ittehad* is that we did not take up a sufficiently firm and intransigent stand! The result, therefore, is that I have told the Nizam that I must return at once to England and I am going to Bombay on Thursday for a few days and then go to Karachi and so home. Meantime, a new Negotiating Committee will come to Delhi on Friday consisting of Moin Nawaz Jung³ who is the Home Member and in charge of Constitutional Affairs Department: he will be accompanied by Dickie's old friends Abdur Rahim and Pingle Reddy! Abdur Rahim is a prominent member of the *Ittehad*, Moin Nawaz Jung is a firm supporter of this party and against the acceptance of the draft we brought back; Reddy is a bag of lard incapable of understanding or speaking English and is selected no doubt as a decent old Hindu with no political following. He is a firm ally of Rahim. I have advised the Nizam that these negotiations are doomed to certain and early failure. I have no doubt, therefore, of the result of the negotiations, for as V.P. [Menon] has often told me, the sort of events which have now taken place will mean the rupture of negotiations with all the attendant misfortunes for Hyderabad.

The Nizam is very upset at my departure and will keep in touch with me in England and is quite likely after an interval, if events make such a course desirable, to ask me to come out and have another try on a wicket which will plainly be stickier.

I have absolutely no doubt that I cannot continue in Hyderabad and appear to advise, when a course is being taken of which I thoroughly and heartily disapprove. I do not think, however, that it would be consistent with my duty to a client to make any sort of public announcement: any speculations there are I cannot stop. You will know what use to make of this letter and why I am addressing it to you. If you want in the same way to communicate with me, my address in London is 3 Paper Buildings, Temple, E.C.4, and my cable address is Monckton, 56 Temple, London.

Chhatari will, I think, be leaving this week. He will certainly not retain his office in the changed circumstances. Sir Sultan is coming with me to Bombay; we have been and are in complete accord.

Give my love to those to whom you show this letter.

[Yours ever,
WALTER MONCKTON]

¹See H-294. An intelligence report of 25 October 1947 also provides some information on the discussions which took place in the Hyderabad Executive Council regarding the Standstill Agreement. One of the members opposed the agreement on the ground that owing to strong difference of opinion between Nehru and Sardar Patel there might soon be a change of Government and the Indian Government was likely to be "weakened by internecine quarrels in the Cabinet". Not signing the agreement, it was thought, would allow Hyderabad to consolidate itself. See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

²See H-293 and H-294.

³See H-292.

H-290

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]
30 October 1947

'Your Excellency's telegram.'¹ Owing to changed political situation here the old delegation has been dissolved and a new one has been created consisting of three members of Council of which Moin Nawaz Jung is the Chairman, who is bringing my letter addressed to Your Excellency tomorrow Friday. I may add that Nawab of Chhatari is retiring from his post on first November while Sir Walter Monckton has left for Bombay² today on his return journey to England and Sir Sultan Ahmed has already left for Delhi this morning.

[NIZAM OF HYDERABAD]

¹Not traceable.

²H-289.

H-291

Walter Monckton to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

NEPEAN HOUSE,
NEPEAN ROAD, BOMBAY,
30 October 1947

My dear Dickie,

I am going to spare you more than a brief note and I assume that

you will have seen my letter to Pug¹ and also have had a talk with Sultan Ahmed with whom I have been in complete accord. I have not resigned my position as Constitutional Adviser, because it is the wish of moderate elements in Hyderabad, both Muslim and Hindu, that I should be available, as they expect a failure, when I am called upon to try and undertake negotiations with India again. All that I have done is to ask to be relieved of any part in the present negotiations, of the conduct of which I thoroughly disapprove. I am sure that it will be a good thing for Hyderabad if they are made to see that 'direct action' by the *Ittehad*, coercing the Nizam to adopt a policy with which he does not agree, does not pay. It is for this reason that I hope in the interests of Hyderabad the present negotiations will fail obviously and quickly and that thereupon the inevitable pressure may react upon Hyderabad until its citizens appreciate that dictation by the *Ittehad* minority cannot pay. The Nizam himself fully understands that his own personal rule, intended to be in the interests of both the communities and, on the other hand, true democracy are possible forms of Government in the State but that dictation by an extremist minority has no proper basis as a system of orderly Government. The trouble really is that, through a doubt thrown by the *Ittehad* into his mind of the reliability of his Police and his Army (in the latter case I believe unfounded), he allowed himself to be over-awed and to give in to a political agitation which, with a little firmness, he could have overcome. He still remains genuinely of opinion that the advice which Sir Sultan and I and Chhatari were giving him was right and sound and he pressed me in our last interviews to be ready to come back, if called upon, in a month or two. I made it plain to him that I should only come back on terms and that a situation would have to be created in Hyderabad favourable to resume negotiations after the present rather impudent attempt to negotiate again on the basis of a draft which the Government of India had already rejected. I pointed out that your Government would say that it was now clear that Hyderabad had been playing for time and had no intention of coming to terms. In our last interview this morning H.E.H. told Sir Sultan and me that it was amusing these *Ittehad* gentlemen were taking to Delhi a draft prepared by me, whom they regard as a traitor, and that supported by a confidential letter from the Nizam himself which has not been disclosed to the Delegation. Where does farce end and tragedy begin?

You will remember that V. P [Menon,] speaking, I think, with the authority of his Minister, told me a month or so ago that, if I were thrown out, the negotiations with Hyderabad would certainly fail and that the best course would be for me to go away for a month or two, when I should most probably be asked to come back again. You will no doubt recollect Ali Yavar Jung, whom you considered the most intelligent Indian in our Delegation. I had a letter from him this morning on my departure deploring the turn of events. He said that if I had gone sooner "the breakdown would have come earlier and you would have been back by now (as I am firmly convinced you will be despite all that has now happened)". He says in another passage: "I had, as I told you on Tuesday and Wednesday, a shrewd suspicion that the particular document passed by Council and H.E.H. on your advice would not go. I must say I did not even remotely expect 'direct action' of any sort but I did expect H.E.H. would back out. What has happened now is that we have a Victor Emmanuel and a Mussolini ..." "I am thinking, now that you are leaving, of going away for a couple of months. I know you will come back before long but I suggest you should agree to come on certain terms. I would hate to see you treated again as you have been treated".

Other Muslims in and outside the Council have been saying the same thing during this week. I only mention it to you in case it may have some bearing on your own policy. Nothing I have written to you or Pug meant to be concealed from V. P.

I don't want to close this letter without telling you what a good team the last Negotiating Committee was. You know for yourself what a good fellow Chhatari is. His departure means a real loss to moderate opinion. Sir Sultan you also know but I am thinking especially of Ali Nawaz Jung who started, as you will remember, very much of the *Ittehad* way of thinking, but he has been in fact a tower of strength to me, wholly loyal to our policy and decisions, before the Council and H.E.H., whether or not I have been present. The new people, who are coming to you, are of a very different calibre and character. Rahim I need not describe, and cannot in printable language; I doubt whether Reddy² will come; if he does, he is fortunately unable to speak or understand any language intelligible to you. Moin Nawaz Jung is the ablest of the three but he has given himself up entirely to the *Ittehad* doctrines and is much too small fry for negotiations on this level. In your shoes I should not be wasting much time with him.

Biddy,³ I know, has written a personal line to Edwina⁴ to say how grateful we are for all your kindness to us and I want to say to you that I shall always look upon this attempt as a happy memory and do not regret anything about it except, I fear, occasional outbursts of impatience which I know you will forgive!

We expect to leave Bombay in four or five days for Karachi to get home by about 10 November.

Love to Edwina and again many thanks to you for your invaluable help, understanding and adroit ingenuity in all crises.

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

¹H. L. Ismay. See H-289.

²Pingle Venkat Rama Reddy, Minister for Food, Agriculture & Civil Supplies, Hyderabad.

³Walter Monckton's wife.

⁴Lady Mountbatten.

H-292

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
30 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Please refer to Your Excellency's letter dated the 21st October 1947.¹

2. It has always been my desire to make the fullest contribution to the stability of this sub-continent, and it was with that object in view that I first offered to enter into a treaty with the Dominion of India whereby suitable arrangements could be made in respect of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. That offer having been found unacceptable to the Dominion of India, I had, with a view to resolve difficulties and in a spirit of reasonable accommodation, offered a Standstill Agreement not only in regard to the administrative arrangements, but also in the three essential fields of Defence, Communications and External Affairs.

3. I was, therefore, deeply disappointed to learn from my Delegation that even the terms of this offer were not acceptable to Your Excellency's Government. The Delegation placed before me another Draft Agreement,² which, I was given to understand, Your Excellency's Government would be prepared to enter into. I and my Council of

Ministers have given the matter our deepest consideration and regret that the proposed draft does not do justice to the unique position which Hyderabad holds and to which Your Excellency has also made references.

4. I need not assure Your Excellency that it is my earnest wish that there should not be a breakdown in our negotiations. I am as anxious as Your Excellency's Government to see that peace and tranquility are maintained in the South and I am, therefore, fully prepared to enter into an agreement which should be in keeping with the special status of Hyderabad. I, therefore, trust that Your Excellency will use your good offices with your Government to secure acceptance of the Draft Standstill Agreement to which Your Excellency has made a reference in the first paragraph of your letter of the 21st October.

5. I am sending this letter through my Negotiating Committee which is at present composed of:

1. Moin Nawaz Jung, Minister, Police and Information
2. Mr Pingle Venkat Rama Reddy, Minister, Food, Civil Supplies and Agriculture
3. Abdur Rahim, Minister, Local Government and Industries

The last two being popular Ministers of my Government.

Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

¹See *White Paper on Hyderabad*, para 12, 9 FOA, IB-2/3/12. Not printed.

²Not traceable.

H-293

*Note by Erskine Crum on Mountbatten's Interview with Moin
Nawaz Jung*

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[NEW DELHI,]
31 October 1947

H. E. explained that Sir Sultan Ahmed had handed to him a letter¹ from the Nizam of Hyderabad, and had given to him a full account of the recent developments in that State. Particularly, he had informed him that the Nizam had given his word that he would sign the Standstill Agreement in the presence of all the four members of the old Hyderabad Delegation.

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung said that he had come to Delhi in order

to do all that lay in his power to obtain a solution to the relations between Hyderabad and India, which would be satisfactory and honourable to both parties. H.E. pointed out that he had been engaged on an exactly similar task for a period of four months. He emphasized that the future settlement depended entirely on the Hyderabad Delegation. He asked whether it was considered probable that the Government of India would go back on their previous decision. If by any chance his Ministers were prepared to do this, he would be delighted to put forward alternative suggestions; but surely the chances of this happening must be as had been reported by the members of the previous Negotiating Committee.

H.E. emphasised that His Exalted Highness must surely feel responsibility for all the misery which might come to Muslims not only inside, but also outside his State, if no agreement was reached and the situation was thus not stabilized. He said that both he and his Government were very keen to look after the minorities in India. The one person who could make or mar the future of the Muslim minorities, so far as Southern India was concerned, was His Exalted Highness. He asked what had happened after His Exalted Highness had declared his intention of signing the Standstill Agreement? What had brought about his change of mind?

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung stated that a large number of people in Hyderabad had been against this Standstill Agreement. There had been demonstrations by up to 20,000 people. In reply to a question by H.E, he claimed that there had been Police and Military all over the place controlling these crowds; but, although he was Minister of Police, he could not tell how many there had been. H.E. said that he had been told how many there had been and his information in no way agreed with that of the Minister. He asked what Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung expected to happen at the negotiations for which he had brought a delegation up. Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung said that he intended to present a letter from the Nizam of Hyderabad, a copy of which he would send to H.E that evening.

H.E. said that he had been informed that the previous delegation had been prevented by the Nizam from leaving Hyderabad. He asked what Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung envisaged as the future of Hyderabad. Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung replied that he intended to leave no stone unturned to come to an amicable settlement. H.E. pointed out that an amicable settlement had already been reached. It was not a question of leaving no stone unturned, but of not upsetting the present stones. Those who took the responsibility for breaking off the negotiations must do so publicly.

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung made reference to the previous draft Standstill Agreement² which had been brought up by the old Hyderabad Delegation. H.E. explained that this draft had been shown to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister (who was also Minister of States) who had regretted that they were unable to accept it in that form but would be prepared to accept an amended version. The latter had been approved by the Hyderabad Council and accepted by H.E.H. who had announced that he would sign it. H.E. said that he had no authority to commit his Government to anything, but he pointed out that it was an absolutely new idea to him that the Delegation should return to try to re-open negotiations on the basis of a document which had already been rejected by the other party. This seemed to him to be a very naive and very gauche manoeuvre. What was it expected that his Ministers would think of it? If they were consistent, as might perhaps be expected, was success really to be expected?

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung said that he and the members of his delegation had a great desire to know the background of the recent negotiations. The Governor-General pointed out that he had not got time to go through the whole background a second time. The Delegation could find out all details of this from Sir Sultan Ahmed, who was available at 9, York Road. Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung said that he hoped that the Governor-General, as Chairman of the meeting, which was to take place on Sunday, 2nd November, would be able to keep the scales even between the two parties. H.E. replied that he could not do this if one side had thrown the scales right down. He was sure the Government of India would stand by their offer of the Standstill Agreement which the Nizam had at one stage accepted; it would not be a question of them causing a breakdown. Any breakdown would have to come from Hyderabad.

Finally, H.E. said that he agreed that it must be difficult for Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung to have to carry out these negotiations. Presumably he was only obeying orders.

¹H-292.

²See Enclosure to H-287.

H-294

*Note by Louis Mountbatten of Interview with Sultan Ahmed and
V. P. Menon¹*

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW DELHI,]
31 October 1947

I have received the following telegram from the Nizam of Hyderabad.

"I am sending my letter addressed to Your Excellency through Sir Sultan Ahmed who left for Delhi this morning. Trust Your Excellency will give due consideration to it in favourable light as Hyderabad considers you as distinguished member of the Royal Family of England and also the supporter of the Faithful Ally of British Government."

In accordance with this telegram I received Sir Sultan Ahmed who delivered to me H.E.H.'s letter of the 30th October (copy attached).² He also delivered on behalf of H.E.H. a translation of Qasim Rizvi's speech delivered two or three days ago in Hyderabad, of which the original is attached.³

Sir Sultan gave an account of the events in Hyderabad from the time that the original delegation had left Delhi on the 22nd October.

He reminded me that during the last visit of the Delegation a great deal of time had been spent on the Standstill Agreement. The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister had proved unwilling to accept the first version, but after negotiating for several days a version had been produced which was acceptable to the Government and which all four members of the Hyderabad Delegation felt sure would be acceptable to the Executive Council of Hyderabad and to H.E.H.

The Delegation had expressed themselves as satisfied that this represented a perfectly clear and reasonable offer to Hyderabad to ensure tranquillity in the State, and throughout Southern India for at least a year, during which period a further and final document would be drawn up. The Delegation made it abundantly clear that H.E.H. had repeatedly said that nothing would induce him to consider accession to Pakistan, since this was a geographical impossibility.

The Delegation left Delhi on the 22nd October, and immediately on arrival in Hyderabad that evening they read out the new Draft Standstill Agreement to the Nizam, and also the proposed collateral letter from H.E.H. to myself. H.E.H. did not, of course, in the first instance, like the change, but, on mature reflection, thought it should be referred to his Executive Council, and directed that the Council should

sit day after day for three days in order to give their final advice to him on this matter. The Council sat on the 23rd, 24th and 25th [October]. During the whole of these meetings, the members of the Negotiating Committee were present and answered and explained all the points that were raised to the evident satisfaction of the majority. On the 25th October, a formal vote was taken as to whether the Council advised H.E.H. to accept the version of the Standstill Agreement which had been provisionally accepted in Delhi, and this was passed by six votes to three.

The Negotiating Committee then met the Nizam the same evening, and reported to him the result of the vote in the Executive Council. The next day, H.E.H. called for a formal report from the President of the Council (the Nawab of Chhatari) who sent the decisions of the Council together with the minutes of the three dissenting members. The three dissenting members were Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Mr Abdur Rahim, Nawab Liaquat Jung (the two former incidentally were subsequently appointed to the new Negotiating Committee).

On the same night (the 25th) His Exalted Highness formally approved the decision of the Executive Council, and gave his undertaking to sign the Standstill Agreement subject to a few minor amendments in the collateral letter, and none in the Agreement.

On the 25th [October] H.E.H. worked on the draft letter to me, and signed the secret letter undertaking not to accede to Pakistan. The secret letter contained two other points, firstly that if the Indian Union decided to secede from the Commonwealth, he would be at liberty to reconsider his position, and secondly, if there was war between India and Pakistan, the Nizam would remain neutral (both these points had been considered in Delhi, and had been accepted in principle by the Secretary of the States Department).

The slightly revised collateral letter, and the secret letter were typed in the course of the evening ready for H.E.H.'s signature on Sunday evening. When the Negotiating Committee went there for H.E.H. to sign these documents he postponed his signature until Monday morning, before the Delegation flew back to Delhi. No reasons can be adduced for H.E.H. delaying his signature, since the documents were ready, and the Delegation was to leave in the morning. On the other hand, there is no evidence that bad faith was intended. At three a.m on the morning of the 27th October, a crowd estimated at between 25 and 30 thousand collected round the house which Sir Walter Monckton, the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Sultan Ahmed occupied, which were all adjacent.

They managed to get into touch with the Army authorities by telephone at 5 a.m. and Brigadier Gilbert of the Hyderabad Army sent a truck with Hyderabad State troops to evacuate the Delegation to his house.

No Hyderabad police were seen at any time.

Sir Sultan said that the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* claimed the credit for having organized this crowd to prevent by physical force the departure of the Delegation to Delhi. There were loudspeakers in the crowd calling upon them to remain orderly, and not to create a disturbance, beyond preventing the Delegation from leaving. So far as he knew the crowd was unarmed except for some spears and swords.

At 8 a.m., the Nizam sent a message to the Delegation that they were not to proceed to Delhi that day. He then sent me the following telegram:

"Though Delegation was to leave this morning for Delhi but I am sorry to say owing to unforeseen circumstances they could not leave. I trust Your Excellency will not mind if they arrive Delhi by next Thursday or Friday the latest."

Sir Walter Monckton sent me the following telegram the same day.

"Sorry I could not inform you in advance of our non arrival. Expect to be delayed only a day or two."

These telegrams were not received until the 28th, and I sent the following replies.

To the Nizam "Your Exalted Highness' telegram of 27th October. Thursday or Friday will be equally convenient for the date of arrival of Sir Walter Monckton, the Nawab of Chhatari and their colleagues".

To Sir Walter Monckton "Thank you for your telegram. Delighted you are coming soon as your presence of course will make the whole difference."

On the afternoon of the 27th, the Nizam sent for the Delegation (Negotiating Committee) as he considered it necessary to take stock of the situation before the Delegation left finally for Delhi. He was violent in his denunciation of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, and in particular of Qasim Rizvi. He kept reiterating that he was convinced that the decision which he and His Executive Council had arrived at to accept the Standstill Agreement negotiated by his Delegation in Delhi was the right one, and that he was determined to make Qasim Rizvi accept it. On the 28th, he sent for the Delegation at 9 a.m. and made it quite clear that he was still strongly of the same mind. During the meeting, he suddenly told his Chief Secretary to call for Qasim Rizvi and tell him to come round at once. Within half an hour Qasim Rizvi arrived. The Nizam asked him in the presence of the Delegation for

details of his objections. He stated "If Your Exalted Highness sign this Standstill Agreement, it will mean the death of Hyderabad". He then stated that had the Delegation insisted on the original Agreement being accepted by the Government of India, he was convinced that they would have yielded. He thereupon called upon the Nizam to dissolve the present Negotiating Committee, and give him a chance to form a new one, which he claimed was certain to succeed.

When Sir Sultan asked him what reasons he had which led him to believe that he could succeed where the previous Negotiating Committee and notably Sir Walter Monckton had failed, he said he had his reasons. When asked for even one of these reasons, he replied "Please don't put such embarrassing questions to me, but I am absolutely certain we shall succeed." When pressed for at least one reason, he finally replied "As the hands of the Indian Union are fully occupied with their troubles elsewhere, they will be in no position to do anything to us or to refuse our demands if we insist." Finally, he begged the Nizam to give him a chance of taking up the negotiations. On that Sir Walter Monckton and the other members of the original Delegation emphatically declared that no Delegation could hope to succeed on this point on which Sardar Patel had said that the Government would be adamant, and each of them assured the Nizam in turn that not one point which could be pressed with advantage had been left unused.

Just before leaving, Qasim Rizvi suggested to the Nizam that the two Ministers who had voted against the acceptance of the Agreement in the Executive Council (Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung and Mr Abdur Rahim) should be appointed as the new Negotiating Committee.

All four members of the previous Negotiating Committee then and there tendered their resignations from the Committee, including Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung who had originally been a pro-Muslim die-hard who had provisionally accepted the Vice-Presidentship of the Council, which he now rejected.

Qasim Rizvi then left and the Nizam detained the previous Delegation and with great violence exclaimed "This blackguard, this two-pence ha'penny man must have gone mad." Sir Sultan said that all the Delegation felt somewhat put out at having this man brought into the discussions in their presence, since they had refused the previous day to meet the Nizam when he was present.

Nothing happened on the 29th but on the 30th he sent for Sir Walter Monckton and Sir Sultan Ahmed alone in the evening before they left for the Airfield and read out to them the letter which he proposed to send me of which a copy is attached and asked for their views. Sir Walter Monckton most emphatically refused to give any

opinion on this letter, and Sir Sultan Ahmed also refused to comment, but said he was prepared to deliver the letter. The letter was then typed and signed in their presence and delivered to Sir Sultan Ahmed to give to me. He then asked them if they had seen a copy of the speech delivered by Qasim Rizvi on the 27th and on being told that they had not, gave a copy to Sir Sultan to give to me.

Sir Sultan told me that two men, namely Mr Yamin Zuberi and one other had gone to Karachi and had returned on the 29th. He attributes the Nizam's volte face to some message which they must have received from Karachi,¹ and also to the violent threats of the President of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*.

Every night that the Delegation were present in Hyderabad during this last week, the Working Committee of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* used to meet until at least 8 a.m.

Mr V. P. Menon told me not to be surprised if Lord Ismay and I were offered very large bribes as he had had private information that Sardar Patel, Lord Ismay and myself were to be offered several lakhs. I asked Mr Menon if he expected to cut in on this, and blushing he replied "Yes".

Sir Sultan Ahmed confirmed that the Delegation were reported to be taking 10 lakhs of rupees with them to Delhi.

In the course of the meeting, I remarked that it would be an interesting historic fact that four such different men, who formed the original Negotiating Committee should have all firmly believed that the right course for Hyderabad was to sign this particular Standstill Agreement, and that it was clear that the Nizam was acting against his own team which had for months been carrying out the negotiations, after having in their presence accepted the Agreement and undertaken to sign it.

Sir Sultan Ahmed agreed that the Nizam by this cowardly refusal to face up to the threat of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* had virtually abdicated for himself and his dynasty all powers in Hyderabad, and that it was likely to be the end of the Monarchy. Had he had the courage to go through with it, Mr Menon confirmed, he would have received protection from the Government of India which would have helped to keep him on the throne.

Sir Sultan Ahmed pointed out that Qasim Rizvi had urged the Nizam to transfer large sums of money to Pakistan to help that State build itself into a strong State. H.E.H. himself told Sir Sultan about this and declared firmly that he had no intention of sending money to beggars.

Finally on the 30th, the Nizam sent me the following telegram [for text see H-290].

Sir Sultan Ahmed told⁵ me that his last words to the Nizam of Hyderabad had been "This will be the end of you, and your money."

⁵Copy sent by, V. F. Erskine Crum to V. P. Menon on 5 November 1947. See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*.

⁶H-292.

⁷Only main points of Qasim Rizvi's speech have been included in Enclosure. For full text, see note 1. Not printed.

⁸A 3-man team of *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* sought an interview with Jinnah at Quetta. They were informed that Jinnah was unable to see these people of a political organization in Hyderabad. In a press statement on 1 June 1948, he stated that Hyderabad should be free to take decisions as the constituted authority of the Hyderabad Government may think proper. See H-312.

⁹For another account of the political events in Hyderabad, see Annex.

Enclosure to H-294

Main points of Qasim Rizvi's Speech at a Public Meeting Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[English Translation]

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
27 October 1947

Syed Qasim Rizvi reminded the 20,000 strong audience of the public meeting that Hyderabad faced great dangers.¹ The real danger, however, he said, was from those who wished to place Hyderabad in Indian Union's lap. He charged that Hyderabad's destiny has been entrusted to the hands of the people who have not the least sympathy for its people. He had always emphasized, he said, that the people alone can build their destiny but in return he had been accused repeatedly of fostering distrust against those in whom H.E.H. had confidence. But, he said, at the same time, the people who are charged with moulding of the State's destiny must have people's confidence and those bereft of that confidence had no right to decide their fate.

He lashed out at the members of the Hyderabad Delegation in very strong terms. He stated that Nawab of Chhatari, who headed the delegation, had no sympathy for Hyderabad as the "strings attached to his nose are in Patel's hands." Such a person was not fit to be included in the delegation, he demanded. The other member of the delegation, Sultan Ahmed, was described as a paid agent of the Congress. He informed the audience that Sultan Ahmed had termed the *Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* as a "body of goondas" and that if he were the Prime Minister he would have "every member of that body

shot and the *Majlis* banned". The third member, an Englishman [Walter Monckton], according to him had never kept faith with the Muslims. Monckton was, he said, able to gain influence in Hyderabad politics by representing himself as a friend of Lord Mountbatten. He prayed to God to protect Hyderabad from his anti-Muslim intrigues. The fourth member, Ali Nawaz Jung, was described as "senile" and that his old age had enfeebled his brain.

He demanded that the delegation be reconstituted immediately.

Qasim Rizvi reminded his audience that Hyderabad had already declared its independence on 15 August, 1947 and the people held festivities which demonstrated to the world that Hyderabad was free. The makers of that declaration, he opined, should not now favour "signing the instrument of slavery" in order to sink into the abyss of the degradation or falling into the hell of Indian Union. He feared the State would revert to the conditions which obtained there before 15th August, 1947, and slavery to the British would take the form of slavery to the Hindus.

He felt glad that the H.E.H. has already ordered withholding the departure of Hyderabad delegation to Delhi for 3 days which may extend to any period.

Qasim Rizvi advised that the State authorities must shed the feeling of weakness and put an end to the negotiations. This approach, he felt, required the spirit of courage to live for the ideals of independence. Side by side, 25 lakh Muslims of Hyderabad were capable to follow the path of martyrdom, he declared. He called for "jihad" and supreme sacrifices for the sake of Hyderabad for that was the only way to ensure respect and honour for future generations.

Qasim Rizvi lamented that "our government has not yet paid any attention to Pakistan for fear of displeasing India and breakdown of the on-going negotiations". He advised the Hyderabad Government to enter into relations with Pakistan before it was too late. He said Pakistan was extending a hand of friendship towards Hyderabad and was prepared to accept the State as a friend and equal.

At the end of his address he invoked the blessings of God and recited the Quranic verses on righteousness and martyrdom and asked the people

to pray to God to save them from the impending "calamity".

Negotiations on Standstill Agreement between the Hyderabad Delegation and the Government of India which had continued in an atmosphere of intimidation and coercion tactics, broke down on 20 October 1947, as Patel rejected the Standstill Agreement proposed by Hyderabad. India had proposed that Hyderabad should not send a political representative to Pakistan, or conduct foreign relations during the period of agreement, and obtain arms only from India. The *Ittehad ul Muslimeen*, headed by Qasim Rizvi, strongly reacted to not only the terms of the agreement but to the conduct of the delegation as well. They organized a 20,000-man agitation on 27 October.

Annex to H-294

Roy E. B. Bower to George Marshall

US National Archives, 845.00/11-1047

[Extract]

No. 922

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, MADRAS,

10 November 1947

Sir,

I have the honor to summarize the state of affairs in H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions. For brevity, the Nizam's territory will be referred to as Hyderabad.

The present survey begins with October 27, 1947, a date which contending parties within Hyderabad have themselves fixed as marking a significant turning point.

On October 26 the *Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* (Lit: organization of union of Muslims) adopted a policy of direct action as a measure to bring about Hyderabad's complete independence. The society is commonly known locally as the *Majlis*. It is a well organized group of Muslim subjects of the Nizam. Its president is Qasim Rizvi. The convenor of its "Direct Action Committee" is Mr Yamin Zuberi and the chairman is Mr Abdur Raouf. Slogans used by the *Majlis* are "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long Live Pakistan) and "Azad Hyderabad Zindabad" (Long Live Independent Hyderabad).

Mr Yamin Zuberi and another *Majlis* emissary flew to Karachi on October 23 and 24, returning almost at once. On October 27 the Direct Action Committee staged a successful demonstration of power. Muslim crowds prevented the departure for New Delhi of the Nizam's negotiators: the Nawab of Chhatari, President of the Council of Ministers, commonly called the Prime Minister; Sir Walter Monckton, the Nizam's constitutional adviser, whose wife was formerly the Countess of Carlisle; Sir Sultan Ahmed; and Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung. These four

delegates resigned. By October 31 Sir Walter and his wife had left for England, Sir Sultan Ahmed left Hyderabad, and the Nawab of Chhatari had resigned his post as Prime Minister.

On October 30 the Nizam appointed a new delegation: Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Minister of Police and Information; Mr Abdur Rahim, Minister for Commerce, Industries, and Local Government; and Mr Pingle Venkatarama Reddy, a Hindu, Minister of Supplies. The latter two hold their positions as ministers through election by the legislature, and were therefore described as delegates of the people. The State Congress Party points out that as it abstained from participation in the local legislative elections, no minister can claim to represent more than a section of the people. The three-man delegation left for New Delhi on October 31.

On November 1 the Nizam appointed Nawab Mehdi Yar Jung, an elderly man, former Publicity Director, as acting President of the Council, assisted by Nawab Zain Yar Jung, Vice President of the Council.

To go back again to October 27, direct action on the part of the *Majlis* set in train a fresh series of violent events.... In any case there has been considerable disturbance of peace. Both sides—Hindu and Muslim—want the outside world to believe that custom houses and their records have been burned, shops and houses looted and destroyed, persons beaten to death, toddy trees (a source of government revenue) cut down, normal community life paralyzed, schools closed, factories shut down, etc. One cannot rely on the press of either side in an effort to ascertain the facts. Indeed, the more lurid pro-Congress press in Madras leaves the reader in some doubt as to whether the worst violence has been committed by Muslim police or by Hindu patriots. It is enough to note in this section that violent events have taken place and that it appears that on the whole the government has the upper hand and is fairly successful in maintaining order.

On October 28 there appeared a London journalist's unsigned feature story which asserted that General Edroos, Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's forces, and Mir Nawaz Jung, the Nizam's Agent-General in London, had purchased arms and ammunition in Britain to the value of ten million rupees. The story was denied the next day.

2. MADRAS REACTIONS

Madras reactions to events in Hyderabad are better understood if a few background details are kept in mind. Of indirect consequence in this context is the well-founded fear of southern industrialists that their northern rivals will penetrate Madras Province and seize the

dominant economic role in exploiting South India's industrial potentialities. Anything likely to consolidate the southern position finds favour. Hyderabad is not itself a rival, but it looks to the north, to Bombay for finance, to Karachi for political support, to Mecca [Makkah] for inspiration, possibly to Britain for armaments. Madras industrialists can be expected to view with equanimity the Nizam's difficulties if, as a quite possible result, his Dominions are diminished, the Telegu-speaking third of them joining with the Madras Province (or the Andhra Province if the northeastern part of Madras becomes a separate entity). Conversely, the southern businessmen and landowners are perturbed by signs of aggression on the part of the Nizam, who covets Berar to the North and ceded Districts to the South as well as a seaport to the West or East or both. Unfortunately, southern commercial and political leaders face a less remote hazard, that of communism. In supporting the elements most likely to succeed in keeping the Nizam within his borders or in attaching part of his lands to the adjacent provinces, these Madras leaders realize that they run the risk of supporting communism. The franchise has been given to thousands who are ill prepared to exercise it wisely. In the Andhra section, particularly the masses have fallen under the spell of communistic doctrines. Perhaps that is all to the good as part of the political education of the submerged masses, but it favors the election of communists. To complicate matters, northern industrial rivals have been known to give secret support to communist-led strikers in the South.

It is therefore fairly obvious why many leading Madras legislators, publicists and industrialists are cautious in their support of the All-India Congress Party campaign against the Nizam of Hyderabad. Dr. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Vice-president of the All-India States' People's Conference, indicated the nature of the campaign in a press interview on November 4. He is quoted as follows:

"Hyderabad is undoubtedly pursuing a suicidal policy, both in regard to accession and internal reform. The people's movement has so far been strictly confined to the principle of non-violence. We warn the State against this reckless march of repression, lest it should provoke the law-abiding people of the State.

"What one sees in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad is no index to the position in the towns and villages. The apparent lull in the cities does not betoken the subdual of the movement in the State. Andhra, Maharashtra and Kannada are alive, astir and agog. The State's repressive policy knows no bounds of law, morals or humanity. The wildest acts of repression are being indulged in. Reports of arson, looting, and outrage against women's honour are being received from

reliable sources in the interior villages. The recent burning of three villages near Secunderabad is reprehensible to a degree."

[*Paras 13-18 omitted*]

3[OTHER REPORTS]

Much too choice to be buried in a newspaper file is this remark made in a Madras [newspaper] editorial a few days ago: "There are many esoteric manoevers in the game".

It is impossible for anyone to know what is going on. Not even the Nizam can know everything essential to his plans. For instance, he cannot know the extent of the plot or plots against him. It is said that he has confined his elder son, the Crown Prince, to a sort of protective custody in the palace. The prince's two sons are at school in India, too young to be actively a part in any plot to overthrow their grandfather. The Crown Princess, who is a very great deal smarter than her husband, remains in England, reportedly aloof from policies or any sort of esoteric maneuvers.

As previously reported, stories have long been going the rounds about (a) arms smuggling and (b) the acquisition of Goa. No outside observer can do more than piece together a few questionable bits of information which by chance might reveal a fact or two.

British patronage of Pakistan has often been asserted in the Congress press to make it seem as untrue as any of the favorite themes of the more rabid propagandists, such as the reign of terror one. However, there is independent testimony which does point to British readiness to assist the Muslim world, to or through which run some of the commonwealth's trade routes. Not many years ago Portugal and Britain celebrated the 800th anniversary of peace between them. Portugal's big brother might not object to the development of Goa as Hyderabad's seaport (which was under the Hindu dynasty that controlled the area until the 17th century).

One can be somewhat more sure of the facts concerning the alleged reign of terror in Hyderabad. The press is totally unreliable, for even when unbiased, it has the greatest difficulty in obtaining news. Even telephone conversations are interrupted "accidentally" when editors try to speak with correspondents. The Consulate-General has its own private sources of information, although deplorably few in number. From three widely separated places in Hyderabad—each of the three reported in the pro-Congress press as the scene of indescribable violence—come first-hand accounts of disturbances during the past three months. There has been an occasion or two which merits a stronger

description than "fracas", but the worst was the burning of a considerable number of houses, or more accurately, huts. At one place almost every Hindu left town overnight and fled across the nearby border in imagined terror. These people are all back again, doing business as usual. The police have been brutal, according to these and other reliable reports, but no more so than was justified in keeping disorder to a minimum. Innocent victims have suffered, as is inevitable, but there seems to have been far less paying off of private scores under the guise of communal patriotism than might have been expected. At a fourth place, where the factory labourers are usually susceptible to communist propaganda, there has been no trouble at all, despite this being an excellent pitch on which to set up a soap box. In total, one must almost reluctantly and almost irrationally believe that the press communiqués issued by the Nizam's government are more or less truthful, for instead of seeming to suppress the facts they admit the existence of more disorders than do the Consulate-General's first hand witnesses.

It was Mr V.P. Menon, Secretary of States Ministry, who, in an interview with an officer of the Embassy at New Delhi, said that the Government of India would not attempt to impose its will on the Muslim-ruled State of Hyderabad by refusing to supply food when needed, because the population is 85% Hindu. As though Patel, the Congress Party boss, cares about what happens to a few million Indians, Hindu though they may be. They could be thrown to the still hungrier wolves for all he cares—and their sufferings could be blamed on the Muslims. One absolutely reliable American whose concern it is to obtain food supplies for a large district institution in Hyderabad states that current food shortage in that district is due entirely to the stoppage of customary imports from provincial surplus areas a few miles away. This isolated anecdote is repeated simply because it may be indicative. Even as one is reluctantly inclined to credit the Nizam's version of events one is reluctantly obliged to doubt the versions put out by the Congress Party and some members of the Government of India. They render themselves liable to the suspicion that they subscribe to Hitler's dictum that any lie is believed if it is big enough and shouted often. It is not, however, what one would call esoteric maneuvering.

Respectfully yours,

ROY E. B. BOWER

American Consul

H-295

Note of Discussion by Louis Mountbatten with M. A. Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

[*Extract*]

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,
1 November 1947

INTRODUCTION

In the course of three and half hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation,¹ Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well as talking about the overall policy affecting States. I have divided this note into four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the subjects were discussed nor of course were all the remarks made consecutively.

PART II, HYDERABAD

I told Mr Jinnah how much I regretted that at this serious moment he should have been compromised by the behaviour of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen's* delegation to Karachi.

He asked me what I meant. I told him that the two delegates, Yamin Zuberi and his companion, who had been reported by the press as having seen him² in Karachi, had returned to Hyderabad and were alleged to have influenced the Nizam into going back on his word to accept the Standstill Agreement which his Executive Council had passed by six votes to three. The inference had been drawn that they had carried a message to H.E.H. from Mr Jinnah, and that this was the cause of the latter's reversal of his decision.

Mr Jinnah assured me categorically that he had merely seen these two men out of courtesy, for a matter of five or perhaps seven minutes. They had told him that H.E.H. was about to sign an Instrument of Accession to India, and they begged Mr Jinnah to intervene. Mr Jinnah had replied that it was outside his power to intervene and that it was only a question for the Nizam and his own Government to decide.

I then recounted to Mr Jinnah briefly the events which Sir Sultan Ahmed had related to me on October 31st,³ and Lord Ismay substantiated

this account from a letter he had received from Sir Walter Monckton.

Mr Jinnah once more affirmed most solemnly that he had nothing whatever to do with the recent reversal of the Nizam's decision. He had sent no verbal message whatsoever to Hyderabad. The advice he had tendered to H.E.H. in writing some time ago was that he was between the devil and the deep blue sea. If he acceded to India, there would be bloodshed in Hyderabad; and if he did not accede, there would equally be bloodshed. Thus an Agreement, but not Accession, seemed to be the only hope.⁴

I told him that the Nizam had sent me a letter through Sir Sultan Ahmed, dated 30th October, in which he implied that if negotiations now broke down with a new Negotiating Committee he might have to consider entering into an agreement with Pakistan.⁵

Mr Jinnah laughed and said "That looks to me as though he is threatening you. It has nothing to do with me. I have never discussed any form of agreement with the Nizam."

I asked him straight out whether he would be prepared to sign a Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad if he were asked to by the Nizam. He replied that a Standstill Agreement implied that there were relations or intertwining factors which formed the basis for a Standstill. He could not think of any such factors between Pakistan and Hyderabad, and whereas he did not envisage wishing to sign such an Agreement, he would have to examine the matter carefully, if it were put to him, before refusing.

I drew his attention to the unfortunate effect it would have if in fact he were to start negotiations with the Nizam after they had been broken off with the Dominion to which he was irretrievably linked geographically and by majority of population.

Mr Jinnah said he would bear this in mind.

⁴Louis Mountbatten visited Lahore on 1 November 1947 to attend the meeting of Joint Defence Council. The conversation took place with Jinnah in the presence of H.L. Ismay.

²According to a US Embassy report these gentlemen saw Jinnah on 23 October 1947. See Annex to H-294.

³See H-293.

⁴See H-267.

⁵Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 30 October 1947. See F. 200 71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-296

Summary of V. P. Menon's discussion with the Hyderabad Delegation¹

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

MINISTRY OF STATES, NEW DELHI,

5 November 1947

I met the Hyderabad Delegation for the last time today. Before the actual discussion about the Agreement started, I narrated the incidents in which certain officials of the Hyderabad Government had taken part in the neighbouring Provinces, and stressed the fact that these small incidents might lead to big events and that it was in the best interest of the Hyderabad Government itself not only to see that justice was done to the majority community but that they should be made to feel that justice was being done by the Hyderabad Government. I added that the Dominion Government could not remain unconcerned if complaints about ill treatment of Hindus came from Hyderabad. Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung told me that he had also heard of many complaints, and agreed that it was in the best interests of H.E.H. to live in friendly relations with the neighbouring Provinces. As regards the refugees who had come from the Central Provinces, he said the Nizam's Government would be prepared to send them back. In fact, the Nawab of Chhatari had already written a letter to Mr Shukla² asking him to come to Hyderabad and persuade the refugees to go back. (I understand from Mr Rau, Chief Secretary to Government, C.P. & Berar, who phoned me up today, that the C.P. Muslims are trickling back from Hyderabad). Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung has promised to send a detailed reply to all our complaints as soon as he receives them.

In regard to correspondence, I suggested to the Hyderabad Delegation that in future all letters which they wanted to send to Provincial Governments should be sent through us. Similarly, we would instruct the Provincial Governments to send any complaints, they have about Hyderabad, through the States Ministry.

As regards the Agreement itself, I communicated H.M.'s view that he entirely agreed with the view expressed by H.E when the latter met the Delegation that the Agreement should either be accepted or rejected as it stood. I added that we had progressively gone down step by step from our standpoint in order to avoid a conflict with Hyderabad. If Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung's protestations that Hyderabad

wanted to remain on friendly relations with India were genuine, I saw no reason why Hyderabad could not accede to the Indian Dominion. This would at once clear the air and it would then be possible for the two Governments to understand each other better. If Hyderabad stood out of the Indian Dominion, it would be an eyesore to the people of India. In the interests of Hyderabad they should accede, and it was in that belief that the Government of India agreed to have a Standstill Agreement for one year. They knew the difficulties of Hyderabad vis-a-vis *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, and they did not want to force the pace of H.E.H. the Nizam and, therefore, they had made this compromise. They had taken that decision deliberately considering all the aspects, and they could not change the Agreement in any way whatsoever. Nawab Moin said that if they went back with the Agreement without any sort of concession, it would be very difficult to get it accepted by the Council. I told him the difficulties were created not by the Government of India but by the Nizam himself. He must make up his mind either to rule the Hyderabad State in its best interests himself or be guided by the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*. If the latter course was adopted, the Government of India could not help H.E.H. The fact that the Agreement which had been accepted by the Nizam's own Delegation and accepted by him and his Council was to be changed by show of force by a political party showed that he acquiesced in its tactics, and no negotiations were possible under such circumstances. I told the Nawab definitely that we would have nothing to do with it.

Then the Hyderabad Delegation asked that if no amendment of the Standstill Agreement was possible, would we consider some suggestions in the collateral letter? I told him that it was open to the Nizam to put in whatever he liked and that we could not stop him from this. The main point which they wanted to put in the collateral letter was that the State should be able to appoint not only Trade Agents but also Political Representatives. I told the Delegation that if the Nizam wanted to appoint Political Agents, we would have no objection provided they worked in complete subordination to our High Commissioners or Ambassadors as the case might be. The Hyderabad Delegation were not prepared to accept this. I told them that the Government of India could not go beyond what was contained in the letter.

Then they raised the question of arms and ammunition. They wanted a provision that if Hyderabad did not get within a reasonable time the arms and ammunition they required, they must be permitted to import from outside. I told them that if this concession was granted we

could not resist a similar claim from other States and that we could not concede this point.

Lastly, they wanted to say in the letter that the Nizam suspended the exercise of Paramountcy on these three subjects for one year only. I said it had been sufficiently indicated in the Agreement itself and I had no objection if the Nizam wanted to include it in the collateral letter. I told the Delegation that the collateral letter could not add or subtract from the Agreement itself and so it was open to them to add anything to the letter but that we would not give any reply to it, beyond pointing them out to the last clause of the Agreement.

Mr Rahim added that they were going back empty handed. I said I was very sorry that the Delegation should think so. In my opinion they had got everything they wanted.

They asked me whether it was necessary before they returned to Hyderabad to report our conversations to H.E. I told them there was no necessity for it and that I would myself tell H.E. what had happened. I asked Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung how long they would take to communicate to us the Nizam's decision. They said it would take about a week. I made it clear to them that it was in the best interest of both parties that this suspense should be ended as soon as possible. They promised to come back on Saturday the 15th November, when they expected to communicate H.E.H.'s final decision one way or the other.

Nawab Moin finally asked whether H.E. would like to send a reply to the letters from the Nizam. I told him that H.E. would prefer not to send any reply till he knew whether the Nizam was going to sign the Agreement or not.

V.P. Menon, Secretary, States Department, provided a copy of the note to Mountbatten.

²Ravishankar Shukla, Prime Minister, Central Provinces.

H-297

Record of Louis Mountbatten's Interview with Moin Nawaz Jung

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

6 November 1947

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung said that, after having started at a great

disadvantage, the Delegation, of which he was the leader, had had a series of most friendly discussions with the Secretary of the Ministry of States, and now knew the background fully. They were leaving for Hyderabad the following day and hoped to return after about a week with something more final. The only changes that were envisaged were in the collateral letter and not to the draft of the Standstill Agreement which had been agreed between the previous Delegation and the Government of India.

Mr Menon said that three alterations to the collateral letter had been suggested by the Hyderabad Delegation. He doubted whether one of these would prove acceptable to his Government; but with the other two there would probably be no difficulty.

The Governor-General said that these suggested amendments would certainly be considered by his Government. He could not guarantee that they would accept them, but he had made it plain previously to Sir Walter Monckton that such changes might be discussed. He went on to say that the behaviour of the Delegation, of which Sir Walter Monckton had been a member, had been irreproachable throughout. No other team could have obtained all they had obtained. He exhorted Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung not now to lose what they had gained.

The Governor-General said that he wanted Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung to inform His Exalted Highness that he was disappointed with the events which had taken place just before the new Delegation had left for Delhi. These developments had made things very much more difficult. He referred particularly to the most unstatesmanlike letter from His Exalted Highness proposing that he would conclude a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan if he did not conclude one with India.¹

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung stated that this letter had been sent without the advice of anybody. His Exalted Highness must have been in a desperate mood when he drafted it. The Governor-General replied that Rulers of 17 million people did not get in desperate moods if they knew their jobs. What reason was there to become desperate? No Ruler should be frightened of his subjects. The situation had, as a result of the Nizam's action, now become more electric and more difficult. The time was now approaching when H.E.H. would have to make his mind up finally. Failure to sign the Standstill Agreement would be an inconvenience of a minor nature for India, for Hyderabad it was likely to be a well-nigh irretrievable disaster.

The Governor-General explained to Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung his policy in Kashmir. He stressed that, if the Maharaja of Kashmir had

taken his advice, continuously offered, to ascertain the will of his people and accede to one or other of the Dominions according to their decision, his dynasty would have been secured whichever way the voting had gone.

Finally, the Governor-General emphasized the falseness of the assumption that India was now in a weak position, and too preoccupied with other matters to be able to give the Hyderabad issue their full attention. Indeed, the converse was true; India was immensely powerful, and still possessed one of the biggest armies in the world.

¹See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-298

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

HYDERABAD RESIDENCY,
7 November 1947

My Delegation returned to Hyderabad today and informed me the gist of their talk with Your Excellency and States Ministry. I believe you are going to England soon, therefore I should like to defer negotiations until Your Excellency's return to India. I am grateful for your valuable help in the past and trust you will extend the same in future. I trust Your Excellency will give me the exact date of your return so that my Delegation may be in Delhi at that time. I may add that I am anxious and keen to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible.

[MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN]

H-299

Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
9 November 1947

No. 592/89-A

My dear Nizam,

I thank Your Exalted Highness for your telegram of the 7th November.¹

2. My Government agree to defer further negotiations until my return to India on the 24th November, but consider that it is essential that they should be concluded by the end of the month at the latest. It is suggested, therefore, that your Delegation should be ready to open negotiations again on the 26th November.²

3. I am given to understand that the communal situation in Hyderabad, according to reports received here, is deteriorating, and I trust that Your Exalted Highness will do everything within your power to restore the confidence of the Hindus in your State. As you will well appreciate this is very important not only for the successful conclusion of the negotiations, but also in the interests of Hyderabad State itself.

Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹H-298.

²Vallabhbhai Patel also made a statement in the Indian Legislature on 19 November 1947 that 25 November 1947 had been indicated as the final date for the completion of negotiations with Hyderabad. See Governor-General's telegram to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 20 November 1947. See F. 200/71-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

H-300

Walter Monckton to Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

PERSONAL

PALACE HOTEL, KARACHI,
13 November 1947

My dear Dickie,

I did hope to be in England before now but I have been chased during the last fortnight, since I left Hyderabad, by two or three communications a day by special messenger from H.E.H. I have been to Lahore and seen Jinnah.¹ I found him very inadequately and inaccurately posted with Hyderabad news mostly through unofficial channels. I thought it best, as H.E.H. had wished, to correct Jinnah's impressions by a careful summary of the recent negotiations and of the reasons which impelled both H.E.H. and me to wish to come to a Standstill Agreement with your Government. When I saw him, Jinnah was tired and in bed and, although very friendly, did not take any line² or give any advice. Since then, I learn that he is again in bed at Lahore and it is not clear whether he will come back to Karachi in the next few days or

not. Though I am anxious to get back to England, the Nizam is obviously troubled and worried and is turning to me constantly for advice, which I could give him more easily now that, as a result of the firm stand which you took, we are back at the position in which I left the negotiations and he is still wanting to follow my advice. I have told him that I wish to go back to England and to see you before you leave on the 22nd, but that I will postpone my departure till the last possible moment in order to give him the chance of summoning me to Hyderabad for a further consultation if he wishes it, since I gather that the negotiations must be finished one way or another by the end of the month. The difficulty is that telegraphic communication between here and Hyderabad is terribly slow, and although he sends many special messengers, it may take days before he can let me know what he wants. I am, therefore, arranging to leave Karachi by Lancaster on the 20th unless he stops me. This means that we shall be at Heathrow on the afternoon of the 21st. I do hope that you will spare me half an hour that evening, although I know it is asking a lot. If you feel able to do so, would you get your Secretary to get in touch with mine who is meeting us; his name is Carver and he can be found in my Chambers any time between 10 [A.M] and 6 [P.M] Telephone Number: Central 8192 or 8193 or 2106, address: c/o me, 3 Paper Buildings, Temple. I shall cable to you at Buckingham Palace as soon as I am certain to start. If, by any chance, H.E.H. keeps me here, I shall hope to see you in Delhi; in any case I am letting Pug Ismay know what I am doing for the information of V.P [Menon] I am afraid that they might misunderstand my seeing Jinnah and assume, contrary to the fact, that my advice or policy had in some way altered.

Yours ever,
WALTER [MONCKTON]

¹Annex.

²Although Monckton has admitted here that Jinnah did not take any line on Hyderabad, Grafftey-Smith, British High Commissioner in Pakistan, reported to Arthur Henderson, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, London that "Jinnah appeared to prefer that the Nizam should choose the crown of Muslim martyrdom". See Annex, para 34

Annex to H-300

L. Grafftey-Smith to Arthur Henderson

PRO, DO 142/419

[Extract]

[KARACHI,]

[Undated] November 1947

REVIEW OF EVENTS IN PAKISTAN-14 TO 20 NOVEMBER 1947
STATES

Paras 29-32 omitted¹

HYDERABAD

33. Sir Walter Monckton, who spent some days in Karachi during the period under review, visited Mr Jinnah in Lahore and explained to him the advantages, as Sir Walter saw them, of a decision by the Nizam of Hyderabad to sign the proposed Standstill Agreement with India, his first approval of which had, under pressure from the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* in the State, been withdrawn. This Standstill Agreement is, in Sir Walter Monckton's view, the best possible temporary solution of the Nizam's difficulties, since it leaves the status quo in being for 12 months, during which anything may happen, and thus affords a valuable breathing space and time for the Nizam to watch events in India and in Pakistan. Sir Walter states that he found in Delhi, considerable body of opinion, which Sardar Patel endorsed in conversation, that there is much to be said for leaving Hyderabad as a stable and strong bulwark against the rising tide of communism now manifest in Madras and elsewhere. Major disturbances in Hyderabad now could only benefit subversive elements.² Sir Walter used this argument with Mr Jinnah. He also pointed out that, during the year of the Standstill Agreement, the Nizam would be free to make a large loan to Pakistan³ from the £70 million sterling controlled by Hyderabad; whereas, if the Nizam chose the course of resistance to India's proposals, this opportunity would disappear, and it would not be long before the Nizam's authority was limited to the urban centres with their predominantly Muslim population. Indeed, he would probably lose his throne.

34. In his interview with Sir Walter Monckton, Mr Jinnah showed himself unresponsive to these arguments and appeared to prefer that the Nizam should choose the crown of Muslim martyrdom; but Sir Walter Monckton left with him a note setting out the position as he

saw it, and he is not unhopeful that this may carry some weight in deciding Mr Jinnah's final attitude.

¹These paragraphs related to Kashmir. See KR-449.

²See Annex to H-294.

³The statement attributed to Monckton appears in sharp contrast to a strong stand of India over the deposit of Rs. 20 crore securities by Nizam with Pakistan, by way of loan as they continued to pressurize Hyderabad to prevent their encashment. See FOA, F. IB-2/3/20, 28 January 1948. Not printed. Also see H-305, 306, & 307.

H-301

Louis Mountbatten to Walter Monckton

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/71-B

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
29 November 1947

My dear Walter,

I cannot refrain from writing to you on this great day for in two hours' time (after the airmail has left) I am going to countersign on behalf of India the original Standstill Agreement,¹ negotiated by you and now signed by His Exalted Highness!

When I met the Delegation on return from London, they went to every length to get the Agreement varied; they even ended up by asking that the word 'shall' should be substituted for 'will' in one case! I told them that my whole object was to obtain the Nizam's signature on a completely unchanged Agreement, and so rejected their request.

I naturally agreed to variations in the collateral letter and pointed out that I had originally accepted your request on this point. In fact I have made it clear that you have won all along the line.

This, therefore, is your day, Walter, and I shall be thinking of you as I sign your Agreement.

It was nice seeing you again in London and Edwina and I are most grateful for all your help about our personal Bill.

I hope you will be coming out to India early next spring for final negotiations and will stay with us in Delhi.

Yours ever,
M. DICKIE

¹Enclosure to H-302.

H-302

*Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten**FOA, F. IB-2/3/17¹*

SECRET

HYDERABAD,
29 November 1947

I regret that we have not been able to reach a final agreement as to the eventual nature of the association between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India. As Your Excellency knows, I have not been prepared to contemplate accession to either Dominion, but short of this, I have been ready to negotiate with your Government upon any other basis. I am now enclosing a Standstill Agreement which I am prepared to execute if Your Excellency's Government are also prepared to sign it. It is a disappointment to me that after such protracted negotiations we are unable to do more for the present than carry on existing arrangements subject to such changes as the departure of Paramountcy imposes. On the other hand, it is essential to put an end to the present state of uncertainty, and the fact that the Agreement now to be executed is to endure for a year means that both Governments will be able to turn their attention more fully to the problems of administration without constant preoccupation with the question of our constitutional relationship. To that question we shall eventually have to return, but I am confident that, if during the next year our association in accordance with the terms of the Standstill Agreement is marked by goodwill on both sides, we shall be more likely at the end of that period to reach a satisfactory agreement as to the nature of our long-term association. I regard this Standstill Agreement accordingly as founded upon the principle of good neighbourliness and I am sure that Your Excellency and your Government will approach it in the same spirit. By executing this Standstill Agreement I am in no way permanently prejudicing my rights as an Independent sovereign, but I am of course conscious that I am in some important respects suspending the exercise of certain of these rights during the currency of the Agreement.

It is plain that an agreement in this general form will necessitate a good deal of adjustment in regard to particular arrangements. In this connection, I learn that your Government is prepared, as soon as possible, to negotiate with mine arrangements for the posts, telegraphs and telephones within Hyderabad to be worked as a Hyderabad system

in harmony with the Dominion system. There are, in addition, problems about the Hyderabad Forces, both in regard to the troops and their equipment, which our Governments will need to discuss in the light of the fact that on the 15th August, 1947, the Hyderabad Forces and Police available for the maintenance of internal order could no longer rely upon the backing of the troops stationed in and near the State by the Paramount Power. This question has already been discussed with the late Military Adviser-in-Chief and with his successor, and I have no doubt that Your Excellency's Government will have no objection to making any necessary adjustments in these respects and indeed in other cases of the same character (having their origin in the exercise of Paramountcy functions) which are already apparent or which may come to light in giving effect to the general provision contained in Article I of the Standstill Agreement. So far as arms and equipment are concerned, I understand Your Excellency's Government are ready and willing to provide Hyderabad with the necessary requirements of its Forces and Police. It is only if for any reason the Dominion Government cannot supply such requirements within a reasonable time that I shall approach other sources of supply, and then only after previous intimation to your Government.

3. There is also the question which has been much discussed between my Delegation and the representatives of your Government about diplomatic and trade representatives for Hyderabad abroad. I am prepared to execute the Agreement on the understanding that the Government of the Dominion will take no objection to the maintenance of the Hyderabad Agent-General in the United Kingdom or to the appointment of similar representatives in any other country. I shall be prepared to arrange for the complete co-ordination of the work of these representatives with the diplomatic and commercial representatives of the Dominion of India in such countries and to inform you in advance of any representatives whom I may decide to appoint. I am confident that Your Excellency's Government will be equally ready to co-operate with mine in regard to the import and export trade of Hyderabad.

4. There are several matters which have been outstanding between us for some time and which I should like to see cleared out of the way as soon as the Agreement comes into force:—

i. No Paramountcy functions remain to be exercised; nor was the Hyderabad Residency retained except as a house for the British Resident when there was one in the past. In these circumstances, I should be glad if your Government would now hand it over to Hyderabad. Suitable arrangements can be immediately made about the Treasury and your Treasury officials.

- ii. It is urgently necessary that arms, equipment, and, in particular, ammunition, should be immediately made available to Hyderabad. We have had no supplies since July and the shortage is interfering with the training of the Hyderabad Army.
- iii. In the same way, there has been difficulty in securing the importation of "soft" vehicles for the use of the Army and in the special circumstances of Hyderabad, you will appreciate the importance of mobility having regard to the areas to be covered.
- iv. I understand that the last of the Dominion troops stationed in Hyderabad will be removed in the course of the next month and I shall be glad of confirmation on this matter.
- v. The transfer to Hyderabad of all jurisdiction within the State was agreed in principle before the 15th August, 1947, and was largely effected before that date and has continued since. There are however some points still outstanding in this regard in relation to Police jurisdiction on part of the railways which run through the State. I assume that such jurisdiction will be immediately restored to Hyderabad.

5. It is of course manifest that my rights in regard to such matters as currency, coinage and postal rights are in no way impaired by the Standstill Agreement, but I should be glad if Your Excellency would give me an express assurance that the rights, to which I have just referred, continue undiminished.

6. I should like to take this opportunity of suggesting that, in relation to passports, the Dominion of India should agree, as a matter of convenience in a question which is becoming urgent, to the Chief Secretary of my Government or some other appropriate officer issuing passports to Hyderabad subjects which would be countersigned by the Dominion.

7. I am sure that in entering into this Agreement both our Governments intend to do all they can to prevent and discourage subversive movements and propaganda in the territory of the other.

8. I know well Your Excellency's interest in all steps taken to abate communal antagonism. It may, therefore, be of interest to you to know that, in conformity with earlier declarations on my part, I propose to issue a *Firman* in the immediate future expressing my firm resolve to protect the lives, rights and interests of all my subjects alike, irrespective of caste or creed.

[MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN]

¹This file contains the Government of India *White Paper on Hyderabad*, issued on 1 September 1948. See FOA, F-IB-2/3/48.

Enclosure to H-302
Standstill Agreement between India and Hyderabad
FOA, F. IB-2/3/18

29 November 1947

Whereas it is the aim and policy of the Dominion of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar to work together in close association and amity for the mutual benefit of both, but a final agreement as to the form and nature of the relationship between them has not yet been reached:

And whereas it is to the advantage of both parties that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in matters of common concern should, pending such final agreement as aforesaid, be continued:

Now, Therefore, it is hereby agreed as follows:-

Article 1.—Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to the matters of common concern, including External Affairs, Defence and Communications, which were existing between the Crown and the Nizam immediately before the 15th August, 1947, shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India (or any part thereof) and the Nizam.

Nothing herein contained shall impose any obligation or confer any right on the Dominion

(i) to send troops to assist the Nizam in the maintenance of internal order;

(ii) to station troops in Hyderabad territory except in time of war and with the consent of the Nizam which will not be unreasonably withheld, any troops so stationed to be withdrawn from Hyderabad territory within 6 months of the termination of hostilities.

Article 2.—The Government of India and the Nizam agree for the better execution of the purposes of this Agreement to appoint Agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively, and to give every facility to them for the discharge of their functions.

Article 3.—(i) Nothing herein contained shall include or introduce paramountcy functions or create any paramountcy relationship.

(ii) Nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of either party any right continuing after the date of termination of this Agreement, and nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for this Agreement, would have been exercisable by either party to it after the date of termination hereof.

Article 4.—Any dispute arising out of this Agreement or out of

agreements or arrangements hereby continued shall be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by those arbitrators.

Article 5.—This Agreement shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of one year.

In confirmation whereof the Governor-General of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar have appended their signatures.

[MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN]
Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
Governor-General of India

H-303

Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad

FOA, F. IB-2/3/19

SECRET

NEW DELHI,
29 November 1947

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of Your Exalted Highness letter dated 29th November¹ and the Agreement. While my Government and I note that Your Exalted Highness has no intention of acceding to Pakistan, we very much regret that you should have been unable to execute an Instrument of Accession with India. Both my Minister for States in his statement of the 5th July and I myself in my speech of the 25th July to the representatives of the States² have made it clear that it is the earnest desire of the Government of India to maintain the sovereignty of the States and to work with them as full partners in the administration of the three subjects proposed for accession. My Government cordially reciprocate your hope that, given goodwill on both sides, the working of the Standstill Agreement will provide a basis for a satisfactory long-term solution. Placed as Hyderabad is, its interests are inextricably bound up with those of India; and my Government hope that before the present agreement expires, it will be possible for Hyderabad to accede to the Dominion of India.

2. My Government will be prepared to discuss with your representative as soon as possible the question of handing over the posts, telegraphs and telephones; and also the future strength and equipment of the Hyderabad Forces.

As regards the supply of arms and equipment, the Dominion Government

will be able to supply your legitimate requirements.

3. My Government have no objection to your maintaining an Agent-General in London and appointing similar representatives elsewhere, if necessary. In this connection, they are very glad to have your assurance, to which you will appreciate that the Government of India attach great importance, that the activities of such representatives will be fully co-ordinated with those of the representatives of the Dominion of India and will be confined to matters properly relating to trade and commerce.

The Government of India are certainly prepared to co-operate with Hyderabad fully in regard to its import and export trade.

4. As regards the points raised in para 4 of your letter, my Government have authorized me to say as follows:

(1) My Government gladly agree that the Residency buildings at Hyderabad will be returned to your Government as soon as alternative accommodation promised by you is made available for our Treasury and officials employed there.

(2) My Government will take the necessary action in regard to the early supply of arms and ammunition for which an indent has been received from your Government.

(3) My Government will help your Government in securing the vehicles that they require.

(4) It is the definite intention of my Government that the troops at present stationed inside Hyderabad territory should be progressively withdrawn according to an agreed programme and that the withdrawal should be completed by the end of February 1948 at the latest.

(5) On the points remaining to be settled regarding the retrocession of jurisdiction, these can be discussed with my Government by your representative as soon as he is appointed.

5. I am authorized to assure Your Exalted Highness that your rights in regard to currency, coinage and postal matters will in no way be impaired by the Standstill Agreement.

6. My Government will take up the question of passports mentioned in paragraph 6 of your letter. They are fully prepared to assist you in this respect.

7. With reference to paras 7 and 8 of your letter, the Government of India desire to assure Your Exalted Highness that it is their earnest desire to promote communal harmony and to maintain peace and

security, and they will co-operate whole-heartedly with you to that end.

8. I enclose the Agreement duly signed by me.³

[Yours sincerely,]
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹H-302.

²No. 14, Vol. VIII, 42-7.

³See Enclosure to H-302.

H-304

Mir Laik Ali to M. A. Jinnah

F. 833/42

NEW DELHI,
5 March 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

Immediately on my return to Delhi, I had to get busy on the negotiations over the Hyderabad issue. During the various conversations, I gathered that it would probably be better that I do not present the memorandum¹ that I had brought over from Karachi yet, as it might possibly lead to greater misunderstanding in certain sections and might also adversely affect the Hyderabad talks. Mountbatten also thought so. I am therefore taking the memorandum back with me to Hyderabad this morning. I propose to return back to Delhi after some time and follow up the matter and then convey the contents of the memorandum. I have of course conveyed in general terms that Pakistan is equally anxious to see the Kashmir issue settled amicably and to resolve all the differences with India and I have stopped at that.

I continue to face difficulties over the Hyderabad issue. I pray Almighty to give guidance and lead us to a peaceful and honourable solution of the issue.

I trust you are keeping well. With most respectful regards to Miss Jinnah and self. I say *Allah Hafiz*.

I remain,
Very sincerely,
MIR LAIK ALI

¹Not traceable.

H-305

*Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten**FOA, F. IB-2/3/21*

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

9 March 1948

I have read the minutes of the discussion between my Delegation and yourself and Mr Menon on the 2nd and 4th of March.¹ I see that Your Excellency said that the greatest service which my Prime Minister could do on his visit to Karachi would be to arrange for the so-called Rs. 20 crores loan not to be realized during the term of the present Standstill Agreement. I learn that you were of the opinion that to dispose of this matter would do much to allay the suspicion which exists in the minds of the Government of India about Hyderabad. My Prime Minister, in undertaking to ask the Government of Pakistan not to put the securities in question on the market during the currency of the Agreement, certainly went beyond any express authority which he had. You would no doubt appreciate that to make such a proposition to Pakistan long after the transfer of securities is an embarrassing matter for the State, but I well understand that he took this course in his enthusiasm to do all he could to remove a ground for suspicion, which, in Your Excellency's opinion, was interfering with the proper working of the Standstill Agreement.

2. I see also that with the same purpose he agreed to amend the recent Currency Ordinance in order to take the sting out of it, as he expressed it, by permitting travellers as a matter of concession to use Indian currency for their bona fide requirements.

3. I am, however, most disappointed to learn that the draft joint announcement which Sir Walter Monckton prepared on the basis of the agreed outline was not acceptable to your Government. I understand that your Government was only prepared to agree to the issue of a joint statement of Sir Walter Monckton's draft, of which I attach a copy, was altered in three important respects.²

4. My Government remain ready to take the steps agreed upon in the conferences to remove all sources of suspicion, but the only way in which the corresponding suspicions here can be dispelled is for the various promises on behalf of the Government of India, in particular those recorded on page 6 of the minutes of the 4th March to be implemented without delay. It was, I understood, not seriously denied that the passage not only of arms and equipment but of motor vehicles,

plant, machinery and the goods and commodities ordinarily necessary for the economic and commercial life of the State, were being deliberately held up in the provinces which surround Hyderabad. If this is to continue, it is hard to see what hope there can be for the future. Surely after clearing the grounds for suspicion on the part of Hyderabad in a manner agreed upon, there should be no hesitation on the part of the Government of India to pronounce its intentions towards the implementation of the Standstill Agreement. Such an attitude has caused and still creates tension and misunderstanding between us and I trust that Your Excellency will ensure, before it is too late that, what have amounted in recent months to economic sanctions and a complete blockade, are immediately withdrawn. This and the supply of arms and ammunition already admittedly overdue would do much to remove suspicion and pave the way not only to the working of the Standstill Agreement but to a more lasting solution of the problems which confront us. My Prime Minister has made it plain, that both in the realm of Foreign Affairs and Defence, we are anxious to contribute to your security and to assure you that Hyderabad is not a nest of Pakistan in India nor a possible source of danger to your Dominion. If Your Excellency can secure what I have asked for in this letter,³ you will not find me wanting in my efforts, on the lines indicated by my Prime Minister, to remove any grounds of distrust of Hyderabad which now exist in India.

5. Discussions have taken place during the last few days between the representatives of the Government of India and of the Hyderabad Government under the chairmanship of the Governor-General. These discussions have not been concluded and the Hyderabad Delegation will return by the end of this month when the discussions will be resumed.

6. In the meanwhile, with reference to the exchange of securities between Hyderabad and Pakistan, the Government of Hyderabad has agreed to arrange not to cash the securities in question during the currency of the Standstill Agreement. The Government of Hyderabad has also agreed with reference to the recent Currency Ordinance to amend it suitably in consultation with the Government of India.⁴

[NIZAM]

¹Not traceable.

²For details see *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F. IB-2/3/20. Not printed.

³In his reply of 19 March 1948, Mountbatten informed the Nizam of Hyderabad that as Governor-General, he was not in a position to answer the letter. See *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F. IB-2/3/22. Not printed.

⁴Paras 5 and 6 are amended version, as modified by Government of India in Walter Monckton's draft.

H-306

V. P. Menon to Mir Laik Ali

FOA, F. IB-2/3/23

[NEW DELHI,]

23 March 1948

I am directed to address you on the relations between the Government of India and H.E.H. the Nizam's Government.

2. The Government of India consider that a position has been reached in the discussions relating to the Standstill Agreement when definite and prompt steps have to be taken to prevent the relations between the two Governments as well as the security of the areas on both sides of the Hyderabad border from deteriorating further.

3. The Government of India have given the most careful consideration to the views which have been placed before them by you and other representatives on behalf of H.E.H.'s Government at the various discussions which have taken place since January, 1948. They have come to the conclusion that H.E.H.'s present Government have failed¹ to carry out the obligations under the Standstill Agreement as hereinafter stated:

A. They have committed a breach of the existing agreements and arrangements relating to External Affairs

- a. by giving a loan of twenty crores to a foreign power, to wit, the Pakistan Government;
- b. by appointing a Public Relations Officer in Pakistan (now recalled).

B. They have also failed to carry out their obligations relating to Defence, that is to say

- a. by repudiating the obligations arising out of the Indian States Forces Scheme, 1939;
- b. by increasing the strength of the State Forces without the approval of the Government of India;
- c. by failing to forward an Annual Return in respect of the Police Forces;
- d. by supporting and taking assistance from the *Razakars*, a private army of irregulars, functioning in collaboration with the Military and the Police of Hyderabad.

C. They have further committed a breach of the agreements and arrangements in respect of communications by entering into an agreement with the United Press of America for setting up a transmitting

and/or receiving station at Hyderabad without the concurrence of the Government of India.

D. They have further committed a breach of the agreements and arrangements as to other matters of common concern in the following respects

- a. by making the use of Indian currency for cash transactions illegal in the State;
- b. by banning the export of groundnuts and other oilseeds.

4. We have already brought these breaches to your notice in our discussions, but regret that, so far, they have not been set right.

5. H.E.H.'s Government will appreciate that as soon as the Standstill Agreement was executed, the Government of India began to perform an essential part of the Standstill Agreement by withdrawing the Indian Army stationed at Bolaram. Practically the whole of it had been withdrawn by the end of February. The Government of India are also anxious to fulfil their obligations. H.E.H.'s Government are aware that obligations under the Standstill Agreement are reciprocal. The Government of India therefore expect that H.E.H.'s Government will fully co-operate with them by forthwith taking action in order to fulfil their obligations under the Standstill Agreement in the following manner, that is to say

- a. by withdrawing twenty crores loan notes handed over to the Pakistan Government;
- b. by agreeing to a joint commission being appointed to examine and determine the agreements and arrangements relating to matters of Defence;
- c. by furnishing a return of the strength, organization and equipment of the Police in the form in which it used to be done prior to August 15, 1947;
- d. by banning the organization of *Razakars*;
- e. by repealing the Ordinance making the use of Indian currency for cash transactions illegal in the State;
- f. by cancelling the ban on the export of gold, groundnuts, and other oil-seeds; and
- g. by cancelling the agreement, if any, with the United Press of America as regards the transmitting and /or receiving stations for foreign news.

6. The peculiar position of *Ittehad-ul-Musilmeen* in Hyderabad and of the Communists on the border causes the gravest concern to the Government of India. They consider that in the interests of peace inside the State and on both sides of the border the *Ittehad-ul-Musilmeen* should be banned and its organizations wound up. If the activities of

the *Ittehad* are not immediately stopped, it is apprehended that a very grave situation will develop, involving the security not only of the Hyderabad State, but also of the adjoining Provinces of C.P., Bombay and Madras.

7. I am accordingly to request that H.E.H.'s Government will take prompt and definite steps to fulfil their obligations arising out of the Standstill Agreement and to ban the *Ittehad* as suggested. The Government of India will appreciate a very early reply indicating action which H.E.H. the Nizam's Government decides to take, or has taken, in respect of the various matters set out in this letter.

[V.P. MENON]

¹Earlier on 28 January 1948, the Additional Secretary, Ministry of States, India, had sent a memorandum on infringement of the terms of the Standstill Agreement to the Agent-General of Hyderabad at New Delhi, as an advance intimation of India's objections, to serve as basis of discussions in future. See *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F. IB-2/3/20. Not printed.

H-307

Mir Laik Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru

FOA, F. IB-2/3/24

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

5 April 1948

In reply to the letter, addressed to me by the Secretary to the Ministry of States of the Government of India and dated the 23rd March 1948,¹ which was delivered to me personally by the Agent-General of the Government of India on the 20th March 1948 on the relations between the Government of India and the Nizam's Government, the Nizam and his government are as anxious as the Government of India to prevent the relations between the two Governments, as well as the security of the areas on both sides of the Hyderabad border from deteriorating further. The Nizam's Government would be glad to see the Standstill Agreement implemented henceforward with that goodwill on both sides, which, as the Nizam observed in this collateral letter accompanying the Agreement, would make it more likely that at the end of the period a satisfactory agreement could be reached as to the nature of our long term association. In the meantime, I am sure that you will appreciate that goodwill will not be promoted by attempts, by economic pressure or otherwise, to coerce the Nizam into the abandonment of his right to independent status which he had

consistently asserted since the 15th August 1947.

2. You will permit me to say at the outset that this Government finds little encouragement, from the point of view of improving relations between the two Governments, in the marked change between the tone of the letter, to which I am replying, with its increased catalogue of alleged breaches and its growing demands upon this State, and the more reasonable and amicable atmosphere which prevailed during the discussions between the Hyderabad Delegation and the Governor-General as recently as the 2nd and 4th March 1948. This Government hopes that after the full and candid reply, which I am now sending, the way may be open to a return to a more friendly interchange of views. During those discussions the so-called Pakistan loan of 20 crore was treated as the most important outstanding obstacle to good relations and I undertook (at the suggestion of the Governor-General) to ask the Pakistan Government not to put the securities in question on the market during the currency of the Standstill Agreement. I have accordingly done so. Nobody then suggested that the Hyderabad Government should withdraw twenty crore loan notes handed over to Pakistan Government. Yet that is the first demand contained in the letter under reply—see paragraph 5 (a).² To take another instance, no one suggested at Delhi that the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, a political party which has been established in the State for many years, “should be banned and its organizations wound up.” Yet that is the demand made in paragraph 6 of the letter of the 23rd March. These are but two examples which illustrate the change of attitude which the Government of India has now adopted. Others will emerge in the course of this reply.

3. Before dealing in detail with the specific allegations in the letter I must draw attention to paragraph 5 of it, in which the Government of India treats the withdrawal of the Indian Army stationed at Bolaram as the “performance of an essential part of the Standstill Agreement.” I am sure that your Government appreciates that the presence of non-Hyderabad troops in the State up to the 15th August 1947 was justified, and indeed required, by reason of the Treaties between the British Government and the Nizam. Those Treaties were unilaterally denounced by the British by Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act. Thereafter (as was constantly pointed out by the Nizam to the Governor-General and never denied), there was no justification for the retention of Indian Army troops within the State. It is true that, in spite of the Nizam’s protests, such troops were still in Bolaram when the Standstill Agreement was signed more than three months later, on the 29th November 1947 and that, not unnaturally in the circumstances, the Nizam in his letter to the Governor-General of the same date in speaking of “several matters which have been outstanding between us

for some time" said [in paragraph 4 (iv)] that he understood that the last of the Dominion troops stationed in Hyderabad would be removed in the course of the next month; and that the Governor-General in his reply of the same date [paragraph 4 (4)] assured the Nizam of the intention of His Government to complete the withdrawal by the end of February 1948 at latest. But the Government of India would have had no right to keep them in Hyderabad, whether or not the Standstill Agreement had been signed. All that Article I of that agreement did in this connection was expressly to prevent the Dominion from acquiring any such right

A. BREACHES OF STANDSTILL AGREEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

4. Paragraph 5 of the letter goes to express the anxiety of the Government of India to fulfil their other obligations. It is added that obligations under the Standstill Agreement are reciprocal. If by this the Government of India intends to introduce the principle of reciprocal obligations in the Indian Contract Act, in order to excuse breaches by the Government of India of their obligations under the Standstill Agreement, we are advised, and shall so contend if and when the matter goes to arbitration, that this doctrine has no application in the circumstances of this case. Moreover, the Nizam's Government has faithfully performed its obligations under the agreement, as they understand them. There are (as appeared in Delhi and will appear in the course of this letter) differences of opinion as to the nature and extent of the obligations of Hyderabad under the agreement. But the Nizam's Government is ready and willing if it is found to have erred in its interpretation of those obligations, to carry them out as ascertained in the manner prescribed in the agreement itself. But it has great difficulty in understanding what prevents or has prevented the Government of India from carrying out some of its obvious, admitted and fundamental obligations under the agreement. Let me instance cases not only covered within the terms of the agreement itself but by reason of their importance, specifically referred to in the collateral letters of the same date on the faith of which the agreement was executed.

[Paras 5 to 10 omitted³]

B. ANSWERS TO CHARGES AGAINST HYDERABAD

[PARAS 11 TO 20 OMITTED⁴]

C. ANSWER TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S REQUESTS

21. I have in the course of the foregoing paragraphs indicated the readiness of the Nizam's Government to co-operate with the Government

of India to carry out the Standstill Agreement and the practical steps they are taking and are prepared to take for this purpose. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience I will recapitulate these steps under the headings given in paragraph 5 of the letter from the States Ministry

- a. in respect of the matter of the so-called loan to the Pakistan Government I have taken the action in this regard suggested by the Governor-General in the Delhi Conference.
- b. I have in the course of this letter and the discussions, which are referred to in it, expressed the anxiety of the Hyderabad Government to have the size of its forces determined after the consultation already suggested between General Chaudhri and the army authorities in the State. I do not see any necessity for the appointment of a Joint Commission to examine and determine the agreements and arrangements relating to matters of Defence. I should prefer as a speedier and more convenient course to have these matters also discussed between the appropriate officers, military and civil, of the two Governments. It may well be, and indeed it so appears from a perusal of the letter under reply, that there is a difference of opinion about the interpretation of the Standstill Agreement in regard to these questions, for instance as to the extent to which Article 3 (i) cuts down the content of Article 1. If so and if we cannot reach agreement by discussion, the Hyderabad Government will be anxious to have the matter settled by arbitration as provided by the Agreement.
- c. The return of the strength, etc., of the Police has been rendered.
- d. I have said in paragraph 17 above that the question of *Razakars* ought to be considered in relation to the problem of the border districts as a whole.
- e. The amendment of the currency ordinance which was agreed upon in the Delhi Conference has been made and published.
- f. The ban on export of gold represents the continuance of an embargo put on such export long before the British and I hope that your Government will, on reconsideration, agree that it constitutes no breach of the Agreement. The ban on the export of surplus oilseeds, other than groundnuts, has been removed. The ban on the export of groundnuts should be the subject of discussion between me and the appropriate ministers of the Government of India as agreed in the Delhi discussion.
- g. There is no agreement between the Hyderabad Government and the United Press of America as regards a transmitting station. It is hoped that, on reconsideration, the Government of India will

agree that there can be no legitimate objection to the installation of the receiving station.

22. The Nizam's Government is unable to agree that the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen* should be banned and its organizations wound up, as suggested in paragraph 6 of the letter from the States Ministry. This is, of course, a matter concerning the internal policy of the State. The *Ittehad* is, as I have said in paragraph 2 above, a long established political party in the State, being the sole political organization of Mussalmans, and the Nizam's Government, which is not banning any other political organizations in the State, (except the Communist Party, as in India) is satisfied that there are no grounds whatever to justify proscribing the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*.

D. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS UNDER THE AGREEMENT

23. I have dealt in the foregoing paragraphs fully and frankly with the allegations and requests summarized in the letter from the States Ministry, in the hope that your Government will appreciate that we are genuinely anxious to remove the sources of disagreement and suspicion. The Nizam's Government is anxious to carry out fully its obligations under the Standstill Agreement, as they are ascertained to be. I have, in the course of this letter, drawn attention to questions upon which the two Governments do not at present see eye to eye as to the extent and character of their respective obligations. Meantime, the economic blockade of Hyderabad is being tightened every day, and a propaganda war of nerves is being carried on against us at full blast. Our latest reports are that troop concentrations are taking place in the Indian Union all round Hyderabad and there have been instances of military personnel of the Union Government going about in our territory in mufti with concealed weapons. Nevertheless, we want friendly settlement and I, on my part, would like to do all that is humanly possible to achieve this end, so long as it is consonant with our dignity and honour. If I have not succeeded in removing the sources of disagreement and if you do not think that further discussions would remove them, I have to draw your attention to Article 4 of the Agreement which provides that any dispute arising out of the Agreement or out of agreements or arrangements thereby continued should be referred to arbitration. It seems to the Nizam's Government that arbitration as provided for in that Article, is the proper course in the circumstances which have arisen, to resolve our difficulties. I am, therefore, to suggest that, to ensure the smooth working of the Agreement from now onwards, both Governments should agree to submit to arbitration all outstanding points between them, which can no doubt be

formulated without delay by the appropriate officers of our respective Governments.

[MIR LAIK ALI]

142H-306.

³The paragraphs contained item-wise comments of Hyderabad Government on the breaches of the Standstill Agreement by India: (i) Supply of arms and equipment; (ii) Supply of soft vehicles; (iii) the Import and Export trade of Hyderabad; (iv) Berar; (v) Authorization of Air Services in Hyderabad; and (iv) Subversive movements.

⁴The answers covered the following issues: (i) So-called Pakistan loan; (ii) Appointment of a Public Relations Officer in Pakistan; (iii) Defence; (iv) Indian States Forces Scheme; (v) Size of State Forces; (vi) Annual Return of Police; (vii) The *Razakars*; (viii) Agreement with United Press of America for Receiving Station; (ix) Currency Regulation; and (x) Ban on Exports.

H-308

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

FOA, F. 1B-2/3/25

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

5 April 1948

Information, which has reached me in Hyderabad, gives me reason to think that the letter¹ addressed to my Prime Minister by your States Ministry was in the nature of an ultimatum to be regarded as a prelude to an open breach of friendly relations. I am therefore making a final appeal to you to exercise your good offices to prevent such contingency.

2. I was glad when at the end of November, 1947, the Standstill Agreement was finally executed, because I thought that, if a working arrangement continued for a year or so with goodwill on both sides, suspicion would diminish and that in the light of experience the Dominion would discover that some form of association, other than accession, was after all practicable and satisfactory.

3. Unhappily hitherto the Standstill Agreement has not worked smoothly. But the situation can be remedied and our original hopes revived. There are difficulties in interpreting the obligations imposed by the Agreement and in ascertaining the obligations which are continued by it. Moreover, the fact that the Agreement specifically excludes Paramountcy, so that whatever followed directly and exclusively from the relationship and was not covered by any agreement or administrative arrangement, is no longer in force, involves further

complication. But these difficulties can be solved, as was contemplated in the Agreement itself, by arbitration.

4. The letter, to which I have referred, from your States Ministry to my Prime Minister sets out a summary list of alleged breaches of varying importance, some of them introduced for the first time. But in the discussions which you had with my Delegation in Delhi at the beginning of March you said that the so-called Pakistan loan and the currency regulation confining cash transactions in my State to my own currency, were the principal obstacles to goodwill. In the case of the loan, my Government have taken the action which you yourself suggested and I have every hope that it will be effective. So far as the currency regulation is concerned, my Prime Minister agreed at the Delhi Conference to amend it, in order to take the sting out of it, by making it inapplicable to travellers for their bona fide requirements. The necessary amendment has since been made and published.

5. What has concerned me has been that, whereas the British regularly supplied me with arms and equipment, I have had no arms, equipment or ammunition whatever for my Forces or Police since July 1947. I have constantly pressed your Government and Your Excellency on this subject but while your Government have objected to my getting my requirements from other sources, they have supplied me with nothing themselves, with the result that I have been gravely embarrassed both in training my troops and in maintaining law and order.

6. An equally tense situation has been created by the Government of India in relation to the trade, commerce and economic life of Hyderabad. On many occasions, I expressed to you, through Sir Walter Monckton and others, my apprehension that if I chose, as I had been assured I could, to remain independent, the Government of India would seek to coerce me into accession by an economic boycott or even by finding some excuse to invade my territories. In paragraph 2 of your letter to me dated the 12th August, 1947,² you used these words "I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile act by the Dominion and your State might be subjected to blockade, but I am satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying such pressure." You sent me assurances on several later occasions that you would never be a party to any improper pressure on the State and that you had received the necessary assurances from your Ministers. I must tell Your Excellency frankly that, in spite of these assurances and in spite of the Standstill Agreement, economic pressure has in fact

been applied on Hyderabad with growing intensity from the time when the British left. There is no manner of doubt that it is in full force today. Even medicines, medical stores and hospital requisites are being held up and chlorine [denied] for the water supply of my people. Of all this my Government have in their possession documentary evidence. There are many Britishers and other foreigners who have been in the State in recent months and can confirm what I say of their own knowledge. Nor has it been seriously challenged by the officers of your Government. I have hitherto made no public protest, but if it is now intended to create an open breach of friendly relations, I can no longer remain silent. Whatever difference of opinion there may be on the question of Hyderabad's decision in present circumstances not to accede, the world must know the way in which Hyderabad has been treated.

7. In 1947, the British Government unilaterally denounced the treaties between them and my State. I wonder if Your Excellency remembers my letter to you as Crown Representative dated the 9th July, 1947.³ I attached a copy together with a copy of the reply I ever received to it. I have hitherto refrained from publishing these documents but now I must release them. Will history say that the British were content to sacrifice their tried friends because they had too little nuisance value?

8. The world must know how, between them, the British Government and the new Government of India—I do not seek to apportion blame—have denied me the fulfillment of the promise that I should be free to choose whether to accede or to remain independent.

9. I appeal to Your Excellency, after the assurances you have given me, not to be a party to the imposition of economic pressure on me and my State. I even hear in Hyderabad that forces of the Indian Army are being moved and stationed round the borders of my State, and cannot but ask for what purpose these troop concentrations are taking place. Your Excellency's Government must know that there can be no intention of offensive action by Hyderabad against the Indian Union. I must warn Your Excellency that, if the policy of attempted coercion is persisted in, I gravely fear that ultimately the peace, not only of Hyderabad but of the whole of South India, will be endangered.

10 Last year the British, without consulting me, severed all the ties which bound my State to the King Emperor. Will your Excellency not keep faith with me now? To break faith with the weak causes perhaps less immediate disadvantage than to break faith with the strong, but assuredly in the end it brings its retribution. I hope Your Excellency

will forgive me for this frank and honest expression of my feelings and sentiments.

[MIR OSMAN ALI]

¹H-306.

²H-269.

³H-260.

H-309

Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad

FOA, F. IB-2/3/26

[NEW DELHI,]

8 April 1948

Sir Walter Monckton brought me your letter of 5th April.¹ I hope that you will treat this reply to certain points which you raised in it on a strictly personal basis. As you well know, I am now a constitutional Governor-General, and my official views are those of my Government. I thought, nevertheless, that useful purpose might perhaps be served if I were to convey to you some of my own personal feelings and thoughts on the present situation. I know not only that you will treat these with the confidence which, I feel sure you will agree, they deserve; but also that you will take full account of what I have to say both as a friend of Hyderabad's, as a well-wisher for the lasting peace and prosperity of this sub-continent as a whole, and as one who has personally always believed in, and will continue to believe in, constitutional monarchy as the best form of Government in this troubled world.

2. I would first say that I fully shared your gladness, to which you refer in your letter, when the Standstill Agreement between India and Hyderabad was executed at the end of November, 1947.² I too hoped that the satisfactory working of this Agreement, with goodwill on both sides, would result, on its termination, on the ground being prepared for the formulation of a permanent close association between India and Hyderabad. This hope was fully shared by my Government. Nobody could be more distressed than I that the agreement has, for various reasons, not worked smoothly. No one could be keener than I that a full measure of goodwill should return, and that Hyderabad's relations with India should, at the earliest practicable moment, be put on a permanent basis as a result of renewed negotiations in a spirit of friendship.

3. I am firmly of the belief that this spirit would have prevailed from the commencement of the Standstill Agreement, and that you and I would be seeing it grow even now, if only that most unfortunate incident, which took place in Your Highness's capital city on the night of 27th October, had not occurred. I refer to the occasion when your Delegation, of which the Nawab of Chhatari (your Prime Minister at that time), Sir Sultan Ahmed, Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung and Sir Walter Monckton were then members were unfortunately unable to leave Hyderabad for Delhi as intended. I need not enter into the full details of this incident, and the part which the police played in it. These facts are as well known to Your Exalted Highness as they are to me. But I must reiterate my firm belief that, if these methods of coercion had not been permitted to interfere with the carrying out of your Exalted Highness's wishes at so crucial a moment, the story of relations between India and Hyderabad would have been written by a very different and far happier pen.

4. I feel that it is my duty to set your Exalted Highness's mind at rest on one point. You refer to assurances, which I have given to you in the past, that I would never be party to improper pressure on your State. These assurances remain as good today as when they were given. Never will I, the constitutional Governor-General of India, be a party to any such procedure.

5. You refer particularly to paragraph 2 of my letter of 12th August, 1947,³ in which I said: "I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile act by the Dominion and your State might be subject[ed] to blockade, but I am satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying such pressure." I can now once more assure you that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, Pandit Nehru and the other Ministers of the Central Government of India have in no way been parties to any policy of applying economic pressure on Hyderabad. I do not know whether you have ever met Pandit Nehru; if you had, I do not believe that you would allow any accusation of the nature you imply to be levelled against him.

6. But this I must make clear to you. These assurances were given at a time when both my Government and yours were united in the resolve to make the Standstill Agreement work. I can assure you that such a resolve still holds the field, so far as the Government of India are concerned. But certain events must have supervened which make it very much more difficult for the same neighbourly feelings as then existed, to exist today.

7. You will have noticed that during the course of the last few

months, the ruler of nearly every State in this sub-continent, which is in relationship with the Dominion of India, has introduced, or has declared his intention of introducing in the near future, truly responsible and representative Government. I say nearly every State, for there is one exception—Hyderabad. It is impossible for any fair minded person in the outside world to view the present Government of Hyderabad but as one representing, and indeed dominated by, a party which commands the support of only a part of the minority community in the State; for to the best of my knowledge, is [*sic*] it responsible to the legislature.

8. I do not personally believe that friendly relations between India and Hyderabad, which we are agreed are the necessary prelude to a satisfactory long-term settlement, can come so long as the state of affairs to which I have referred above exists. I am not saying this as Governor-General of India, I am saying it as an impartial observer and as a well-wisher of Hyderabad.

9. I therefore believe that the ability to take the first step towards arresting the present downward trend in the relationship between India and Hyderabad—and arresting it before it goes too far for hope of improvement—and towards starting that amelioration in the relationship which will, we all hope, end in permanent amity, rests in Your Exalted Highness's hands. If you could now see your way to introducing a Government truly representative of the desires and aspirations of your people as a whole, I believe that you will do a great service to the future of the whole of this sub-continent.

10. I shall not deal, in this letter, with the controversy which is at present taking place over certain details of implementation and interpretation of the Standstill Agreement. That, I am sure you will realize, is a matter for my Government to deal with and one in which I have no part. But I repeat that I believe that the ability to take the first step towards bringing about the spirit of friendship, in which the Agreement can be made to work, is yours and yours alone.

11. You sent me with your letter a copy of a letter which you wrote to me as Crown Representative on 9th July 1947, and the only reply that you have ever received thereto. I have investigated this matter and it appears that the reason why a further reply was not sent lay in an error of staff work in the Political Department here. Owing to the enormous pressure under which all concerned were working at the time, it was possible for such an error to have occurred. That it should have happened in connection with so important a document is, I admit, unfortunate.

12. Finally, let me tell you that, in the same way as you say that there is no intention of offensive action by Hyderabad against the

Indian Union, there is no intention of offensive action by the Indian Union against Hyderabad. I will end with this thought. Let us not believe that, however serious a situation may become, there is nothing that can be done to retrieve it, and that all we can do is fatalistically to await the worst. I will continue to do my best. I have told you how I think you could help.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

¹H-308.

²H-302.

³H-269.

H-310

*M. Vanderman¹ to Jawaharlal Nehru
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*

F. 120 (Vol. V)-GG/127-9

KHAIRATABAD,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN,
9 April 1948

Dear Panditji,

On the happy and auspicious occasion of the birthday of His Majesty the Nizam of Hyderabad & Berar I expect of [a man of] your culture and position that you will sincerely associate yourself with me in offering humble and heartfelt congratulations to His Majesty the Nizam on the occasion and fervent prayers to God to grant him a long and healthy life to rule over his dominion with greater benevolence to all his subjects, Hindus and Muslims alike.

Panditji, believe me, I have deeply reflected for days and weeks together over your past public utterances and your present actions, and my reading of your past public career and your present official life leads me to the recurring question: were all his past utterances publicly giving expression to his ideologies and beliefs in matters political, economic and religious, merely hypocritical in order to rise to power? For, otherwise, I cannot see any justification for your present actions as the Premier of India Union. You are simply dabbling in power politics and imitating, and crudely too, your old imperialist conquerors whom you once hated and condemned downright.

Under the plea of putting down feudal system prevailing in some petty Hindu States in India, you are actually walking in the footsteps

of British Imperialistic Rulers and annexing Indian States. The allure-ment of their equal partnership with you is a mere myth. You are now actually reviving the theory of "Subsidiary Alliance" in the form of "Subsidiary Association."

Your whole plan of annexation of Indian States stands self-exposed as Hindu imperialism aimed at the expansion of Indian Dominion and ultimately at the annexation of Pakistan. You may deny this as a mere allegation. But events in India, since your coming to power, do point to this as your obvious aim profess whatever you may to the contrary.

You cunningly manoeuvred and accepted the accession of Kashmir to India. Then you acted in a still worse manner with the State of Junagadh, which had naturally and legally acceded to Pakistan, imagining that you would provoke Pakistan to declare war on you. But little did you know the heights of Quaid-i-Azam's statesmanship and cool-mindedness. Not content with having committed these Himalayan blunders you chose to spill the blood of thousands of innocent men, women, and children of the beautiful valley of Kashmir by waging an unholy war against the martial frontier tribesmen who are out to liberate the valley from the tyrannical autocracy of the Dogra Raj. Failing in your war campaign, you very unwisely, chose to rush to the UNO where you stood, once again, self-exposed in the eyes of the entire world.

Then, Panditji, without drawing any profitable lesson from the Kashmir episode you began practising Hitlerite tactics against your sister dominion of His Majesty the Nizam. You commenced with hostile Press propaganda exactly in Hitlerite manner against Hyderabad. But when you found that truth was prevailing in favour of the Great Nizam, you resorted to shock tactics, all merely to coerce and intimidate His Majesty the Nizam to accede to India against the will and consent of the most powerful section of his subjects in the dominion.

Panditji, while you have day in and day out chosen to hurl unfounded allegations against Hyderabad police and patriotic men as having raided your territory, you have had not the courage or fairness to condemn the most horrifying, inhuman, subversive and terrorist activities of Indian nationals. Your subjects, in the name of communists, have been systematically conducting planned raids into Hyderabad territory carrying out arson, loot and murder and rape, thereby glaringly violating the Standstill Agreement and committing infringement of territorial integrity.

You have also hastily chosen to apply economic sanctions against Hyderabad by withholding the import of all essential supplies including even medicines which action on your part is clearly warlike and

inhuman. Is this not an undeclared war against a peaceful neighbour?

The methods you have practised and still practising in order to bring about accession of Hyderabad Dominion are so very nefarious in nature that all thinking people unanimously pronounce them as Nazi-like. I may pertinently ask you as to wherefrom you get sanction to dictate to my Government? Have you any legal or moral authority under which you can indulge in such Nazi-like tactics against my country? May I bluntly ask: who are you to interfere in the internal affairs of my land? Have you not the moral courage to publicly declare that you have stepped into the shoes of the imperialistic Britisher and exercising Paramountcy with vengeance?

Dear Panditji, my ruler and my countrymen will never, unlike those of Kashmir or Junagadh, tolerate any infringement of the sovereignty and independence of our country. Any offensive on your part will surely mean flow of much innocent blood before you can ever hope to set foot on the peaceful and prosperous Hyderabad soil!

Panditji, after having candidly expressed my views no word of caution to you is necessary for, soon or late, you are sure to become wise!

With kind regards,

I remain,
Your sincere friend,
M. VANDERMAN

¹M. Vanderman, a prominent industrialist of Hyderabad, sent copies of this open letter to rulers and statesmen of various countries, including Secretary-General, UNO.

H-311

V. P. Menon to Mir Laik Ali

FOA, F. IB-2/3/29

[NEW DELHI,
15 May 1948]

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th April 1948¹ to Hon'ble the Prime Minister of India.

2. The Government of H.E.H. the Nizam are aware that the conclusion of a Standstill Agreement for one year, without the accession of the State to the Dominion of India, is an exceptional arrangement to which the Government of India have not agreed in the case of any other State. In the case of Hyderabad, the Government of India acquiesced in such an arrangement out of consideration for the special

circumstances of the State, and in the hope that during the period of the Agreement, the State would be able to settle its internal difficulties so as to make it possible for it to accede to the Dominion of India.

3. The Government of India regret to note that, while they themselves have spared no efforts to implement the Standstill Agreement in the spirit in which it was concluded, the Government of H.E.H. the Nizam have acted in violation of the Agreement almost from the moment of its conclusion. There has been much technical argument on the question whether any one of these acts is an infringement of the terms of particular provisions of the Agreement although it is difficult to see what technicalities can justify the Hyderabad Government in, for instance, placing orders overseas for arms and ammunition except through, or without obtaining the prior consent of the Government of India; and that in quantities far in excess of anything that the State, according to its own calculations, requires. The Government of India, however, have no doubt that all these acts go counter to the spirit and essence of the Agreement, as is clear from the fact that they have all had the intention and effect of emphasizing the sovereignty of Hyderabad and its separateness from India, particularly in matters concerning External Affairs and Defence, whereas the Standstill Agreement required that the status quo (including the position of Hyderabad as a State in association with India and having no external status) should be maintained. And the Government of India believe that any impartial observer will agree with their view on this question.

4. The Government of H. E. H. have suggested that the points in dispute should be referred to arbitration, and it is no doubt true that the Standstill Agreement provides for such reference. But, considering the large number of points on which differences have already emerged, it is clear that arbitration on these points would take up all that remains of the period of one year for which the Agreement is to run, leaving little scope for the implementation of the award of the arbitrator. Reference to arbitration, moreover, could be regarded as a practical solution only if the Hyderabad Government were agreeable to taking certain steps immediately which could be regarded as a genuine token of that Government's desire to maintain cordial and friendly relations with the Government of India.

5. The most urgent of these steps are

- a. to declare illegal and to disband the *Razakars*, the volunteer organization of the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*; and
- b. to ensure that the press and radio controlled by the Government of Hyderabad cease forthwith propaganda hostile to the Government of India.

6. The Government of India find it difficult to reconcile the assurances of friendliness and goodwill towards India of H.E.H.'s Government, contained in your letter, with the attitude of Your Government towards the *Razakar* organization. It is suggested in your letter that the *Razakars* (who have been responsible for many acts of violence not only in the State of Hyderabad itself, but also in the territories of the Dominion of India) have a recognized part to play in the internal security arrangements of the State, which indicates that they function with the support and sympathy of H.E.H.'s Government. The information in the possession of the Government of India, however, shows that the activities of the *Razakars* are in fact directed towards the following purposes

- a. suppressing all opposition in the State by violent methods;
- b. terrorising the border areas of the three neighbouring India Provinces by irresponsible acts of violence;
- c. conducting a virulent propaganda against India; and
- d. organizing and mobilizing Muslims in some parts of India against the Government of India.

The Government of India cannot but take extremely grave notice of such activities especially when they take place in its own territories; and the close association between H.E.H.'s Government and the *Razakars* becomes therefore a matter seriously affecting the relations between the two Governments.

7. The Government of India also observe that while frequent complaints have been made by your Government of Communist incursions upon Hyderabad State territory, it is reported that that Government have recently removed the ban, which they had earlier imposed upon the Communist Party.

8. The Government of India cannot regard it as friendly behaviour towards India for the Government of Hyderabad to allow broadcasts over the Hyderabad radio and articles in the press whose tone and contents are consistently hostile to India and designed to confirm the people of Hyderabad State and India in their apprehension that the Government of Hyderabad are not desirous of continued friendly relations with the Government of India.

9. The Government of India have shown great forbearance in the face of such openly provocative actions in the hope that the hostility and violence would be a passing phase and that friendliness and cordial relations, the desirability of which the Hyderabad Government have invariably accepted, would soon take their place. It would appear, however, that this attitude has been taken as a sign of weakness. Nothing could be more unfortunate.

10. The Government of India further regret to note that H.E.H.'s Government have throughout the last five months adopted an attitude not conducive to a lasting solution of the Indo-Hyderabad problem. While failing to implement the Standstill Agreement, your Government have unequivocally declined so much as to discuss the question of accession; and, in spite of assurance, they have also declined to announce the grant of responsible Government in the State, to summon a Constituent Assembly, or even to reconstruct the present Government—thus shutting out all sections of the people of Hyderabad from a voice in its government, except the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, which represents only a section of the 14 per cent Muslim population of the State. On the other hand, your Government is in active association with the *Ittehad*, and *Razakar* organization is being strengthened with the direct assistance of your Government.

11. While maintaining the closest relations with Pakistan, your Government have embarked on activities which endanger not only the tranquillity of South India, but threaten communal relations throughout India.

12. I am to say that the Government of India, after giving the whole matter their most careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that if conditions are to improve rapidly—and rapid improvement has now become absolutely essential—it is imperative that H.E.H. the Nizam's Government should take immediate steps to put an end to the activities of the *Razakars*. The Government of India are convinced that this is the only way in which peace and normal conditions can be re-established in Hyderabad and its neighbourhood, and cordial relations restored between the Government of India and Hyderabad. They hope that on an objective consideration of the situation, H.E.H. the Nizam will agree with this view.

13. H.E.H. the Nizam will also appreciate that the Government of India have responsibility to their own citizens and must therefore take effective action for safeguarding the security and essential interests both of India and of her people.

[V. P. MENON]

¹H-307.

²Mir Laik Ali sent a reply to this letter on 23 May 1948, clarifying the stand of Hyderabad on all the points raised by V. P. Menon. He reiterated that Hyderabad earnestly desired to maintain the most friendly and cordial relations with India and that the State was anxious to settle points of difference by negotiations or arbitration, as provided in the Standstill Agreement. See *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F. IB-2/3/30. Not printed.

H-312

Press Note by Governor-General's Camp Office

F. 188-GG/21

QUETTA,
1 June 1948

Three representatives of the *Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen*, Hyderabad, Deccan, arrived in Quetta without any previous intimation and desired an interview with the Quaid-i-Azam.

They were informed that the Quaid-i-Azam regretted very much that he was unable to give an interview to the representatives of a political organization in Hyderabad as in his opinion it would be unwise to do so.

The Quaid-i-Azam, however, stated that his views were already known both to the Governments of Hyderabad and India. Hyderabad was an independent sovereign State and it was for its duly constituted authority to accede to India or remain an independent Dominion.

He held that India should not resort to the methods of force, coercion and violence to compel Hyderabad to accede to India, as it was contrary to high sense of morality, justice and fair play in dealing with a sovereign independent neighbouring State.

He added "Of course, I need not say that not only Muslims of Pakistan but Muslims all the world over fully sympathize with Hyderabad in its struggle. Hyderabad should be free to take a decision as the constituted authority of the Hyderabad Government may think proper because that is the only honourable course for both the countries, India and Hyderabad, to follow".

H-313

Louis Mountbatten to Nizam of Hyderabad

FOA, F. IB-2/3/39

[GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,]
15 June 1948

It gives me very great pleasure to be able to write to you at last when the long and protracted negotiations between Hyderabad and

India are drawing to their successful conclusion because Mir Laik Ali is taking down to you today the [following] final papers which have been agreed up here, subject to Your Exalted Highness ratification.

2. This situation has not been easy to hold here and we are all agreed that the matter must be concluded today, Tuesday, without fail in the interests of good feeling and friendship.

3. I only have five days left in India, and they are very fully taken up indeed with meetings and farewell lunches, receptions and dinners. It will be difficult to find the time to come to Hyderabad, but I am so anxious to be able to express the goodwill of India in person to you before I go, that I will somehow find the time to get down even if it is only for two or three hours, for I should much like to renew our acquaintance before I leave.

1. (DRAFT) LETTER

From—Prime Minister of India

To—Prime Minister of Hyderabad

In connection with the agreement which has to-day been signed between the Government of India and the Government of Hyderabad, I have to state that:

1. The Government of India will do their utmost to ensure that the flow of goods of all kinds at present held up between Hyderabad and India is resumed and maintained.

2. The Government of India wish to collaborate on a joint basis in the economic development of Hyderabad, and to afford all facilities to this end.

3. It is not the policy of the Government of India that there should be any unfair discrimination against Hyderabad in the working of the new agreement.

4. In the course of discussions the representatives of the Hyderabad Government raised the question of:

- a. Hyderabad having freedom of control over overseas export and import made under its own authority, the transactions thereof being conducted through the Reserve Bank of India.
- b. The question of Hyderabad becoming a member of some international organizations, i.e. Food [and Agriculture] Organization, Postal Union, [World] Health Organization, International Monetary Fund.

These questions cannot be considered in isolation and have to be decided with reference to the constitution of these organizations and the Government of India's relations with them. The Government of

India, however, is prepared to consider these matters sympathetically with the representatives of the Hyderabad Government.

2. (DRAFT) *FIRMAN*

After protracted discussions between my Government and the Government of India, I am now in a position to announce the lines of my policy. I am most anxious to put an end to the uncertainties which prevail as to the nature of the relationship between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India. The views of the Dominion of India have been clear to me and mine are well known to them. I have now decided to consult the will of my people upon the question whether Hyderabad should accede to India. I shall, therefore, take a Plebiscite in Hyderabad on the basis of adult franchise. In order to ensure that the Plebiscite is fairly conducted, I shall arrange for it to be held under the supervision of some impartial and independent body. I should accept the result of the Plebiscite whatever it may be.

2. But I am satisfied that more is required than the holding of a Plebiscite, in order to restore confidence and tranquillity. I have, therefore, decided to instruct my Government to proceed in accordance with the following principles. In doing so, they will appreciate that the re-establishment of goodwill between India and Hyderabad is the object of my policy and is of greater importance than the terms of any agreement which may be reached between India and Hyderabad in accordance with these principles.

- i. It is my intention to introduce responsible Government in Hyderabad and to that end to establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949.
- ii. In the meantime, there should be a reconstitution of my Government as a result of which a new Interim Government will be formed, in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties.
- iii. My Government has been able to reach agreement with the Government of India on the nature of the interim relationship between Hyderabad and India pending the holding of the Plebiscite. This agreement, which involves some modification of the existing Standstill Agreement, has been embodied in a separate document signed by the Prime Minister.

3. (DRAFT) HEADS OF AGREEMENT

General

1. The Nizam's Government agree that they will, on the request of the Government of India, pass legislation similar to the legislation of

the Government of India on any matter enumerated in the schedule attached.

2. If the Nizam's Government fails to pass the required legislation with due despatch, the Nizam himself will forthwith pass the necessary ordinance under his own powers.

Defence

3. The Dominion Government agree to fix the strength of the Hyderabad Army at a figure not exceeding an overall of 20,000. The provision of the Indian State Forces Scheme of 1939 will apply *mutatis mutandis* to these Forces and the Government of India undertake to supply arms, ammunition and equipment on the scales and conditions laid down in the Scheme. The Government of India will have the right of periodical inspection and the Nizam Government will also give all facilities in regard to such inspection and furnish such information and Returns as they may be requested to do by Government of India from time to time.

4. The Nizam's Government agree to limit their Irregular Forces to 8,000 in addition to Ceremonial and Household Guards. The Hyderabad Government agree that all other formations of a military character shall be disbanded. Progressive steps will be taken for the disbandment of the *Razakars* within three months; rallies, parades, demonstrations and speeches by *Razakars* cease forthwith.

5. It is agreed that the Government of India will not station their armed forces inside Hyderabad State; but if in an emergency the Government of India wish to station their forces inside the State for the period of state of emergency declared in India by the Government of India under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, this will be agreed to by the Hyderabad Government. In such an event it is further agreed that the Government of India will be willing to pay to Hyderabad nominal compensation for the occupation of buildings in the State and for other services.

6. If in any emergency as above, Indian Army units are stationed in the Hyderabad State they will be subject to the appropriate Dominion law governing the armed forces of the Dominion.

External Relations

7. It is agreed that Hyderabad's external relations with any foreign country shall be conducted by the Government of India. Hyderabad will, however, have freedom to establish trade agencies in order to build up commercial, fiscal and economic relations with other countries; but these agencies will work under the general supervision of

and in the closest co-operation with the Government of India. Hyderabad will not have any political relations with any country.

Continuance of existing agreement and arrangements

8. Subject to the above paragraphs, the existing agreements and administrative arrangements in regard to matters of common concern shall continue and will be given effect to by both sides. The said agreements and arrangements shall cease to have effect on 29th November, 1948, as was provided in Article V of the Standstill Agreement of 29 November, 1947.

On behalf of the
Government of India

On behalf of the
Government of Hyderabad.

15th June, 1948

SCHEDULE

A. Defence

1. Any armed forces raised or maintained by Hyderabad whether within or without the State.

2. Naval, military and air force works

3. Arms, firearms, ammunition

4. Explosives

B. External Affairs

1. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries; extradition.

2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from Hyderabad, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in Hyderabad of persons who are not Hyderabad subjects.

3. Naturalization.

C. Communications

1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication.

2. Railways of the Government of India in the State; the regulation of the Nizam's State Railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers, the regulation of other railways in the State in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers.

3. Aircraft and air navigation; regulation and organization of air traffic and aerodromes; provisions for the safety of aircraft; carriage of

passengers and goods by air.

H-314

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, FOA, F. IB-2/3/40

HYDERABAD, DECCAN,

16 June 1948

I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your letter of fifteenth June¹ sent through my Prime Minister, who has also presented to me full report over the points on which there have been differences. I greatly appreciate the efforts which Your Excellency has all along made to bridge the gulf between India and Hyderabad and it is my earnest wish that settlement of the Indo-Hyderabad problem is soon arrived at. At this crucial stage, I found it necessary to consult my Council over the issues involved. The most serious difference found is in the draft *Firman*, which has now been materially altered by omitting the words "on a basis which I shall consider later," in para (2) sub-para (i) which were already agreed previously through Monckton, and by completely changing the wording of sub-para (ii) which gives it a different complexion altogether from the original draft received² from Delhi. These changes were found in the final copies given to my Prime Minister yesterday towards the end of his meeting with you and which he discovered on his return. There is also the very vital issue of freedom in trade, economic and fiscal matters which have been left over for sympathetic consideration without accepting it even in principle which has been our inherent right. There is no provision regarding arbitration which, as already existing in the Standstill Agreement, is necessary so as to provide for amicable settlement of any possible differences in future. Under the circumstances, the Council find themselves unable to recommend the acceptance of the revised draft, and taking the situation in the country into account, I am in full agreement with my Council. I still hope it will be possible for Your Excellency to consider over the above points and accommodate Hyderabad's views so as to arrive at a satisfactory agreement. I shall be glad to arrange further visit of my Minister to assist in the matter, if necessary. I wish again to express my deep sense of appreciation for the interest Your

Excellency has taken in these matters.

[NIZAM]

^{1&2}H-313.

H-315

Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram, FOA, F. IB-2/3/41

[HYDERABAD, DECCAN,]

17 June 1948

As Your Excellency knows, Sir Monckton flew down from Delhi during the night and has seen me this morning. He has satisfied me that the changes in the draft *Firman*, to which I referred in my telegram of sixteenth June,¹ were contained in drafts which he saw on Monday, fifteenth June, and that he thought that my Prime Minister had received copies on the afternoon of the same day. In these circumstances, I am anxious to take the first opportunity of correcting the impression contained in my telegram that the changes were not made known to my representatives in Delhi, until the last moment. Many drafts were being prepared upon [*sic* for by] both sides and the members of my Delegation were constantly engaged in discussions with Your Excellency and various representatives of your Government so that a misunderstanding on this matter could easily arise. My telegram had to be sent when Sir Walter Monckton was in Delhi. If he had been here the mistake could not have arisen.

2. Although the negotiations have been protracted and we all want to reach a final agreement, I am afraid it is impossible to do so within a day or two. We are now within sight of settlement on most of the important issues but there remain questions upon which agreement must be reached before the final result which we both desire can be achieved. I cannot doubt that we could reach accord on the outstanding questions of phraseology in the *Firman*² but my Council are also greatly troubled about the refusal of India to agree even in principle to fiscal freedom and control over Hyderabad's overseas and export trade being secured to the State. My Prime Minister drew attention to this important matter at an earlier stage in his discussions with Pandit Nehru and yourself. Later, a draft giving effect to our suggestion was

furnished to Mr Menon. I can understand that the subject is one which will require examination in detail but I must ask for the principle to be conceded.³ Further my Council cannot advise me to agree to leaving India free to station troops except in the border areas of the State whenever India chooses to declare a state of emergency. I should be found very ready to co-operate in any grave emergency. There is also the question of arbitration to which I referred in my previous telegram.

3. While for these reasons, I cannot accept the drafts in their present form I earnestly hope that negotiations will be continued and a settlement reached in a very short time. Hyderabad will always owe much of its success in finding a happy compromise to Your Excellency's readiness to help us on our way and for this we shall always be grateful.

[NIZAM]

¹H-314.

²The draft Agreement reached between India and Hyderabad to regulate the relations between the two Governments had not been accepted by the Nizam. The terms of agreement and the draft of the *Firman* which were to have been issued by the Nizam in the State, following the signing of the Agreement, were released at a press conference. See S. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. VI, New Delhi, 1987, 236. On 4 September 1948, Mir Laik Ali protested that India "altered the draft announcement in a manner and to an extent that it almost reduced the position of Hyderabad to the level of subservience and humiliation". See *Keesings Contemporary Archives 1948-50*, Vol. VII, London, 9523.

³The negotiations for Hyderabad's accession to India were broken off in New Delhi on 17 June 1948. India indicated it would intensify economic blockade of the State. The Nizam refused to introduce popular government. See H-316. Also see *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F. IB-2/3/30. Not printed

H-316

Note by Jawaharlal Nehru to Ministry of States¹

[NEW DELHI,]

20 June 1948

INTERIM DEFENCE MEASURES

It appears that our instructions regarding the entry of our armed forces into Hyderabad territory in pursuit of raiders from that territory have not been clearly understood or conveyed to the local officers concerned.² I have also just seen a copy of a telegram from the C.P. Government No. 56 CC dated 19th June addressed to States Ministry. All this necessitates clear directions to be given and conveyed to local authorities concerned.

I suggest that those directions should be issued through the Defence Ministry to our army commanders round about Hyderabad and by the Home Ministry to the local governments concerned. These

instructions should be as follows:-

“Pending further instructions, the following policy should be followed in regard to Hyderabad State:

“With the exception of articles of food, salt, medical stores and chlorine for purifying the water supply, all other articles should be denied entry into Hyderabad State and strict blockade should be maintained in regard to these other articles. In the case of any doubtful article, reference should be made to the Government of India.³

“In view of raids from Hyderabad territory into Indian Union territory, swift action should be taken to repel these raids and punish the raiders. This may be taken by both the police and the army. Where the raiders escape into Hyderabad territory, they should be pursued across the border and punishment inflicted and, if possible, raiders captured and brought back. This again may be done both by the army and the police, provided always that this is done in adequate strength so as to avoid any danger to our party crossing the border. Provided also that care should be taken that our party crossing the border does not go too far beyond the border thus getting isolated from its main base and possibly entangled in the interior of Hyderabad State. Our counter action must not go too beyond the border and there should be no dispersal of our forces on the other side. Where a more serious situation arises demanding the use of larger forces, an immediate reference should be made to the Government of India.

“Our armed forces on the border of Hyderabad, including Police and Home Guards, should be on the alert all the time to prevent raids as well as any kind of smuggling into Hyderabad State.”

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹S. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, VI, 242-3.

²The Indian Army units were reported on 27 June 1948 to have been deployed on the borders of Hyderabad. This was in sharp contrast to the assurance given by Mountbatten to the Nizam on 8 April 1948, that no offensive action was intended by India against Hyderabad. See H-309, para 12.

³On 21 June 1948 Nehru issued these instructions to Ministry of States: (i) All aircraft going to Hyderabad and stopping on any Indian airport should be searched for arms; (ii) Financial transactions with Hyderabad should be discontinued; (iii) Stoppage of communications across Hyderabad be investigated, S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, VI, 243-4.

H-317

Pakistan High Commission, London to Foreign Office, Karachi

FOA, F. 1-26/9/2-6

PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON,
7 July 1948

Speaking on the Hyderabad-Kashmir disputes at the House of Commons yesterday, Mr Churchill and Mr Attlee punctuated their arguments with bitter taunts against each other's party. Accusing the Government of having abandoned British pledges to the Princes and the scheduled classes, Mr Churchill said that they should not allow the State to which they had assured a sovereign independent status to be strangled, starved or over-borne with violence. Drawing an interesting parallel with Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, Mr Churchill said "since when are the rights of States of independence to be impinged or compromised by the fact that they are land-locked? I say that Hyderabad has an absolute indivisible status of independence, and is fully entitled to the membership of U.N.O if accepted by that body." Mr Churchill continued, "a very harsh blockade has been imposed on Hyderabad by the Central Government of India, a blockade which, in many aspects, is similar to that which the Soviet Government are now throwing round Berlin, except that the numbers of helpless people are far greater, 17 million compared with the 2.5 million, and also because several very harsh features have been introduced into the subject as the prevention of supply of medicines and hospital equipment.

"I am prepared to submit a number of cases of correspondence which show clearly how the medicine and drugs are being blocked by the Provincial Governments which are Congress dominated. It is three months since any chlorine arrived in Hyderabad. The chlorination of the water and chlorine in hospitals are essential in the prevention of very serious pestilences." Mr Churchill quoted Mr Nehru's speech at Madras and laid special stress on the passage "if and when we consider it necessary, we will start military operations against Hyderabad State". The language, he said, might well have been used by Hitler before devouring Austria, or overwhelming Czechoslovakia. Mr Churchill asked the Government what they had done to safeguard the financial status of Hyderabad; he reminded the Government that, not so long ago, they had given certain concessions to the Indian Government by way of the Sterling releases, but had they made any provision

for the Government of Hyderabad who had also made large contributions and had proved itself a faithful ally to the British Government? "Irrespective of colour or creed," Mr Churchill said, "the people of India should be subject to the same focus of criticism of moral responsibility as other peoples of the world; if an act of aggression was committed by the Nehru Government on the independence of Hyderabad, it might well involve the prestige of the Crown. "Further", Mr Churchill pointed out, "the Nizam's Government had agreed to a plebiscite in Hyderabad, provided it was fair and under the auspices of the U.N.O, and provided there was no property qualification but adult suffrage." He explained that there were 5 million untouchables in Hyderabad who had no property, and would be disqualified to vote, if a plebiscite were based on property qualified. It is believed in India that these 5 million would vote to stay with the Nizam Government from whom they would get a better deal.

Exposing the inconsistent policy of the Nehru Government, Mr Churchill said that with regard to Kashmir, India preferred to abide by the will of the Ruler, but with regard to Hyderabad, desired that the will of the people should be the guiding factor in determining its future status.

Replying, Mr Attlee reminded Mr Churchill of the Standstill Agreement between the Union of India and the Nizam, in which the Nizam had expressly handed over external relations to the Union of India.

Mr Attlee said it was realized by everybody that with Dominion status paramountcy must come to an end.

Mr Churchill interrupted: "I am basing my argument not on paramountcy at all, but on ordinary decency and fair play."

Mr Attlee continued that after the British had ceased to rule in India then obligations and treaties must go. There had been no unilateral repudiation of treaties because the matter was fully discussed with the States representatives, including the representatives of Hyderabad.

There had been a juridical accession to India by Kashmir, and the dispute which had arisen was a complaint brought to the United Nations that the Government of Pakistan was interfering with the internal affairs of the Union of India, to which the State of Kashmir adhered.

A United Nations Commission was now in Kashmir and he was very hopeful that it would be able to get exactly what Mr Churchill wanted, a fair plebiscite.

A spirited exchange between Mr Attlee and Mr Churchill followed. Without rising Mr Churchill interjected: "Don't bully because you have a majority."

Mr Attlee: "The right Hon'[ble] gentleman always takes what he

calls his facts from one side. I have to hear both sides and get my information from both sides. I do not start with Mr Churchill's preconceived opinion that everything the Hindus do is wrong."

Mr Churchill: "You have no right to say that at all. I will not allow it to pass unchallenged that I start with pre-conceived opinions that everything the Hindus do is wrong. I think it is a shameful statement for the Prime Minister to have made to try to throw that upon me in the hope that he may make antagonism with vast millions of people."

There were loud Opposition cheers and repeated shouts of "Withdraw" when Mr Churchill resumed his seat.

Mr Attlee reiterated his charge that Mr Churchill invariably selected his facts from one side only. That did serious harm, and he did not think Mr Churchill, in this matter, spoke for the whole of his party. He (Mr Attlee) had information and complaints of the blockade from one side and definite repudiation¹ from the other.

The Union of India had been trying to do exactly what Mr Churchill had been suggesting. He referred to the decision to take a plebiscite based on adult franchise under an impartial, independent body.

"It is not always wise to offer mediation. We are hoping for a settlement of this case, and we have constantly urged that on neither side should there be pressure.

"To intervene at a particular moment and try to put all the blame on one side is an extremely stupid thing to do in Indian matters, and extremely dangerous. The Government had done their utmost to obtain the fullest and fairest methods for holding a plebiscite for people to decide."

Mr Attlee concluded: "In these very difficult circumstances one wants to be very careful what one says. One wants to be very careful not to judge things by past prejudices instead of by present events. It is unfortunate that on the occasions when he speaks on these matters, Mr Churchill does not seem to me to do anything either to reconcile conflicting parties in India or draw closer the bonds between India and Pakistan and the rest of the Commonwealth.

"Indeed, I know this is expressed by people—not least people sitting on this side of the House—but I know the feelings of many people, administrators, businessmen, who are conservatives with a lifelong knowledge of India, who are unanimous on one thing—they deplore the interventions of Mr Churchill on the Indian problem."

SCOPE OF THE DEBATE

Before the debate opened, Mr Attlee asked the Speaker for a ruling

as to the scope any debate on India and Pakistan might assume in view of the fact that they are now self-governing Dominions.

Mr Churchill at once protested that it was very inconvenient that the Prime Minister's attitude should have been disclosed to him, as leader of the Opposition, at such short notice. It was four days since he wrote to Mr Attlee, as a matter of courtesy, and for his convenience saying that he proposed to raise this matter. The letter stated:

"I propose to remind you of your pledges, and, indeed, of ours, about the rights of these States, and I trust you will be able to be present on this occasion, as the matter is one which affects the good faith of His Majesty's Government, past and present.

"I am informed that both Hyderabad and Kashmir are willing to have their fate decided by plebiscite² under the auspices of U.N.O. provided that the basis of election is adult suffrage without property qualifications. This seems to me a solution difficult for any believer in democracy to be able to deny them, and I appeal to you to help it forward. Without this much blood may flow and our promises be broken."

"I was surprised ", Mr Churchill complained, "not to hear in the interval that the Prime Minister considered all this would be out of order. At the same time as he raises this issue in the House, he has sent me a letter, saying that is his view, that, while pledges may be discussed, nothing connected with Hyderabad and Kashmir should be discussed. He sent me that letter this morning."

Mr Attlee retorted that he had pointed out that as we were members of the Security Council the action of the Council on Hyderabad and Kashmir was obviously one on which the Government would have to state their attitude. It was very important to consider what could be said in debate in the House about the internal affairs of the Dominions.

Mr Churchill said that Mr Attlee had sent a letter to the Speaker and had sent him (Mr Churchill) a copy. It clearly sought a ruling that the affairs of Kashmir or Hyderabad must not be discussed in the House.

"That raises the very largest issues in regard to the whole future of Parliamentary procedure," he maintained. "If a grave catastrophe arises there, or in any other Dominion, or a clash occurs between two Dominions, is the House of Commons to be the only place in the world where it may not be discussed?"

The Speaker said that so long as there was Ministerial responsibility it was hard for the Chair to say that this or that should not be discussed.

Opening the debate Mr Lloyd (Cons. Wirrall) suggested that the facts

about Hyderabad would cause acute embarrassment to well-wishers of India in this country. If the situation was permitted to continue, Muslims throughout India might join in a revival of communal strife. There might be a bloodbath infinitely worse than that of last autumn.

¹See H-270, H-307, and H-308 for a correct perspective. Also see Press Interview of Jawaharlal Nehru, 17 June 1948. S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, VI, 235.

²Mir Laik Ali had offered on 8 June 1948, in a meeting with Mountbatten, to hold a plebiscite for deciding the issue of accession to India or Independence, to be conducted under the supervision of the UN or an impartial organization. See the *Memorandum on the Hyderabad Case* for UN, FOA, F. 1(1)/27, para 46. V.P. Menon rejected this offer on 9 June 1948. He told the Hyderabad delegation that "there was no question of a plebiscite being held under the conditions in which the *Razakars* were left free to terrorize the people into submission." See Government of India, *White Paper on Hyderabad*, FOA, F.IB-2/3/38.



Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar



Hamidullah Khan, Nawab of Bhopal

JAMMU & KASHMIR STATE

KR-318

*Ch. Hamidullah Khan to K.H. Khurshid**F. 921/234-35*JAMMU,
24 February 1947

My dear Khurshid,

I am enclosing a letter from Shaukat. He is overrating your strength. Anyway, you will please see what you can do for us under the present distressing circumstances.

I would like to meet Quaid-i-Azam in Delhi. He is likely to come over there in the second week of March when it is quite convenient for me to pay a visit there.

Please try to find some time in that week for me and let me know immediately. I hope you are quite fit and healthy.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
HAMIDULLAH

PS. Mr. [Muhammad] Ishaq [Qureshi] got your letter and showed me the contents.

Enclosure to KR-318
*M. Shaukat Ali to K.H. Khurshid**F. 366/1-4*SUB-JAIL, RIASI,
23 February 1947

My dear Khurshid,

I was really surprised to know that you have been receiving fictitious telegrams on my behalf while I am still in jail. I have seen your first letter in reply to the telegram; hope you have not been informed when it was too late. After our arrest in Srinagar certain rival obscurantist groups have emerged, some of them pure opportunists while others politically disillusioned, who are indulging in eccentric and purposeless activities. The pathos of it all is that they all pretend loyalty to the Muslim Conference.

Our detention seems to have stabilised. So far it was thought that it was only for the elections. But now it seems that group formations

inside the Assembly are equally important and our release could interfere in Kak's¹ plans. We also learn that Ch. Hamidullah Khan² is finding the outside atmosphere too hot. The people are getting out of control. They are forcing his hands to resort to Direct Action since constitutional means have failed to effect our release. I understand that Ch. Hamidullah has accordingly written to Quaid-i-Azam seeking his advice and help. Knowing, as you do, that the crux of the whole matter is Kak, is it not possible for you to suggest to Quaid-i-Azam to get into touch with the Maharaja³ and see that Kak gets a kick-out. Political Department, I am told, has taken up a policy of non-intervention, so direct approach alone can help. A statement, too, would not be opportune either. Backward States like Nabha and Patiala, too, have released persons for similar offences after a few days. But we continue to be Kak's special guests for four months now and without trial.

I do not know what your future programme will be. Otherwise, if Quaid-i-Azam was going to Bombay in the near future, certainly that would have been a very good opportunity to get into touch with Maharaja who is also there. I do not think it is at all possible to expect anything better so long as Kak continues as the head of the State [*sic*]. He is doing his worst to disrupt our organisation. Firstly, soon after our arrest, he played up Yousuf Shah. Now he is fostering the provincial question: Kashmiri vs. non-Kashmiri. Persons like Ghulam Ahmad Jeweller and other reactionaries who, in the garb of sympathetic although independent persons, have found their way into the Assembly and are enthusiastic to play his game. Offices are offered to everyone according to his price. Jeweller is making a desperate bid for ministership. These are Kak's methods and tactics. No organisation with a grain of self-respect can stand it. So the conclusion is that Kak must go. No political party favours him. Even the Dogras (professional loyalists) have unfurled the banner of revolt against Kak. And National Conference is preparing for yet another struggle to be launched this season. In short, he is misruling in the teeth of universal opposition.

Personally, I am convinced that if it were not for the League's non-interventionist policy *vis-a-vis* the States, we would not have found ourselves so desperately alone. I am not unmindful of the higher political strategy which necessitates such a course of action, but I think it could still be reconciled with a slightly more practical interest in the affairs of Kashmir, even indirectly. Mamdot, Daultana, Nishtar, Qaiyum, etc., all agree with me, but they are powerless without Quaid-i-Azam's permission. I have given you a rough idea about the political conditions

here, and I hope you will take necessary steps.

Reply on the following address:

Hakim Aslam, Vakil, Riasi, Jammu.

Yours very sincerely,
SHAUKAT

¹Ram Chandra Kak, Prime Minister, Jammu & Kashmir.

²Acting President, J & K Muslim Conference.

³Hari Singh.

KR-319

Mohiud Din to K. H. Khurshid

F. 784/187-90

ISLAMABAD, KASHMIR,
11 March 1947

Dear Mr. Khurshid,

Assalaamo 'Alaikum.

Thank God for the rebirth of our correspondence after a long and unavoidable—at least on my part—interval which was very much tiresome for me.

You know that I was throughout helpless. When you got the lucky chance to visit England, did you remember this humble friend of yours who is proud of your post? There was no farewell letter from you; and there came no news of your arrival from England at least on your part. You were in Karachi but what was your address? This did not induce me to write to you. Now you are in Bombay, I know your address of [*sic*] therefore this letter. To all my humble submissions your honour's brief but magnificent apology shall be the same hackneyed term: "lack of respite". There the matter ends.

Dear friend! Whatever took place during the above-mentioned interval has satisfied me to a great extent. The Bihar carnage was in the same direction in which the historic Punjab agitation was. The messages of Quaid-i-Azam come true when the Muslims start any movement anywhere in British India. And we are surely and steadily gaining ground. But I am now a realist—and this is because of Quaid-i-Azam's moral cameos. I see how much struggle lies ahead of us. We have to face thousand and one heavy odds—of Congress inside and abroad, and of the treacherous Britishers, and, last but not least, traitors in our own camp. British India is lucky in this that it has Quaid-i-Azam. Here I see

some dark clouds in the sky. The condition of State is stationary. While the two nations fight for freedom, the Princes fight for autocracy.

Unfortunately the League has adopted the policy of non-interference in the States. What is the sense? If the 1935 Act separated the States from the British India, that Act is going into oblivion. The future is ahead. The States are going to be free. The Congress has already hired agents in the States. Muslims long for the guidance of the League but they are dismayed—they complain of League's "non-interference". Accepting every item of League programme in British India, I cannot but disagree with its policy towards the States. Does the League think of solving or rather tackling the States problem after the British Indian problem is solved? If you ask me to support Pakistan because millions of Muslims shall be free from the domination of Hindus in British India, I will do it; but the same urge compels me to ponder a bit over my own fate. If I am not in Pakistan, then why should I not tackle my own problems at home? Besides, Pakistan needs Kashmir, and we need Pakistan. But the fight for it must begin now. Thus the policy of non-interference is beyond my understanding. If the League is kind enough to tell us that it will never help us in any way, we shall act accordingly.

The session of the Kashmir Assembly is to begin on March 27. The number of Muslim Independents is nearly 12 out of 21. The rest [of the] 9 Muslims are with the League but not with the Muslim Conference. There are a few among them who are with the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, the rest are either with the Kashmir Muslim Conference or [with the] Jammu Muslim Conference. Hamid¹ and his party are against Yusuf Shah² and his party—and both are traitors. The Government does not consider them worth anything, otherwise it shall find many an MLA of this little group to get ministership or anything from the Government. Here I want the League to interfere. Issuing a general statement will not do; the League must give definite instructions to the party leaders; even a Punjabi Leaguer may be instructed to confer with them. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar may do anything but that will be a long way. What is needed is the guidance of the nine Muslims in the Assembly immediately.

I got the licence of pleadership only last month. I do my bit of work in the bar.

I hope you are keeping good health and a cheerful mood.

Sincerely yours,
MOHIUD DIN

¹Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan.

²Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah.

KR-320

*Mir Abdul Aziz to K.H. Khurshid**F. 784/191-202*SRINAGAR,
14 March 1947

My dear Khurshid,

Many thanks for your letter of 1st March,¹ which I received a few days ago.

In your long letter you have raised a point about the "forged" letters of Abbas.² My dear friend, the letters are not forgeries. No fool on earth would do such a thing as to publish forged letters. Don't we know that today or tomorrow Abbas is coming out of the prison and to declare whether the letters are his or not? Furthermore, as you have pointed out, I don't know why the letters are not written in pencil; they are written in ink.

I fully agree with you that the Muslim Conference leaders do not work according to their constitution. Personal opinion of a man in high position will matter more than the decision of a body of the party.

You have said that in my article in the *Jauhar*, [which] I sent to you, there was only a vague reference as to why M. Amin and Mr. Dallal were expelled from the Muslim Conference for three years. I would like to tell you the whole story.

A few months before October 1946, the National Conference had launched its campaign of Quit Kashmir³ and naturally a large section of the people was impressed by the stunt and they became National Conference-minded. At this time, according to my thinking, it was the duty of the Muslim Conference leaders either to jump into the Quit Kashmir Movement headlong and get themselves finished or to denounce the Quit Kashmir Movement as the Congress patronised it and, of course, with the help of the local Government, get a foothold in the political field of Kashmir. The Muslim Conference did neither of the two things. In fact the Muslim Conference leaders, including Abbas, were subconsciously won over by the Quit Kashmir Movement. Abbas thought that the Quit Kashmir Movement gave a stimulus to Mr. Abdullah and he (Abbas) had lost the chance. Of course a cool-headed leader like Mr. Jinnah acted differently when the Congress went behind the bars in 1942.⁴ But every Muslim is not a Jinnah.

The National Conference, with the great Indian National Congress at its back, is still a great force in Kashmir politics. At a time when the

National Conference and the Government are at war with each other, it is not proper for the Muslim Conference to start an agitation against the Government. An agitation at this time started by the Muslim Conference will not help the Muslim Conference but the National Conference. 'I personally still believe that the time is far off when the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference should start Direct Action or agitation of any sort against the Government.

Public meetings were banned in Srinagar because there were disturbances there. The Muslim Conference declared that their session was to be held in Srinagar. Mr. Abbas gave a statement in the *Dawn* that Direct Action of the Muslim Conference was to start at the time of the annual session. When he came to Srinagar on 23rd of October, he directly went to Mir Waiz Manzil, had a talk with the Moulvi Sahib and decided with him that he, the Moulvi, Mr. Shaukat Ali, and Moulvi Nurud Din should court arrest. On 24th of October, a meeting of the Working Committee, in which were present Mr. Dallal, M. Amin, M[oulvi] Nurud Din, Saghar of Jammu, Major Ali Ahmad Shah, Mr. Shaukat and Mr. Abbas, the decision was adopted. Mr. Dallal, I and M. Amin were exempted from jail-going and were directed to save ourselves from being arrested. On 24th, i.e. the same day, a meeting of the City Muslim Conference workers, about two hundred in number, was addressed by Abbas, Saghar of Jammu and myself. The people were directed to take a procession to Gulab Bhawan when the leaders had got themselves arrested the day after [i.e. on 25 October.]⁵

After the meeting all of us sat together to ruminate upon tomorrow's programme. M. Amin said that Mubarak Shah, Special Secretary to Premier Kak, had called him on phone. He asked those present whether he should go to see him or not. Mr. Abbas first told him to go and see what he wanted, but then he was told not to go there. It was 9 p.m.

I, Mr. Abbas and Mr. Shaukat returned to Amirakadal. Abbas stayed at the Majestic Hotel for the night. Early in the morning I came to Abbas. He asked me whether I was in the know of the "new situation". I said that I knew nothing because [I was] for the whole night at Rambagh. He told me that late in the night Amin and Dallal had gone to Mubarak Shah and the District Magistrate and [he] had given an undertaking to the latter. He also told me that those people had stabbed the Muslim Conference in the back. He also said that in his opinion even the Mir Waiz was included in this conspiracy. Let me explain the conspiracy.

Mr. Dallal, as the Secretary of the Reception Committee, had given an application to the District Magistrate for permission to hold the annual session. He had stated therein that no communal hatred was to

be spread in the session, the session was to be held for one day. Mr. Abbas called this an "undertaking".

The day before, Mr. Abbas told us that he would avoid the clash were there a *via media*. He was prepared to postpone jail-going had he any sort of permission to hold the session. These people, I mean Jammu leaders, also had been trying to get the permission. Unfortunately they failed to get it through Hamid's brother, Niaz Ahmed.

Mr. Abbas looked confused for the last few months. I spied marks of desperation and confusion on his face. It seemed to him that his organisation was going to be a failure.

A meeting of the "Working Committee" was held. Mr. Abbas, Mr. Shaukat, [Mr.] Durrani of Jammu and Mr. Hamid were all those present.

In this very "meeting" Mr. Abbas decided to appoint Hamid as his successor. Explanation was called from M. Amin and Dallal. But, I assure you, dear Khurshid, that it was Mr. Abbas who came down from his room to Mr. Dallal and [Mr.] Amin and told them that in reply to the explanation [that] he had called, they should write that [what] they had done [was] in the interest of the Muslim Conference.

Permission was granted by the District Magistrate to hold the session for one day. Of course it was conditional but the conditions were only formal.

Had Mr. Abbas any political foresight he would have welcomed the conspiracy and the Muslim Conference would have held its session, be it only for one day. A clash would have been avoided. When the Unionist Government banned the procession of Mr. Jinnah in Lahore, the Muslim League did not even hold its session because it did not want an immature clash.

In the evening [there] happened what happened. The National Conference-minded Muslim Conferences [Conferencites], after the arrest of Abbas, used Mr. Hamid as a tool to create disruption in the Muslim Conference. Mr. Abbas was in Srinagar Central Jail. Everything was communicated to him and in reply he sent them letters written in ink, which you call forged.

There are many like you who honestly believe or pretend to believe that the letters are forged. They believe that we people, (Mir Waiz, I and others) are the agents of Kak. But I assure you that we do not care at all for what they say. I consider it foolish on the part of the Muslim Conference to come to a clash with the Government at this stage. There is no harm even in making friendship with the Government to get the great enemy, the National Conference, killed. If the Jammu people (who at this time are licking the shoes of Kak to get themselves

released) do not side with us, we can pull on without them.

We might lose sympathies of many but we believe that we are right and are not becoming tools of anybody. We hope we will succeed in our mission.

You ask about the rupees ten thousand story published by the *Nawa-i-Waqt*. It pained me to hear such a thing from you. Don't you find such stories about Mr. Jinnah being published in unsympathetic quarters? Where can you expect a radical democrat whose party exists mainly upon the farthings of poor labourers to get rupees ten thousand from? It is a pity that you believed that story to be true. Mr. Jinnah and the *Dawn*, let me be bold enough to say, adopted a very undemocratic and an irresponsible attitude in this connection. Their part in spoiling the Muslim Conference was not small. Of course they could do no more.

Mr. Abbas has committed himself differently with different men. I very much doubt he will take any part in politics after his release.

The recent statement of Attlee in the Commons⁶ has changed the trend of politics in Indian States. The League and the Congress have nothing to do in the States. We in the States know our game better than those in British India do know about it.

What I write may seem to you exactly what other *ghaddars* of the nation like Khizar [and] G.M. Sayyid say about Mr. Jinnah; but I assure you that we are not fighting for our personal ends nor are we playing in the hands of the Government. Our aim is revolution—revolution to relieve our people from the yoke of political, economic and social subjugation.

You say that we are not doing anything to get our leaders released. We, I mean the Kashmir Muslim Conference, have passed resolutions, [and] have sent our man (Amin) to see Mr. Kak in this connection. What more could we do? And let me know what has Hamidullah done in this connection.

I have written a long letter this time. Most of it might seem to you nonsense and mere braggings. But this is how I think about the Muslim Conference and Kashmir politics.

I think we should close this chapter now. I hope I have written enough to you regarding the disruption of the Muslim Conference. I do not want to write anything more in this connection. If the differences are summed up, well and good; if not, even then I assure you we have got no fear. We can carry on without interference of the Jammu

leaders who have never helped but have always spoiled our Muslim Conference.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,
MIR ABDUL AZIZ

¹Not traceable.

²Ch. Ghulam Abbas, President, Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference.

³The "Quit Kashmir Movement" was launched by Sheikh Abdullah on 15 May 1946 against the Dogra regime, challenging their acquisition of the State in 1846. In April 1946, he had submitted a Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission to that effect. See Annex.

⁴Refers to the "Quit India Movement" launched by the Indian National Congress on 8 August 1942.

⁵On 25 October 1946, Ch. Ghulam Abbas, Agha Shaukat Ali, Moulvi Nurud Din and Allah Rakha Saghar were arrested by the State police for holding the annual session of the Muslim Conference at Srinagar in defiance of the ban imposed by the State Government. See the *Civil & Military Gazette*, 29 October 1946

⁶No. 1, Vol. I, Part I, 1-3.

Annex to KR-320

SHEIKH ABDULLAH'S MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET MISSION¹

Today the national demand of the people of Kashmir is not merely the establishment of a system of responsible Government, but their right to absolute freedom from the autocratic rule of the Dogra House. Nearly a hundred years ago the people of Kashmir became the victims of a commercial deal by the covetous agents of the East India Company. For the paltry consideration of 75 lacs of Sikh currency rupees (less than half a million pounds sterling) the people of Kashmir, the land and its potential wealth, were sold away to Maharaja Gulab Singh, the Dogra vassal of the Sikh Kingdom. We challenge the moral and political validity of this sale deed, to which the people of Kashmir were never a party, and which has since 1846 been the document of their bondage.

At this moment, the future of the inhabitants of India is on the anvil, and the constitutional pattern of the future is being hammered out by the British Cabinet Mission. The question of the Treaty Rights of the Princes has become a moot point between the peoples of the States, the Princely order, and the Paramount Power. For us in Kashmir the re-examination of this relationship in its historical context is a vital matter.

The crux of our contention is this that the sale deed, which brought Kashmir under the rule of the Dogra House, confers no privileges equivalent to those claimed by States governed by the so-called Treaty Rights. As such, the case of Kashmir itself stands on a unique footing and the people of Kashmir draw the attention of the Cabinet Mission

to their just claims to freedom on the withdrawal of British Power. The sale deed of 1846, misnamed the Treaty of Amritsar, makes the matter quite clear.

No sale deed, however sacrosanct, can condemn more than four million men and women to the servitude of an autocrat when the will to live under his rule is no longer there. We, the people of Kashmir, are determined to mould our own destiny and we appeal to the members of the Cabinet Mission to recognise the justice and the strength of our Cause.

Kashmir is not merely a geographical expression in the north-west of the vast sub-continent of India, famed for its beauty and natural wealth, but it is a land strategically situated, the meeting point of India, China and Russia, and as such has an international significance. Our homeland is the cradle of the Kashmiri nation which by virtue of the homogeneity of its language, culture and tradition and its common history of suffering, is today one of the rare places in India where all communities are backing up a united national demand.

¹Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom 1819-1946*, Vol. I, Lahore, 1977, 669-70.

KR-321

Ghulam Ahmad Jeweller to K.H. Khurshid

F. 366/11-14

SRINAGAR,
16 March 1947

My dear Khurshid,

Thanks for your letter of the 6th instant¹ which I received yesterday, and for the information therein.

The present communal rioting in the Punjab and, prior to that, the Muslim League agitation against the [Tiwana] Ministry,² have been and are still playing their part in the minds of the people here, especially on those who belong to the National Conference. The recent Congress resolution on the general political situation in India as a whole and in the Punjab³ [in particular] has also not spared [sic for allowed] them [to remain] unaffected. They are seeking some way out of what is called the National Conference. I mean the leaders of that party, whether inside or outside it, are saying that if Sh. Abdullah

wants to remain in the National Conference after seeing all the Congress is doing for him, he may [do so,] but we can no longer remain in it. Some say let Sh. Abdullah come out of the bars and then we shall compel him to join the League and start the Muslim Conference afresh. The only difficulty which I can guess in bringing the Nationalist Musalmans into the Muslim Conference fold is [the absence] of a [good] leader in the Muslim Conference and, secondly, the detention of Muslim Conference and National Conference leaders at present. But as soon as any of them comes out, you would hear a very encouraging news about Kashmir. Only God knows what a miracle the Quaid-i-Azam has played [*sic* for performed] on the minds of Kashmiri Muslims and in the Punjab situation that at present there is not even a smallest child who doesn't know him and respect him. The general trend of people has changed to a great extent. I pray to God to bring the time nearer when I shall see the Musalmans of Kashmir and those of India as a whole united. And I still hope, that time is not far away.

The present political tension in the Punjab and in the Frontier has perturbed the minds of Kashmiri Hindus to the extent that they are running here and there in order to form peace committees. The one thing which I want to put here is that the Muslim Leaguers are not so much eager to start a communal strife as are the Nationalists. I can't say whether it shall start or not here also. What I am hearing of the Punjab and especially of Rawalpindi [is that the] situation is encouraging on the one hand and discouraging as well on the other. But, somehow, I think it is proper at this time that the airs and pride which the Hindus had [assumed] on account of the Punjabi Hindus has vanished for ever. What is your opinion about it?

Your letter was shown to Zahir and Ghulam Nabi. First, they thank you for the same and, secondly, they say that it is a matter of responsibility and however after due thinking over it they shall let you know as well. However, they all convey to you their *salaams*.

Kari is okay and is here. He is busy with his own business. His wife is at Jammu. He says that he had written to you some time back but you had not replied or that you had not received that. Well, he is writing to you again very soon.

Whenever you intend to come to Srinagar, inform me telegraphically so that we may arrange a reception committee to receive you at the aerodrome. [After] more than two and a half years, you are returning to your home for a few days.

The whether [*sic*] is getting healthier and very pleasant day by day.
How is [it] at Bombay?

Salaams from all to you, Omar, brothers and friends.

Yours sincerely,
GULLA

PS. By the way, since when have you changed your name?

¹Not traceable.

²Refers to the Civil Disobedience Movement launched in January-February 1947 against the Khizar Hayat Tiwana Ministry in the Punjab.

³See Enclosure to Appendix I. 9, Vol. I, Part II, 20.

KR-322

Yusuf Quraishi to K. H. Khurshid

F. 886/147-8

[Original in Urdu]

PERSONAL

CENTRAL JAIL, SRINAGAR,
23 March 1947

Respected brother,

Assalaamo 'Alaikum.

Received your letter of 14th March.¹ Earlier I had written another letter to you before I went on hunger strike. The hunger strike lasted 12 days, during which the Government, calling the Military inside the jail, subjected political prisoners to utmost violence, removed some to Jammu, mercilessly beat others, and forcibly arrested a number of them. In short, the Central Jail is today nothing short of Karbala. The jail Doctor is performing the duties of a C.I.D.² inspector. It is a long story, so I am cutting it short. For the past 15 days I have been put under an armed guard. Because of hunger strike I lost nearly 12 pounds. I am now getting better. Keep praying for me.

In today's letter you have mentioned some very strange things. It is amazing, indeed, that you should talk about England after such a long time, and that you were not aware of my arrest earlier. It means that you have been completely out of touch with the events of the past five months in Kashmir. It seems that you have written this letter while under some sort of stress and strain. However, here is the reply to your queries.

There is no question of bargaining with the Government over the release of friends detained in Riasi [sub-jail]. Our immediate problem

is that of direct action, but about this our friends are keeping mum. Mere release of the detainees should not be our goal. I am prepared to prove that the friends have set at naught our eight-year long struggle. Time, labour and sacrifice are needed to remedy the situation that has arisen, and, according to reports, these things are lacking in our friends. The Muslim Conference cannot be strengthened by only condemning the action of the adversary from the stage; action is an absolute necessity.

The situation in the Punjab and the Frontier Province is under study. Relevant information about it is gathered from the *Civil & Military Gazette* and the *Statesman*. It is a pity that things have worsened because of the Hindu-Muslim riots. Kashmir is so far safe from them.

I am not aware of how the Riasi friends are faring. I am only hoping that they are well. It is being said that the detainees of the Muslim Conference would be released before the Assembly session, that is before the 27th of March. But the present situation indicates that the Government is not going to do so. I wish to Allah that this may happen, so that the mettle of those indulging in mere paper work may be tested. I agree with you that it would be better for us to remain out of it. But the danger is that these friends may again adopt their old attitude, about which I wrote to you before going on hunger strike. I had also thought of writing a few words to the Quaid-i-Azam. But, as weakness overcame me and the situation worsened, I gave up the idea. For the present, I do not feel the necessity of doing so. May Allah preserve the old man. *Aameen!*

You have not told me anything about the Constituent Assembly. Apparently the Congress seems to be determined to make it a success, and the *Nawabs* and *Rajas* seem to be supporting it. Please inform me of the real situation.

Kashmir seems to be the personal fiefdom of Kak Sahib which is currently under military and defence rule. No body cares for anyone. An ordinary constable enjoys more authority than a Governor.

So far I have written some two dozen letters to the Governor, demanding supply to me of the *Dawn*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Javeed*, and also some books. What to speak of granting to me a special class, they have imposed restrictions on my receiving clothes from home. I shall, *Insha' Allah*, fight manfully against all odds. I am deliberately not talking about other matters. I hope you will answer my earlier letter. I shall be grateful.

Yours sincerely,
[YUSUF] QURAISHI

PS. My address is already with you.

¹Not traceable.

²Criminal Investigation Department.

KR-323

*Yusuf Quraishi to K.H. Khurshid**F. 886-A/167**[Original in Urdu]*

PERSONAL

CENTRAL JAIL, SRINAGAR,
24 March 1947

Dear Brother,

Assalaamo 'Alaikum

For the past fifteen days I have been in solitary confinement. Torture has crossed all limits. I dropped a letter¹ to you yesterday and have been driven to write to you again. Yesternight it rained and the light went out. A lantern was provided to help me in offering my prayers but it was taken away after only five minutes. I told the Sikh warder that it was not proper for him to do so. I was locked up in the room; the warder abused me in an obscene and vulgar language for at least 30 minutes. An hour later the Superintendent came, who after listening to me perfunctorily said, "I am sorry" and went away. Today I have written to the Chief Secretary, the Governor and the Inspector-General (Jails) all the details of this incident. I have also sent a detailed account of it to Ishaq at Jammu. Permission to offer prayers is refused. They are harassing me one way or another. There is nobody to inquire about it.

Here is an account of another incident. Pandit Srikanth, the representative of the *Globe*, was arrested under Section 524 a month ago. Todate Jawaharlal, Maulana Azad and the *Globe* Agency people have sent telegrams to the Prime Minister. The Nawab of Bhopal and Sir Sultan Ahmed have talked to Kak and also written to him. Bakhshi² and others have also issued statements. I felt the need to say it all because we also had our representatives but not a voice was raised for us.

I was extremely pained by this incident. It was well publicised, but there is need for more publicity. I shall be grateful if you would take appropriate steps in this regard. What to speak of special class and other facilities, they do not allow me even to sit in peace. Reaction to it will embarrass them as well.

It is said that those arrested under Section 524 will be released in about seven to ten days.

Yours,
QURAISHI¹KR-322.²Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad

KR-324

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Louis Mountbatten**IOR, R/3/1/137*

17 YORK ROAD,
NEW DELHI,
17 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

You asked me to send you a note on Kashmir and I promised to do so. I now enclose this note.

I hope you will have a pleasant holiday in Kashmir and come back refreshed.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure to KR-324
A Note on Kashmir¹

[*Extract*]

NEW DELHI,
17 June 1947

[*Paras 1-3 omitted*]

The State consists of roughly three parts: Kashmir proper, Jammu, Ladakh, Baltistan, Skardu and Kargil. The last named are very sparsely populated and have a considerable number of Buddhists. Jammu is largely a continuation of the Punjab.

2. Kashmir proper is a very definite cultural and linguistic unit with a very long history behind it. In the past it has been a very great centre of Buddhist and Sanskrit learning. The people of Kashmir, Hindu or Muslim, have probably more in common than Hindus and Muslims elsewhere in India. Their language is Kashmiri, their dress, food and social customs are more or less alike. There is extreme poverty all over Kashmir except for some landlords and State officials and merchants.

3. In Kashmir proper, Muslims form 92% of the population. In the whole State, Muslims are 77%² and Hindus 21%, the others being chiefly Sikhs and Buddhists. The following are the population figures:

[Rest of the para omitted]

4. About fifteen years ago a popular movement arose in Kashmir State under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, himself a Kashmiri, educated at Aligarh University. This movement was very largely Muslim as the population itself was largely Muslim. It took shape in the Muslim Conference.³ It was not, however, definitely communal. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and imprisoned and later communal riots broke out in Kashmir. This was in the early thirties. This was followed by committees to inquire into political reforms that might be granted to the people. Certain reforms were granted and legislature was started.

5. Sheikh Abdullah, on coming out of prison, tried to give a definitely nationalist turn to the movement and changed the name of the Muslim Conference to the Kashmir National Conference.⁴ He had some trouble with communalists in his ranks and a few left him and the organization. But the movement continued to grow and spread especially to the masses who were principally Muslim. Many Hindu and Sikh young men were also attracted to the National Conference. Even those Hindus who did not join it were usually more or less friendly to it.

6. Of all the people's movements in the various States in India, the Kashmir National Conference was far the most widespread and popular. Sheikh Abdullah was amazingly popular among the masses and numerous songs and legends grew up about him.⁵ Certain reactionary Hindu and Muslim groups opposed him and his movement. These Muslim groups later allied themselves to the Muslim League, but they had little influence in the State. The Hindu groups represented a certain vested and middle-class element chiefly interested in the State service of which they had a dominant share.

7. The Maharaja is a Dogra Rajput and his army consists almost entirely of Dogra Rajputs. Kashmiris, whether Hindu or Muslim, are excluded from it. This was a common grievance among all Kashmiris.

8. The real background of the popular movement was economic. The terrible poverty of the people was contrasted not only with the enormous riches of the few but also with the potential resources of Kashmir State. The land system was out of date and oppressive, as well as partial to certain dominant classes. It was with this background that the popular movement grew up under Sheikh Abdullah. It demanded political reforms and responsible government.

9. This movement allied itself to the All-India States people's movement as represented by the All-India States People's Conference. This Conference, though an independent body, has been working in line with the National Congress. Sheikh Abdullah became a Vice-President

of the All-India body and last year, while he was in prison, he was elected President. He is still the President not only of the Kashmir National Conference but also of the All-India States People's Conference.

10. After the introduction of various reforms in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir National Conference, though far from satisfied with the extent of the reforms, decided to cooperate with them. They contested the elections for the State Assembly and won a large number of seats. One of their members became a Minister. Members of their party delivered highly eulogistic speeches praising the Maharaja for what he had done and was doing, but at the same time demanding responsible government. Their objective was responsible government under the aegis of the Maharaja who would function as a kind of constitutional head. That also was the objective of the All-India States People's Conference in regard to all the States in India.

11. The policy of the Kashmir National Conference was thus one of cooperation with the State authorities and more specially with the Maharaja who was considered above conflict of parties. This attitude was, no doubt partly governed by an expectation of favours to come. But there was certainly a fund of goodwill for the Maharaja and all criticism was directed to various Ministers. There was plenty of room for criticism, for the Kashmir administration for long years past has been amazingly static and unchanging. Nothing gets done there and any intelligent officer soon gets the feeling that he is wasting his talents and his energy because he can get nothing done.

12. This period of semi-cooperation with the Kashmir State authorities even survived the upheaval in India of August 1942.⁶ The Kashmir National Conference sympathised with this upheaval and demonstrated accordingly. But the then Prime Minister, Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, refused to take any precipitate action, and the situation calmed down.

13. There was a rapid change in Prime Ministers. Within a few years there were four Prime Ministers. Meanwhile, the Minister who represented the Kashmir National Conference complained more and more that he had no responsible work to do and indeed that he could hardly approach the Maharaja himself. Mr. Kak was throughout the Minister in attendance on the Maharaja and ultimately in 1945 he became Prime Minister. The National Conference supported him in this on the ground that he was a Kashmiri. Almost immediately after Mr. Kak became Prime Minister, there was a change in the attitude adopted towards the National Conference. This Conference represented the most powerful organisation in the State with a very big mass following. It had drawn

into its ranks most of the idealistic youth in the State, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, and it was especially popular among the peasantry. Evidently Mr. Kak thought that this was too strong to be encouraged or tolerated and he began to encourage communal organisations both of the Muslims and the Hindus.

14. Matters came to a crisis early in 1946 and the National Conference Minister resigned. Thus the period of cooperation between the National Conference and the State authorities ended and the situation became progressively more tense.

15. When the Cabinet Mission came in 1946, great expectations were roused all over India including the States. There was considerable irritation at the fact that no representatives of the States people were interviewed by the Cabinet Mission. When it was known that the Cabinet Mission would go to Kashmir for a few days, a telegram was sent on behalf of the Conference to them in which the slogan of "Quit Kashmir" was used and the Amritsar Treaty,⁷ according to which Kashmir was sold to the great grand-father of the present Ruler, was bitterly criticised. Subsequently the Quit Kashmir cry was explained to mean nothing more than responsible Government under the aegis of the Maharaja.

16. A big agitation began to grow up in Kashmir in support of the message sent to the Cabinet Mission. Within a few days, however, Sheikh Abdullah was invited by Nehru to Delhi to discuss the situation. Sheikh Abdullah thereupon stopped the agitation completely and said that nothing should be done till his return from Delhi. Four days later he started for Delhi and was arrested *en route*. At the same time large number of other arrests were made and the military practically took possession of the valley. It was clear, and indeed it was admitted by Mr. Kak, that he had long been making preparations to crush the National Conference. These preparations had nothing to do with the new phase of the agitation and had preceded it. The Quit Kashmir cry gave Mr. Kak a pretext for quick and widespread action.

17. This happened about 15 months ago and ever since then there has been a continuing conflict between the State authorities and the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah and many of his colleagues have been in prison, most of them sentenced, others in detention. There has been repression of an extreme type and the people generally have suffered very greatly, especially during the winter months when food and fuel were deliberately not distributed with fairness. The

police and the military have fired at crowds and individuals repeatedly, killing many.

18. These events in Kashmir produced a powerful effect in other States in India and the All-India States People's Conference made Kashmir a test case. Probably to some extent some of the other Rulers also treated it in a like way from their point of view. It is widely believed with a great deal of justification that the Political Department gave its backing to this repressive policy of the State and encouraged it.

19. Over a year has elapsed since this began and the result is that Sheikh Abdullah is probably more popular than ever with the masses of Kashmir. The Muslim League there has no particular following. Latterly even the communal Sikh and Hindu organisations have demanded Sheikh Abdullah's release. It is said that the Dogra army also strongly disapproves of Mr. Kak's policy which has resulted in making the Maharaja completely ineffective and almost a prisoner in his palace. Corruption is rampant in the State and the whole administration is centred in a small clique controlled by the Prime Minister. Almost everybody else complains bitterly of this clique and says that nothing can be done in Kashmir till Mr. Kak ceases to be Prime Minister. Even the Maharaja has begun to realise this and wants to do something about it. But Mr. Kak has so frightened him and so isolated him that it is difficult for the Maharaja to take any step of his own volition.

20. Kashmir has become during this past year an All-India question of great importance. It was only because of other developments in India and a desire to avoid adding to the existing troubles that an effort was made to prevent this spreading.

21. Sheikh Abdullah's organization, the Kashmir National Conference, has demonstrated its hold on the masses and there is no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah himself is by far the most outstanding leader in Kashmir. Mr. Kak's efforts to build up a rival leadership have not produced much effect. It is true, however, that Sheikh Abdullah's long absence in prison has produced a certain confusion in people's minds as to what they should do. The National Conference has stood for and still stands for Kashmir joining the Constituent Assembly of India. From the Maharaja's point of view this is obviously desirable and preferable to joining the other Assembly. Mr. Kak, however, comes in the way and it has been reported that he has told the Maharaja that the Viceroy favours Kashmir joining the Pakistan Assembly because of the Maharaja, that as soon as he joins the Indian Union, there will be communal riots in the State and that possibly hostile people from the

surrounding territory of Pakistan might enter Kashmir and give trouble. The Maharaja is timid and is in a fix. There is no doubt that if Mr. Kak remains in control, he will himself see to it that there are communal riots.

22. The situation in Kashmir cannot be effectively met without major changes leading to responsible government in the State with the Maharaja as the constitutional head. Indeed there is no other way out and if this course is not adopted, the Maharaja's position will become progressively more insecure. If, however, the Maharaja gives a lead in this direction by joining the Constituent Assembly of India taking steps for reforms in the State, he would immediately put himself right with the people and gain the support of Sheikh Abdullah and the most powerful party in the State, which, though predominantly Muslim, includes many Hindus and Sikhs.

23. Before this can be done, the immediate steps that appear to be essential are the removal of Mr. Kak from the Prime Ministership, and the discharge of Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues from prison. It has been said that there are other prisoners also who belong to the Muslim League. There is no reason why all such prisoners should not also be released. If any person misbehaves in future, action can be taken against him.

24. Mr. Kak's policy during the past year has caused tremendous injury to Kashmir and to the Maharaja. Unless this is completely reversed very soon, the Maharaja's difficulties will become insurmountable and the only solution then will be by way of violent upheaval. In this upheaval the sympathy of nationalist India will not be with the Maharaja. Mr. Kak has succeeded in antagonising every decent element in Kashmir and in India as a whole. He has hardly any friend anywhere.

25. It is interesting and important to note that Kashmir has kept out of communal troubles during a period when the rest of India has been full of them. This is a remarkable tribute to the policy of the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah. During this period there is little doubt that Mr. Kak encouraged communal friction in order to weaken the political movement. Yet he did not succeed although the leaders of the popular movement were in prison.⁸ When Sheikh Abdullah comes out of prison, he will undoubtedly be able to control his people effectively and he will gladly cooperate with any real steps for the progress of Kashmir.

26. Sheikh Abdullah's wife, Begum Abdullah, has played a notable part during this past year in heartening the people of Kashmir and in giving relief to the vast numbers of sufferers there. Previously living

mostly in *purdah*, she has come out and gone to her people.

27. What happens to Kashmir is, of course, of the first importance to India as a whole not only because of the past year's occurrences there, which have drawn attention to it, but also because of the great strategic importance of that frontier State. There is every element present there for rapid and peaceful progress in cooperation with India. Communalism has not vitiated the atmosphere as in other parts of India. The resources of the State are very great; but unhappily a wrong policy, carried through ruthlessly by a man without any scruple or long vision and with a great deal of personal ambition, has brought the State to the verge of ruin. There is almost complete unanimity today in Kashmir amongst all classes and sections of the people that Mr. Kak should go. Where he can go to, it is difficult to say because he has made himself unacceptable everywhere in India and more especially in Kashmir. But in any event he must be removed from his position of authority. The second immediate step that has to be taken is the release of Sheikh Abdullah as well as of other political prisoners. Obviously no conditions can be attached to this release. When Sheikh Abdullah is released, he will, no doubt, take counsel with his colleagues in Kashmir and outside before any fresh step is taken. The National Congress is deeply interested in this matter and but for the urgency of other work, Nehru would have been in Kashmir long ago. He still thinks of going there soon. Gandhiji also intends going there before long.

28. If any attempt is made to push Kashmir into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble because the National Conference is not in favour of it and the Maharaja's position would also become very difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India. This will satisfy both the popular demand and the Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that Pakistan would create trouble if this happens.

¹Enclosure to No. 229, TP, XI, 442-8.

²Some other sources quoted the Muslim population as being about 85%.

³Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed in 1932.

⁴In 1939, Kashmir Muslim Conference was renamed Kashmir National Conference

⁵For an account of Sheikh Abdullah's services to the Congress, see KR-358.

⁶Refers to the Quit India Movement.

⁷According to the Amritsar Treaty of 16 March 1846, Kashmir was sold out to Gulab Singh, Ruler of Jammu, for a sum of Rs. 75 lakh (about £500,000). See Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (1846-1990)*, Islamabad, 1992, 8.

⁸The Congress was able to manipulate the exit of Premier Kak on 11 August 1947, by agreement with the Maharaja. See Enclosure to KR-334.

KR-325

*Record of Interview between Louis Mountbatten
and Jawaharlal Nehru¹**[Extract]*

TOP SECRET

24 June 1947

[Paras 1-4 omitted]

5. Finally, we talked about Kashmir. I told him I had arranged with the Maharaja to have a long talk with him on the last day (Sunday)—first an hour or so alone with him after luncheon, and then an hour or so with him and his Prime Minister after dinner. Unfortunately His Highness had been indisposed and had had to take to his bed, and so the conversation could not take place.

Pandit Nehru said that that was an old trick which the Maharaja had played on him when he was going to meet him in Kashmir—he had on that occasion also had “a tummy ache.”

I remarked that I did not think the colic was feigned, and that in any case I had managed to have a certain amount of conversation both with the Maharaja and Mr. Kak, the Prime Minister,² though not together. The advice I had given to both of them independently was:

- a. That Kashmir should not decide about joining any constituent assembly until the Pakistan Constituent Assembly had been set up and the situation before them was a bit clearer.
- b. That meanwhile they should make no statement about independence or about their intentions.
- c. That they should go ahead and enter into “standstill” and other agreements with both new States.
- d. That eventually they should send representatives to one Constituent Assembly and join one of the two States, at least for defence, communications and external affairs.
- e. That so far as possible they should consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought was best for their State.

I said that I got the impression that the Maharaja and the Prime Minister had separately agreed that this was sound advice; but both had stated that on account of the balance of population and the geographical position in which they found themselves, any premature decision might have a very serious effect on their

internal stability.

Pandit Nehru agreed that my advice was sound and unexceptionable.

6. He then asked me what luck I had had about Sheikh Abdullah. I told him that my wife had had an invitation from Begum Sheikh Abdullah to have tea with her at her house, and that she had enclosed a letter from Pandit Nehru urging acceptance. I told him that this letter only arrived on Friday evening and that Sunday was being devoted to an expedition away from Srinagar; and the only spare time on Saturday had been taken up for visits to two hospitals which had not been included in the programme. The only way therefore that the Begum could have been seen, would have been to invite her up to the Palace. This the Maharaja asked me not to do since he said she was indulging in political propaganda against him and it would be too awkward if she came. Her Excellency had therefore written to the Begum and explained her inability to accept her invitation.

Pandit Nehru said he was sorry that I had been unable to solve the problem of Kashmir, for the problem would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison and the rights of the people were restored. He, Nehru, felt himself called upon to devote himself to this end, and he thought he would soon have to go to Kashmir to take up the cudgels on behalf of his friend and for the freedom of the people.

I replied that both H.H. and the Prime Minister had particularly asked that no Congress or League leaders should come and visit Kashmir until their decision had been announced, since it would gravely add to their trouble if they were to be subjected to political propaganda before a decision had been reached. As this did not appear to deter Pandit Nehru, I then pointed out that he really must look to his duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred millions in India and only four millions in Kashmir. He would soon be the Prime Minister of an Indian Government, ruling at least two hundred and fifty million; and I would consider it highly reprehensible of him to desert his most important duties at the Centre to interest himself on behalf of four millions who might very well be going to join Pakistan and have nothing more to do with him. In fact I called upon him as a matter of duty not to go running off to Kashmir until his new Government was firmly in the saddle and could spare his services.

He reluctantly agreed that I was right, and took my advice in very good part.

M[OUNTBATTEN] OF B[URMA]

¹No. 319, *TP*, XI, 592-3.

²Mountbatten told Kak that "the only protection for Kashmir after the 15th August was to join one or other of the Constituent Assemblies". No. 294, *ibid.*, 556.

KR-326

*Louis Mountbatten to Maharaja of Kashmir*¹

IOR, R/3/1/94

[NEW DELHI,]
27 [28] June 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

As you know, I had promised Mr. Nehru and Mr. Gandhi that I would take up the question of Sheikh Abdullah with you.² I had to inform them, however, that owing to your having colic on the very day that we had arranged for a discussion on this matter, it had not been discussed.

I told them³ that I had had discussions both with you and your Prime Minister about the future of Kashmir; and that I thought I had succeeded in convincing both you and your Prime Minister that it was essential not to make any statement about independence, since your freedom of choice on the lapse of paramountcy remained constitutionally the same. I told them that I understood that you were willing to enter into agreements with both the new Dominion Governments and that you were seriously considering the question of linking yourself up from the military point of view with one or the other new Dominion, and might consider sending representatives to that Constituent Assembly provided that this did not involve you in a closer association than you desired.

I further went on to say that you were most anxious not to have any political leaders coming up at this time, since any form of propaganda speeches at this moment might well rouse communal feelings and provoke bloodshed which you have been so successful in avoiding up to now.

Mr. Nehru was very upset, and said he felt he must go up to Kashmir himself at once. I told him that I did not feel that his services could be spared from the Centre with only seven weeks remaining in

which to fix up the details of partition and the transfer of power; and he promised to think it over.

Mr. Gandhi then came to see me and said that Mr. Nehru had agreed not to go provided he, Mr. Gandhi, went in his place. Mr. Gandhi, however, offered not to go and to let Mr. Nehru go if I would prefer that.

I told him that provided he would give me the necessary assurances not to indulge in propaganda, I would put the case to you personally; and I dictated an official letter to you in his presence yesterday, which I now enclose. I have also sent a copy of the official letter to Gandhi.

May I suggest that you should send an answer direct to Mr. Gandhi and that if you do decide to accede to his visit you should stress that you do so under the conditions mentioned in my letter.

I need not remind you that I have not the power to stop either of these two coming up to visit you, and so you will have to make up your mind which of the two you would sooner have. I sincerely hope for all our sakes that, if you do accept a visit from one of them, you will be able to so arrange matters that there is no clash. I am sure that you and your Prime Minister, with your great tact and knowledge of the situation, will be able to handle this matter. My attention has been drawn to Your Highness' letter of the 11th July 1946 to Nehru, as a result of which I understand that the latter paid a second visit to Kashmir last year without any untoward incident.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹No. 386, TP, XI, 717-8.

²Sheikh Abdullah was arrested during the Quit Kashmir Movement launched in May 1946 and released on 29 September 1947.

³See KR-325.

Enclosure to KR-326
Louis Mountbatten to Maharaja of Kashmir¹

[NEW DELHI,]
26 June 1948

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

I am writing to tell Your Highness that I have had a talk with both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, who are both still anxious to visit Kashmir. I pointed out to them that any visit from a big Congress leader in which speeches were made could not fail to cause the League to send speakers of the order of Mr. Jinnah to counter their propaganda. This

would in effect produce the electioneering atmosphere which you so rightly wish to avoid, since, as you pointed out to me, there has been no bloodshed up to date and only violent political speeches could now bring about this bloodshed.

Mr. Gandhi tells me that Pandit Nehru is prepared to forego his visit if he (Mr. Gandhi) goes instead.

I am therefore writing this at Mr. Gandhi's request (and dictating it in his presence) to suggest that you should agree to his visit in the near future and make things as easy as possible for him.

He has given me his firm assurance that he will make no political speeches or carry out any form of propaganda. The object of his visit would be to see Madame Abdullah; and, if you granted permission (but only if you did grant him permission), he would like to see Sheikh Abdullah. He would like to meet the people in a general way, but has no desire to address them or to collect large crowds.

May I suggest that Your Highness or your Prime Minister should communicate direct with him to save time.

I am sending Mr. Gandhi a copy of this letter.²

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹Enclosure to No. 386, TP, XI, 718-9.

²Mountbatten wrote to Gandhi on 27 June saying, "I enjoyed our interview so much; it is always most refreshing hearing your point of view and obtaining the benefit of your advice". No. 386, note 4, *ibid.*, 719.

KR-327

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Maharaja of Kashmir*¹

NEW DELHI,
3 July 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Rai Bahadur Gopaldas [a prominent Hindu of Lahore] saw me today and conveyed to me the substance of your conversation with him. I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprehension in your mind about the Congress. Allow me to assure Your Highness that the Congress is not only not your enemy, as you happen to believe, but there are in the Congress many strong supporters of your State. As an organization, the Congress is not opposed to any Prince in India.² It has no quarrel with the States. It is true that recent events

resulting in the arrest of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru³ and the continued detention of Sheikh Abdullah have created a feeling of great dissatisfaction amongst many Congressmen who wish well of your State. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru belongs to Kashmir. He is proud of it, and rest assured, he can never be your enemy.

It is unfortunate that none of the Congress leaders has got any contact with Your Highness. Personal contact would have removed much of the misunderstanding, which probably is based largely on misinformation gathered through sources not quite disinterested.

Having had no personal contact, my correspondence has been with your Prime Minister since the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, and my efforts have been to persuade him to have a different approach to the problem, which in the long run would be in the interest of the State.

It is necessary to assure you that in your domestic affairs the Congress has no intention, whatever, of interfering. If it had not been so, the Constituent Assembly would not have been able to attract a vast majority of Princes who have joined it, and I have no doubt that the rest will also join with very few exceptions who have no choice owing to peculiar circumstances, for instance Bahawalpur, Kalat, etc.⁴ In the Negotiating Committee, your Prime Minister was present, and our decisions were unanimous in the four meetings⁵ that he attended. In these meetings, all the Princes got complete satisfaction from us about their special rights, privileges, etc. which they enjoyed.

I fully appreciate the difficult and delicate situation in which your State has been placed, but as a sincere friend and well-wisher of the State, I wish to assure you that the interest of Kashmir lies in joining in Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay. Its past history and traditions demand it, and all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision. Eighty per cent of India is on this side. The States that have cast their lot with the Constituent Assembly have been convinced that their safety lies in standing together with India.

I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency the Viceroy returned without having a full and frank discussion with you on that fatal [fateful] Sunday⁶ when you had given an appointment which could not be kept because of your sudden attack of colic pain.⁷ He had invited you to be his guest at Delhi, and in that also he was disappointed. I had hopes that we would meet here, but I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency told me that you did not avail of the invitation.

May I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be better if you even now come to Delhi, when you will certainly be his guest? We

want an opportunity of having a frank and free discussion with you in an atmosphere of freedom, and I have no doubt that all your doubts and suspicions, of which I have heard from Gopaldas, will completely disappear. In free India, you cannot isolate yourself, and you must make friends with the leaders of free India who want to be friends with you.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, ed., *Sardar Patel's Correspondence (1945-50)*, *New Light on Kashmir*, Vol. I, Ahmedabad, 1971, 32-4.

²See No. 10, Vol. VIII, 36-8.

³Nehru was arrested in Kashmir in June 1946 for violating an order prohibiting his entry. He had gone there in connection with the defence of Sheikh Abdullah in a sedition case. See No. 594, *TP*, VII, 1021-2.

⁴See Enclosure to Appendix VII. 10, Vol. III, 979.

⁵The earlier meetings had considered the modalities of deliberations between the States Negotiating Committee and the corresponding committee of the British India component of the Constituent Assembly. See No. 326, *TP*, IX, 575-7. At a meeting held after announcement of 3 June Plan, Mountbatten urged the States to join one or the other Constituent Assembly. He confirmed that such an action on the part of a State would be "a matter of free choice", and that the question of any State deciding to join neither Constituent Assembly was "hypothetical". See Enclosure to No. 27, Vol. II, 70.

⁶22 June 1947.

⁷See KR-325.

KR-328

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Ramchandra Kak*¹

DELHI,
3 July 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I am addressing this letter to you after a long time with a heavy sense of responsibility. I invite your attention to the second paragraph of my last letter of 11 April 1947,² after which I have not written to you, as you did not choose to send any reply. Conditions in India have since changed considerably, and I do not know how your mind is working at present.

You are aware that on 15th August, India, though divided, will be completely free, and you also know that by this time a vast majority of States have joined the Constituent Assembly of India. I realise the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its history and its traditions, it has, in my opinion, no other choice.

Do you still think that Sheikh Abdullah should continue to remain in jail? I am asking this question purely in the interest of Kashmir State. You know my attitude all along and my sympathy towards the State. I am once again advising you as a friend of the State to reconsider the matter without any delay.

His Excellency's visit³ was the proper time when this should have been done, but if it is not done now, perhaps it may be too late. I do not wish to write anything more.

Hope you are doing well.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 32.

²Ibid., 31. Not printed.

³Mountbatten visited Kashmir from 18 to 23 June 1947.

KR-329

'KASHMIR MUSLIMS SUPPORT STATE'S INDEPENDENCE MOVE'

New DELHI, July 4: "Heartiest congratulations on the reported independence decision.² I hope that the announcement to this effect will be made soon", says the President of the Jammu and Kashmir State Muslim Conference Co-ordination Organisation, in a telegram to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

He adds: "We assure you of our loyal co-operation and earnestly appeal to you to release the Muslim Conference leaders".

It is learnt that Chaudhary Hamidulalh Khan, acting President of Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and leader of the Muslim Conference Party in the Kashmir State Assembly, is shortly coming to Delhi where he is expected to attend the meeting of the All-India States Muslim League Working Committee, scheduled to be held early next week. It is further understood that he will also meet Mr. Jinnah³ and other Muslim League leaders.—OPI.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 6 July 1947.

²Mountbatten had advised the Maharaja as well as the Prime Minister of Kashmir against making any statement about independence or about their intentions. See KR-326.

³See KR-332.

KR-330

*Maharaja of Kashmir to Louis Mountbatten*IOR, R/3/1/94¹THE PALACE, SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
8 July 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I write to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated 26th June.²

It is true that we have had comparative peace here during the recent months and in spite of the fact that massacre and arson on an unprecedented scale have raged over the country, there has been no bloodshed here. But as I told you, this has been the result of a policy of firmness and impartiality which, if I may say so, had been the guiding principle of administration in this State. It would, however, be foolish to assume that because we have succeeded in so far maintaining peace, amidst the terror raging in the neighbouring territories, we can in all circumstances be equally successful. The present is a very inopportune time for political leaders to come to Kashmir as the position is most delicate. A tiny spark, in spite of the best intentions in the world, may set alight a conflagration which it would be impossible to control.

In the circumstances I would say that it would be advisable from all points of view for Mahatma Gandhi to cancel his projected visit to Kashmir this year. If, however, for reasons of his own he is not in a position to do so, I should still say that his visit should take place only towards the end of the autumn.

I note that he has given you his firm assurance that "he will make no political speeches or carry out any form of propaganda."

We have no objection whatsoever to his seeing Mrs. Abdullah but I am afraid it will not be possible for him to see Sheikh Abdullah. There are political considerations which render such a meeting most inadvisable.

I need hardly say that if Mahatma Gandhi would like to stay as my guest during his visit here, I should feel very glad. I would however, again strongly advise that he or any other political leader should not visit the State until conditions in India take a happier turn.

Yours sincerely,
HARI SINGH¹Enclosure to No. 4, TP, XII, 5.²Enclosure to KR-326.

KR-331

*Maharaja of Kashmir to Louis Mountbatten¹**IOR, R/3/1/94*

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PALACE, SRINAGAR,
8 July 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter dated 27th June [28] 1947.²

I am sorry for the delay in sending a reply which was due to the fact that there were rumours that Mahatma Gandhi was not immediately coming to Kashmir—rumours which have now been confirmed by the A.P.I. As for writing to Mahatma Gandhi direct, I feel it would be inappropriate for me to send him a letter in reply to a letter from you. I am enclosing an official letter³ in reply to your official letter of the same date which you may show to Mahatma Gandhi.

With regard to the second paragraph of your letter, the position generally is as you have stated, though we do not—at least for the time being—consider the question of linking ourselves from the military point of view with either one or the other of the Dominions or of sending representatives to a Constituent Assembly. A decision in these matters will be taken when we see how things turn out and in the light of circumstances as they develop.

Visits of outside leaders who know little of the circumstances prevailing here beyond what they hear from interested parties are embarrassing even in normal times but they have grave potentialities under the present conditions. As I told you, though we have been successful in our endeavour to maintain peace in this State under very trying circumstances, we make no secret of the fact that it is only by hanging on by the skin of our teeth and a measure of luck that we succeeded. Visit of prominent political leaders in an atmosphere surcharged with suspicion and passions such as prevails nowadays keep the country in a ferment and are far from conducing to the maintenance of peace. Moreover, the trouble is that if a leader of one political denomination arrives, he is bound to be followed by a leader of another denomination, and people, therefore, constantly live in a state of tension. The political situation in India having developed as it has, I would repeat with all the emphasis at my command that, it will be extremely difficult in the present conditions to guarantee that as a result of the visit the situation will not deteriorate with consequences that cannot be contemplated with equanimity. That we succeeded in avoiding

any untoward incident during Pt. Nehru's second visit last year is true, but conditions then were different. The fever resulting from the partitioning of India and the division of certain Provinces has thrown most people off their balance. He would be a bold man indeed, who could say with any confidence that in the present circumstances a visit of a leader of Mahatma Gandhi's high standing will not produce untoward incidents.

All things considered, I would earnestly request Your Excellency to dissuade all political leaders from visiting Kashmir during 1947. If, however, Mahatma Gandhi is unable to cancel his visit, I suggest that it would be in the best interests of this country and of India as a whole that the visit should take place only toward the end of the autumn. But I must emphasise the fact that it is impossible for us to guarantee the prevention of any untoward incident, circumstanced as we are, though we will, I need hardly assure you, try with all our might and main to safeguard against any such occurrence. I must add that what applies to Mahatma Gandhi, applies to all political leaders⁴ of similar standing with equal if not greater force.

Yours sincerely,
HARI SINGH

¹No. 4, TP, XII, 3-5.

²KR-326.

³KR-330.

⁴In view of the Maharaja's strong opposition "to any Muslim League leader coming to Kashmir," Mountbatten had advised Jinnah "not to go or send anyone" there. See No. 78, TP, XII, 114.

KR-332

Press Statement by M.A. Jinnah

F. 788/33

11 July 1947

Mr. M.A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, has issued the following statement to the press:

"The Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference leaders, Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan and Mr. Mohammad Ishaq Qureshi, had an interview with me today and they informed me of the situation there which is making the people restive. They placed before me the question of the detention of the Muslim Conference leaders who have been in jail now for nine months without trial. Their only offence was that they held the Muslim Conference session in spite of prohibitory orders of the Government. But they soon dispersed and did not proceed with

their business. Only six leaders were arrested to which no resistance was offered and everything went off peacefully. For such a technical offence they have already suffered nine months and I see no justification for their continued detention. I hope that the Maharaja and the Prime Minister of Kashmir will realize the fast changing circumstances and wisdom demands that feelings and sentiments of Muslims who form 80 per cent of the population should not be ignored, much less hurt.

“The second question that is engaging the attention of the Muslims of Kashmir is whether Kashmir is going to join the Constituent Assembly of Hindustan or the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. I have already made it clear more than once that the Indian States are free to join either the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or remain independent. I have no doubt that the Maharaja and the Kashmir Government will give their closest attention and consideration to this matter and realize the interests not only of ruler but also of his people. We have made it clear that we are not going to coerce, intimidate, or put any pressure on any State making its choice. But those States who wish to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly will find us ready and willing to negotiate with them agreement for the mutual advantage of both. Those who wish to declare their complete independence may do so. Pakistan Government is willing to come to such terms with them as may be beneficial for both and secure mutual and reciprocal interest.

“Lastly, I hope that the Muslims of Kashmir will organize themselves and create complete unity and solidarity among the Musalmans under their wise leadership.”

KR-333

MUSLIM PRINCES ASKED TO JOIN PAKISTAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY¹

STATE LEAGUE DEMANDS DEMOCRATISATION OF ADMINISTRATION

New Delhi, July 10: The Working Committee of the All-India States Muslim League, which met here under the presidentship of Mr. Rasool Khan, welcomed the “declarations of independence” by the Nizam and the Maharaja of Travancore, and wholeheartedly supported the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference² demand for the declaration of Kashmir as an independent State on the lapse of Paramountcy.

The Committee strongly recommended to the Muslim States to

decide to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and link up with the Pakistan Dominion Government.

By its main resolution, the Committee appealed to the Rulers of States to completely dissociate themselves from communal bias and bitterness, take all sections of their subjects into their confidence and try to solve their constitutional and political problems in the closest association with their subjects.

The Committee felt that the only safe course for those Indian States, who would not join either of the two Dominions, was to keep harmonious relations with both the Dominion Governments and make arrangements to avoid all immediate causes of conflict or differences.

The Committee further appealed to the Rulers to immediately liberalise and democratise their constitutions, so as to give their subjects full opportunities of sharing the responsibility of administration.

The resolution requested the Indian Princes to declare unequivocally that they would guarantee the protection of the life, honour and property of the minorities and give them adequate constitutional safeguards to preserve their separate social, religious and cultural existence, which would lead to permanent peace, harmony, progress and prosperity.³

The Committee noted "with great disappointment and apprehension" that not a single Muslim representative had been sent to the Indian Constituent Assembly by those States, which had decided to join it and demanded some special provision to give adequate representation to the Muslims of those States.

The Committee recommended to the Maharaja of Kapurthala to consider the desirability and suitability of Kapurthala joining the Pakistan Constituent Assembly "in view of the fact that Kapurthala is a State where Muslim subjects are in a clear majority".

Other resolutions dealt with the demands and grievances of Muslims in Bharatpur, Cutch [Kutch] and Kathiawar States, Sirohi, Cochin, Jaipur, Patiala and Alwar.—API.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 12 July 1947.

²The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was represented by acting President, Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan.

³Jinnah spelled out his policy towards the minorities on 13 July 1947. See Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi, ed., *Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, Vol. IV, Lahore, 1996, 2585-92.

KR-334

Ramadhar¹ to Vallabhbhai Patel²

C/O A.I.S.A.
SRINAGAR
14 July 1947

Respected Sardar Sahib,

I have written to Dada [Acharya J.B. Kripalani]³ and Panditji [Jawaharlal Nehru] about Kashmir affairs [and] copy of one of the letters sent to Dada was forwarded to you also.

I am enclosing herewith a document giving out in brief the general outline of the present position of developments here. The question of joining the Indian Union has not been taken up just now. He [the Maharaja] will join soon after the items contained in the enclosure have been carried out.

It is obvious that I have written this at the instance of Gopaldasji. I have not added even an iota of my own. If anything, I have tried to say less.

I am arriving at Delhi on the 17th. I hope to see you also then. I shall explain things at length if you care for details.

With *pranams*,

Yours sincerely,
RAMADHAR

¹General Secretary, All-India Spinners' Association.

²Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 35.

³General Secretary, All India Congress Committee.

Enclosure to KR-334

The Maharaja has given his word for the following:

1. General amnesty to be proclaimed within a week or ten days' time.

2. Kak to go as soon as possible. The task of finding out his substitute has devolved upon Gopaldasji. He hopes to get the new person within a fortnight.

Now two things are expected from the other side. The weekly agitation should remain suspended and that Gandhiji should visit Kashmir only after the intended general amnesty has been proclaimed and not before that. The Maharaja is apprehensive of trouble if Bapu visits Kashmir during Kak's presence in the ministerial *gaddi*.

RAMADHAR

KR-335

CONGRESS TOLD TO KEEP HANDS OFF KASHMIR¹MAJORITY FAVOURS INDEPENDENCE
SAYS MUSLIM CONFERENCE CHIEF

SRINAGAR, July 15: Ch[audhary] Hamidulalh [Khan], President, All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, in a statement to the press warns the Congress to keep its hands off Kashmir.

Ch. Hamidullah said: "After their discomfiture and defeat in NWFP² and Baluchistan³ the agents of the Indian National Congress are once again casting their covetous eyes on Kashmir, and the Congress propaganda machinery is making frantic offers to win over the State to the Indian Union".

To the Indian National Congress, its propagandists, its hirelings, and columnists, I say "Hands off Kashmir". The Muslims of the State, who form 85 percent of the population of Kashmir, have cast their votes in favour of an independent Kashmir under the aegis of the Maharaja.⁴ This constitutes a gesture of goodwill towards the minorities whose interest will be safeguarded by the Ruler under the terms of constitution.

Appealing to the minorities not to be led astray by the Congress propaganda, Ch. Hamidullah added: "Let the minorities know once for all that if Kashmir strays off the path of independence and elects to join one of the two Unions, she will not be allowed to maintain her separate entity. Therefore, I think that the only best choice to maintain our integrity is an independent Kashmir".

Referring to that section of Muslims in the State who are opposed to the idea of an independent State, Chaudhary Sahib said: "Such people should not shut their eyes to the fast changing times but they should take a warning from the Khan brothers.⁵ Let all such Muslims, who for one reason or the other stay out of the Muslim League, join hands with the Muslim Conference and work to set up a strong and independent Kashmir".

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 18 July 1947.

²See No. 201, Vol. III, 545.

³See No. 77, note 4, Vol. III, 184.

⁴See KR-329.

⁵Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

KR-336

KASHMIR'S ENTRY IN PAKISTAN DEMANDED¹
RULER SHOULD REMAIN CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD

Srinagar, July 21: The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference Convention which met under the Presidentship of Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan, Acting President of the Muslim Conference, has passed unanimously a resolution urging the State to join Pakistan.

The resolution says: "This convention is of the considered opinion that in view of its geographical position, means of communication, facilities of import and export of necessities of life, racial and cultural affinities, contiguity of frontiers as well as the fact that Muslims constitute 85 percent of the population, the only proper course for the State is to join Pakistan."²

The resolution also urges the Maharaja of Kashmir to declare internal independence and sovereignty of the State and to accept his own position as that of a constitutional monarch.

The Maharaja is also asked to establish a Constituent Assembly for the State and to surrender matters concerning defence, foreign affairs and communications to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.

In the end, the resolution warns the authorities that if this friendly advice is ignored and the Kashmir Government joins the Indian Union, the Muslims of the State will strongly oppose and condemn such a step.

Two other resolutions, one demanding the release of all political prisoners, and the other protesting against the promulgation of Sec[ti]on 50 and the censorship on the daily *Khidmat* and the weekly *Javeed*, have also been passed.—Globe.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 24 July 1947.

²Chaudhary Hamidullah Khan had earlier warned the Indian National Congress and its propagandists "to keep their hands off Kashmir" See KR-335.

KR-337

M. Gul Mohammed to K. H. Khurshid

F. 921/176-7

KUCHA MUSTAQEEM, HABIBGANJ,
LAHORE,
25 July 1947

Daulat-i-Jamhuria Pakistan Zindabad!

My dear Khurshid,

Assalaamo 'Alaikum. Now when Muslim India has achieved its goal to a very great extent, it is the turn of the Muslims of Kashmir that their case should be taken up with [sic for in] great earnest now. It is no secret that so far [as] the leadership of Kashmir is concerned, we cannot boast of an unpurchasable and incorruptible leader. So far as Sheikh Abdullah is concerned, his case is as clear as daylight. He is all in all in the enemy's camp. His lieutenants and co-workers, however, are not all bad. There are some intelligent people in his camp who even today are willing to join hands with those who may have a great good in heart [sic] for the State Muslims. So far as the Muslim Conference is concerned, it has failed to give a proper lead to the Muslim masses who are literally gasping for the same. There is no organisation and no working plan with this body. Of course its members as well as the high command know very well how to play with the sentiments of the public. It is only the connection of this body with the Muslim League that at times some importance is given to it by the public. The recent election fought between Ch. Hamidulalh and Sh[eikh] Amin was won for [sic] Ch. Hamidullah simply on this issue. Otherwise the true opinion of the public was in favour of Sh[eikh] Amin and against Ch. Hamidulalh who had never been liked or sincerely trusted by the public. The same is the case with him today.

Under the above circumstances, I would ask you to spare a few moments for your motherland and give us some guidance as to which procedure we should adopt so that without harming anybody we may at least be able to achieve the fundamental rights of a human society. If possible, please convey my sincere good wishes and *salaam* to Quaid-i-Azam and [his] sister. Perhaps, they will remember me if you were to tell them that in 1944 I met them twice in their house-boat mooring near Convent Garden while I was in the State service then working as a

Municipal Engineer at Srinagar.

With kindest regards,

I am,

Yours very sincerely,

M. GUL MOHAMMED

KR-338

Mohammad Ishaq to K.H. Khurshid

F. 784/216-8

JAMMU,
29 July 1947

My dear Khurshid,

I have just returned from Srinagar. You must have read the resolution¹ adopted by the convention. I do not know what are your reactions to it but I feel an explanation is due from us. We had gone to Srinagar with the honest intention of supporting our stand on independence and in fact Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas Khan had himself drafted the resolution to be moved. In Srinagar, however, we soon found that we shall have to face a determined opposition. For one thing, the glamour of Pakistan was more attractive than the dreary prospects of an independent State for most imaginations. Secondly, the recent announcements in the Parliament were interpreted in the political circles here to signify that irresistible pressure would be brought on Kashmir to join one of the two unions. In that event it was felt that in the face of a clamorous demand from one side to join the Indian Union and the absence of counter-demand from us the State would have a strong case for choosing the former course. After a two-day fight we carried our point (viz. the independence resolution) with the working committee but had to make concessions in the convention on the third day. Essentially our stand remains the same. We have demanded an independent Kashmir² in all matters of internal administration but with respect to defence, communications, and foreign affairs, the State should cooperate with Pakistan on considerations of contiguity, economic factors and cultural affinities. Without this concession it was impossible to carry the house with us. We felt we were failing you and deviating from our previous stand but we were bound by the conventions of democracy. We had the option to resign but we honestly felt that that was not advisable under the circumstances.

You know best what transpired at Delhi between the Viceroy and Mr. Kak and you will kindly intimate us about the whole affair. The slight change made in our position, however, has secured us the zealous support of the masses and would go a long way to strengthen our organization. One thing is certain that in case the State joins the Indian Union, there will be very determined resistance from Muslims everywhere in the State and the situation will certainly get out of hand from them. We are devoting full attention to build up strong organization.

By the way, Mr. Shahmiri³ of Kashmir was deputed specially to secure a way of approach to the League. Did he see you and what was his game? You of course know the measure of reliance to be put on him.

What is your programme? When do you move to Karachi⁴ to install the new regime?

Yours sincerely,

MOH[AMMA]D ISHAQ

[The following remarks are recorded on the above letter]

Dear Khurshid,

As I understand...[*personal comment omitted*] R.C.Kak called upon Q[uaid-i-] A[zam].⁵ Will you kindly let us know what transpired?

With best wishes,

Yours,

HAMIDULLAH

¹KR-336.

²Ibid.

³Probably, Muzaffar-ud-Din Shahmiri, Secretary, General Administration Department, Jammu & Kashmir State.

⁴Jinnah arrived in Karachi on 7 August 1947.

⁵R.C. Kak called on Jinnah on 25 July 1947. See Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam 1942-47*, Lahore, 1989, 89.

KR-339

*Wilfred Webb to George Abell*¹

Telegram, IOR, R/3/1/94

MOST IMMEDIATE/CONFIDENTIAL
[2597-S]

[SRINAGAR,]
29 July 1947

No. 73. Viceroy's telegram No. 2989-S of July 28th.² Have conveyed

His Excellency's message. His Highness says visit of either Gandhi or Nehru not only most inadvisable at this stage but most dangerous in potentialities from point of view even of India as a whole. There is no ban on entry into the State but it must be remembered that all public gatherings, processions etc. are banned in the interest of public peace. Kashmir Government will do their best to prevent untoward incidents during visit if it cannot be avoided but are not prepared to give any guarantee in this behalf.³ As for declaration regarding adherence to a Dominion His Highness says no decision has been arrived as yet.

[WILFRED WEBB]

¹No. 280, TP, XII, 410-11.

²Mountbatten by this telegram had advised the Resident in Kashmir of Nehru's intended visit and that he should be "decently treated". See No. 260, TP, XII, 380.

³It was later decided that Gandhi should visit Kashmir instead. See Nos. 269, and 277, *ibid.*, 397 and 405, respectively. Abell, by telegram 3050-S of 30 July, asked Webb to "emphasise to Kashmir Government that Viceroy hopes every possible precaution will be taken to ensure that there are no untoward incidents". Webb telegraphed on 31 July that "Prime Minister assures me that every possible... precaution is being taken". He reported later that Gandhi had met both Kak and the Maharaja and was to see Begum Abdullah. See R/3/1/94: ff 53-7. Not printed.

KR-340

KASHMIR¹

Acharya Kripalani's² infructuous visit to Kashmir's vale of tears does not appear to have discouraged Congress land-grabbers and siren-voices are still straining hard to lure Kashmir into the net. Mr. Gandhi is probably waiting for the psychological moment when the resistance of the State authorities will have to be sufficiently worn down to allow the saint to succeed where the philosopher failed. An obviously inspired news item has already mentioned a projected road-link between Kashmir and Hindustan,³ the air is thick with rumours of intrigues and counter-intrigues between the *Khaddar*-clad *ahimsaites*⁴ and the bejewelled courtflunkies,⁵ and in most of these intrigues there is sometimes an overt and sometimes a covert slant towards Kashmir. Kashmir is a Muslim land, it adjoins a most strategic stretch of the Pakistan frontier, its people are wedded to the people of Pakistan by common ties of religion, culture and blood, and the Dogra House rules it not in natural dynastic right but as a legacy from the British. It is the

only State perhaps, which did not surrender its paramountcy to the British, when the British came, but acquired this paramountcy from them. Constitutionally, this paramountcy should also lapse when the power that conferred it has abjured her own overlordship. We do not intend, however, to indulge in legal hair-splitting. There are three straight alternatives before Kashmir. She can either declare herself independent or she can join either the Hindustan or the Pakistan Union. We consider that a declaration of independence in the case of Kashmir, though technically valid, would be a spurious and insincere declaration and the only object such a declaration can have is to consolidate the present brutal administration by a perennial bargaining for power with all the interested parties, namely, Hindustan, Pakistan and the British. It will mean putting into the hands of the ruling clique a blank cheque book which can be cashed at any counter and it will keep cashing it piecemeal and will use the cash to forge chains and fetters for the unhappy people that a freak of history has put in its power. The second alternative is the union of Kashmir and Hindustan and this union is as unthinkable as the union of the Pathanland with the land of Birla's millions. The Muslim League, or the Pakistan Government, unlike their Congress counterparts have not thought fit to hector and bully the States or to cringe and whine before them but our conception of the State is a comprehensive one and includes both the ruler and the ruled. An injustice has already been done to the Pakistan State by the unilateral reversion of Gilgit to the Kashmir *Darbar*. In this Muslim territory, the rights of sovereignty had been acquired by the British for a considerable period of time and during this period of lease, the rights should have devolved not on the Maharaja but on the successor authority, which in the case of predominantly Muslim areas, is represented by the Pakistan Government. The Pakistan External Affairs Department should certainly have been consulted before the decision was made. The accession of Kashmir to the Hindustan Union would be an injustice, far more flagrant and stupendous, and it is obvious that neither the Muslims of Kashmir nor of Pakistan will contemplate such a step with equanimity. In fact this procedure would be extremely dangerous for the future good relations of Pakistan and Hindustan for the Muslim people of Kashmir, a people compared to whom the Czarist serfs lived in aristocratic luxury are bound to rebel against their present inhuman degradation and if the Maharaja draws upon the armouries of Hindustan as he has been doing on the armouries of the British in the past, the Muslims of Pakistan will not be able to look on unmoved. Despotism and their advisers are not normally gifted with an unusual amount of foresight but if the Kashmir Court

are, it should be obvious to them that their only guarantee of existence, inside the State, is a free and democratic Kashmir allied or affiliated to a free and democratic Pakistan.

¹See Editorial, the *Pakistan Times*, 1 August 1947.

²President, Indian National Congress He visited Kashmir in June 1947.

³On 27 July 1947, the Kashmir Government approved metalling of the Kathua Road to link the State with India through Pathankot "which is the only outlet for the State to enter India". See the *Pakistan Times*, 29 July 1947.

⁴Apostles of non-violence as a creed.

⁵See Annex II to KR-341.

⁶Gilgit Agency was ceded back to the Maharaja of Kashmir on 1 August 1947

KR-341

Wilfred Webb to George Abell

Telegram, IOR, R/3/1/94

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

No: 85

[SRINAGAR,]

11 August 1947

Have just been informed that Kak has resigned¹ and His Highness has appointed Major-General Janak Singh in his place temporarily.

[WILFRED WEBB]

Reason not known to me.

G.E.B. ABELL

Please ask Webb for full background² to dismissal and whether Kashmir will now join one of the two Dominions.

MOUNTBATTEN

¹See the *Pakistan Times*, 13 August 1947.

²See Annex I, II & III for background.

Annex I to KR-341

Wilfred Webb to George Abell¹

Telegram, IOR, R/3/1/94

IMMEDIATE/SECRET

No. 86.

[SRINAGAR,]

13 August 1947

Your telegram No. 3352-S of Aug. 12th.² Kak asked for permission to retire as he felt he had lost confidence of Ruler who he found had

been corresponding with Congress through other channels. I believe break came because of indecision of His Highness to make up his mind either to join one or other Dominion, or in peculiar circumstances for Kashmir to come into the open and ask for agreements with both. His Highness, Dogras and Hindu communities incline towards India but bulk of population are Muslim and if consulted would probably favour Pakistan especially Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad area. Kak although Hindu clearly saw implication and felt that if Kashmir joined either Dominion especially India it would mean serious trouble.

2. Kak further was advising His Highness he must fix his Privy Purse and that autocracy must gradually give place to democracy. Kak unfortunately had his shortcomings in that he placed his brothers in the way of good business while Prime Minister thus benefiting whole family. His Highness's letter accepting his request for retirement stated that he had lost confidence of people.

3. I saw new Prime Minister yesterday, and he is aware of the situation and although inclining towards India as a Hindu, realises bulk of Muslims will not accept decision. He therefore wishes for agreements with both. Kashmir Government issued statement³ last night that they welcome Standstill Agreements pending further negotiations with both Dominions. From this press note it is apparent that they are not likely to join either Dominion at present.

4. Kashmir Government are in grave dilemma as a decision to join either Dominion will result in serious trouble that might also have repercussions outside State.

[WILFRED WEBB]

¹No. 456, TP, XII, 696-7.

²Abell sent it in compliance with Mountbatten's minute. See KR-341.

³KR-345.

Annex II to KR-341

SECRET BEHIND KASHMIR'S INDECISION¹

KAK TRYING FOR STANDSTILL AGREEMENT WITH DOMINIONS

What prevents Kashmir from declaring her intentions is the question asked from every side as State after State takes her place in the new political set up. And so much more hangs upon her decision than upon the decision of noisy States like Travancore. Kashmir is an ace among States by virtue of her geography. Her silence, therefore, is mystifying in the extreme and most tantalizing for many. It is the intention of the present article to tear off the veil from some of this mystery.

And if I say that the present welter is composed of indecision and court intrigue and some astute piece of statecraft, I shall not be far wrong. Only that would be thickening the mystery which I am seeking to solve.

MEN BEHIND THE SCENE

I shall do better by beginning with the powers with whom lies decision.

And herein Kashmir differs from the other States. Power at the highest level rests here with the ruler and is not shared with any of his dewans. His dewans wield vast powers in their own way but they are never sure of the Ruler's confidence. They are never sure of tomorrow. The Ruler's displeasure hangs like the sword of Damocles over them which might smite them any moment. And it does smite too—five dewans in three years is a salutary warning for ambitious underlings.

The present Maharaja is indeed credited with liberal views despite the treatment meted out in the State to popular movements. But of late he is known to have fallen under curious influences. The most powerful among them is that of a *Swami*. The *Swami* resides in the royal palace amidst sumptuous luxuries. He is variously described as a spiritualist of a high order, an astute agent of the political department of the Government of India and a shrewd mountebank. He takes credit for the fiasco of the Nehru campaign against the State and since that event his influence with the Maharaja has greatly increased. But his leanings are unpredictable and therefore political circles, both official and public, regard his presence in the palace with great dismay. Although the Maharaja is believed to belong to the Bhopal group of rulers essentially, he stands aloof from them and is his own adviser.

POLICY OF DRIFT

The man in actual charge of things in the State, Pandit R. C. Kak manoeuvres a good deal but with one aim in view, viz., to secure his tenure of office and to utilize his position for the interest of his clique. In politics he confines himself, therefore, to a policy of drift that pays him for the time but leads the State nowhere. He counts upon the rivalry of the League and the Congress and by playing one against the other he hopes to keep both on tenterhooks. He also hopes to ward off present danger by concluding a "standstill" agreement with Pakistan and the Indian union alike.

[*One para omitted*]

INDEPENDENT KASHMIR

Their [Kashmiri Muslims] allegiance is shared by two organizations,

the Muslim and the National Conferences, led respectively by Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas Khan and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who at this critical moment are both locked in jail. Congress credit has fallen considerably in the State ever since that body retired from its fight in Kashmir and bartered all the claims of the people for a smile from the Princes. On the other hand, the establishment of Pakistan has electrified the imagination of Kashmiri Muslims and filled their mind with new hopes. There is no escape from the fact that Congress has ceased to exist as a live force in Kashmir.

In this hour of triumph for their ideology the Muslim Conference has shown commendable restraint. The State is sandwiched between the great arc of Pakistan on three sides and by Muslim principalities of Turkistan on the fourth. And instead of favouring wild schemes the Muslim Conference leaders had offered their full support for maintaining the independence of Kashmir as a separate entity² under the aegis of the present Maharaja in return for grant of full responsible government. This was a gesture of goodwill towards the non-Muslim minorities and a great concession to them but instead of welcoming this move some of them started crying for the moon. The position has undergone a considerable change since the decision of the British Government to bring pressure on the States to come to an understanding with either of the two unions in matters of defence, communications and foreign policy. The Muslim Conference therefore has demanded that this understanding can and should be made with their closest neighbour, the Pakistan State. Thus the Muslim Conference alone has given a positive lead in this fateful issue. Palace circles continue to make a close secret of their indecision. Mr. Kak is none too sure of his position and waits with baited [*sic* for bated] breath for a sign. The National Conference stands bewildered. They find they had been backing the wrong horse like the Khan Brothers in the N. W. F. P. Will they persist in their folly? It is idle to speculate over their next move, but I would hazard a guess. Sh. Mohammad Abdullah has something of the dramatic in him. He loves to spring surprises. His Quit Kashmir³ was such a surprise. He might spring one yet. He might steal a march over his political opponents and declare for an amalgamation of Kashmir with Pakistan and sweep the supporters of "maximum independence" off their feet. There is no other way left for him to retain his hold on the masses. He would certainly like out-Heroding Herod.⁴

IS INDEPENDENCE A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION?

Internal independence is a practical proposition for Kashmir. She is

a solvent State and has been so for ages. She would have a favourable trade balance and she has the raw materials and water-power to build up big industry. She has also great mineral wealth and several untapped sources of revenue. She needs only a small but compact army for police duty. Defence is no longer a national but an international concern and it would not be inconsistent with the sovereignty of any State to have a co-ordination of its defence with a strong neighbour.

But I am straying off my path. The point I wanted to make was simply this—that while Provinces and States are putting their houses in order we in Kashmir are reading horoscopes at the feet of *gurus* and *swamis*. Kashmir still gropes for her destiny.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 8 August 1947.

²See KR-335. However, Congress was implacably opposed to any State choosing independence, and that prompted the Muslim Conference to demand that Kashmir “join Pakistan”. See KR-336.

³See KR-320.

⁴Herod the Great, king of Judea, was known for cruelty. He had had every child in Bethlehem under the age of two killed in an attempt to destroy the infant Jesus. The expression means outdoing Herod in tyranny and cruelty.

Annex III to KR-341
Margaret Kak to Stafford Cripps
PRO, Cab 127/113

15 DENMAN DRIVE, HAMPSTEAD GARDEN SUBURB,
LONDON, N.W.11,
16 October 1947

Dear Sir Stafford,

[*Para 1 omitted*]

[2.] He [Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, the then Prime Minister of Kashmir] resigned office at the beginning of August 1947. His resignation was brought about by two sections of people whose ultimate aims were distinct, though their immediate object, the removal from office of the Prime Minister, and the substitution of one more amenable to influence from without, was common to both.

[3.] In the summer of 1947, the first section was in the ascendant. It was headed by Swami Sant Dev, a *Saddhu* of great age and undoubted shrewdness, who had attained a position of great influence in the Palace. He exhorted His Highness to rule as his ancestor, Gulab Singh, had ruled and encouraged the Dogra Rajput community to re-assume the position of pre-eminence which he believed to be their birthright. He also encouraged the idea of a confederation of Himalayan States, of

which the Jammu & Kashmir State was to form the nucleus. In all these designs, he was to be the power behind the throne.

[4.] The second section consisted of those who wished immediately to accede to India, and who considered the State administration was strong enough to carry through such accession without any adverse effect on its unity or composition.

[5.] The then Prime Minister was an obstacle to both sections.¹ He realized that the dreams of the reactionaries, apart from their injustice, were utterly impossible, and he believed with entire conviction that to accede to either Dominion at that moment would precipitate a crisis which would lead to the breaking up of the State, since its inception an artificial unit, into its component parts.

[6.] Both sections wished to take advantage of the other's opposition to the administration, and in the intrigues which led to my husband's resignation, both participated. A point then arose when he was forced to ask His Highness either to permit him to retire, or to declare full confidence in the policy the Prime Minister thought right and to put an end to the intrigues which had been brought to light without any possibility of challenge.

[7.] From this point, the politics of Kashmir cease[d] to concern my husband or his family, but in support of the truth of the assertion that two distinct sections were concerned in bringing about his resignation, it may be pointed out that contrary to all expectations, no change in policy was made by His Highness's Government after August 11th until the incursion of the Pathans at the end of October forced His Highness's hand, and caused him to accede to India and release the National Conference prisoners.

But that such policy was ineffective unless supported by administrative efficiency, justice and integrity of purpose was amply demonstrated by the revolt in Poonch and the sharp deterioration in the morale and general conditions of the State which followed immediately on the resignation of the Prime Minister, the installation of favourities in key positions and the sending away of such high officers as the Chief of the Military Staff, the Inspector General of Police and various Ministers.

[8.] The story of the treatment my husband has received since his retirement is as follows. On August 12th we went up to Gulmarg for a month's holiday, intending to make arrangements to travel to England in the autumn on a holiday visit to my people whom I had not seen for ten years.

[9.] While we were still in Gulmarg, we heard of trouble in Poonch and tension in Srinagar. It was no doubt in view of this unsatisfactory

state of affairs that it was felt necessary to find material to justify the change of Prime Minister at such a critical time. His Highness's letter of August 11th² permitting my husband to retire was cordial, but by the end of August rumours reached us that frantic efforts were being made to explore every possible avenue, which might lead to the possibility of charges being made against my husband.

Enquiries and investigations were being carried on, not through official channels, but by private persons who nonetheless were allowed to make use of the services of Government officials and to call for Government records.

[Paras 10 to 20 omitted]

Yours very sincerely,
MARGARET KAK

¹On 14 July 1947, Ramadhar, Secretary, All-India Spinners Association, informed Vallabhbhai Patel that the Maharaja had decided to ditch Kak as soon as possible. See Enclosure to KR-334.

²Not traceable.

KR-342

Janak Singh¹ to Abdur Rab Nishtar

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

SRINAGAR,
12 August 1947

Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, States Relations Department, Karachi
Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Standstill Agreements² with Pakistan on all matters on which these exist at present moment with outgoing British Indian Government. It is suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreement.

[JANAK SINGH]

¹Following Kak's resignation on 11 August 1947, Janak Singh took over as State Premier protem.

²See KR-346.

KR-343

*Janak Singh to Abdur Rab Nishtar**Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2*

No. B/530

SRINAGAR,
14 August 1947

Understand local post offices have received instructions to hoist Pakistan Flag on post office buildings on 15th August. In this connection please refer my telegram of 12th.¹ In view of that telegram and fact that postal buildings in State belong to His Highness' Government, it is necessary that pending final decision the day should be celebrated only as directed by Jammu and Kashmir Government that is by illuminations on 15th and holiday on account of establishment of Indian Union and Pakistan and retrocession of paramountcy. Matter extremely urgent and in order to avoid any complication, grateful if postal authorities are instructed accordingly and information of the action taken sent to me also.

Addressed to Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and repeated to Telepost.
[JANAK SINGH]

¹KR-342.

KR-344

*All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference to Abdur Rab Nishtar**Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2*SRINAGAR,
14 August 1947

Kashmir Government dislikes hoisting Pakistan Flag 15th on post office building[s] despite acceptance Standstill Agreement. Understand having telegraphed¹ you on subject. In consideration of preponderance Muslim population, kindly intervene.

[ALL JAMMU & KASHMIR MUSLIM CONFERENCE]

¹KR-343.

KR-345

KASHMIR NOT TO JOIN ANY DOMINION¹
STATE WILL WELCOME STANDSTILL ARRANGEMENTS

SRINAGAR, Aug. 14: A communique says: "The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir has wired to the States Relations Departments of India and Pakistan to say that the Jammu and Kashmir Government will welcome Standstill arrangements with them on all matters on which these exist at present with the outgoing Indian Government. It has been suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreements.²—APA.

¹The *Civil & Military Gazette*, 15 August 1947.

²Gandhi had earlier declared that "the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Kashmir and Jammu." See Annex.

*Annex to KR-345*KASHMIR WILL HAVE TO JOIN EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN¹

WAH, Aug. 6: Addressing his prayer gathering, which consisted mostly of refugees living at the camp, Mr. Gandhi said, he was glad he had been able to visit the camp and see the patients in the hospital and keep other appointments in connection with his visit to the camp.

He had made up his mind not to hold any public meetings or address them but he was able to see the workers. He was also able to see the Maharaja Saheb and the Maharani Saheba and Prime Minister Kak Saheb. He was sorry he was not able to see Sheikh Abdullah Saheb who was undoubtedly the leader of the Kashmiris.

He could say that on August 15, all being well, legally the State of Kashmir and Jammu would be independent. But he was sure that the State would not remain in that condition for long after August 15. It had to join either the Union [of India] or Pakistan. British paramountcy would terminate on August 15 and real paramountcy would then commence.

Mr. Gandhi referred to the paramountcy of the Kashmiris. They had one language, one culture and so far as he could see, they were one people. He could not distinguish readily between a Kashmiri Hindu and a Kashmiri Muslim.

He had the good fortune to read what was euphemistically called the Treaty of Amritsar, but which in reality was a deed of sale. He supposed it would be dead on August 15. The seller was the then

British Governor-General and Maharaja Gulab Singh, the buyer. The treaty going, would the State revert to the British and therefore to England? If to India to which party?

He held that without going into the intricacies of law which he had no right to dilate upon, common sense dictated that the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Kashmir and Jammu. He hoped that the question would be decided between the two dominions, the Maharaja Saheb and the Kashmiris. If the four could come to a joint decision, much trouble would be saved. After all Kashmir was a big State, it had the greatest strategic value perhaps all over India.—API.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 7 August 1947.

KR-346

M. Ikramullah¹ to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

No. 32

KARACHI,
15 August 1947

Your telegram of the 12th.² The Government of Pakistan agree to have a Standstill Agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir for the continuance of the existing arrangement pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreements.³

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

¹Foreign Secretary, Government of Pakistan.

²KR-342.

³On 26 August, the Standstill Agreement was signed. See the *Pakistan Times*, 28 August 1947.

KR-347

*Janak Singh to Abdur Rab Nishtar**Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2*

No. B/50

SRINAGAR,
15 August 1947

Reference my telegram No. B/530 of 14th¹ asking for rescinding orders regarding hoisting Pakistan Flag on post offices in the absence of Standstill Agreement of which copies were also sent to Telepost Karachi, Post Master General Lahore and Superintendent Post Offices Srinagar. No reply received but flags hoisted all the same.² This has been resented by various common spies [communities?] and the situation has become tense. Request order lowering of the Flag immediately failing which untoward events beyond control of the Government may lead to undesirable results. Formal detailed protest regarding the whole question being forwarded separately.

[JANAK SINGH]

¹KR-343.²In fact, three flags were hoisted: the Indian flag, the National Conference flag and the Pakistan flag. There were about 2,000 persons present when the Pakistan flag was hoisted. See KR-348.

KR-348

*Jan Muhammad¹ to Gulam Mohamad²**F. 784/219-4*SRINAGAR,
16 Aug[ust] 1947

Dear Brother,

Hope that you must have reached that place safe and sound and being too busy with the ceremonies which are unprecedented in the history of India, you did not care to write a letter. Well, you have got enough of excuses and everybody can justify you for this.

On the very day when you left this place for Karachi, Ram Chandra Kak, the ex-Premier of this State, received a sealed letter from His Highness forcing him to resign.³ He received this news with a great shock. Maharaja disgraced him much. First of all, it was Monday, he

could have sent him the orders on Sunday even, secondly as soon as he took his seat in his office, he received the letter and he at once told the *Jamadar* to get his car which to his great misfortune had already left. Then the *Jamadar*, out of necessity, got another car for him in which he left for good and for ever. Had he hesitated and not left the office at once, people would have hooted him much. He is at Gulmarg now. On his way from Tangmarg to Gulmarg, people addressed him as *Rama hoon*⁴ and with other nicknames. Some of the National Conference workers have been released and some leaders are yet in the jail. Muhammad Abdullah will be released on 17th of this month.⁵

P[and]t Jawaharlal Nehru is also coming here on the same date for about four hours by air. People in general have rejoiced much at the retirement of Kak. Yesterday was very conspicuous. There were three kinds of flag: Pakistan flag, Indian flag and National Conference flag. About two thousand people gathered round our mosque when the Pakistan Flag was hoisted. All the Muslim officials were present. There have been some stray quarrels here and there. But on the whole, it was all peaceful. So far about the politics of Kashmir.

Coming to the homeside, I may congratulate you that our sister has been bestowed with a daughter. She is in good health and the baby too is lovely.

Rest O.K. *Salaam* from all of us to you. What about your employment? Please do write [to] me at your earliest convenience.

Yours,
JAN MUHAMMAD

^{1&2}Kashmiri leaders.

³See Annex III to KR-341.

⁴Rama, the wolf

⁵He was released on 29 September 1947. See KR-353, note 2.

KR-349

Ministry of Communications, New Delhi, to Sri Prakasa¹

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

NEW DELHI,
17 August 1947

Following from Prime Minister Kashmir about P & T arrangements in the State.

Begins: Kashmir Government desire arrangements with Indian Dominion Union pending decision whether to have own arrangements or

Standstill Agreement with anyone out of the two dominions. *Ends.*

It was decided by Partition Committee that until States decided their attitude definitely in relation to accession, *status quo* about control of P & T office should obtain. Hence P & T offices were allowed to be controlled by PMG West Punjab Circle with effect from the 15th August. Now that Kashmir Government desire that control should rest with Indian Dominion for the present staff belonging to Indian Posts and Telegraphs being posted to Kashmir State in place of those who have opted for Pakistan.

Kindly contact Sardar Nishtar and request him to issue orders to PMG West Punjab to transfer control of all P & T offices telephone exchanges and wireless station in Kashmir State to PMG East Punjab.²

[MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION, INDIA]

¹The Indian High Commissioner passed on a copy of the telegram to M. Ikramullah on 18 August 1947.

²Dewan Chamanlal, in his note of 23 August written to Vallabhbhai Patel, protested that the Kashmir State did not seem to realise the full implications of the transfer of postal and telegraphic arrangements from Pakistan to India. See Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 36.

KR-350

M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

IMMEDIATE
No. 63

KARACHI,
20 August 1947

Your telegram B/50¹ of 15th addressed Ministry Communications regarding hoisting flags received on the 19th. No instructions were issued regarding hoisting flags on post offices in Kashmir State. Seems some misunderstanding. Understand flags have already been removed.

2. With regard Standstill Agreement please refer to Foreign telegram No. 32 dated 15th August 1947 repeated below:

[See KR-346]

3. High Commissioner India at Karachi informed us on the 18th that you sent following telegram to India Government about P & T arrangements.

[See KR-349]

In view of the existence of Standstill Agreement between Kashmir State and Pakistan Government this telegram to India is not understood particularly as Kashmir State posts and telegraphs must pass through West Punjab.

4. In future please address communication on all subjects to Foreign Karachi.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

¹KR-347.

KR-351

Janak Singh to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

SRINAGAR,
22 August 1947

Reference your telegram of 16th August¹ accepting Standstill Agreement. Kindly inform all oil companies concerned and local authority that arrangements for sending kerosine and petrol under bond to Jammu and Kashmir under former agreement with British India [which still] holds good so that there may be no hold up in petrol and kerosine supplies to Jammu and Kashmir which would cause serious complications, are confirmed will be appreciated [sic].

[JANAK SINGH]

¹KR-346. The date given here presumably is the date of receipt of the telegram sent on 15 August.

KR-352

Hamidullah Khan to Liaquat Ali Khan

FOA, SA (4)-6/2

PERSONAL/SECRET

SRINAGAR,
23 August 1947

Will you kindly refer to my telegram of the 22nd August 1947¹ on the subject of Indian States Department set up in Kashmir.

2. As you know with the lapse of paramountcy on the 15th August 1947, the Kashmir Residency representing the Political Department of the late Crown Representative ceased to exist in Kashmir, as in all other States. A corollary of this change was the abolition of the Political

Agency, Gilgit, which was a subordinate Agency of the Kashmir Residency.

3. Since this change took place a number of allegations have been brought to my notice by certain members of public, which I have thoroughly scrutinised and take the opportunity of laying before you, as they might eventually jeopardise the interests of Pakistan State, the building of which is going to be an uphill task.

KASHMIR RESIDENCY

4. On the abolition of the Kashmir Residency the States Department of the Government of India have opened a small office in Kashmir by retaining a few office assistants from the late Residency Office until the Kashmir State is able to decide its course for action.

5. A retired Under Secretary of the External Affairs Department of the Government of India Mr. I. S. Gonsalves has been appointed as Officer-in-Charge of this Department. The Department is known as the Indian States Department, Kashmir, and the designation of the Officer-in-Charge is States Department Officer, Kashmir.

6. In the beginning we were under the impression that this Department was to represent both the Dominion Governments until the Kashmir State decided with whom she was going to line up, but we in Kashmir were greatly surprised when the staff retained for this new Department from the late Residency staff was carefully selected from Hindu officials, with only one Muslim who has been deputed on a junior out-post job about 100 miles away from the headquarters. There was more than a dozen experienced and senior officials available from the late Residency and Gilgit Agency staffs but their right and claims were totally ignored. Our surprise and doubts had no bounds when on the 22nd August 1947 the officials retained in this Department were made to swear an oath of allegiance to the Dominion of India. This we are at a loss to understand. How could members of a Joint Department of the two Dominions functioning in Kashmir swear their allegiance to a particular Dominion when the decision of the Kashmir State itself is in a melting pot.

7. The Indian States Department is doing its utmost to devise ways and means so that the Kashmir State may be made to join the Union of India. Mr. I. S. Gonsalves, the States Department Officer, has been in Kashmir for more than ten years in the Kashmir Residency in the past, and is hand in glove with the Dogra and Pandit high officials of the State. Until May 1947 he was in the External Affairs Department at Delhi and it is reliably understood that Pandit J. L. Nehru deputed him to Kashmir after settling all these details with him and he holds

promise for a high secretariat job in Delhi when his mission in Kashmir is fulfilled.

8. The Kashmir Residency left behind valuable property worth more than a lakh in Srinagar and Gulmarg. This includes a large number of good typewriters, duplicators, cycles, fire-proof almirahs and safes, stationery, furniture and silver and other cutlery and superior china crockery. A large number of these articles is being misappropriated by the Head of the Department with the connivance of his Hindu officials, and the remaining articles are being disposed of among friends and relatives. A few articles will, however, be sold by auction to serve as an eyewash. Most of the articles thus misappropriated would have been an asset for the Pakistan Government which must be short of such things [words missing] duplicators and cycles, etc.

9. Those of the officials of the Residency who have opted to serve in Pakistan are being victimised by the Indian States Department Officer and his staff. Proposals about their future are being made without even consulting them and a large number of the 4th grade Muslim Government servants who had elected to serve in Pakistan and were prepared to serve anywhere in Pakistan have been served with notices for termination of their services against their will. This is entirely against the rules said to have been made by the Governor-General in Council in July last. Why should permanent Muslim officials who have opted for Pakistan be forcibly retired unless Pakistan Government refuses to employ them?

10. Another feature of the last day of the Kashmir Residency has been that temporary Muslim officials holding appointments against permanent vacancies were turned out on the last day and junior Hindu officials holding purely temporary jobs were made permanent in the vacancies thus made. This has greatly hit a number of Muslim officials. Adverse remarks were intentionally made against their names at the eleventh hour to justify the wrong action.

GILGIT AGENCY

11. In Gilgit Agency the position has been still worse. One absolutely new and three other working wireless transmitting plants have been handed over to the Kashmir Government free of all charges or on very nominal price. These sets should have been taken into account in the division of assets.

12. The Gilgit Agency *Toshakhana* was well-known for a very large number of fine carpets that it possessed. There were also about fifty good typewriters at Gilgit. Most of these articles have been handed over to the Kashmir State without any price. A large number of carpets

has been misappropriated by the British officers who were in charge of the show at Gilgit and they have despatched them to their shippers. A few Muslim officials who tried to check them from this loot have been victimised in various ways and adverse remarks made in their service records.

13. You will, therefore, find that the Britishers who are in league with the Congress have played their last trick in Kashmir and are trying to please the Kashmir State in many ways.

My humble suggestions in this respect are:

- a. If the new Indian States Department set up in Kashmir represents both the Dominion Governments then a complete change in the personnel employed should be effected immediately. The Officer-in-Charge must be a Muslim with at least two senior Muslim officials.
- b. If the Department in question represents the Dominion of India only then the Pakistan Dominion should also at once set up a rival office in Kashmir.
- c. Pakistan Government should at once depute an officer to report on the property which is being misused and misappropriated.
- d. Officials of the late Residency and Gilgit Agency who have opted to serve in Pakistan should not be served with notices for termination of their services unless they are not actually required by Pakistan Government.
- e. The adverse remarks made against Muslim officials of these Departments after they had declared to serve in Pakistan should be ignored as they were made out of vengeance with the connivance of Hindu officials.

14. As the questions involved were of considerable importance I have ventured to bother you with this rather long letter and hope to be excused.

15. The Muslims of Kashmir wish all success to Pakistan and pray for the long life of their Quaid-i-Azam and his worthy Deputy.

[HAMIDULLAH KHAN]

¹See FOA, SA (4)-6/2. Not printed.

KR-353

Hasan Ali Khan¹ to Abdur Rab Nishtar

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

GARHI HABIBULLAH,
23 August 1947

Reliable information Sheikh Abdullah release² on Pandit Nehru's visit Kashmir. He will suggest joining Indian Union either through referendum or otherwise. Both courses dangerous to Muslim interests. Franchise standard very high, excludes mostly Muslim population. Muslim Conference solicits League's help.

HASAN ALI KHAN

¹A Muslim League member of the NWFP Legislative Assembly.

²He was released on 29 September. See the *Pakistan Times*, 30 September 1947. He had tendered a "qualified apology" to the Maharaja on 26 September pleading that the "regrettable happenings of the past" had "been created by interested people in order to achieve their own ends". See Karan Singh, *Heir Apparent: An Autobiography*, Delhi, 1982, 81-2.

KR-354

*Publicity Secretary,¹ Muslim Conference, Kashmir,
to Liaquat Ali Khan*

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

SRINAGAR,
23 August 1947

Local Congress newspaper *Nawayug* today's issue forecasts Kashmir definitely joining Indian Union. Writes that since new Premier assumed office Government never doubted advisability joining Union but owing various reasons especially decision Punjab Boundary Commission made no announcement. Now that Gurdaspur divided and Pathankot gone to India, Kashmir Government's worries over. Paper quotes his New Delhi Correspondent that Indian Union intends constructing railway line between Kathua and Pathankot and Kashmir Government constructing new road between Srinagar and Jammu for which survey already made.

[PUBLICITY SECRETARY]

¹G. Mohamed. Also see KR-355.

KR-355

*G. Mohamed to Liaquat Ali Khan**FOA, SA (4)-6/2*

GULAM MOHIDIN & SON,
SRINAGAR,
25 August 1947

Dear Hon'ble Liaquat Ali Khan,

You will be pleased to remember when you visited Srinagar in 1944, I had the privilege of arranging transport etc. for your family under the instruction of Quaid-i-Azam. After that I had a chance to meet you for [a] few minutes last year in the house of Khan Iftikhar Husain of Mamdot at Lahore. I flew to New Delhi only last month on the 17th to offer personally my humble felicitations to Quaid-i-Azam. I also attempted to meet your goodself for the same purpose but I was told by your Ass[istan]t Secretary Mr. Wazir Ali and your P. A. Mr. Sufi that you were extremely busy and that there was very little chance of my being able to get an interview with you. Still I had the good fortune to meet you at Quaid-i-Azam's house when I was coming out of his room after meeting him.¹ I met there Hon'ble Ghulam Mohammed also who knows me and my father very well.

I have been off and on keeping Quaid-i-Azam informed about the political developments in this place and now that he must be extremely busy and as you are now directly concerned with such affairs I have taken the liberty of writing to you direct and beg to enclose herewith a report to which, in spite of your multifarious duties, I have no doubt you will be good enough to give your personal consideration. I have before this also conveyed to you telegraphically a newspaper report² suggesting that Kashmir is joining Hindustan. I sent this telegram under the name of Publicity Secretary Muslim Conference.

I have assured Quaid-i-Azam of my humble services in whatever form these can be used by Government. If, therefore, you approve I shall deem it a privilege to keep you informed from time to time about political conditions in this place as I consider that Kashmir is an important item

from all points of view.³

With respectful regards,

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

¹G. Mohamed met Jinnah on 18 July 1947. See Ahmed Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam*, 85.

²KR-354.

³On 25 August Hamidullah Khan and Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf in a joint statement warned that in case the Kashmir Government "decides to join India Union the State Muslims will be compelled to resist the move". See the *Pakistan Times*, 26 August 1947.

Enclosure to KR-355

Note by All-Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference

FOA, SA(4)-6/2

[*Extract*]

[25 August 1947]

RETIREMENT OF RAMCHANDRA KAK

The retirement of P[andi]t Ram Chandra Kak came suddenly though not surprisingly.¹ It was expected as the rumours were afloat even about two months before this that there were serious differences between the Maharaja and Kak on the issue of joining this or that Dominion and it is believed that Kak favoured Maharaja to declare independence, and if it was inevitable to join either of the Dominions, he (the Maharaja) would join Pakistan. The Maharaja, on the other hand, is believed to have been favouring joining Hindustan. Kak, it is said, was realistic and he fully realised the implications and difficulties of joining Hindustan. However, many who did not like Kak, believed that he was doing this in order to save his skin as in case the Maharaja joined Hindustan he had to release Sheikh Abdullah and bring him and his party to power which naturally meant the end of Kak. Anyhow, whatever the motive of Kak it is agreed that he was standing in the way of the Maharaja to federate this State with the Hindustan Union. The crisis seemed to have come on this issue resulting in the discharge of Kak. Other factors responsible for this are also believed to have been the strong hostility of Dogras against this Kashmiri Pandit and they intrigued and manoeuvred and brought about his exit. In this, it is said, the *guru* of the Maharaja, a *swami* who wields immense influence on the Maharaja and who is rightly described as Rasputin, has taken the largest part.

AFTER THE RETIREMENT OF KAK

As soon as Kak retired, the whole policy went through a drastic

change. The National Conferencites, who till then had been kept under check, were given free license and they started their *goondaism*. Their detenues started coming out of the jails and the Government started negotiations with them. It is believed, and it is a fact, that they have approached Sh. Abdullah and are negotiating with him. They have cancelled the warrants that were pending against such persons who were for all these sixteen months since the Quit Kashmir agitation of Sh. Abdullah started, working outside Kashmir. They are now in Srinagar and taking part in these negotiations. Bak[h]shi G[h]ulam Moham[m]ed, the Acting President of the National Conference, who was also running after the Congress leaders for all these months, has been called and it is believed that he has been called with the set purpose of bringing influence on Sh. Abdullah to declare unconditionally for Hindustan. In short, the Government and the National Conference are intriguing and any time an announcement is expected declaring Kashmir joining Hindustan. The Government has started harassing such elements as are against the National Conference. They have placed pre-censorship on *Daily Hamdard*, a local Urdu paper, widely circulated and owned by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz who is pursuing generally pro-League and anti-Congress policy. He himself is radical democrat. Another English weekly, the *Kashmir Times*, which is also a staunch critic of the National Conference, has received a warning. It will be interesting to note that both these papers wrote nothing against the Government or published any such matter which could be considered least objectionable. That, in short, shows the present policy of appeasing the National Conference who, only months back, wanted the Maharaja to quit. The National Conference has also undergone a radical change in their policy and they, now themselves openly in their own paper, repudiate the Quit Kashmir slogan and interpret it to mean only "Quit Autocracy". At one place, their workers went so far as to lodge a complaint with the police against some Muslim Conferencites that they had raised "seditious" slogans as *Dogra Raj Murdabad*. This reciprocal trend is a point to what the Kashmir Government intend to do and how they want to use Sh. Abdullah and his followers to stab the Musalmans in the back.

KASHMIR GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PAKISTAN

As to what the Kashmir Government thinks of Pakistan and what their intentions are with regard to their future policy—either to join Pakistan or Hindustan—will be explained by the following few facts:

HOISTING OF PAKISTAN FLAG ON POST OFFICES

The local Superintendent of the Post Offices had received orders

from the Postmaster General (PMG) that on the 15th of August he should hoist Pakistan Flag on all the post office buildings. When the Kashmir Govt. learnt about this, they sent their Inspector General Police (IGP) and other police officers and bullied and intimidated the Superintendent of Post Offices, and he was compelled to refer the matter to his PMG. The Kashmir Government also approached the Pakistan Govt. requesting them not to hoist the flag.² The Superintendent, however, received instructions from the PMG to hoist the flag which he did on the 15th at about 10.30 in the morning. The Prime Minister himself had approached the Superintendent and written him a letter to desist from hoisting the flag. When the flag was hoisted, the Kashmir Government sent alarming telegrams to the Pakistan Government that there was danger of demonstrations etc. and "the situation may get out of control" if the flags were not removed at once. This was so mischievous and false that it is difficult to expect any civilised Govt. to stoop to such meanness unless they are maddened and blinded by prejudices [as] our Government is. What actually happened was that as soon as the Musalmans heard of the flag having been hoisted they came in thousands and saluted the flag and nowhere there was any untoward incident.³ But the PMG, sitting as he did about 400 miles far from this place, must have been upset and he ordered the Superintendent to remove the flag which was done the next day i.e. 16th August at about noon. The Government was so keen to give maximum publicity to this news that the flag had been removed, that the Prime Minister approached through his Publicity Officer every newspaper and asked them to give this news in their papers which was done by them. The Superintendent Post Offices must have sent a full report to his PMG.

NEWS BROADCAST FROM PAKISTAN BROADCASTING SERVICE

In Anantnag, the second largest town after Srinagar, the local authorities have ordered that on all radios belonging to Town Area Committee and *Panchayat* news must not be relayed which come from Pakistan Broadcasting Service.

HARASSMENT OF MUSLIM LEAGUERS AND MUSLIM VISITORS

Those who hoisted Pakistan flags on the 15th are threatened and wherever National Conferencites interfered (fortunately they interfered very little) no police protection was given to the aggrieved party, and on the contrary they were threatened.

There has been, this year, a great influx of Muslim visitors in this place. They are mostly from the Frontier and the Punjab. Their presence in this place has greatly upset the Hindu Government and they cannot

see so many Muslims going about and their cars with either Pakistan or Muslim League flags running. On the 15th August, a grand Pakistan dinner was arranged in Srinagar where most of the prominent Muslim visitors were present. This Muslim fraternization on this day was too much for the bigoted Government and like this too wherever these Muslim visitors move they carry with them Muslim League ideas. That is natural and beyond this they take absolutely no part in local politics. But our Government could not keep quiet. They issued a communique warning (though the warning was mild and clever) the visitors not to take part in the local politics. This naturally was directed against the Muslim visitors and none else, for when Jai Prakash Narayan, Aruna Asaf Ali, Kripalani, Nehru and last of all Gandhi came, their actual and factual interference was not interference but something else, only because they were Hindus.

NEWS AND VIEWS FAVOURING KASHMIR JOINING HINDUSTAN

The Kashmir Government has also started this tactic. In a local Hindu paper which is believed to be expressing this time the official views, a front page news was flashed that the Kashmir Government had decided to join Hindustan.⁴ In this, the paper quoted its New Delhi Correspondent saying that India[n] Govt. were contemplating the construction of a railway line between Kathua (in Jammu Province) and Pathankot which has now gone to India after the partition of Gurdaspur. A substance of this news item was telegraphed to the Hon'ble Liaquat Ali Khan on the same day the paper was issued. Similarly the other papers which favour the present Government have started a subtle propaganda of analysing the advantages of joining Hindustan and disadvantages of joining Pakistan. There is no doubt that all these are sponsored by the Government. The Hindu members of the National Conference are busy going about and propagating the idea of Kashmir joining Hindustan.

SH. ABDULLAH AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS PAKISTAN OR HINDUSTAN

There are divergent views about Sh. Abdullah's attitude towards Kashmir joining Hindustan or Pakistan. Sh. Abdullah is still in prison and as stated above the Government have approached him and negotiations are going on with him. It is believed that his release is a matter of days.

Some believed that Sh. Abdullah is over-burdened with Congress favours and the personal interest shown in him by P[andi]t Nehru and to the extent that he (Nehru) went to help him will leave no choice for him but to do whatever he is asked to do. It is believed that he would,

therefore, unconditionally favour Kashmir joining Hindustan. To bring about a dramatic and safest means for this, there are again many views. It is said that as soon as he will be released, he will be taken to New Delhi and from there he will come with some concessions. It is also said that his release will synchronise with the visit of P[andit] Nehru. It is also said that he will be released and simultaneously the Government will declare its accession to Hindustan and will also declare some reforms bringing Sh. Abdullah and his party in power. Sh. Abdullah will thus engage the people with the working of the reforms and would support the Hindustan idea. Some again believe that he will ask the Government to declare its accession to Hindustan and then release him so that he can tell the people that he is not responsible for it as he was in the jail and that the Maharaja has done it.

The other view about Sh. Abdullah's attitude is that he has refused to commit and he has told them that he would consult his colleagues and study the outside atmosphere. This, it is believed, is because the Sheikh fully realises that the public opinion has tremendously changed and that if he takes a wrong decision it might mean his own doom. He is more particular to safeguard his own leadership. There is no doubt that in his own party there is a great difference of opinion on the issue of Pakistan and if Sh. Abdullah were to face this issue he would encounter a lot of opposition. As such [it] is believed that Sh. Abdullah will think hundred times before deciding to support the idea of Kashmir joining Hindustan.

The third view is that as a *via media* Sh. Abdullah might decide for Kashmir remaining independent.

So far [as] the Kashmir Government view is concerned, they desire from their heart to join Hindustan and all the facts given above go to show clearly their intentions, but they too are faced with certain difficulties. They apprehend trouble if not so much in the Kashmir Province but some in the Jammu Province (there is already trouble in Poonch where some arrests have been made and civil disobedience has been started by the Muslim Conference). There may be other factors of administration, communication etc. which form difficult problems to solve. So, the Government is also faced with a dilemma. If they declare independence, they are thus making no contribution and then the policy of the ex-Premier Kak is upheld. In short, the position at present is most uncertain and highest secrecy is being maintained and though the indications of the intentions of the Government are clear beyond doubt yet nothing can definitely be said.

PAKISTAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE KASHMIR GOVERNMENT

Whereas the Kashmir Government has acted with such prejudice and meanness, as is clear from the Pakistan flag hoisting affair on the

post offices and other facts given above, the attitude of the Pakistan Government is most appeasing and conciliatory. The Kashmir Government asked for removing the Pakistan flag from the post offices and the Pakistan Government at once agreed. The Punjab police at one point had entered in [sic for from] Jhelum District in [to] the State territories to safeguard something there and as soon as the Kashmir Govt. brought this to the notice of the Punjab Government the latter at once regretted and undertook to remove the force. The Kashmir Government asked the Punjab Government to protect their properties in Lahore and other places in Pakistan territories and they were at once assured of this. There may be several other instances of co-operation and appeasement of the Kashmir Government by the Pakistan Govt. The Pakistan Govt. has also on the request of Kashmir Government kept in abeyance the order of transfer of some Kashmiri Hindu employees of the post offices who had elected to serve in Hindustan. It may be noted that out of 800 employees of the post offices in Kashmir circle only about 200 have elected service in Hindustan. The rest have elected to serve in Pakistan. How far this appeasement and lenient policy of the Pakistan Government is correct, in view of the hostile policy of the Kashmir Government to do whatever they like? The Pakistan Govt. is showing magnanimity and real statesmanship but on the other hand the Govt. they are to deal with are hardly reciprocal and in fact not fully advanced and civilised to appreciate this high standard of a civilised Government and to reciprocate this most friendly gesture. They, on the contrary, seem to take undue advantage of this gesture.

ATTITUDE OF QUAID-I-AZAM, MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PAKISTAN,
PAST AND PRESENT TOWARDS MUSALMANS OF KASHMIR IN
CONTRAST WITH THE ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS AND ITS
REPERCUSSIONS

Quaid-i-Azam has declared his policy towards the States a number of times—that they can join this or that Dominion or remain independent.⁵ He has not even mentioned geographical contiguity, which a State should at least consider when joining this or that Dominion. It follows, therefore, that Kashmir can join Hindustan and Quaid-i-Azam cannot have any objection to it, though geographically Kashmir may be contiguous to Pakistan. Not only that, but even though Kashmir is a nerve centre of defence of Pakistan.

The policy of the Muslim League has all along been that of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of the States.

In contrast to this policy of Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League, the Congress has directly intervened in the affairs of the States, particularly

that of Kashmir. Sh. Abdullah started his "Quit Kashmir" agitation last year and if left to his and that of his party's strength the movement would have died in weeks, not even in months. Sh. Abdullah now counts only in the Kashmir Province and that also from Baramula to Anantnag, an area of 60 miles, but of course the most important and the most thickly populated area in the whole valley. The *goondaism* and fascist methods of his followers had very much brought him down in the public and he had lost a great deal of his influence. In actual fact the trouble in the whole valley was also confined, after the arrest of Sh. Abdullah, to a few *mohallas* of the city in Srinagar and a little trouble in Anantnag. So, within a few days of the start of the movement, it fizzled out. But who kept it alive? Nehru and the Congress. Nehru came twice, first time he staged a drama on the Kohala bridge when he diverted the attention of the whole world towards Kashmir and second time he marched into the city triumphantly and conducted himself the defence of Sh. Abdullah. After him, he sent Jai Prakash Narayan, Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali, Congress President Mr. Kripalani and last of all the last weapon in the Congress armoury the Mahatma himself. Besides, money flowed regularly for all these months and the movement was kept going and finally brought to a very successful end. The success has been brought not by the local strength of Sh. Abdullah but by the vast resources of Congress and by their direct intervention in the affairs of the State.

The Muslim League, on the other hand, has remained absolutely disinterested and quiet, excepting for an occasional editorial note in *Dawn* or *Pakistan Times* and sometime a statement by Quaid-i-Azam. Incidentally, the Muslim Conference, the counterpart of the Muslim League in the State, also suffered and its leaders were also kept in detention without trial for nine months (they are still in detention) for a very minor and technical offence but not a single leader of the Muslim League, even from provinces, not to talk of any top-ranking leader, came to ask their welfare. With the result, the Muslim Conference morale went very low, and it went into disruption and what it had gained before the "Quit Kashmir" agitation due to Muslim League successes in the Punjab and elsewhere were all lost to it and it became a completely dead and third rate political party. But what the position is now? Fortunately the establishment of Pakistan has again changed the hearts of the people and with all its shortcomings the Muslim Conference can succeed to rally the people round itself if only they have some outside support. That too, however, is not the immediate issue now. To organise the Muslim Conference and to plan for it is [a]

matter of long drawn policy. We are at this time faced with a most important and critical situation and the only issue that counts this time is as to where our State is going. The National Conference Musalmans are triumphant and they now talk in the terms of a party which is victorious after a "war" and dictates its own terms. They are going so far as to suggest that Quaid-i-Azam should mend his previous attitude and should issue a statement upholding the "Quit Kashmir" slogan and placing the same interpretation on the Treaty of Amritsar as Gandhiji has done. Then, they say, they will consider helping Muslim Conference to persuade Maharaja to join Pakistan. This is all tall talk but this shows their trend of mind. If an attempt is made to convert them they put forward the argument as to what the Muslim League has done for them—at least for the Muslim Conference people who were their own followers. They argue that the Muslim League stands for the sovereignty of the rulers whereas the Congress stands for the sovereignty of the people.

As far as the Muslim Conference followers are concerned though much they resisted to believe that the Muslim League was disinterested in them, yet they are now openly giving expression to their feelings of disgust. They feel as if they are left in the lurch and that the Pakistan Government has absolutely no interest in them—at least now for her own sake, when such an important issue is there as to whether Kashmir should join Pakistan or Hindustan. In the latter case they clearly see that the defences of Pakistan will be jeopardised and it will be pocketed in between and encircled from all its strategic frontiers. At this important time, the absolute silence of the Pakistan Government or her leaders has terribly demoralised the Pakistan Musalmans here, and there is now hardly any person on whose lips there is not this note of disaffection.

INTERNAL COMMUNAL SITUATION

The communal situation is so far satisfactory but [a] large number of Sikh and Hindu refugees are pouring into the State with the connivance of the Kashmir Govt. They are becoming a menace to Muslims here whom they threaten with dire consequences. In face of these bloodthirsty Sikhs, the savage Dogra Army, the hostile Government, and last of all our own dissension, the Muslims are feeling very insecure and frustrated.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the situation as at present demands most immediate attention of the Pakistan Government and her leaders to allay the fears of Musalmans of Kashmir and assure them that they are not forlorn and forgotten. The Muslim Conference is faced with a grim situation

and they want to act before the Maharaja decides to join Hindustan as, if he once decides, nothing can be done. But what will be the attitude of the Pakistan Government and her leaders? That is not certain. If the Musalmans of Jammu and Kashmir fight a battle they will be fighting in fact the battle of Pakistan and it is essential that Pakistan should help them in their struggle. It is also most important that the Pakistan Government must send some top-ranking leader here so that the Musalmans here feel encouraged that they have some body at their back. If, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League does not act, Kashmir might be lost to them and the responsibility for this would be theirs.

¹See KR-341.

²See KR-343 and KR-347.

³On 26 August, the State troops opened fire on a large crowd at Bagh which had gathered to witness a flag-hoisting ceremony. See the *Pakistan Times*, 31 August 1947.

⁴See KR-354.

⁵See KR-332.

KR-356

M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

No. 73

KARACHI,

26 August 1947

Reference your telegram August 19th.¹ Instructions issued to all concerned to continue supply of kerosine and petrol under bond to Kashmir.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

¹KR-351. The date of issue shown therein appears different.

KR-357

*Postmaster General, Lahore, to Director General Posts
& Telegraphs, Pakistan, Karachi*

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

LAHORE,

Undated [August 1947]

Following from SP Jhelum. *Begins.* Wazir (District Magistrate) orders 28 August (in view of circumstances prevailing Poonch *illaqa*) notification under Jammu and Kashmir Defence Rules to submit to him for censor any telegram/telegraphic message concerning political situation *illaqa* received by Poonch to Jhelum area for transmission or transmitted or delivered. Further desires disclosures forthwith such messages transmitted since 16th August. *Ends.* Previously such censorship was being referred to Resident, Kashmir. Presume the Hon'ble Minister for States Relations Dept. is authority concerned. Wire orders.

KR-358

Nasira Siddiqui to M. A. Jinnah

FOA, S. 4 (9)

[Original in Urdu]

14 LAKEVIEW HOTEL,
SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
Undated [August 1947]

Most respected and revered Hazrat Quaid-i-Azam Sahib

May your fortune prosper!

Assalaamo 'Alaikum,

I beg to encroach upon your precious time because of certain important political matters. Before stating why I am bothering you, let me introduce myself. Your humble servant, as member of the Working Committee of the Punjab Muslim League has, during a short period of seven years, in connection with the political struggle, by God's grace and under your leadership, performed relief work in the disturbances in Bihar, Sind, and especially Punjab. Besides, I have had the distinction of outdoing all my sisters by staying in the Frontier¹ for three

weeks each time, to take part in the Civil Disobedience Movement and the Referendum.

Regarding it as my duty, I came to the Kashmir Valley, with the consent of my local leader, to do a bit of work for the Kashmiri Muslims² in collaboration with the Muslim Conference. I met many members and workers of the Conference and ascertained the situation. Unfortunately, as you might know, there are two factions of the Muslim Conference, each claims to be the Muslim Conference. Having seen both sides of the coin, I tell you what I found. Mir Waiz Maulvi Yusuf leads one faction which has a few Working Committee men. Maulvi Yusuf is a reserved and quiet gentleman, unfamiliar with political manipulation; though being a religious scholar, he has considerable influence over people who trust him and not only listen intently to his speeches but also act accordingly, albeit only in so far as religion is concerned. He is not regarded as a political leader; the Muslim Conference followers ardently desire a political leader who can match up to Sheikh Abdullah and, like him, can resort to hooliganism, if need be. Maulvi Yusuf's party does do some work and have an office, if not a proper one. The other party includes men who are not members of Working Committee except, perhaps, for one or two. They are gossip-mongers with an axe to grind. No one trusts them; they have no office, no programme, no propaganda apparatus. Their leader is Ch. Hamid[ullah] whom his own party does not trust. He is given to issuing statements, not seldom contradictory, rather indiscriminately. A few persons, not members of the Working Committee, get together and hold meetings. I could not find more than a few sincere workers. This is the state of affairs in the Muslim Conference which failed to capitalize on the opportunity provided by the incarceration of the National Conference leadership, of strengthening itself. Given the state of public awareness here, not much effort is required to make the Muslim Conference a strong party. The people generally are more educated here than those in the NWFP; most are staunch Pakistanis but are dispirited because of bad leadership. The National Conference, however, is a well-organized party. There are many in it who support Pakistan but are not prepared to turn their backs on Sheikh Abdullah, even if they have to go to hell for him, because the Muslim Conference is doing precious little work.

There is bit of change in atmosphere due to Prime Minister Kak's resignation. Rumour in the Muslim Conference circles has it that the Maharaja has telegraphed India as well as Pakistan that Kashmir would

stay neutral, but it is believed that this is mere eyewash and that it has been decided to accede to India. The Maharaja's joining the Indian Constituent Assembly will portend disaster.

It is now imperative that the Muslim Conference begins to work in real earnest, or else all Muslims will be doomed to a sell-out at the hands of a few selfish people. It has become quite clear that without an improved leadership, the Muslim Conference cannot deliver. First of all, both factions of the party should be unified in order to remove the existing obstacles to its work. Thereafter, it should seek to collaborate with the National Conference in the changed situation. Nationalists have almost been eliminated elsewhere and it is now imperative that the National Conference, if it really desires the liberation of Kashmir, must abandon its present course.

I have initiated efforts to unify the two factions by calling small meetings. These efforts will be continued. In my humble view, however, the situation is such that this monumental task is beyond me. It requires an eminent personality who can come to the rescue of the people of Kashmir by beefing up their political organization through helping to install some able leader. For instance, you may kindly depute Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman or Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan. This is a pressing need. People complain bitterly why, even though they are staunch Muslim Leaguers as well as Muslims, the League High Command does not guide and help them, as it ought to, even as the Congress helps the National Conference financially, physically, and through press publicity. Congress leaders also keep visiting here. The League is stinted for funds but it can help by extending us encouragement and sympathy through the press. Why are we being ignored? We fully count on you; Kashmiris are ready to lay down their lives for you.

The people here had requested the Punjab to help out with four or five thousand rupees but there has been no response since there are no sincere workers. In fact, I have advised the people here to raise funds locally. Many a tourist has come to Kashmir and there are several affluent persons here as well. I have started to organize students and women through the Muslim Students Federation and the Muslim Conference Women Committee, respectively. Women are more enthusiastic and it will not take long to organize them. That is all I could do. I beg you once again to send Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman or Raja Saheb. I beg your pardon for taking the liberty to write at length and intrude

on your precious time. Kindly do reply even if it is in a few words.

Deep respects for Miss Jinnah.

Your most obedient servant,

NASIRA SIDDIQUI

[PS] I gather that Sheikh Abdullah is being released from detention on 15 or 16 August.³

¹See Appendix VIII. 61 & VIII. 78, Vol. I, Part II, 371 & 382, respectively.

²Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom (1947-1978)*, Vol. II, 789-90 and 862.

³Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September 1947. See KR-353, note 2.

KR-359

Note by Anonym

FOA, SA (4)-6/2

Undated [August 1947]

REPORT ABOUT KASHMIR

About 600 out of total 800 employees from Kashmir Postal Circle have elected to serve in Pakistan. As such before the 15th of August the DGP [Director General Posts] New Delhi had asked the Sup[erintenden]t Post Offices Kashmir to relieve a certain number of postal employees who had elected to serve India in exchange of the same number that were to come from India. The Sup[erintenden]t passed orders and those who were involved went into a deputation to the Prime Minister Kashmir and persuaded him to request the DGP New Delhi to keep these orders of transfer in abeyance.

The DGP sent a telegram to the Sup[erintenden]t Post Offices Kashmir on the 12th August asking him to keep the orders of transfer in abeyance. He also informed, about this, the Kashmir Prime Minister and also enquired from him whether the Kashmir State would like to be served by Pakistan Postal Services or that of India.

On the 15th August the Kashmir Government wired to DGP New Delhi that they would like to be served by Indian Government.

The High Commissioner for India in Pakistan seems to have communicated this desire of the Kashmir Government to the Pakistan Government¹ and it appears that the Pakistan Government have declined² to accept this position on the plea that the Kashmir Government has requested the Pakistan Government for continuance of the present arrangements.

The DGP New Delhi has thus informed the Kashmir Government about this reply of the Pakistan Government and has made a further suggestion to the Kashmir Government that they should clearly inform the Pakistan Government that they (the Kashmir Government) want to be served by India Government.

The United Press of India has sent a news today from Srinagar that the Kashmir Government is sending its representatives to New Delhi for signing the Instrument of Accession.

Latest news suggests that the Kashmir Government has definitely decided to accede to the Hindustan Union.³

¹See KR-349.

²See KR-350.

³See Enclosure to KR-355.

KR-360

M. L. Qureshi to Abdul Hamid¹

F. 216 (6)-GG/1

5 September 1947

Dear Khan Sahib,

With reference to our conversation over the telephone I enclose a letter (air mail express delivery letter) addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister, Kashmir State, Srinagar, and shall be grateful if you will kindly see that it is despatched to Srinagar and reaches its destination with the least possible delay by air mail.

Thank[ing] you in advance,

Yours sincerely,
M. LATIF QURESHI

¹Post Master, Karachi.

Enclosure to KR-360

E. St. J. Birnie to R. L. Batra

F. 216 (6)-GG/2

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
KARACHI,
5 September 1947

My dear Mr. Batra,

I have conveyed to Quaid-i-Azam His Highness' very kind message

and he is very grateful for the expressions of goodwill communicated to him through you.

Quaid-i-Azam perfectly understands the apprehensions felt by His Highness in view of the present situation and its possible repercussions in Kashmir State. He has, however, asked me to say that a visit to Kashmir later in the year would not be suitable owing to weather conditions and he would prefer to come up on or about the 15th September staying for a fortnight. As you know Quaid-i-Azam's visit is entirely for the purpose of rest and he does not even wish it to be announced and would in fact arrive privately and would like to be taken immediately to any residence which you might very kindly select for him and Miss Fatima Jinnah. The more private the residence the better pleased he would be as he has had a very strenuous time as I am sure you realise and is in need of quiet and rest away from all the arduous duties of the Dominion.

I feel sure that His Highness will wish to help him and I would be most grateful if you would convey the contents of this letter to His Highness and let me know as soon as possible.

As even air mail takes some time perhaps you would very kindly send me a signal.

Thank you very much for your kindness to me in Srinagar and I hope very much that I may have the opportunity of meeting you again.

Yours very sincerely,

E. St. J. BIRNIE

KR-361

E. St. J. Birnie to R. L. Batra

F. 216 (VII)-GG/5

11 September 1947

My dear

I am sending this by hand of Air Commodore Whitley, together with a copy (attached) of my letter of the 5th September,¹ in case with the posts so bad these days my original letter has not yet reached you.

I would be most grateful if a telegraphic communication could be sent as soon as possible giving His Highness' answer to Quaid-i-Azam's

request as time is now so short.

I hope you are well.

E. St. J. BIRNIE

¹Enclosure to KR-360. When Birnie reminded R.L. Batra on 11 September 1947 for a telegraphic reply to this letter, he replied the same day that no such letter was received. See F. 216 (VII)-GG/3-4. Not printed.

KR-362

Vallabhbhai Patel to Baldev Singh¹

NEW DELHI,
13 September 1947

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have received a request from the Kashmir *Darbar* to arrange for the loan of the services of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch for services as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir forces vice Major-General Scott who is retiring.

2. You know the difficulties of the State, and I feel that at this juncture it would be most useful to have an officer of our own Army as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir forces. The officer selected is the son of the Prime Minister of Kashmir, General Janak Singh, and has opted for service with the Indian Dominion. It would be best therefore, to lend his services for a period of three years on condition that, if the State decides to join the other Dominion, Col. Katoch will revert to the Indian Dominion.

3. It is possible that, owing to the fact that the India Command has recently been set up, you might find it difficult to spare Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch.² While it is possible for us to find substitutes, I am doubtful whether Kashmir could get a more suitable person. I would, therefore, request that any such reasons should give way to the overriding consideration of having our own man as Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir State Forces.

YOURS SINCERELY,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 37-8.

²Baldev Singh promised a response within a few days. Ibid., 38. Patel reminded him on 2 October 1947 to assign Col. Kashmir Singh to the State.

KR-363

*R. L. Batra to E. St. J. Birnie**F. 216 (VI)-GG/7*

CHERRY GROVE,
SRINAGAR,
17 September 1947

My dear Mr. Birnie,

Thanks for your letter of 11th September¹ which together with a copy of your letter dated 5th September² I received this morning through Air Commodore Whitley.

In reply to your telegram on the 11th, I wired back immediately that your letter had not been received up to then. The position is the same even now.

I have submitted your letter now received to His Highness and am desired to say that it is with great regret that His Highness in the best interests of every one has to say that the time is not opportune for a visit by the Quaid-i-Azam even though he may wish to come in his personal and private capacity. In addition to the reasons which were mentioned to you when you came here, the feelings of the people have greatly been perturbed by the almost total annihilation of a party of over 200 State subjects,³ though being escorted from Rawalpindi, only as recently as 9th September. In addition, the continued occurrence of deplorable events in the neighbouring Dominions is keeping the people excited. His Highness has, therefore, no alternative but to strongly urge that the visit should not take place this year.⁴

With regards,

Yours sincerely,

R. L. BATRA

Deputy Prime Minister, Kashmir

¹KR-361.

²Enclosure to KR-360.

³According to a report by the local authorities the number of persons killed did not exceed six. Subsequently, stern measures were taken to "round up all suspicious elements" and 25 bad characters arrested. See the *Pakistan Times*, 12 September 1947.

⁴See Annex to KR-379.

KR-364

Hamidullah Khan to Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf

Telegram, FOA, S. 4 (9)

BARAMULA,
17 September 1947

Mirwaiz Muh[amma]d Yusuf care Quaid-i-Azam, Karachi

Regret our several telegrams¹ left unattended with result that Indian Union shortly taking over control Kashmir communication in their hands. Replacement present Superintendent Post Offices for charges of hoisting Pakistan Flag² by Muslim substitute, though meant insult Pakistan Flag had still some consolation to Muslim preponderant population this State. Abrupt order posting admitted Hindu communalist means final death blow Muslim right by India Union. Apparently present Postmaster General Pakistan Lahore not suiting present occasion and lacking administration who also causing dissatisfaction public who are put [to] serious inconveniences various respects. Present neglectful attitude if continues will result harmful Muslims' rights in Kashmir in general and Pakistan particular. Intervene and caise [sic] proper administration by substituting present Postmaster General preferably by Kh. Abdul Rehman or S. N. Ahmad or some other officer fully acquainted with Kashmir politics to safeguard Muslim and public interests.

HAMIDULLAH
President, Muslim Conference

¹Not traceable. However, see Enclosure to KR-355.

²See KR-344 and KR-347.

KR-365

Vallabhbhai Patel¹ to K.G. Neogy²

NEW DELHI,
17 September 1947

My Dear Neogy,

A representative of the Kashmir Government saw me this morning. He came here some days ago and has been stranded there for want of a plane service to Srinagar. I understand that all the planes which were not running on scheduled flights have now been taken over by your Ministry and that is why no service can now be laid on to Srinagar.

I am sure you appreciate the necessity of maintaining communications with Kashmir State, particularly in the present emergency. As things are, air communications are the only ones possible. I would, therefore, suggest that you might arrange, under arrangements with the airways company, which was operating this service previously, to release planes for this purpose. Incidentally, this would also assist you in making arrangements for the non-Muslim refugees stranded in Srinagar. I would suggest that, if you agree, action on these lines may be taken immediately.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 39.

²Minister for Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation in the Nehru Cabinet.

KR-366

Janak Singh to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
20 September 1947

Your telegram 26th August.¹ Despite instructions issued by you report received from State Customs Kohala that one petrol tank bound for Kashmir arrived Pakistan via Kohala on 11th September late in evening but returned next morning. Also salt brought from Rawalpindi by one Mohammad Ashraf Khan shopkeeper Kohala Kashmir side was not allowed to be imported into State. Some trucks allowed to pass exit octroi post Rawalpindi. Premier West Punjab and Deputy Commissioner Rawalpindi were requested 15th September to inform definitely all Pakistan officers of their duty with regard to transport of goods to Kashmir. No reply received from either. Shall be grateful if strict instructions² are issued at once and compliance ensured to stop obstructions of passage of goods etc. bound for Kashmir.

[JANAK SINGH]

¹KR-356.

²On 25 September 1947, Ikramullah telegraphed the West Punjab Premier requesting that safe passage be ensured for Kashmir-bound goods through Kohala. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

KR-367

Vallabhbhai Patel to Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir¹

[NEW] DELHI,
21 September 1947

My Dear Maharaja Sahib,

Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan² met me yesterday and I am glad to learn that Your Highness had decided to appoint him as your Prime Minister. It is a wise choice and I have no doubt that he will be able to handle the affairs of the State in this critical period, firmly and in a statesmanlike manner.

He has discussed with me about the immediate requirements of the State and I have promised him full support and co-operation on our behalf. We fully realise how difficult the situation there is, and I can assure Your Highness that we will do our best to help your State in this critical period. Justice Mehr Chand will convey to you personally the gist of our conversation on all matters affecting the interests of Kashmir.

I have also written a letter to Mr. Batra [R. L. Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir] today on matters on which he had asked for our assistance.

I trust Your Highness is keeping good health.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 40.

²Judge of Punjab High Court who succeeded Janak Singh. See Enclosure 2 to KR-392.

KR-368

Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

GULAB MAHAL,
SRINAGAR (KASHMIR),
26 September 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

Thank you for your letter of 21 September.² I am glad to know that you had a generally satisfactory talk with Justice Mahajan. I trust that

a little further elucidation of the points of view regarding the essential requirements of the moments would result in a satisfactory solution.

As regards communications, R. B. R. L. Batra is writing to you in detail.³

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
HARI SINGH

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 42.

²KR-367.

³KR-390.

KR-369

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel*¹

NEW DELHI,
27 September 1947

My Dear Vallabhbhai,

I am writing to you about Kashmir. I met Mahajan before he went there and had a talk with him. I felt that his approach might not be wholly successful.

2. It is obvious to me from the many reports I have received that the situation there is a dangerous and deteriorating one. The Muslim League in the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The only normal route then is via the Jhelum valley. The Jammu route can hardly be used during winter and air traffic is also suspended. Therefore it is important that something should be done before these winter conditions set in. This means practically by the end of October or, at the latest, the beginning of November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that.

3. I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.

4. Whether this strategy succeeds or not depends upon the forces opposed to it. I rather doubt if the Maharaja and his State forces can meet the situation by themselves and without some popular help. They will be isolated from the rest of India and if their own people go against them, it will be very difficult to meet the situation. Obviously

the only major group that can side with them is the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership. If by any chance that is hostile or even passive, then the Maharaja and his Government become isolated and the Pakistani people will have a relatively free field.

5. It becomes important, therefore, that the Maharaja should make friends with the National Conference so that there might be this popular support against Pakistan. Indeed, it seems to me that there is no other course open to the Maharaja but this : to release Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference leaders, to make a friendly approach to them, seek their co-operation and make them feel that this is really meant, and then to declare adhesion to the Indian Union. Once the State [accedes] to India, it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there is delay in this accession, then Pakistan will go ahead without much fear of consequences, specially when the winter isolates Kashmir.

6. It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession to the Indian Union should take place early. It is equally clear to me that this can only take place with some measure of success after there is peace between the Maharaja and the National Conference and they co-operate together to meet the situation. This is not an easy task; but it can be done chiefly because Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice. At the same time he cannot carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place before them. What this can be in the circumstances I cannot define precisely at the present moment. But the main thing is that the Maharaja should try to gain the goodwill and co-operation of Abdullah. This is the belief, also, of various minorities in Kashmir who have no other support to lean upon. I do not think it is possible for the Maharaja to function for long if no major section of the population supports him. It would be a tragedy if the National Conference remains passive owing to frustration and lack of opportunity.

7. Nobody can guarantee what will happen in this complicated situation. But the course I have suggested seems to me the wisest one and the most likely to produce results. But it is important that there should be no delay. The time element cannot be forgotten and delay itself may cut us off completely from Kashmir owing to the approach of winter.

8. I tried to explain much of this to Mahajan. But I fear he only partly appreciated what I said, I do not know what advice you gave to him. Your advice will naturally go a long way either to the Maharaja

or to Mahajan.

9. At the present moment Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are still in prison. It seems to me very injurious to future developments. Unfortunately the Maharaja cannot make up his mind easily.

10. I hope you will be able to take some action in this matter to force the peace and to turn events in the right direction. We have definitely a great asset in the National Conference provided it is properly handled. It would be a pity to lose this. Sheikh Abdullah has repeatedly given assurances of wishing to co-operate and of being opposed to Pakistan; also to abide by my advice.

11. I would again add that time is the essence of the business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.

Yours sincerely
JAWAHARLAL [NEHRU]

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 45-7.

KR-370

Kashmir Muslims Association to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S. 4 (9)

LAHORE,
30 September 1947

Prime Minister Pak. Govt., Karachi,

Kashmir Muslim leaders entry ban[n]ed in State territory. Muslims ruthlessly butchered in Poonch. Muslims' demand for mixed troops in civil areas rejected by State authorities. Muslims greatly harassed by Dogra atrocities.¹ About one lakh evacuated State territory so far. Armed Sikh gangs pouring in great numbers. Grave consequences apprehended. Kindly intervene.

KASHMIR MUSLIMS ASSOCIATION

¹The Sylhet Branch of Kashmir Muslim Conference had also, in their telegrams of 26 September 1947 to M. A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, expressed concern over police repression against Poonch Muslims and urged help to the victims. See FOA, S. 4 (9). Not printed.

KR-371

*Note by Anonym**FOA, S-6/2**Undated [September 1947]*LIST OF RAIDS FROM THE JAMMU-KASHMIR STATE
INTO THE WEST PUNJAB (SIALKOT DISTRICT)

10.9.47—Local armed Dogra gangs, assisted by Dogra [soldiers] raided various villages in Police Stations Sambarial, Phulkian and Chaprar.

11.9.47—Dogra refugees helped by their relatives from Jammu State attacked 2 Muslim villages in Police Station Phulkian. About 60 Muslims were killed, 12 injured and 11 Muslim girls abducted. About 30 of the raiders were shot dead by the Police.

16.9.47—The road to Jammu was blocked in Police Station Sadar by about 3000 residents of Jammu State. These men were dispersed by Police firing.

16.9.47—The Police picket near village Bhanot on the borders of Police Station Chaprar, was attacked by a Hindu Dogra mob from Jammu State territory. The picket opened fire, but caused no casualties. Three Muslims of a village in Police Station Philaura were killed by Hindus from Jammu State territory.

18/20.9.47—Non-Muslims, including Sikhs from across the Ouj[Ujh] Nala and Dogras of Sadr Chak in Jammu State, opened fire on a village of Nawan Pind on the 18th September and raided village Jhanjar on the 20th. Three villagers of Nawan Pind were killed and three seriously wounded in Jhanjar. (This appears to be a joint border raid).¹

24/25.9.47—Six non-Muslim soldiers from Jammu State waylaid and robbed 3 Muslims of village Dhandar, P.S. Lesar. A Muslim of Panjgirain was also killed by some unknown raiders from Jammu State territory, who took away his body.

¹On 18 September a correspondent from Jammu reported that Rajput and Sikh bands, which had fled Pakistan, had built up "nests" on the State side of the frontier. He also reported mysterious infiltration into Kashmir of several Indian troops apparently "to coerce the State to join the Indian Union." See the *Pakistan Times*, 20 September 1947.

KR-372

M. A. Said Ansari to M. A. Jinnah

FOA, S4 (9)/0/13

PURBIAN, MOCHI GATE,
LAHORE,
1 October 1947*Nahmaduhu Wa Nusalli Ala Rasulihil Karim**Bismillah 'ir Rahman ir Rahim*

May it reach H. E. the Quaid-i-Azam,

In the very near future, Kashmir State is going to join the Indian Union, when 40 lakh Kashmiris of the State shall be exposed to the same danger to which the West and East Punjab Muslims are exposed, for sheer want of arms, rifles and pistols lacking which no subject in India is safe and secure, especially the Muslims.

Out of 40 lakhs of Kashmiris, 95 per cent Muslim Kashmiris are all without arms, such as pistols and rifles. Whenever they are attacked, they are slaughtered like goats, mercilessly. Their armlessness, it is to be feared, may not become a cause of their easy ejection with a nose and two ears from the State [sic] like evacuees of the East Punjab, and it will be a very difficult task to rehabilitate them in the overcrowded West Punjab. The State has intended to grant the lands of Muslims to non-Muslims to make it a Hindu State by population too.

Then, God forbid, West Punjab shall be exposed to attacks from all corners of the State, on the north and west of W. Punjab, i.e., from Abbottabad, Murree, Mirpur (Jhelum), Bhimber (Gujrat) and Jammu (Sialkot) [sic].

The State has bridged Ravi River at Pathankot and they are preparing motor road at top speed to connect it with Jammu; and Jammu to Poonch to connect it with Baramula and Srinagar.

The Sikh army and Sikh agriculturists are pouring in the State by this new route, in large number, to rehabilitate there... [illegible] for Kashmiris by their ejection as evacuees.

Now is the proper time to help the Kashmiris (Muslims) by arms, through the border tribes who are all their Muslim brethren and the close neighbours of Kashmiri and Poonchi Muslims.

When Indian Union is providing Sikhs and other warlike people of East Punjab with the necessary arms for self-defence and protection, how can Pakistan ignore the self-defence and the protection of Pakistan

and its border Muslim tribes and Kashmiris, for the Maharaja is a non-Muslim ruler of the State, he is not going to grant any defence, [or] arms to his Muslim subjects, for he is now bent upon the ejection of his Muslim subject[s], by evacuation to Pakistan, to rehabilitate his co-religionists.

In case we provide the border tribes and the Kashmiris through them with the arms for self-defence, Pakistan shall defend itself with the least cost for the time being. But if we ignore this timely help to them, we shall have the same bitter experience of East Punjab refugees with an attack of the regular armies of the State from the five avenues noted above, which, being a difficult task to resist, shall not be easy to manage.

If the evacuation began before winter, as it has begun from Jammu, and the State continued it through the whole winter, all the families of Kashmiris shall die on the way unheeded, for their ejection will be at the point of the bayonets of the army and not voluntary, while the Kashmiris shall be armless [*sic*] goats like the East Punjabis to be slaughtered or ejected by force without any cash or proper habiliment.

In such a bad plight of the Kashmiris, it would become an unmanageable task to grant protection and shelter to hordes of Kashmiri refugees.

Therefore, it is incumbent on the State of Pakistan to look to this timely help to the border tribes and their Kashmiri Muslim brethren, to provide them with self-defence, for without them, they are no better than mere slaughterable goats.

Self-defence is an incumbent duty of every Muslim and Muslim State to provide their subject[s] and their border [*sic*] brethren with the necessary arms of self-defence for the holy *Qur'an's* verdict is *Khuzu Hizrakum* (defend yourselves against your enemies).

If two lakh rifles are to be provided at the expense of one crore rupees to the border tribes for the defence of Kashmiri homes and hearths by arming 2 lakh Kashmiris out of 40 lakh to resist the attacks of the State Army by self-defence under the guidance of these Militia of border tribes, this ejection by force can be checked by the Kashmiris themselves and they can protect their homes and hearths, their children, women and the aged against the attacks of the State Army. Above all, the Kashmiri Muslims, thus defending themselves, can prove to the Maharaja that they are the real sons of the soil of Kashmir, and their ejection is not an easy task, rather this being a question of life and death of 40 lakhs of the followers of Islam, which is impracticable to

solve by ejection forced [*sic*].

Quaid-i-Azam's most obedient servant,

M. A. SAID ANSARI

TB Specialist

KR-373

Ram Chandra Kak to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

SRINAGAR,

1 October 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

I am grateful for your letter of 23 September² and am to convey to you the thanks of our Government for your very kind help in procuring for the State the loan of the requisite wireless equipment for making Srinagar and Jammu landing well-equipped for all-weather air service.

Mr. Ahuja, the bearer of your letter, has taken great pains to examine the situation again and to discuss all details. The proposals as finally evolved have been agreed to by our Government and a formal intimation on the subject is being sent to the Director General of Civil Aviation in Delhi. It is trusted that no time would now be lost in sending the requisite apparatus and deputing the staff which Mr. Ahuja has undertaken to select for the purpose.

Mr. Ahuja has very kindly suggested that for purpose of secrecy of certain important administrative messages which may have to be sent from here to you or others at New Delhi, it would be advisable to use a special code. This is an excellent suggestion and I trust the authorities concerned would agree to this.

I hope you will agree that side by side with the development of air services and aeronautical communication it would be desirable if suitable meteorological observations could also be secured. We will greatly appreciate your very kindly asking some officer of the Meteorological Department to visit this place for advising the State as well as for actually setting up the installation.

I have also explained to Mr. Ahuja the immediate necessity of having a transmitter for enabling the Publicity Department of the State to contradict and effectively counteract the mischievous and false propaganda which Pakistan radio is permitting to be broadcast. In my view it would be far more efficacious if it is done from here than from any

other place. The Government shall be grateful if the necessary apparatus is loaned at an early date. It should be powerful enough to let the broadcasts be audible at least in every nook and corner of the country if not actually abroad. In case a special officer be needed to work it, the services of one may kindly be lent for the purpose. Mr. Ahuja informs me that the installation could either be worked conjointly with the wireless apparatus to be fitted at the aerodrome or independently. There would be no difficulty in working it in the manner in which it may be more efficacious.

A separate self-contained letter is being sent to the Hon'ble Defence Minister for supplying arms and ammunition. Part of these was requisitioned long ago through the Resident and the remaining represents our immediate present needs. It is requested that you may kindly use your good offices to have the indents supplied immediately. The reason for this need hardly be stressed as you must be well aware of the dangers which are being manufactured and threatened against the State. In case we are fully equipped we are resolutely determined to face, if forced.

Thanking you again and with best regards,

Yours sincerely,
RAM CHANDRA KAK

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 43-4.

²Janak Singh was the State Premier on the date given in this letter as R.C. Kak had already resigned. See KR-342, note 1. Kak was indeed under investigation during October 1947. See Annex III to KR-341, para 9.

KR-374

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Maharaja of Kashmir*¹

NEW DELHI,
2 October 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter² of 26 September 1947. I went to Amritsar on 30 September and delivered to Justice Mahajan the letters which Thakur Harnam Singh had brought from Your Highness. I had also a further talk with Justice Mahajan and understand that he is joining your service very shortly.

I need hardly say how pleased we all are at the general amnesty which Your Highness has proclaimed. I have no doubt that this would rally round you the men who might otherwise have been a thorn in your side. I can assure Your Highness of my abiding sympathy with

you in your difficulties; nor need I disguise the instinctive responsibility I feel for ensuring the safety and integrity of your State. I can, therefore, assure you that in everything that we do we shall pay the highest regard to the interests of your State. Sheikh Abdullah will be coming to Delhi shortly and we shall endeavour to reach a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which you have from that quarter. I shall then suggest to Your Highness how best we can proceed further.

In the meantime, I am expediting as much as possible the linking up of the State with the Indian Dominion by means of telegraph, telephone, wireless and roads. We fully realize the need for despatch and urgency and I can assure you that we shall do our best.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 42-3.

²KR-368.

KR-375

Liaquat Ali Khan to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

No. 158

KARACHI,
2 October 1947

We are willing to do everything we can and are indeed taking steps to see that Kashmir is supplied with essential commodities of which it is in need. It must, however, be appreciated that certain difficulties stand in our way. Drivers of lorries are, for instance, reluctant to carry supplies between Rawalpindi and Kohala and it is impossible for us to spare troops for this escort. The Government of Pakistan are seriously concerned about reports reaching them to the effect that armed Sikhs are infiltrating into Kashmir State.

We would once again impress upon you the need for representatives of the Governments of Pakistan and Kashmir to meet and consider the question of supplies, the infiltration of these armed Sikhs and other outstanding questions. We leave it to you to suggest the venue of this meeting.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-376

*R. L. Batra to Baldev Singh¹*SRINAGAR,
3 October 1947

My dear Sardar Sahib,

An indent for military equipment was sent to you on 1 October, and another letter connected therewith is being sent today. I trust this would receive our earliest attention.

I am writing this to say that Mr. Justice Mahajan after meeting you at Delhi conveyed the hope that it would be possible for the Indian Dominion to concentrate some military forces at Madhopore or at any equally near and convenient centre for rendering this State succour in case it is needed.

In my letter being sent today the situation which appears to be developing requires strengthening of all resources. The State is determined to face the menace squarely but in case occasion arises for the Government here to avail of the help promised above it trusts that it can confidently rely on the fulfillment of the same.

Thanking you in anticipation for the same and with best regards,

Yours sincerely,
R. L. BATRA

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 48.

KR-377

*Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹ to Vallabhbhai Patel²*NEW DELHI,
3 October 1947

Dear Sardar Sahib,

I again enquired what steps are being taken to remove necessary stores for the construction of telephone and telegraph lines from Pathankot to Jammu. I was told the load to be carried is too heavy for aeroplanes, but eight wagons loaded with all the necessary material have been despatched from Calcutta and will reach the border as soon as the bridges on the Eastern Punjab Railways have been repaired. But if there is any delay in the repairs, the Eastern Punjab Railway authorities have

agreed to arrange for transshipment and provide a special train to carry the load to its destination.

A special officer is already surveying the route and as soon as the material reaches the border the construction will start; and although the normal time for the completion of such construction is two months, it may be possible to complete it much earlier.

I have also suggested that a wireless transmitter may be installed at Jammu immediately. Amritsar has already a transmitter and a receiver and thereby important messages from Srinagar may be telegraphed to Jammu from where they will be wirelessly either to Amritsar or to Delhi. This will give us immediate connection and we will not have to wait for the completion of telegraph and telephone line

Yours sincerely,
Rafi Ahmed Kidwai

¹Union Minister for Communications, India.

²Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 48-9.

KR-378

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Baldev Singh*¹

NEW DELHI,
7 October 1947

My Dear Baldev Singh

I hope arrangements are in train to send immediately supplies of arms and ammunition to Kashmir State. If necessary, we must arrange to send them by air.

I think the question of military assistance in time of emergency must claim the attention of our Defence Council as soon as possible. There is no time to lose if the reports which we hear of similar preparation for intervention on the part of the Pakistan Government are correct. It appears that the intervention is going to be true to Nazi pattern.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 57.

KR-379

*Janak Singh to Ikramullah**Telegram, FOA, S-6/2*

No. 76-CC

[SRINAGAR,]

8 October 1947

Grateful for telegram 172 dated sixth October¹ intimating Major [A.S.B] Shah's deputation. Kindly refer to the concluding portion of my telegram of third² to which yours is a reply. Government extremely busy in dealing with disturbances caused by armed people infiltrating [*sic* for infiltrating] unchecked from Pakistan Dominion, portion of Hazara and Murree into Poonch. Shall gladly discuss matter when this trouble is controlled. Your Government can keep your own people in check if so desired. This Government will appreciate if this is done. Telegraphed to Foreign Pakistan camp Lahore and repeated to Major Shah Under Secretary, Pakistan care Premier Lahore.³

[JANAK SINGH]

²Not traceable.¹Also see Annex.*Annex to KR-379**Howard Donovan to George Marshall**US National Archives, 845.00/11-347**[Extract]*

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

NEW DELHI,

3 November 1947

Sir,

[Paras 1 and 2 omitted]

MAHAJAN'S STATEMENT

In his press statement published November 1, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir denied allegations made in a press note issued by the Pakistan Government. He said it was not true that he declined to interview a representative of the Pakistan Government sent to Srinagar in October.¹ He denied having received—until after the armed invasion of Kashmir had begun—a telegram² inviting him to visit

Karachi for discussions. He said the Kashmir Government's advice³ to Mr. Jinnah not to visit the State in September was not intended as a discourtesy; and said the question of accession to India had not been settled until the Pakistan Government's "policy of coercion by invasion" made it unavoidable.

¹See KR-379.

²See KR-394.

³See KR-363.

KR-380

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru*¹

NEW DELHI,
8 October 1947

My dear Jawaharlal,

I am returning herewith Kachru's letter to you, which you so kindly sent to me for perusal. After you received this letter, Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State, was here. He told me that Sheikh and Begum Abdullah were to meet His Highness the Maharaja that day, i.e., 6 October. He also told me that about half the political prisoners had already been released and the other half were to be released within the next two or three days.

2. We all realise that the position is full of dangerous potentialities. We are giving the Kashmir Government as much assistance as possible within the limited resources available. There are all sorts of difficulties in our going all out to assist the State. But I am sure things would improve when Justice Mahajan takes over the Prime Ministership. He is at least keenly alive to the dangers which surround Kashmir and knows his own mind. I hope there would be an end to the almost fatal indecisiveness which has so far been the bane of the Kashmir Government. In the meantime, all that we can and should do is to assist the State to the best of our capacity. I have also impressed upon Batra the need for mobilizing popular opinion on the side of the Government. I am sure they themselves realize it.

3. Para 19 of Kachru's letter² has a fling which is obviously aimed at me. I do not think that anything which could have been done for Kashmir has been left undone by me; nor am I aware of any difference between you and me on matters of policy relating to Kashmir. Still it is most unfortunate that persons down below should think that there

is a gulf between us. It is also distressing to me.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 56.

²Annexure to Enclosure to KR-380.

Enclosure to KR-380
Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel

FOA, S-6/2

NEW DELHI,
5 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter¹ I have received from Dwarkanath Kachru [Secretary, All-India States Peoples' Conference] from Srinagar. A subsequent message says that he is staying on for a few more days.

Yours Sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL [NEHRU]

¹Annexure.

Annexure to Enclosure to KR-380
Dwarkanath to Jawaharlal Nehru

SRINAGAR,
4 October 1947

My dear Panditji,

I am now here for the last four days. Probably I will fly back on Monday.

The position here can briefly be summarized thus:

1. Sheikh Sahib and his close associates have decided for the Indian Union.

2. But this decision has not been announced yet and the impression is being given that so far the National Conference have taken no decision.

3. The leaders of the National Conference are mostly in jail and only Sheikh Sahib has been released so far.

4. The stand taken by Sheikh Sahib is that the political prisoners must be released and the Working Committee and the General Council must

be allowed to meet to consider the problem and to place their decision before the people.

5. Meanwhile, Sheikh Sahib is delivering speeches to educate public opinion and to prepare the people for what seems to be the inevitable decision of the National Conference.

6. Speeches are delivered to show that killings of Hindus and Muslims are un-Hindu and un-Islamic; that the issue of accession cannot be decided by a religious sentiment and that the friends and sympathizers of Kashmiris during these years of struggle or suffering have been Gandhiji, Jawaharlalji and the Congress and not the Muslims or the League or Mr. Jinnah. Attempts are being made to show that Jinnah and the League have done great harm to the popular movement in Kashmir and that the objective of the League and Mr. Jinnah is the preservation of the Princely Order and feudal oppression.

7. It is also emphasized that the objective of the Kashmir National Conference is the attainment of people's sovereignty with the Maharaja enjoying a constitutional position and that this would be the main factor determining the decision of the Conference in the matter of accession. In short, they would join the Dominion which enables them to achieve these objects or helps them in the achievement of their objective.

8. Another important fact which must be borne in mind is the utter collapse of the administrative and governmental machinery. An atmosphere of fear and insecurity pervades the place. There is no competent or reliable person to talk or negotiate on behalf of the Government or the Maharaja and so far no step has been taken to begin talks with Sheikh Sahib.

9. The Maharaja is incapable of taking a decision and though Sheikh Sahib has written a nice letter to him and the Maharaja too has expressed a desire to meet Sheikh Sahib and his wife, there has really been no move from the Government or the Maharaja.

10. All this has made Sheikh Sahib very uneasy and the continued imprisonment of his colleagues adds all the more to the seriousness of the position.

11. Sheikh Sahib feels that unless there is a transfer of power to a substantial degree, the National Conference may find itself in a difficult position. To fight the League, to maintain law and order inside the State and to carry the masses with them, it is highly essential that a settlement with the National Conference should be brought about simultaneously with the accession to the Union.

12. Alternative to the National Conference is undiluted Muslim communalism of the most militant type and the National Conference

urges that it be taken into confidence and be closely associated with the governance of the country.

13. This is the demand of the progressive elements amongst the minorities and they also urge that all progressive sections should stand behind Sheikh Sahib and strengthen his hand.

14. The threat to Kashmir is real and unless the Congress takes up a strong stand and forces the Maharaja to come to some agreement with the National Conference, Kashmir is doomed and there will be nothing to prevent the conquest of Kashmir by Muslim League leaders and private armies. The Maharaja is doomed and so are the National Conference and the minorities.

15. Sheikh Sahib has received your letter today and tomorrow a reply will be prepared for you.

16. I shall most probably fly back on Monday and shall bring it along with me. This letter will be a detailed one and will explain the case of the National Conference.

17. Sheikh Sahib was most anxious to fly to Delhi to meet you but the situation here is such that he cannot leave the place for some days more. He has therefore asked me to go back in order to explain the whole case to you and Sardar Patel.

18. I hope you will realise the urgency of the situation here and bear it in mind while talking with the representatives of the Maharaja.

19. I need hardly repeat that you realise the whole position much better than most of us but I hope your colleagues will also take a similar view of the situation here.

Yours,
DWARKANATH

KR-381

Press Statement¹ by R. L. Batra

FOA, S-6/2

NEW DELHI,
10 October 1947

KASHMIR TO MAINTAIN "STRICT NEUTRALITY";
POLICY TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN EXPLAINED

The words "strict neutrality" describe the Jammu and Kashmir State's policy towards the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Mr. R. L. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister of the State, made this point in an exclusive

interview today [Friday].

The path of neutrality, he said, was beset with many difficulties, but the State was determined to follow it until a calmer atmosphere, conducive to balanced thinking, prevailed. Then only could they decide which Dominion they would join.

Mr. Batra added that it was in pursuance of this policy that the State had sheltered over 100,000 Muslim refugees from Gurdaspur and given them safe passage to Pakistan. They were fed, clothed and helped at the expense of the State in the same manner as Hindu refugees from Sialkot. One battalion, under the command of Brig-Gen Khuda Bux, guarded the Muslim refugees.

PAKISTAN'S THREAT

But, the Deputy Prime Minister said, their kindness had not been appreciated. Instead, Pakistan had threatened them in many different ways. The Pakistan press was advocating action against the State.

Though Pakistan had signed a Standstill Agreement, Mr. Batra complained that they had not supplied them with their quarterly quota of petrol which amounted to 384,000 gallons.

A large number of Kashmir nationals had been killed in the disturbances and the Kashmir *Darbar* was compelled to lodge a strong protest with Pakistan.

Mr. Batra contradicted the rumour that he had come to negotiate accession to India. "This is totally wrong", he said.

"I have come here", he added, "to discuss certain matters connected with our Standstill Agreement. We depend upon food and supplies on India just as we depend upon our telegraphic communications and petrol supplies on Pakistan. Questions constantly arise from this arrangement which need to be settled".

¹The *Statesman*, 11 October 1947.

KR-382

Janak Singh to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SRINAGAR,
11 October 1947

Reports coming in of free distribution of arms and ammunition in Pakistan areas adjacent [to] State borders and incursion of armed men

into State territory. Such action bound to endanger peace and result in consequences which His Highness's Government believe your Government are as much desirous to avoid as they. Shall be grateful for prompt and effective measures to stop such things. For restoration of peace and confidence, it is of utmost importance to avoid at all costs people across State borders getting arms for raiding State territory.

[JANAK SINGH]

KR-383

M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

No. 241-RC/47

KARACHI,

12 October 1947

Men of the Pakistan Army who have recently returned from leave at their homes in Poonch report that armed bands which include troops are attacking Muslim villages in that State. Their stories are confirmed by the large number of villages that can be seen burning from Murree hills. The Pakistan Government are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace on their borders and the welfare of Muslims in adjoining territories and on these grounds alone would be justified in asking for an assurance that steps be taken to restore order in Poonch. One feature of the present situation in Poonch which however makes it peculiarly dangerous to the friendly relations which the Pakistan Government wishes to maintain with Kashmir is that the Pakistan army obtains a large number of recruits from Poonch. Feeling in the battalions to which these men belong is rapidly rising and the situation is fraught with danger. The Pakistan Government wishes to avoid such a situation as they are sure do the Government of Kashmir, but if it is to be avoided, immediate and effective steps must be taken to end the present state of affairs and, in particular, if it is true that the State troops are taking part in the attack on Muslims,¹ to ensure the restoration of their discipline. The Government of Pakistan would like to be informed of the action taken.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

On 13 September 1947, the Muslim Conference, Murree, appealed to Jinnah to intervene as the public of Poonch was being looted and fired upon by the State Forces and Sikh gangs. The Kashmir Muslim Association, Lahore, also sought the help of Liaquat Ali Khan on 30 September 1947 for saving the Muslims of Poonch from savage repression, which had led to some 100,000 leaving the State. See FOA, S. 4 (9). Not printed.

KR-384

M. Ikramullah to Janak Singh

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

No. 242-RC

KARACHI,

12 October 1947

Pakistan Government wish to draw your Government's attention to series of raids made from Jammu State into Sialkot district during the month of September. At least six raids by armed Dogra gangs and refugees from West Punjab sheltering in Jammu State territory have so far been reported. These raids have been accompanied by considerable loss of Muslim life. In the raid of two villages in police station Phulkian on 11th September, some sixty Muslims were killed and eleven women abducted by Dogra raiders. In a recent case, non-Muslim soldiers from Jammu State were reported to have waylaid and robbed Muslims of village Jhanjar. Pakistan Government take a very serious view of the violation of their frontier by raiders from the Jammu State. They take strong exception also to non-Muslim refugees being allowed to use State territory as a base of operations against West Punjab. They would be forced to regard the continuance of such raids, unchecked by Government as an unfriendly act. Pakistan Government therefore strongly urge that immediate and firm action be taken to stop the raids into West Punjab territory.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

KR-385

K. H. Khurshid to M. A. Jinnah

F. 142/44

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,

12 October 1947

My dear Sir,

I reached Srinagar on the evening of the 2nd instant and ever since I have been overwhelmed by all sorts of reports and information furnished by my friends, acquaintances and stray visitors. I have made a summary of what I have heard and seen and what I believe to be true. I

sifted the information received, verified it through other sources and have prepared the enclosed papers. Perhaps many of the things have already reached you from other sources but I have made a comprehensive report and also given my opinion and made suggestions.

I am afraid it is rather lengthy and may appear to be superfluous at places, but whatever I thought was necessary to be placed before you has been typed down.

I do hope, Sir, that you and Miss Jinnah are in the best of health.

With my respectful and kind regards,

Yours obediently,
[K. H.] KHURSHID

Enclosure to KR-385
Note by K. H. Khurshid

F. 142/45-8

SRINAGAR,
12 October 1947

Events in Kashmir have been moving very fast ever since the release of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as an act of "Royal Clemency".¹ Other members of his party, who were either imprisoned or detained last year in connection with the "Quit Kashmir" agitation, have also been released. But the Muslim Conference people continue to rot in jails.²

Side by side, the State is getting rid of Muslims who held positions of any significance in the State forces.³ The Army now stands cleared of all Muslim and European officers who have been all replaced by Hindu Dogra Rajputs.

The position appears to be that the Maharaja is dead set against Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. He is reported to have said that even though his body be cut into seven hundred pieces, he would not accede to Pakistan. And, therefore, he is preparing to meet any and every eventuality. The State today is a hotbed of dirty court intrigues and all sorts of manoeuvres and machinations are going on [sic] the part of the Government to disrupt the Musalmans and suppress the popular feeling in favour of Pakistan. But there are practical difficulties in the way of the Government in making public their intentions for some time to come. A well-informed Dogra official told me that it was mostly a question of rifles. If Pakistan had more rifles than Kashmir has, the latter would join Pakistan.

Given below is the position, as it can be gauged from facts and recent events that have taken place in the State, of the Government and various political elements:

A. GOVERNMENT

Whether a decision to accede to the Indian Union has been taken or not, every action of the Government unmistakably points towards the road to Delhi. The Maharaja is getting rid of all undesirable or doubtful people around him. His uncle has taken over as Prime Minister. The Deputy Prime Minister (a new post) is one Mr. Ram Lal Batra, a nominee of Sardar Patel, and he keeps continually moving between Srinagar and Delhi.

The release of Sheikh Abdullah has been effected with the sole aim of giving the impression to the outside world that Kashmir's accession to India, when announced, will have the support of the biggest political party in the State. It is also being said in local political circles and the press that if an agreement is reached between Pakistan and India on the question of ascertaining the wishes of the people of an Indian State before she accedes to either Dominion, Abdullah and party will be promised a few seats in the Government in return of their support to accession to India.

Work on the road connecting East Punjab and Jammu¹ is going on apace. Thanks to floods in the Ravi, the work has suffered heavily and a considerable delay has been caused in its completion. Another road connecting Jammu and Srinagar is also under way of construction, because the existing one is not open to traffic during the three months of winter and it is hoped that this new road will be trafficable perennially.

Petrol supplies, which were stopped by the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi, are now coming by air from Delhi.

Not in a mood to take any risks at all, the Government is deploying Dogra troops all over the State. Fresh contingents have been sent to border areas of Gilgit and Poonch. It is persistently rumoured that Gurkha and Sikh troops of the Indian Dominion are awaiting orders to march into the State on the border of Kashmir-East Punjab. The removal of Muslims and other non-Hindu officers of the Army speak for itself.

When winter sets in, roads to Gilgit will be blocked and Kashmir will be practically cut off from the rest of the world if the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road is not open to free traffic as at present. Only military vehicles and some few private cars are now running on this road due to shortage of petrol.

The tribes on the Gilgit-Chitral border and Poonch-NWFP border have warned the Maharaja against accession to India. As a matter of

fact, the State forces have already come into clash with armed Muslims in Poonch. A goodly number of State troops is engaged there.

All these factors plus the fact that no political party has as yet supported accession to India except some Punjabi Hindus of Jammu, are standing in the way of Maharaja making his declaration.

B. MUSLIM CONFERENCE

The Muslim Conference now is practically a dead organization. With all its leaders either jailed, imprisoned, detained or externed, there is hardly anybody to carry on the work. Whatever was left of the organization, was damaged by the controversy between Mirwaiz and Ch. Hamidullah,⁵ both of whom are now externed. But there is a very strong undercurrent of popular feeling in favour of Pakistan, to utilize and exploit which [*sic*] there is nobody here. Spontaneous demonstrations are being held in different parts of the city and the State but there is nobody to mobilize these scattered elements.

C. NATIONAL CONFERENCE

They are in a queer position. It is a well-known fact that Abdullah never had any non-Muslim following in the State, and now his followers feel that as Pakistan has been established and the League-Congress controversy is at an end, the State should accede to Pakistan. That is the reason why since his release Abdullah has been making equivocal statements. I am enclosing herewith the full text of one of his recent speeches,⁶ as published by the official paper of his party.

He has made a number of other speeches more or less on similar lines and so far he has made the following points:

1. The primary question before us (Abdullah's party) is that of the establishment of responsible government and freedom of the people of the State. I still stick to 'Quit Kashmir' and that is our main demand. The question of accession to India or Pakistan is a secondary one.
2. The Muslim League holds that sovereignty rests with rulers and princes (this is an obvious misrepresentation of our interpretation of the position of States that paramountcy does not lapse but has reverted to the Indian States) of Indian States. The League neglects the poor and the masses for the sake of Nizam.
3. I have personal grudges against Mr. Jinnah who called me a *goonda*⁷ and who said 'Quit Kashmir' was the cry of a few miscreants. But I am prepared to let bygones be bygones and not let personal feelings influence our decision.
4. We will join him that supports our freedom demands but we have also to consider our economic position, our trade and commerce and other things. We will not be led by sentiments and I

shall revolt if the Maharaja accedes to either Dominion without popular approval. Let us get our freedom first and then as free people we shall give our verdict in favour of one or the other dominion.

In private talks with some of his own followers who went to convince him of the futility of his present stand, he is reported to have said that Mr. Jinnah should write to him and invite him for talks, but there will be only one basis i.e. the League should support the movement for the establishment of responsible government in the State.

He has also given it out privately that the Maharaja had expressed his willingness to accede to the Indian Dominion but Sardar Patel refused and told the Maharaja plainly that if responsible government was not established in the State, they would not accept Kashmir's accession. He then asks why cannot the Muslim League do the same? The League has accepted the right of Rulers to decide the fate of the people, he contends.

D. HINDUS

The Punjabi and Dogra Hindus of Jammu and the Kashmiri Pandits have sent a memorandum to the Maharaja asking him to accede to India. But the release of Abdullah has brought about a change in them. They have now allied themselves with the National Conference. Of course, they are weathercocks and their only desire is to save their skins.

In the light of the above, I am personally of the opinion, Sir, that Pakistan must think in terms of fighting (not to use war) as far as Kashmir is concerned. The other side has practically not only decided upon it but is ready for it. Diplomatic pressure has so far failed. The latitude that we have been giving has only served in misinterpreting us in the sense that Pakistan is regarded as weak and about to crash. Of course, we must go on trying as we are but we must not neglect the fighting side of it. Even if unity is established amongst Musalmans and even if a referendum is held and results in a favourable verdict for Pakistan, the Maharaja cannot be trusted for a moment to abide by it, nor the Indian Government with not accepting Kashmir's accession in spite of an adverse verdict.

All that Pakistan has to be ready for in such an eventuality is to supply arms and foodstuffs to the tribes within and without the State who are already sharpening their weapons. The local population can hardly carry on a peaceful movement for more than a fortnight. Successful strategy on behalf of Pakistan will leave the Maharaja with only some barren tracks of hilly south adjacent to East Punjab.

This might sound fantastic but there is hardly any means of telling how the Maharaja is thinking. We should not be caught unawares, and the only way is to prepare ourselves to meet every eventuality.

As regards how [sic] can be established between the people of the State and our people across the border, I may say, Sir, that Major Khurshid Anwar (of Muslim National Guards) is already in Rawalpindi and he can very well be trusted with the work of liaison as he belongs to the State and knows the frontier areas very well.

I would also suggest, Sir, that if you could issue a statement with regard to Kashmir it will help our people here and clarify the League position vis-a-vis the Indian States. As President of the Muslim League, Sir, you can demand the release of the Muslim Conference detenues who have not even been tried, especially now that every other political prisoner and detinue is set free. Besides the position of League, if clarified and reasserted, will take the ground off Abdullah's feet. I am not suggesting this because I have been provoked by Abdullah's utterings, but because I feel that many of our people are being misled and believe that the League is really letting them down. I suggest, Sir, that the following form part of the statement or anything else to the same effect:

It has been brought to my notice that there is some misunderstanding with regard to the policy of the Muslim League concerning the Indian States in certain quarters and some interested persons are deliberately misrepresenting the Muslim League to serve their own purpose and misleading the Musalmans in the Indian States.

According to the Plan of June 3rd* which has been accepted by both Congress and the Muslim League, paramountcy in respect of Indian States which rested with the Crown reverted to the Indian States. The legal and constitutional position, therefore, was, and remains, that it is the Ruler as the head of an Indian State who can negotiate on behalf of his State and take the final decision should [sic for to] join one or the other Dominion. The 500 odd States that have acceded to Indian Union and others which have acceded to Pakistan have followed the same procedure. This cannot be modified or changed except by agreement between the two Dominions and with the concurrence of the Rulers of Indian States. We are ready and Pakistan has already expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Indian Government on the basis and conditions under which they would agree that the question of accession be referred to the people of Indian States.

The Muslim League has always stood for the right of self-determination of the people all over the world and it was this principle

which formed the basis of Pakistan demand by the Muslim League. This is a question entirely different from the interpretation of the position of the States under the Plan....etc.

I have suggested, Sir, in my crude way as to what should be done by the Muslim League and Pakistan with regard to Kashmir. The difficulties here are that the Muslim Conference hasn't got any press and even the neutral press is muzzled. If by a slight mistake our people here give opportunity to the Government to use force, I have no doubt in my mind, Sir, that Dogra troops will enter every house and seize the Muslims and shoot them.

I have just now heard that Sheikh Abdullah has sent one of his lieutenants, Mr. G. M. Sadiq, to Lahore to see Mr. Liaquat Ali. Beyond this, nothing is known yet.

¹See Annexure to Enclosure to KR-380.

²See KR-394, para 4.

³Brigadier Khuda Bakhsh, Commander of the State Forces in Jammu region, was assassinated by his own troops in October 1947. See the *Pakistan Times*, 31 October 1947. Also see Enclosure 1 to KR-392.

⁴See KR-372.

⁵See KR-358.

⁶Annexure.

⁷The words used by Jinnah are reproduced here to set the record straight: "My advice to [Kashmir] Muslims was that differences can be resolved by argument, discussion and exchange of views and reason, and not by Goondatism." See statement by Jinnah, 25 July 1944. Yusufi, *Speeches, Statements and Messages of Quaid-i-Azam*, III, 1915.

⁸See No. 1, Vol. II, 1-6.

Annexure to Enclosure to KR-385
Speech by Sheikh Abdullah at Hazratbal¹
[Extracts]

F. 142/49-51

SRINAGAR,
8 October 1947

After his release from jail, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, speaking on the future of Kashmir, declared:

"We must remember, our decision to join India or Pakistan or remain independent will have as its main basis the consideration who recognises our right to freedom. Attainment of our own freedom is the supreme consideration with us. When we have to choose between India and Pakistan, we will have to judge them on this single test: who recognises that sovereignty rests with the people and thereby concedes our own

demand and who talks in terms of Rajas, Nizams and Nawabs. Obviously, we will go with those who support us in our demand for freedom. We have no business with those who count without the people [*sic*]. We cannot be expected to waste our struggle for the last 17 years, merely to pay homage to a sentiment. If there is anyone who would wish to be a part and parcel of the Muslim world, let him know that he can serve the Musalmans only when he ceases to be a slave. Essentially, the question of joining India or Pakistan or to remain independent is to be seen purely in terms of our own interests. Sentiment has no place in it. We have to see which of the three courses helps our trade. Thousands of Kashmiris live on export of luxury articles and things of art. Thousands of Kashmiris live on the money spent by the visitors in the valley.... What we want here is that forty lakhs of inhabitants of this State should have perfect mastery to shape their own future. You may call it Quit Kashmir, Responsible Government or by any other name. In Quit Kashmir, I never wanted to deprive His Highness² of his throne. I never wanted to place myself on it. What I wanted was simply that His Highness should rule this State with people's consent. He should not count upon the Treaty of Amritsar as the only sanction to rule. We should not be related to each other as master and slave. He should be one of us commanding our respect and attention. Our stand was vindicated by no less a person than Mahatma Gandhi who is the biggest man and biggest leader of our country...."

¹The *Khidmat*, 8 October 1947.

²Hari Singh.

KR-386

Vallabhbhai Patel¹ to N.V. Gadgil²

NEW DELHI,
12 October 1947

My dear Gadgil

You remember I wrote to you regarding a conference with officers of the Kashmir State Government on the question of road communication. The Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir was here the other day and he has asked me to arrange for our officers to reach Madhopur on the 19th for this Conference. Please arrange accordingly and ask your officers to be at Madhopur on that date. If the officers will report to the States Ministry they would be told the names of officers who would be coming from Kashmir State to have discussions with them. I am sending

a similar letter to Rafi [Ahmed Kidwai].

Your sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 57.

²N. V. Gadgil, Union Minister for Works, Mines & Power, India.

KR-387

*Vallabhbhai Patel to R. L. Batra*¹

NEW DELHI,
12 October 1947

My dear Batra,

You remember you spoke to me about Mansehra bridge. I thought you would speak about it to the Defence Department representative at the Inter-Department meeting but understand you did not do so. I have spoken to Baldev Singh and he is quite agreeable to assist us. Please let me know what you want us to do in detail and whether you would like the matter to be treated officially or otherwise.

I am arranging to send our officers about telegraphs, telephones and road to Madhopur on the 19th. Please make arrangement accordingly at your end.

Your sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 58.

KR-388

Nazir Ahmad Marghoob to Altaf Hussain
[Copy to M. A. Jinnah]

FOA, S. 4 (9)

KARACHI,
14 October 1947

Dear Mr. Altaf Hussain,

I am stunned to read in today's *Dawn*¹ that Kashmir's joining Indian Union is an accomplished fact. This has frustrated all hopes and expectations that Pakistan's back will be safe from being stabbed. Everybody

knows what shock tactics were employed to bring Travancore, Bhopal and other States into Indian Union by the sister Dominion and Pakistan had been a passive onlooker on all these occasions. Noble sentiments and good wishes do not count everywhere and utmost efforts are needed to accomplish such jobs.

Indian Dominion was successful to annex a corridor through Gurdaspur for Kashmir and they are now snatching away what is rightfully ours. Messrs Gandhi, Nehru and Kripalani have all gone to Kashmir. Everybody knows why? How unfortunate it is that not a single big leader from Pakistan has gone to Maharaja for friendly talks. We can't expect Quaid-i-Azam to run for every job but his personal envoy can go there all right. This is the time to make 11th hour frantic efforts to show Kashmir the right path. If Pakistan is unable to persuade Kashmir, her next door neighbour, to join hands with her, how can we prevent others to desert us.

For God sake try to save your Muslim brethren in Kashmir who are earnestly looking for Pakistan's help at this difficult hour. If Kashmir is gone Pakistan will be engulfed by enemies on all sides. No price will be too great to have Kashmir to be cut off. Even if it means total surrender to Sheikh Abdullah, this enterprise is worth making provided Kashmir is saved. Your leading article in *Dawn*² tomorrow may perhaps awaken our politicians to enable them to rise to the occasion. There is no time left to wait and see. There will be no use crying over split milk.

We have paid terrible price for deserting Muslim majority areas in East Punjab and if we let go Kashmir in the same way, we must get prepared for another catastrophe of still greater magnitude.

Yours faithfully,
NAZIR AHMAD MARGHOOB

¹Annex I.

²See Annexes II & III.

Annex I to KR-388

KASHMIR'S ACCESSION TO INDIAN DOMINION REGARDED AS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION

SHEIKH ABDULLAH LENDS SUPPORT

PATEL'S STATES DEPARTMENT OPPOSED TO HOLDING PLEBISCITE¹

NEW DELHI, Oct 13. There is very strong rumour that Kashmir is signing the Instrument of Accession shortly. Its joining the Indian Dominion is taken as a foregone conclusion in high political circles.

Sources claiming to enjoy the confidence of Sheikh Abdullah contradicted here the earlier press reports of the Sheikh's inclination towards allowing the State to join the Pakistan Dominion. They maintain that he is in favour of Kashmir joining the Indian Dominion.

The question of the holding of a referendum remains undecided still indications are, however, available of the States Department ideological opposition to it.

It is said that, according to the States Department, plebiscite is to be resorted to only in the case of those States which decided upon accession to a Dominion that did not form contiguous areas [*sic*] with it.

High Congress and official circles discount the possibility of any referendum being allowed. Strong objections are being taken to it by some highly influential circles on the basis that it would cause unnecessary waste of time and money and may, above all, plunge the State into a maze of communal strife and bloodshed.

Sheikh Abdullah's recent observations that religious and other prejudices would not stand in the way of finding a correct solution, and that the people of Jammu and Kashmir were inseparably connected with 90 million people living in 562 Indian States are interpreted as a precursor to a formal decision by the National Conference to advocate the State's accession to the Indian Dominion. —Globe.

¹The *Dawn*, 14 October 1947.

Annex II to KR-388

PLAIN WORDS TO KASHMIR—I¹

Grave concern will be felt by Muslims throughout Pakistan at the state of affairs prevailing in Kashmir as revealed in a Press Note issued by the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday. We knew that behind the iron curtain of censorship raised by the autocratic regime of the Maharaja, intrigues had been going on for a long time, to reduce the Muslim population of the State to helplessness and to impose upon them the tyrannical, theocratic rule of a small minority of Hindus. But who would have imagined that even there in Kashmir, where nearly 90 [85] per cent of the population are followers of Islam, the minority would dare to indulge in arson and mass attacks on Muslim villages? But this is just what is happening, as would appear from the official statement. "Armed bands, which include troops, are attacking Muslim villages and the fires of many burning villages can be seen from the Murree Hills" —reveals the Press Note.

The Pakistan Government have taken the gravest view of these

attacks and have asked the Government of Kashmir to take immediate and effective steps to restore order and to inform them of the action taken. But, it is obvious that even the Pakistan Government are not in possession of information concerning all that may be happening there, because so far they only know what has been narrated by soldiers recently returning from leave at their homes in Kashmir. It is therefore probable that although these reports refer only to Poonch, similar acts of lawlessness are occurring in other parts also of Maharaja Hari Singh's territory.

Simultaneously, a report by a foreign news agency from New Delhi suggests that Sheikh Abdullah who has gone to Hindustan's capital to confer with Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and others, has been finally won over and is soon likely to declare himself openly as an advocate of Kashmir's accession to the Indian Dominion. If so, it would appear that Sheikh Abdullah's recent statement that "even if we join Pakistan we shall never accept the two-nation theory" was no better than an oblique hint to those concerned that unless the Sheikh was paid the price he wanted, he might even toy with the idea of supporting Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Perhaps his threat has succeeded and the desired price obtained.

Whatever may be the attitude finally adopted by this particular individual, it goes without saying that the people of Kashmir are overwhelmingly against their State acceding to Hindustan. Of late, various parties have intensified the demand that their State should join Pakistan, and powerful neighbouring elements on Kashmir's northern border have also left the Maharaja in no doubt as to what they desire. But all this would seem to have fallen on deaf ears and Sir Hari Singh seems becoming deeper and deeper involved in a course of action which is contrary to his people's will. It is also a violation of all canons of justice that Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of the Quit Kashmir Movement which had resulted, on the Kashmir Government's own showing, in bloodshed and other acts of violence, should be at liberty while leaders of the Muslim Conference whose offence was only of a technical nature, should still rot in jail. This clearly indicates the Maharaja's policy, which is to suppress the Muslim Conference and all other elements who oppose Kashmir's accession to Hindustan, and at the same time to accord privileged treatment to Sheikh Abdullah's party and other stooges of the Hindus who allow themselves to be utilized for the purpose of faking "popular support" for an anti-popular and anti-democratic decision amounting to the political murder of the State's majority community.

Simultaneously with this policy the Maharaja is also removing from his Army and from other important posts in his administration such few Muslims as there are and replacing them by Hindus. He has also taken away from his Muslim subjects not only their few licensed arms but even domestic knives and similar other implements, while arms are being distributed to a large number of Hindus. Further, thousands of Sikhs have been imported into Kashmir and Jammu during recent months who are being pampered in various ways. Thus, the stage seems set for a new act in the Kashmir drama which may have a disastrous ending. Perhaps it will not be wrong to say that the attack on Muslims and the burning of their villages which have already begun are in the nature of an experiment in readiness for the "real thing".

The attitude reported to have been adopted by the States Department of the Hindustan Government over the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide the people's wishes on the question of the State's future is typical of Mr. Patel and those of his way of thinking. They would not give a chance to the majority population in Kashmir to declare their verdict but at the same time they insist on the people of Junagadh being given that opportunity. The explanation of course is that Muslims are in a majority in Kashmir and Hindus are in a majority in Junagadh, and for Mr. Patel that is explanation enough! For the same reason it is considered an intolerable affront that a state with a majority of non-Muslims in its population should dare to join Pakistan, but the flouting of the wishes of a majority of population which is Muslim, by a state like Kashmir, is regarded as the perfect example of democracy.

Recently, Kashmir's Deputy Prime Minister complained in a statement of what he described as "threats against Kashmir by the Muslim Press". We would like to tell him and his Maharaja to drop this pose of injured innocence. It is they who are threatening not only the political future of the majority of the people of Kashmir and Jammu but even their property and their lives. When the Muslim Press asks them to desist from this policy and to follow the path of justice, reason and democracy, it does not threaten them but gives them counsel of wisdom. We repeat that counsel again because we do not think it is too late yet for the Maharaja to follow the dictates of reason and enlightened self-interest. Accession to Pakistan on honourable terms is the only answer to the Kashmir Problem.

*Annex III to KR-388*MORE WORDS TO KASHMIR-II¹

Since we had addressed a few plain words to the Kashmir Government last week, the fulcrum of the State's accession issue has been temporarily shifted to the capital of Hindustan. Sheikh Abdullah, with the halo of political martyrdom conferred by the treason trial and incarceration fresh round his head arrived at New Delhi and was received at the aerodrome by the Premier of Hindustan. Since then a sort of triangular palaver had been going on there, to which Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Patel, by turn, have been giving their counsel of wisdom. Of the nature of the discussion or its conclusion, the rest of the world knows little or nothing. But Sheikh Abdullah has dropped a few apparently fortuitous, but cautiously calculated, hints about the direction in which his mind is working or is being made to work. These, by the way, have fully confirmed the analysis of the situation given by our Srinagar correspondent in his despatch last week. The leaders of the National Conference who had organized the spectacular "Quit Kashmir" Movement, donning patriotic robes, are now hand in glove with the Dogra ruling class for reinforcing the very foundation of the tyranny for the elimination of which they claimed to have started the movement.

Sheikh Abdullah still speaks in undertones about responsible government. In his latest statement at Delhi, he is reported to have said that the main interest of the people of Kashmir is not accession to one or the other Dominion, but immediate responsible government and that the people could not decide one way or the other as long as there was no responsible government in the State. This is obviously meant only to bypass the main issue facing the people of Kashmir. The Muslims, who form nearly ninety per cent of the population, are almost unanimous in their demand that Kashmir, with its historical, cultural, geographical and economic association with the people of Pakistan, should accede to that Dominion. Maharaja Hari Singh is aware how irresistible is the will of the people who have been suffering under age-long tyranny and grinding poverty. The Dogra Ruler, who did not hesitate to clap in prison those who dared to talk of responsible government only a short while ago, is now only too glad to let them do so, if only they could stem, for however short a time, the rising tide of popular will for accession to Pakistan. He wants a little breathing time, till the Ravi bridge, now frantically being constructed, is completed, so that he could join Hindustan and let Mr. Patel settle the rest of the question on his behalf.

It is here that the fraud behind Sheikh Abdullah's disingenuous

thesis becomes apparent. The President of the Kashmir National Conference knows that although the Ravi bridge has not yet been completed, much water has flown down the river since he had been sent to jail. The National Conference has completely lost whatever little hold it might have had on the Muslims of the State. There has been a serious landslide against Sheikh Abdullah's leadership on the issue of Pakistan and serious rift has been reported even inside the High Command of the National Conference. In spite of the pressure of extra-territorial friendship and indigenous blandishments, he has not dared to speak in overt terms against Pakistan. He knows how much it will cost him to do so. All the same, he is trying to please his masters by loud commendations of a common Central Government and equally loud condemnation of the two-nation theory. The people of Kashmir will not be slow in grasping the significance of his effort to throw the accession issue into the background and lay stress on the question of responsible government.

Nor is it surprising why Mr. Patel's State Department which has put a deadline for the accession of every other state, should make an exception of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah is being induced to play the role of Mir Jaffar of Kashmir. We do not know whether Sheikh Abdullah, who, at certain moments, speaks ecstatically of Islam, *Rabbul-Alameen* and the Holy Prophet in order to impress the unsophisticated people of Kashmir, would like to be remembered in history as a Mir Jaffar who sold away four million Muslims of the State for a mess of pottage. Whether he wishes to do so or not, the will of a nation determined to achieve its independence can never be sold or suppressed. Hindustan, after decades of slavery, has come into its own; so has the nation of Pakistan; and so will the Muslims of Kashmir. Those who count upon the strength of a river bridge or a ridge-road for the enslavement of a living nation are building their hopes on wrong foundations. Nowhere in the world and at no time in history was a nation enslaved by the mere agency of a bridge or a road. If Maharaja Hari Singh is waiting for the completion of the bridge to announce his decision about accession to Hindustan, he will find that the gulf that divides him from his people had grown all too unbridgeable.

¹Editorial, the *Dawn*, 19 October 1947.

KR-389

M. Ikramullah to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

KARACHI,
17 October 1947

Have repeated en clair a long telegram from Kashmir Premier regarding persistent trouble on border. Matter being discussed Emergency Cabinet Saturday morning [18 October]. Will wire again.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

Enclosure to KR-389

Mehr Chand Mahajan¹ to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SRINAGAR,
15 October 1947

Your two telegrams Nos. 241² and 242³ dated 12th October drawing attention of the State to condition obtaining in Poonch and along border of Sialkot district. Kindly refer to telegrams since sent from this Government to your address and that of the Premier West Punjab and Deputy Commissioner Rawalpindi. Government are surprised at the conclusion arrived at by Pakistan Government without verification of facts. It is Jammu and Kashmir Government which has so far complained of infiltration by the people of Pakistan Dominion [into] their State with a view to create trouble while nothing seems to have been done to prevent this unfriendly act. Government are further surprised that the blame for creating trouble in this State has now been laid on us. Government fully trust that this way of manufacturing bad relations adopted by the border people of territory from Sialkot to Chitral should be scrutinized dispassionately and action taken, as already requested, for withdrawal of people belonging to the Pakistan Dominion back and to prevent further infiltration. This Government has ample proof of infiltration. As is the rule in every Government, including Pakistan Dominion, Military has to take action when disturbance caused cannot adequately be dealt with by civil administration. If this action hurts any only [*sic*] feeling Government hopes you will agree that it is for them to help in the task of restoration of peace. Government is

prepared to have an impartial enquiry made into the whole affair with a view to remove misunderstanding and to restore cordial relations which this Government has strictly kept in view so far even in spite of provocation by the people across the border and has maintained it in its true spirit. If unfortunately this request is not heeded Government, much against its wishes will have no option but to ask for assistance to withstand the aggressive and unfriendly actions of the Pakistan people along our border. The protests of the Kashmir Government about the unfriendly action of the West Punjab Government in blocking the passage of petrol, clothes and food and in stoppage of all transport and communication to the state still remain unheeded by that Govt. and it is pointed out that all these steps of that government seem an act of coercion on His Highness' Government in taking a decision about the accession of the State.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN]

¹Prime Minister, Jammu & Kashmir.

²KR-383.

³KR-384.

KR-390

*R. L. Batra to Vallabhbhai Patel*¹

SRINAGAR,
17 October 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

I hope my previous letter sent through Thakur Harnam Singh has reached [you]. Since then Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch has reached here but neither any ammunition has reached nor any probable date of its arrival has been communicated. Operations going on in Poonch necessitate immediate equipment of our forces with full complement of arms and ammunition. I have, therefore, requested the Hon'ble Defence Member to arrange to release stocks from Delhi immediately and if some have to be obtained from other places then these may also be sent immediately by air direct without trans-shipment at Delhi.

The nature of the country in Poonch has shown that bridges on hill terrain which are being destroyed by enemy action require urgent replacement. This can be done easily if one mile long of Bailey bridging material is supplied on payment to the State. It is understood that this stock is lying at Calcutta and the easiest way to get it would be by a

priority transit by rail via Pathankot.

As motor petrol is also immediately needed for operations and climatic conditions are very uncertain, it is requested that in place of sending petrol by one plane, two planes of Dalmia Jain Airways may be allowed to bring it at least for one week.

In the memo which I left with Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh to be handed to Mr. Shankar, aviation spirit was also asked for. I gave my copy of it to the latter when I met him at yours a few days ago. No intimation has as yet been received whether this is going to be supplied. We want this also very immediately, particularly as reconnoitring by air of various operations of the State has become a necessity.

As you must be aware, owing to breakdown of communications valuable commodities like silk, pashmina, dry and fresh fruit and walnuts are held up here. It will be in the interest of purchasers and the consumers if the Government of India could kindly help by allowing a freighter service to be run for a fortnight by Dalmia Jain Airways, who are already running a chartered passenger service here. Goods worth millions of rupees will be exported in this way. Some of these goods if not exported will perish here, while people in consuming centres will be deprived of the use of the same. I have directed the managing committee of the Dalmias to apply for permission for this freighter service.

I have already requested you more than once to kindly let us have, though it be temporarily only, a broadcasting set for counteracting the propaganda which, as you must be aware, is being set against us by Pakistan Radio for a major portion of the time of the news service period. We are very keen on telling the people in this country of the fallacious and baseless propaganda which is being raised against us. At present the only source through which we can counteract news is through the Indian Dominion broadcasting station and although we are kindly allowed to do this, it is realized that we could not justifiably claim more of your time than at present could be spared for us.

With regard to the Kishenganga bridge, I thought the matter was so secret that it had be talked to the department concerned only. I therefore did not refer to it in the meeting. Since through your kindness and of the Defence Department, Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh has been relieved and has arrived here, he will study the situation and if necessary inform me of what is desired to be done. I will address you and the Hon'ble Defence Minister about it later.

Our Road and Telegraph Chief Engineers have already reached Jammu and will be at Madhopur tomorrow. I hope your officers will

also be there on due date. Government is very keen to push on the works under contemplation and I am sure this will be done at the earliest practicable date.

Hoping to be excused for the trouble and with best regards,

Yours sincerely,
R. L. BATRA

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 58-60.

KR-391

Mehr Chand Mahajan to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram,¹ FOA, S-6/2

SRINAGAR,
18 October 1947

Ever since August fifteenth even in spite of agreement to observe Standstill Agreement on matters on which agreement existed on August 14th with British India, increasing difficulties have been felt not only with regard to supplies from West Punjab of postal system [sic] has been most detrimental to people as well as the administration. Saving Bank accounts refused to be operated. Postal Certificates not cashed. Cheques by branches here of West Punjab Banks not honoured; even Imperial Bank branches put hard to meet obligations owing failure of remittances from Lahore Currency Officer. Motor vehicles registered in the State have been held at Rawalpindi. Railway traffic from Sialkot to Jammu has been discontinued. While the State has afforded safe passage to about one lakh Muslim refugees from Pathankot to Sialkot, the Rawalpindi people have murdered and wounded in cold blood over 180 out of party of 220 Kashmir nationals being conveyed to Kohala at State request.² People armed with modern long range firearms have infiltrated in thousands in Poonch and committed horrors on non-Muslims, murdering, maiming, looting them and burning their houses as well as kidnapping women. Instead cooperation asked for through every possible local as well as provincial authorities and Central Authority, paper promises have not [sic] been made actually followed by more rigorous action than before. Press and Radio of Pakistan appear actually to have been licensed to pour volumes of fallacious, libellous and false propaganda. Smaller feudatory States have been prompted to threat even armed interference into the State.

Even private people in Pakistan are allowed to wire unbearable threats without any check by the Pakistan Dominion Post Offices.³ To crown all the State is being blamed for acts which actually are being committed by Pakistan people. Villages are being raided from Sialkot and in addition actual infiltration in Poonch. The Government cannot but conclude that all is being done with the knowledge and connivance of local authorities. The Government also trusts that it would be admitted that these acts are extremely unfriendly if not actually bordering on inimical. Finally the Government wish to make it plain that it is not possible to tolerate this attitude longer without grave consequences to the life [and] property of the people which it is sacredly bound to defend at all costs. The Government even now hopes that you would personally look into the matter and put a stop to all the iniquities which are being perpetrated. If unfortunately this request is not heeded the Government fully hope that you would agree that it would be justified in asking for friendly assistance and oppose trespass on its fundamental requests [*sic*].

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN]

¹On 24 October 1947, Jinnah told the Maharaja of Kashmir that this telegram had been released to the press before its receipt in Karachi. Hence the reply was to be released to the press as well. See KR-394.

²See KR-363, note 3.

³See KR-357.

KR-392

K. H. Khurshid to M. A. Jinnah

F. 118/2 (Vol. II)-GG/1

MAGHARMAL BAGH, SRINAGAR,
19 October 1947

My dear Sir,

I hope my letter of the 12th instant¹ has reached you by now. Enclosed are a few more papers for your information.

The enclosures consist of a brief summary of events² and the full official text of the statement of the new Prime Minister of Kashmir made at a press conference.³

Some Muslim youngmen including students and businessmen have formed a new organisation named the Pakistan Federation recently.

They are doing well. I shall give detailed information regarding this new organization in my next letter.

I trust, Sir, that you and Miss Jinnah are in the best of health.

With my sincere prayers for your health and happiness and long life and my respectful regards and *Salaams* to you and Miss Jinnah,

Yours obediently,
K. H. KHURSHID

¹KR-385.

^{2&3}Enclosure 1&2.

Enclosure 1 to KR-392

F. 118/2 (Vol. II)-GG/2-3

SRINAGAR,
18 October 1947

[SUMMARY OF EVENTS]

There have been rapid changes in the Administration within the last few days. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan (Congress nominee on the Punjab Boundary Commission) has taken over as Prime Minister. Two Muslims who held posts of Chief Secretary and Director-General of Civil Supplies (the only two Muslim heads of Departments) have been removed from their posts. The Prime Minister made a statement to the Press on the day he took over, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith. After he had read it over some questions were put to him. In answering them he made the following points:

1. He was not in a position to say anything whether the Muslim Conference detainees would be released as he had taken charge only an hour back. But he would examine the cases of all political prisoners and detainees.
2. It was not essential for the State to have entered into a Standstill Agreement with either Dominion. Under the Indian Independence Act, provision was made for the continuation of the then existing arrangements between the States and India with the two successor Governments, till a State decided to accede to one or the other Dominion.
3. It was not necessary for a State to decide the question of accession to Pakistan or Hindustan immediately.
4. He had gone to Delhi before he accepted the office and after

seeking the advice of his friends and in consultation with them he decided to take up the responsibility of office as Prime Minister.

5. Replying to a question whether the Government would not in the first instance attend to the grievances of Muslims who formed the bulk of the population in the State, the Prime Minister said: Trust bred trust. He would not reply if he was addressed by a Muslim as a Muslim. But if one spoke as a Kashmiri to him, he would be at their service.
6. Question: Would you support the demand for the establishment of responsible government in the State?

Answer: Yes, but the position of the Ruler should be safe and secure under any such system of government. Only nation-building departments should be in the hands of the popular representatives. He said that in this connection such a scheme should be prepared which the people could easily digest and not merely swallow in haste and be in trouble afterwards. But "I must wait till there is peace in the State and the situation on the borders is under complete control. Responsible government does not mean that people should be misled by communal slogans and thus vote some religious leaders. Perhaps that is how you take it, but responsible government can also mean that representatives of the people should be appointed on ministerial posts and they should be responsible to the legislature".

Popular feeling is becoming more and more favourable to accession to Pakistan every day. The workers and leaders of the Muslim Conference have started the work of organizing the people in right earnest. But it would be sheer optimism to expect this having any effect upon the authorities. Rumours of all kinds of invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan troops are current and spreading panic among the people although many Muslims seem desperate and would rather welcome such a thing. Although it is unbelievable that there are any Pakistani troops on the State borders, it is quite likely that armed bands of tribal people have assembled there. Rumour is also afloat that some armed people from the Frontier have entered the State territory and on an appointed day would start sabotaging the military movement within the State while those outside would march in. The rumours are very persistent and I have heard some responsible people who think they have reason to believe in their veracity. If this happens it may not only jeopardise Pakistan's position, but seriously affect relations between Kashmir and the Dominion. I would suggest, Sir, that immediate enquiry should be made into this by the Frontier and West Punjab Governments, for

such a thing would obviously throw the Maharaja into the lap of Indian Union and would mean a wholesale massacre of Musalmans of Kashmir.

The Kashmir Government is now arranging for flying fortresses to maintain communications between Delhi and the State. Aircraft that were used for importing petrol are now bringing, in addition, tear-gas bombs, explosives and incendiaries for the State Army. The State has also started recruitment of ex-soldiers, who happen to be mostly Dogras and Sikhs. Muslims are not taken. The State forces at present consist of about 12,000 regulars (of these about 1,500 are Muslims), nearly 15,000 are to be recruited and there is a reserve of nearly 200,000 Dogra Rajputs who are entitled to free possession of firearms under the Arms Act. They have utilized this concession to the utmost. Besides, there are groups of the RSS[S] and other Hindu civilians who possess arms and are being issued fresh licenses.

Enclosure 2 to KR-392
Statement¹ by Mehr Chand Mahajan

F. 118/2 (Vol. II)-GG/4-8

CHIEF SECRETARIAT,
HIS HIGHNESS' GOVERNMENT,
JAMMU & KASHMIR,
SRINAGAR,
15 October 1947

Addressing a Press conference at Srinagar today, the Hon'ble Prime Minister, Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan said:

“At the invitation of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir I am assuming charge of the office of Prime Minister at a moment when the State is on the chessboard of power politics. I am here in a spirit of loyal service to the Ruler and his people and with the firm conviction that Kashmir will once again become the cultural home of India and Pakistan, rather of the whole civilized world and will be called the Switzerland of the eastern hemisphere. I am optimistic enough to say that in the dominions of His Highness the East and the West Punjab will once again meet as friends and brothers and in this ancient land a common meeting place will be found between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and men of all races, religions and between persons speaking different languages.

“Some may feel that I am a trespasser in these territories, but I come with the feeling that I am one of you, I am connected with the ruling

family and their people by a number of ties. Be that as it may, I have affection for all people in all climes who are not possessed of the goods of the world and consequently live a life of poverty and misery. If given an opportunity of rendering true service to them I feel I may be able to ameliorate their lot. However, I do not believe in making promises at the time of taking over. I wish to be judged when I lay down the reins of my office.

“I come with an open mind and have no rigid political creeds and theories in my view. I am satisfied that constructive work for one's country irrespective of ideologies is what is needed at the present moment. I do believe that the Government of His Highness must be one which takes its decisions with the co-operation and the consent of the people's representatives and is ultimately responsible not only to His Highness but also to his people. I have no doubt in my mind that the people of the State are genuinely loyal to the person of His Highness and he is loved by them all and they regard him as a ruler with progressive ideas. I have also no hesitation in stating that His Highness wishes to take no decisions to which his loyal subjects are not consenting parties.

“I would like to mention that in the discharge of my duties as Prime Minister I shall not be guided by any communal consideration, whatsoever. I feel that religion and politics are dangerous bedfellows. That it is so has been proved by the events of the last few months across the borders of the State. Those who wish to carve a communal State in the dominions of Maharaja Bahadur will find no quarter with me. People who wish to sabotage the existing Government and substitute a parallel government of their own will undoubtedly be treated as rebels, and if caught, will share the fate that meets all rebels. I welcome and appreciate the lead given to the people of the State by that great leader of the Kashmiris, Sheikh Moh[amma]d Abdullah. I am glad that before my arrival here he was a free citizen, and I am delighted to say that I had an occasion of making his acquaintance before assuming charge of my office. It will be my sincere endeavour to cultivate friendship with him and other leaders of political parties in the State excepting, of course, those who are disloyal to the person of His Highness and his dynasty, and have pledged their loyalties elsewhere and wish to create disturbances in the State.

“From all officers and servants of the Government, I expect brotherly cooperation and affection, at the same time I wish to sound a note of warning that if there are any in the cadre of Government service who are openly or secretly owing loyalty to another State, then these will be

ruthlessly persecuted and hunted out. Such conduct on the part of civil and military servants cannot be viewed with leniency by any Government, and I speak with experience that failure of the Government servants to discharge their duties is principally responsible for the massacres in the Province of the five rivers. I would like to observe at this moment that no recommendations and other artful devices which verge on flattery will ever work with me. Loyal and honest service to His Highness and his people alone will count with me. It may be noted that I expect every officer to do his own work on his own initiative and responsibility. The plain truth is that I am here to do my own work and not the work of other officers who alone also must do it.

"I assure you that we can change the fortunes of the people residing within the dominions of His Highness and can find enough food and other necessities of life for them and raise their standard of living if we work for the economic and industrial development of the State in a spirit of brotherly cooperation irrespective of our different and conflicting political ideologies and leave aside all communal bickering and squabbles and thoughts regarding percentages in offices. Work and employment must be found for all, irrespective of religious labels. Allow capital to flow from all neighbouring countries and outside into the State with proper safeguards for the local residents. Let learned people in sciences, art and literature from India, Pakistan, Asia and other countries of the West and America and U.S.S.R. feel that Kashmir has a home for them and they can pursue their researches here. Let us be more cosmopolitan in outlook and try to get rid of the spirit of provincialism and communalism. The whole world is becoming one State and there is no room for such narrow ideas in the world of tomorrow. There is however, a condition precedent before these ideas can mature. No capital can flow inside the State and no men of learning will come to our Switzerland unless internal security within the State is guaranteed and fear from external aggression is eliminated.

"As regards internal security I can guarantee it forthwith. His Highness' Government is strong and powerful enough to give this assurance. Let no one harbour panicky thoughts and ideas. I believe in the good sense and brotherly affection of Kashmiri people and I presume that they are shrewd enough to know that without internal security they will have to go without food and other necessities of life. Troubles in the Punjab have hit them very hard and I am sure that they do realise that if there is trouble in the State they and they alone will be the principal sufferers. I hope leaders of all parties in Jammu and

Kashmir will join with me in giving this guarantee.

"As regards the trouble on State borders, I have heard with regret the news of raids from Pakistan side. I am sure that State forces will teach a lesson to the raiders. I intend to write personally to leaders of the Dominion a request to take effective measures to prevent these raids, and I hope my appeal will be listened to by them. I have also learnt with surprise that the authorities of the West Punjab have non-cooperated with the State and have acted in breach of the Standstill Agreements in preventing the supplies of petrol, cloth, food etc. reach the State.

"Communication lines have also been blocked and stopped. I hope to write to my friends in the West Punjab drawing their attention to this unfriendly act. I expect from them a worthy treatment as good neighbours. I am told that the Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone Department are not rendering loyal service to the State. I hope this accusation may prove untrue on investigation. I cannot but express my sense of deep appreciation for the help, advice and assistance given to the Government of His Highness by the leaders of the Dominion of India and the Government of His Highness is deeply thankful for this friendly gesture.

"May I be permitted to observe that whatever decision His Highness may eventually take about the status of the State, keeping in view the public opinion in the matter; in other words, whether it is decided that the State will remain independent or will accede to any of the two Dominions, it will always remain on the friendliest of terms with both the Dominions, and I am sure both the Dominions will allow the State to arrive at a decision according to its economic and other circumstances and in proper time. The State borders verge on both the Dominions and also adjoin the borders of other independent countries and I appeal to all our neighbours for help and friendship and brotherly feelings, and I hope my feelings will find response from all concerned. No decision on this crucial question can be taken in haste and when people's vision is clouded by communal frenzy and when balanced public opinion is not available.

"Finally, I appeal to the leaders of all political parties to give me their full cooperation. I welcome exchange of ideas with all leaders of thought in the State, so that I may be able to tender advice to His Highness and his people about the correct course to be adopted in deciding political questions. I also seek the cooperation of the 5th State [sic for Estate] i.e., the Press in the State and in India and Pakistan and other countries. Without cooperation and support no administration

can be successful. I hope I will have their fullest support."

¹Issued by S. S. Kaul, Publicity Officer, Kashmir.

KR-393

Mir Maqbool Mahmood to F. Amin

F. 110-GG/3-4

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

SEAFIELD, KARACHI,

19 October 1947

Dear Mr. Amin,

Thanks for your letter¹ in reply to my request for an interview with H. E. the Quaid-i-Azam. I had gone to Lahore and returned yesterday.

I had intended to submit at the interview certain suggestions on the following items:

- a. States—particularly Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kalat
- b. Refugee problem—in the light of my personal experiences as a refugee
- c. Defence—with particular reference to the Sikh menace
- d. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
- e. Negotiating Committee for the States
- f. Foreign Publicity and external contacts for Pakistan
- g. Certain aspects of economic and industrial planning
- h. Art and Culture in Pakistan

I do not wish to trouble Quaid-i-Azam when he is busy and will await my opportunity as and when convenient to him. In the meantime, in view of the urgency of the Kashmir problem, I enclose a note for submission to the Quaid-i-Azam.²

Yours sincerely,
[MIR] MAQBOOL MAHMOOD
ex-Secretary, Chamber of Princes

¹See F. 110-GG/2. Not printed.

²Acknowledged by F. Amin on 21 October. See F. 110-GG/9. Not printed.

Enclosure to KR-393
Note by Mir Maqbool Mahmood

F. 110-GG/5-8

KASHMIR AND PAKISTAN

Basis of Approach

Kashmir is a life artery of Pakistan from the strategic, economic and defence points of view. In unfriendly hands, Kashmir can be a source of vital danger to Pakistan and vice versa.

2. Judged by all legitimate and accepted canons, Kashmir's constitutional alignment is natural with Pakistan. Nevertheless, extraneous influences and considerations appear to be pulling Kashmir in the opposite direction. The latest news in the press are alarming and demand immediate action on the highest plane and of the first diplomatic order. Delay or drift would be dangerous. The time between now and the completion of the Pathankot bridge, connecting Kashmir with India, is our best chance. The real interests of Kashmir as well as Pakistan emphasise their coming together.

3. The Pakistan Government has been faced with many vital and immediate problems which no human ingenuity can expect to tackle within two months. The Kashmir issue, however, deserves to be given priority No 1. It has great repercussions even on the refugee problem.

4. In the affairs of Indian States, personal factors play a great part. The Ruler has to be tackled on all fronts—more so when as in the case of Kashmir, the Ruler is weak, vacillating and liable to be influenced. As a Hindu, he would like to steer clear of Pakistan, but persons who carry weight with him could impress on him that even accession to India cannot save him and his dynasty. In fact, he may get a fairer deal from Pakistan, for himself, his dynasty and the Dogra minority in the State than from Nehru or Patel. Experiences of other States which have acceded to India should prove an eye-opener for the Maharaja.

5. With the aforesaid background, and in view of the urgency of this question, a few suggestions are cited below for consideration. Such of them as are approved may be tried. The issue demands immediate and positive action with strength and tact.

Policy and Line of Action

6 a. Kashmir is more vital to us than Hyderabad or Junagadh. The latter two must ultimately fall. Kashmir cannot go against Pakistan if we play our cards properly. In balancing pros and cons of our policy towards Kashmir and its reactions on Hyderabad we [have] already lost much vantage ground.

b. Plebiscite suggested by the Indian Government for Junagadh should be clinched for Kashmir and details must be worked out to ensure impartial and fair voting—under more or less the same procedure as was adopted in NWFP. State machinery should be relied upon. Before that a network of propaganda and mass contact should immediately be pushed into Kashmir. This will have to be done unofficially. *Pirs* (religious leaders) should prove a good and effective, but often tricky medium.

c. The objective ultimately is to bring Kashmir with Pakistan, if immediate accession with us be impossible, it may be inspired that Kashmir may avoid accession with [*sic* for to] India as well as Pakistan immediately but should watch developments. If Indian troops do not help Kashmir at this stage, it will never be able to resist Pakistan infiltration. Another alternative may be suggested to the Maharaja with a view to biding time. He may be advised, through Mr. Abdul Rahman Effendi who is in Srinagar or through some other friend of the Maharaja, that he may split up Kashmir in [to] two states—Kashmir proper and Jammu. Kashmir may join Pakistan, Jammu may join India. At one time the Maharaja and his advisers were working on these lines.

d. Whatever the provocation, and there has doubtless been the greatest provocation, it is expedient to avoid a conflict with the Indian Government at the present stage. The issue of Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh may, therefore, be discussed on the highest plane between the Quaid-i-Azam and the Pakistan Prime Minister with the Indian Viceroy [*sic* for Governor-General] and Prime Minister. It should be impressed on them that there has been enough bloodshed and misery already, and that any further recurrence on the State's issue must be avoided. Plebiscite is a fair basis of approach which originated in the case of Junagadh from the India Government itself. Otherwise, even without plebiscite the accession of the States may be settled amicably between India and Pakistan Dominions on the basis of population. On this basis Junagadh may, in the last resort, be allowed to go to India provided Kashmir is assured to Pakistan.

e. There should be a strong and vigorous campaign for responsible Government in Kashmir sponsored by the Kashmiris with the moral and financial backing of the non-official elements and parties in Pakistan. This must be pushed forthwith as is being encouraged by the Indian States Department in various Muslim States, so that when the new constitution is ready and the question of permanent accession of the States is to be settled, the

elected representatives of the majority community in each State may have the decisive voice. The States Department of India have been advising Muslim Rulers with Muslim minorities in their States to abolish separate electorates in their States and to allot representation on population basis, so that the Muslim minority loses weightage. Kashmir should do likewise.

f. There are influential and dependable friends in Kashmir—such as Mr. Shahmiri, Secretary to Premier, Kashmir—who are in the know of affairs and want Kashmir to join Pakistan in the best interests of Kashmir. They should be tactfully contacted through reliable messengers and their advice sought immediately. Similarly, Kak (ex-Premier, Kashmir, though now under suspicion) and his influential party—who are against the Indian Congress leadership and also against local Dogra group—could be useful. All this and much more could be arranged through a personal unofficial representative of the Quaid-i-Azam who may be temporarily deputed to Kashmir.

g. Gilgit in Kashmir territory is within a few hours flight from the Russian aerodromes. The defence and international aspects of this problem are therefore obvious and can best be discussed personally.

h. Both the Nizam and the Maharaja of Kashmir are very nervous of their future, and rightly so. In the existing circumstances, whether they accede to Pakistan or India, the danger cannot be avoided. Both of these Rulers have told me personally that they envy the position of Bahawalpur, with a Muslim Ruler and a Muslim majority and contiguous to Pakistan. Both the Rulers should now welcome the revival of the proposal made in 1932 that the Rulers of Hyderabad and Kashmir may change places with such adjustments as may be mutually agreed. This proposal would be in the best interests of these Rulers and the peoples of their States. It is also in the best interests of Pakistan and can avoid much bloodshed and misery. It requires immediate and tactful handling simultaneously in Hyderabad and Kashmir and with the Indian Government. The method of approach and the personnel could be discussed personally if the plan is approved. After Mehr Chand Mahajan's appointment as Premier, Kashmir, only a bold plan like this, broached directly with the Maharaja, may succeed. With Nizam's money, Kashmir's resources, and Pakistan's port and support, a great future is assured for Kashmir.

i. International permutations and factors must play a great part in the settlement of Kashmir's accession. This calls for a planned

diplomatic and defence policy, backed by cautious publicity and foreign contacts.

KR-394

M. A. Jinnah to Maharaja of Kashmir

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

No. 259-RC/47

KARACHI,

20 October 1947

I have received telegram of the 18th October¹ from your Prime Minister regarding the situation in Kashmir which, I regret, was released to the press before it reached me and before I could deal with it. My Government have already been in communication with your Government and I deplore that your Prime Minister should have resorted to the tone and language adopted in his telegram to me which embodies a threat to seek outside assistance and is almost in the nature of an ultimatum. This is hardly the way for any responsible and friendly Government to handle the situation that has arisen.

2. On 15th October your Prime Minister sent a telegram² to my Government making similar allegations in the same offensive manner as have been repeated in his telegram of the 18th October, now addressed to me without waiting for the reply to his earlier telegram from my Government. My Government have already replied to that telegram on the 18th October³ and this reply shows clearly that your Government's wholly one-sided and *ex parte* allegations cannot be supported. Since your Government have released to the press the telegram addressed to me under reply, my Government have no other course left open and have therefore decided to release to the press⁴ their reply referred to above refuting your Government's allegations.

3. The allegation in the telegram under reply that the Standstill Agreement has not been observed is entirely wrong. The difficulties that have been felt by your administration have arisen as a result of the widespread disturbances in the East Punjab and the disruption of communications caused thereby, particularly by the shortage of coal. These difficulties have been felt acutely by the West Punjab Government themselves. The difficulties with regard to banking facilities were caused by lack of staff in the various banks and cannot be laid at the door of the West Punjab Government who have in fact tried their [utmost] to ensure protection to the banks. The failure of remittances

from the Lahore Currency Officer has nothing to do with the Pakistan Government since the Lahore Currency Officer is under the Reserve Bank of India. Your Government's complaints regarding press reports and telegrams by private persons are also wide off the mark. Your Government do not realise the fact that there is no censorship in West Punjab. The complaint about local and provincial authorities is thus wholly unfounded. It is travesty of the truth to call the promises of the Central Government paper promises as your Government alleges. My Government adhere to those assurances and have every intention of carrying out the Standstill Agreement.

4. In order to remove the various difficulties relating to communications and supply of goods, my Government suggested long ago that representatives of the Governments of Pakistan and Kashmir should meet. That request was ignored. In the circumstances I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the unfounded allegations and accusations are only a smokescreen to cover the real aim of your Government's policy. A recent instance of this policy is the differential treatment accorded [*sic* for accorded] to leaders of the Kashmir National Conference and the Muslim Conference. On the one hand, your Government have released Sheikh Abdulla[h] who was tried and convicted of high treason, removed the ban on his colleagues and allowed the National Conference organisation a free field in which to carry on their propaganda. On the other hand, Mr. Ghulam Abbas and his colleagues, whose alleged offence was only that they disobeyed the order banning the meeting of the Muslim Conference, are still rotting in jail and the Muslim Conference organisation is not allowed its elementary right of civil liberties. The course which your Government is pursuing [against] the Musalmans in every way, the atrocities which are being committed by your troops and which are driving Muslims out of the State, the various indications given in the press, particularly the release to the press of your Prime Minister's telegram addressed to me containing unfounded allegations and the threat to enlist outside assistance show clearly that the real aim of your Government's policy is to seek an opportunity to join the India Dominion as a *coup d'état* by securing the intervention and assistance of that Dominion. This policy is naturally creating deep resentment and grave apprehension among your subjects, 85 per cent of whom are Muslims.

5. The proposal made by my Government for a meeting with your accredited representative is now an urgent necessity. I suggest that the way to smooth out the difficulties and adjust matters in a friendly way is for your Prime Minister to come to Karachi and discuss the developments that have taken place instead of carrying on acrimonious and

bitter controversy by telegrams and correspondence. I would also repeat that I endorse the suggestion made in your Prime Minister's telegram of 15th October and accepted by my Government in their reply of 18th October to have "an impartial enquiry made into the whole affair"

[M. A. JINNAH]

¹KR-391

²Enclosure to KR-389.

^{3&4}See the *Pakistan Times*, 22 October 1947, for Liaquat Ali Khan's reply to Mehr Chand Mahajan.

KR-395

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Rafi Ahmad Kidwai*¹

NEW DELHI,
20 October 1947

My dear Rafi Sahib,

Batra, Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir State, has written to me that owing to the breakdown of communications, valuable commodities like silk, pashmina, dry and fresh fruit and walnuts are held up there and that it would be best if the Government of India could help by allowing a freighter service to be run for about a fortnight between Srinagar and Delhi.²

2. I do not know whether it would be feasible, but since the season for Srinagar is only a fortnight more, I think it would be better if immediate arrangements could be made for this service. You could probably select some other suitable service and arrange that a freighter flies every day to Srinagar and back with these articles.

3. The Kashmir officer is due to leave tomorrow morning by air. I would, therefore, be grateful if you could let me know some time today whether anything would be possible, and, if so, what further action or assistance you would require from the Kashmir Government sponsored flight and any arrangement for payment of freight etc. would be with the Kashmir Government. It would be for them to recover whatever amount may be necessary from the actual consignors.

Your sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 60.

²A request was also made by Vallabhbhai Patel's Private Secretary to the Ministry of Transport, to provide two aircraft each day to ferry on behalf of Deputy Prime Minister, Kashmir, petrol and aviation spirit to Srinagar. See *ibid.*, 61.

KR-396

M. Ikramullah to Mehr Chand Mahajan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

IMMEDIATE
No. 261-RC/47

KARACHI,
21 October 1947

In our telegram No. 241 RC/47 dated 12th October 1947,¹ we drew your attention to the grave situation in Poonch. Reports since received indicate that a reign of terror has been let loose in Poonch and terrible atrocities are being committed by Dogra troops operating in Poonch area. Large numbers of refugees are crossing from Kashmir territory into Pakistan and they relate stories of inhuman barbarity. Serious anxiety regarding safety of their families in Poonch area is being felt by Pakistan military personnel whom it is exceedingly difficult to reassure in absence of any clear reports or assurances from you. Request immediate detailed report of conditions and assurances of security for Muslim life and property.

In our telegram No. 242 RC/47 dated 12.10.47² we drew your attention to the series of raids made from Jammu State into Sialkot district and asked you to take immediate and firm action to stop them. In your telegram of the 15th October³ you have said nothing about the action that you are taking to stop these raids which are still continuing. A report from the West Punjab Government dated 20th October⁴ stated that a Jammu State *jatha* armed with bren guns and rifles attacked Sialkot border villages. They killed 18 persons and burnt one village after loot. Similarly, two Muslims and one Christian killed by Jammu soldiers firing near Suchetgarh and several villages near State border burnt. Muslims of border villages are evacuating. This is a most serious state of affairs to which your Government must put a stop.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

¹KR-383.

²KR-384.

³Enclosure to KR-389.

⁴Not traceable.

KR-397

Vallabhbhai Patel to Mehr Chand Mahajan¹

NEW DELHI,
21 October 1947

My dear Mahajan,

I hope you have already received a letter from Bakshi Tek Chand [former Judge of the Lahore High Court] which must have been sent to you after I had a talk with him subsequent to my first discussion with Sheikh Abdullah.

Since then I have had further discussion with him. He seems to me genuinely anxious to co-operate and sincerely desirous of assisting the State in dealing with the external dangers and internal troubles with which it is threatened. But, at the same time, as is natural, he feels that unless something is done, and is done immediately, to strengthen his hands both in popular eyes and in dealings with those dangers, it would be impossible for him to do anything substantial.

I myself feel that the position which Sheikh Abdullah takes up is understandable and reasonable. In the mounting demands for the introduction of responsible Government in States, such as you have recently witnessed in Travancore and Mysore, it is impossible for you to isolate yourself. It is obvious that in your dealings with the external dangers and internal commotion with which you are faced, mere brute force is not enough. We, on our part, have pledged to give you the maximum support and we will do so. But I am afraid, without some measure of popular backing, particularly from amongst the community which represents such an overwhelming majority in Kashmir, it would be difficult to make such support go to the farthest limit that is necessary if we are to crush the disruptive forces which are being raised and organized. Nor do I think it would be possible for you to maintain for long the exclusive or the predominant monopoly of any particular community in your security services. It is as necessary for you to treat those who are willing to co-operate with trust and confidence in respect of these services as in respect of others which are generally termed nation-building departments.

In all these circumstances, it is my sincere and earnest advice to you to make a substantial gesture to win Sheikh Abdullah's support. I have no desire to suggest that you should do so in a manner which would be completely revolutionary in character. Such a step may undermine the loyal and willing support of the body politic. I fully realize that His

Highness would like to safeguard his position and that of the State in certain matters. I have no doubt that human ingenuity, statesmanship and conciliation can find a solution in which Sheikh Sahib's position can be safeguarded without in any way jeopardizing that of His Highness.

I feel that it would be in our mutual interests for you to reflect calmly and dispassionately on what I have said above. It would, in my opinion, be best if you could come here for consultation and, if possible, His Highness could be persuaded to come here as well. We could then hammer out something which would rally popular support in defence of the State both from without and from within.

Dewan Shiv Saran Lal, formerly Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, who has recently come to Delhi from the Frontier, is also coming by this plane. He has his own ideas how he can be of service to the State. You can hear him and decide for yourself to what extent his ideas are practicable or would suit your requirements.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 61-3.

KR-398

Mehr Chand Mahajan to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, SA (4) 6/2

No. X-RC 17.15

SRINAGAR,
22 October 1947

Your telegram regarding Poonch.¹ Facts reverse of what alleged. People from across border Rawalpindi and Hazara District causing trouble which has been extended by them from this morning to Muzaffarabad District² of Kashmir Province as well. Pakistan Government can put end to resentment of feelings of Pakistan Army. People belonging to this State whose relations, in consequence of disturbances created by Pakistan people, are displaced and put to inconvenience. Allegation of reign of terror created by Dogras are not related to facts. On the other hand, copies of telegrams from minority communities suffering most at the hands of invaders are reproduced below for information.

Telegram, Public Poonch. *Begins*: Hindus and Sikhs in danger of

being completely wiped out; rebels fifteen miles from city; crisis increased every moment. *Ends.*

Telegram, Hindus Sikhs Poonch. *Begins:* Situation extremely grave; four Rajput families numbering thirty six ruthlessly butchered at Baral near Palandari. Fate of thousands of surrounding villages unknown. Thick clouds of smoke visible. Refugees in thousands pouring every day. Villages fifteen miles distant ablazed; raiders at gates of city. Pray arrange immediate aerial survey and despatch sufficient reinforcements and save. *Ends.*

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN]

¹See KR-396.

²See Annex.

Annex to KR-398

REBELLION IN KASHMIR: MUSLIM PEASANTS' UPRISING¹

SRINAGAR,
24 October 1947

Friction between Kashmir State, with its Hindu Ruler and predominantly Hindu administration, on the one hand, and its mainly Muslim population, backed by public opinion in the adjoining Pakistan Dominion, on the other hand, has in recent weeks taken the form of armed rebellion against the Maharaja by the Muslim peasantry of the western districts of Poonch Province, and culminated within the last two days in the cutting of the main road link between Kashmir and Pakistan leading from Srinagar (the Capital of Kashmir) to Rawalpindi.

According to reports circulating in Srinagar to-day, rebellious Muslims of the Bagh district have been aided and armed by their Pakistani co-religionists from across the Jhelum River, which here forms the border between Kashmir and Pakistan, and consequently the rebels have succeeded in forcing the Kashmir State troops (mainly Hindu Dogras) to withdraw eastwards to the town of Poonch, which is the capital of the province of the same name. The rebels are said also to have raided armouries, to have seized several hundred rifles, and to have chased out minority communities of Hindus and Sikhs who had earlier sought refuge in Kashmir territory from communal troubles in the Rawalpindi division last March.

The latest and most serious development, however, which so far lacks confirmation, is a report that within the last two days the adjacent district of Muzaffarabad, which lies to the north of the Bagh district, and

marches with the Hazara district of the North-West Frontier Province, has likewise passed into the control of the rebel peasantry, who in this case are said to be supported by armed raiders consisting of several hundred Pathans from Hazara.

NO MAILS OR TELEGRAMS

This much is certain that road communications between Srinagar and Rawalpindi have been cut, that the bus services have been turned back and have stopped running, and that mails and telegrams are not getting through. Report further has it that the rebels are in control of the main bridge across the Jhelum River at Kohala, on the Pakistan border, and have driven Kashmir customs officials and troops away from their frontier posts at Domel, on the other bank of the river. As the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road is the main supply route for such commodities as petrol, food, salt, sugar, and cloth, all of which are already very short in Kashmir, the seriousness of this threat to the economy of the State cannot be exaggerated. These matters and also the alleged military intervention by Pakistanis in the Poonch rebellion, formed the gravamen of the recent official complaint by the Kashmir Government to the Pakistan Government.

All these troubles are of course a direct repercussion of the accession controversy which has been exercising men's mind ever since the British Crown's suzerainty over Kashmir ceased on August 15. Because the population of Kashmir is more than 80 per cent Muslim, and because its geographical and economic position make it dependent upon Pakistan, Muslims feel that the State must accede to Pakistan. But the Union of India has been taking a lively interest in the subject, and indications are that the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, has lately been much influenced by representations made by Mr. Gandhi, who visited Kashmir three months ago, and by other Congress leaders. The recent release from prison of Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the Kashmir National Conference and an ardent supporter of the Indian Congress Party, has strengthened the general belief that Kashmir intends ultimately to accede to the Indian Union rather than to Pakistan, and is at present playing for time.

While Srinagar city is to day in a state of suppressed excitement and some anxiety about the outcome of recent events, it is necessary to emphasize that the present regime is still firmly in the saddle. Nevertheless the situation is highly inflammable, and could well provide a *casus belli* between the Dominions of Pakistan and India.

¹*The Times, London, 25 October 1947.*

KR-399

President, Jammu City Muslim Conference to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram, F. 118/2 (Vol. II)-GG/11-2

SIALKOT CITY,
23 October 1947

Quaid-i-Azam, Karachi,

Previous telegrams unheeded. Ten thousand Muslim refugees gathered Rosin Factory, Miran Sahib. All butchered by Dogra Military immediately after assurances from Kash[mir] Premier to them for safety. Within 50 miles radius of Jammu city, all Muslims including women, children, officials etc. killed. Number of killed over 40,000. Organised killing continues.¹ Attacks on Jammu city Muslims started. Over 350 mosques burnt, bonfires of holy *Quran* made. Muslim officials and officers being hunted and killed. All planned by Government. Telegraphic line cut off. Jammu city Muslims on last legs. Kindly awake now this is 12th hour and save thousands from fast approaching death. This is our last dying appeal and if no immediate arrangements are made, you alone will be personally responsible for ruthless murder of thousands of innocent Muslims of Jammu City.² Now or never.

[PRESIDENT, CITY MUSLIM CONFERENCE, JAMMU]

¹See KR-384.

²Pakistan protested strongly, in a series of telegrams to Kashmir State, against raids across the border from Jammu and atrocities committed on Muslims in Poonch. See FOA, S-6, 2. Not printed.

KR-400

M. Ikramullah to Mehr Chand Mahajan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

IMMEDIATE
No. 271-KC/47

KARACHI,
24 October 1947

Your telegram No. X-RC 17.15 dated 22nd October¹ again evades the issue. Instead of giving a factual account of the position in Poonch and the measures being taken by your Government to put an end to the oppression of the Muslims in Poonch you have resorted to quoting certain telegrams from Hindus and Sikhs who fear that they are in

danger. But you maintain a studied silence regarding the condition of Muslims who, as a matter of fact, are being killed and driven out.² The whole weight of State machinery is thrown in favour of the Hindus and Sikhs and against the Muslims. In these circumstances it is impossible to understand what grounds Hindus and Sikhs have for fear. The condition of the Muslims can be judged from a telegram, received from the Muslims of Jammu reproduced below, which is one of many pouring in every day. *Begins:* Dogra military reinforced by numberless Indian Army plain clothes. Sikhs *Jathas* local and from abroad, Hindus and Rajputs armed with modern weapons launched wholesale massacre of Muslims of Ranbirsinghpura, Akhnur, Samba and Jammu *Tehsils* of Jammu District. Several thousand Muslims already ruthlessly butchered.³ Hundreds of women abducted. All moveable property looted and hundreds of Muslim villages burnt to ashes. Hostile forces continuing killing suburban Muslims and burning Muslim villages from all sides now converging on Jammu City and only one mile distance from it. Village Raipur within Jammu Cantonment area burnt. Muslims in city already hopeless minority and altogether unarmed. Fifteen thousand Muslims of Jammu city, including children, women and cream of Muslim intelligentsia surrounded from all sides helpless and in immediate danger of being ruthlessly killed. Muslim military disarmed and Brigadier Khuda Buksh, Jammu Cantt relieved by Hindu Brigadier. If immediate help not made all will be butchered. Persistent bigger tragedy than Eastern Punjab. Pray intervene immediately without losing a second. *Ends.*

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

¹KR-398.

²On 22 October 1947, the NWFP Governor informed Liaquat Ali Khan that a large number of Kashmiri refugees had entered Hazara district. They recounted harrowing stories of brutalities committed by the State forces. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent tribesmen from entering Kashmir to avert retaliation. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

³KR-401.

KR-401

Hamidullah Khan to M. A. Jinnah & Others

Telegram, FOA, S. 4 (9)

SIALKOT,

25 October 1947

Dogra Military, Sikhs, Rajputs, fully armed, began massacre of Musalmans

of Jammu Province commencing from Pakistan boundary adjoining Ranbirsinghpura, Samba, Kashmir, Srinagar, Akhnur and Jammu *Tehsils* also in Udhampur, Rio and Rajouri *Tehsils*. Maharaja personally toured and distributed arms among Hindus exhorting them to save Dogra Raj by killing Musalmans. Military and mobs led by responsible civilian officers chased and killed Muslims.

All Muslim property looted, villages burned, women disgraced, killed and abducted. Over 400 mosques demolished. This killing drive started in *mofassal*, continues towards Jammu city. Thousand of Musalmans gathered as refugees in open places, starved and killed. Over 10,000 Muslims gathered in two concentration camps at Miran Sahib were ruthlessly butchered. Twelve wounded men only remnants of 10,000 souls reached Sialkot and gave heart-rending accounts of miserable deaths of men, women and children and of publicly disgracing Muslim virgins.

Carnage still in full swing. Other *tehsils* affected and hooligans approaching outskirts of Jammu city. Jammu city Muslims numbering 25,000 including women and choicest brains in immediate danger of being butchered. Immediate arrangements for their protection or safe evacuation essential, otherwise will be lost [*sic*]. If Muslims at Capital are killed, Dogras will achieve aim of clearing Muslims from Capital within hundred miles radius and turning Muslim majority into minority. This is a well planned scheme. Jammu centre Muslims must at all costs be saved if Kashmir's accession to Pakistan is ever to materialise. Even Muslim officials not safe. Two Muslim police officers shot, many constables and soldiers killed, others hiding. Brigadier Khuda Buksh reported arrested. Hundreds of thousands of Musalmans have escaped to Sialkot, Gujrat and Shakargarh. Number of Muslims killed in bordering *tehsils* over 45,000. This excludes interior *tehsils* being inaccessible and their accounts presently under-estimated. We knocked every door for help bringing home facts, but so far are disappointed. Pakistan authorities are inert but if Dogras succeed in annihilating and driving out Muslims, not only Kashmir is lost but Pakistan would shake irretrievably. Time and gravity of situation call for immediate strenuous effort and a second's delay would undo Muslim[s] and all over. We entreat you to move yourself and move concerned forthwith [*sic*]. *Ends*

HAMIDULLAH
Acting President, Muslim Conference

KR-402

*Maharaja of Kashmir to Louis Mountbatten**FOA, SA (4)-6/2*THE PALACE, JAMMU,
26 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency¹ has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government.

As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economic and cultural links with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.

I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interest of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both.

I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a Standstill Agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government, under the Standstill Agreement are operating post[s] and telegraph[s] system inside the State.

Though we have got a Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State at first in Poonch and then from Sialkot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahora power house which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as first step to overrunning the whole State.

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from the distant areas of

the North-West Frontier, coming regularly in motor trucks, using Mansehra-Muzaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government, no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. In fact both the Pakistan Radio and press have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provisional Government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both the Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send help, asked for by me, without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so² and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen, so long as I am Ruler of the State and have life to defend my country.

I may also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State has to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. Menon is fully aware of the situation and he will explain to you if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,
HARI SINGH

¹See Annex.

²A new version has it that Kashmir actually acceded to India on 24 October 1947. See S C. Bhatt, ed., *The Encyclopaedic District Gazetteers of India*, Vol. 3, Delhi, 1997, 407. Over 100 aircraft had been commandeered by India and the fleet assembled was ready to transport Indian troops to Kashmir by 26 October 1947. The army movement orders had also been issued the same day. Preparations on such a scale could not have been made in a mere 24 hours unless India had made the decision earlier than formally indicated. See Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, 140 and 144, note 31.

Annex to KR-402

FIGHTING IN KASHMIR¹ Rebels Aided by Tribesmen State Troops Retreat

Srinagar, October 26: From the many conflicting reports and the bazaar

rumours circulating in Srinagar today one fact emerges clearly—that the military position in the rebellious districts of western Kashmir has deteriorated gravely within the past three days. Repercussions of this on public opinion in the capital city of Srinagar and the districts between it and the western border are such that a state of near panic prevails, and Hindu and Sikh refugees are pouring into the city and through it to the predominantly Hindu area of Jammu, which lies some 100 miles south of Srinagar.

Eye-witness accounts of the fighting around the township of Uri, which lies on the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road, some 50 miles from the Pakistan border, reveal a somewhat farcical state of affairs with the Kashmir Army and rebel Muslim peasantry, aided by Muslim deserters and tribesmen from the Hazara District of the North-West Frontier Province, blazing away indiscriminately at one another with mortars and machine-guns for hours on end without inflicting any casualties.

It would appear that neither party really knows how to conduct guerrilla warfare in the mountainous countryside, and the deciding factor is likely to be the morale of the contenders. The indications are that the rebels' morale is higher than that of the State troops, with the result, that the last-named are falling back, and, according to an unconfirmed report, are planning to make a stand at the township of Baramula, some 50 miles farther along the road and within 50 miles of Srinagar.

¹*The Times*, London, 27 October 1947.

KR-403

Jawaharlal Nehru to Clement Attlee

Telegram, FOA, SA (4) 6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 402-Primin-2227

NEW DELHI,
27 October 1947

Begins: For Prime Minister, United Kingdom from Prime Minister, India.

A grave situation has developed in the State of Kashmir. Large number of Afridis and other tribesmen from Frontier have invaded State territory, occupied several towns and rebels massacred large number of non-Muslims. According to our information tribesmen have been equipped with motor transport and also with automatic weapons

and have passed through Pakistan territory. Latest news is that the invaders are proceeding up the Jhelum Valley road towards the Valley of Kashmir.

2. We have received urgent appeal for assistance from Kashmir Government. We would be disposed to give favourable consideration to such request from any friendly State. Kashmir's northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Security of Kashmir which must depend upon control of internal tranquillity and existence of stable Government is vital to security of India especially since part of southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir therefore is an obligation of national interest of India. We are giving urgent consideration to question as to what assistance we can give to State to defend itself.

3. I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression of the will of people of Kashmir is possible, if external aggression succeeds in imperilling integrity of its territory.

4. I have thought it desirable to inform you of situation because of its threat of international complications: *Ends.*

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

KR-404

Clement Attlee to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

[No. 339/47]

KARACHI,

27 October 1947

Begins: "I have received message from Prime Minister of India stating that grave situation has developed in Kashmir.¹ That tribesmen equipped with motor transport and automatic weapons entered Kashmir territory through Pakistan. That they have occupied several towns and have killed large number of non-Muslims and that they are advancing on Srinagar. Mr. Nehru says that Government of India have received

urgent appeal for assistance from Kashmir Government and that they are considering this appeal. He adds that he would like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India.

I have sent Mr. Nehru a reply saying that we have received no confirmed reports of the scale and importance of any incursions there may have been and begging him not to let his answer to this appeal take the form of armed intervention by the forces of India. I would also appeal to you to do everything possible to prevent armed intervention in Kashmir by Muslims from Pakistan, or by tribesmen seeking to pass through Pakistan administered territory on their way to Kashmir. I hope that it will be possible for you to use your influence with any such [tribesmen] who have already entered Kashmir to return home. I am informing Mr. Nehru that I am making this appeal to you.

I also suggest for your consideration as I am suggesting to Mr. Nehru that it might be most useful step towards settlement of difficult question of Kashmir's future if it could be discussed by you, Mr. Nehru and Maharaja of Kashmir at a meeting to be held as soon as possible at some suitable place." [Ends]

¹See KR-403.

KR-405

Mohamed Ali to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 675

KARACHI,
27 October 1947

British High Commissioner saw me just now and handed me the following document:

[Four paras omitted. See KR-404]

British High Commissioner expressed the hope that the suggestion for a meeting between you, Pandit Nehru and the Maharaja of Kashmir would be acceptable to you and that you would wire to Pandit Nehru immediately your acceptance of this suggestion informing the Prime Minister of the U.K. at the same time.

I gave him an account of the genesis of the trouble, how atrocities in Poonch had driven out a considerable section of the Muslim population. The refugees pouring into Hazara District had inflamed the local population.

I also informed him that the Pakistan Government had in no way encouraged the incursion of tribesmen into Kashmir but had in fact opposed it. We could however exert political pressure only since it would be most undesirable to take military action against the tribesmen and provoke armed conflict on the Frontier. He appreciated this point. I also informed him how Sikhs in very large number had gone to Jammu and Kashmir and how they and the I.N.A. and the Dogra troops were killing Muslims and burning their villages in Jammu and driving them out of Jammu into West Punjab. Further I added that if Kashmir accedes to India or India sends her armed forces to Kashmir, it will be impossible for anyone to control the trouble since the whole of Kashmir would then flare up. India should not, therefore, send military assistance or accept the accession of Kashmir even if the Maharaja wants to accede to India; and that India should in such a case insist upon a plebiscite as a prior condition.

Kindly telegraph to me text of your telegram to Pandit Nehru and the Prime Minister of the U.K. so that I can inform the British High Commissioner here.

[MOHAMED ALI]

¹Liaquat Ali Khan was then in Lahore.

KR-406

William P. Cranston¹ to A. C. B. Symon²

PRO, DO 133/65

SRINAGAR,
27 October 1947

Dear Symon,

I am writing this hurriedly in the plane just after leaving Jammu. I will try to finish it at Srinagar on arrival tho[ugh] the plane can only stay there a few minutes. Mahajan, the Prime Minister, was also on the plane and must have spent last night in Delhi. He, Menon and Batra got off at Jammu. Menon hopes to return to Delhi by 1 p.m. today. M.C. Mahajan and Batra intend going on to Srinagar tomorrow, Tuesday, if Menon can charter a special plane for them in Delhi. The Maharaja is now in Jammu and it is not yet known whether or when he may return to Srinagar. A Kashmir State Army Brigadier met Menon at Jammu.

Sheikh Abdulla[h], a Mr. Katni and another man I think Director of Agriculture and also Captain J. Maya Das, Indian Signal Corps, are

now going on to Srinagar. They all emplaned at Delhi.

I gave your letters to Mahajan and Batra and have discussed the matter briefly with them and Menon. Menon asked Mahajan to give me every possible help and both Mahajan and Batra have promised to do so. Both of them have given me a letter to the Governor of Kashmir (the senior official in Srinagar in their absence, Major Pritam Singh) asking him to give me all help and arrange wireless communication, car, protection of the British and protection of R.A.F. aircraft at Srinagar landing ground. Batra said he was about to suggest earlier yesterday that a guard of British troops should be sent to Srinagar to protect the British but in the light of later reports yesterday he now considers this is not necessary and he considers that the Kashmir State and other units from your side will provide ample protection and security for British personnel and also for R.A.F. aircraft and staff throughout the operation.³ The P[rime] M[inister] and Batra had no special fresh news regarding the situation in Srinagar. I will see what the landing ground appears to be like immediately we arrive and will then close this letter quickly as the Captain (British) of the aircraft has promised to take it back to Delhi and he can only halt for about ten minutes. I am also sending a short note to Group Captain Biggar telling him about security on the aerodrome and confirming that there is a good fair weather landing ground at Jammu which took our Dakota easily.

We left at 6.20 a.m. and reached Jammu 8.35 a.m. Menon told me to write or wireless to him if I required anything.

Just arrived.

The landing ground is O.K. and has military Sikh, etc., guards and 4 Dakotas. No sign of raiders yet.⁴

Yours,
BILL CRANSTON

¹A British High Commission official who arranged evacuation of British nationals from Kashmir.

²U. K. Deputy High Commissioner, New Delhi.

³Refers to the Indian Army action in Kashmir on 27 October 1947.

⁴See Annex.

Annex to KR-406

REINFORCEMENTS FOR STATE TROOPS—CITY “NEAR PANIC”¹

SRINAGAR, 27 October 1947: With the arrival this morning of a battalion of Sikh troops of the Indian Army by air at Srinagar, the complexion of events in Kashmir State has changed. The direct intervention by the Dominion of India in Kashmir affairs means that

Maharaja Sir Hari Singh has carried out his Government's threat recently made in an official protest to the Dominion of Pakistan to seek "friendly assistance to oppose trespass on its fundamental rights."²

It is expected that Indian troops will be rushed as soon as possible to the "front line" a few miles beyond the Baramula township, situated 37 miles from Srinagar, on the main road to Rawalpindi, where they will reinforce Kashmir State troops in their stand against an indeterminate number of Muslim rebels and tribesmen who have been advancing upon Srinagar since last Thursday.

THE RAIDING FORCES

Estimates of the raiders' strength varies from several hundred to 10,000, but probably it does not exceed 3,000. They are composed of four elements. The first is Muslim League agents and agitators from Pakistan, who have come across the border and smuggled arms into Kashmir to help rouse the Muslim peasantry of Poonch province. The second element is the villagers who have raised the Pakistan Flag and attacked Kashmir officials. The third is Pathan tribesmen who have joined the rebels partly from religious sympathy and partly for loot. The fourth is Muslim deserters from Kashmir State forces who have taken their arms with them.

Meanwhile, in Srinagar itself, a state of near panic continues to prevail, although volunteers of the Kashmir National Conference (a pro-Indian and pro-Congress body) patrol the city appealing for Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Maharaja himself with all his family left in a convoy of a score of vehicles for Jammu yesterday, and is said to have taken with him all the State jewels and valuables.

THE BRITISH COLONY

The small colony of some 350 Britons, mostly elderly retired civilians and Army officers, who have lived in Kashmir for years, views all these developments with detachment and some regret. The majority are anxious to leave before conditions become impossible. It is learned that the United Kingdom High Commissioners in India and Pakistan are taking action through the Supreme Commander to evacuate all Britons who want to leave Kashmir, and, as road communications are either cut or unsafe, the chances are that Royal Air Force transport machines will fly them out within two or three days.

¹*The Times*, London, 28 October 1947.

²See KR-391.

KR-407

Louis Mountbatten to Maharaja of Kashmir

FOA, SA (4)-6/2

NEW DELHI,
27 October 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness' letter dated the 26th October¹ has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon.² In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness my Government have decided to accept the Accession³ of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India.⁴ Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of Accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader[s], the question of the State's accession should be settled by a conference of the people. Meanwhile in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.

My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government⁵ to work with your Prime Minister.

With kind regards,

I remain ,
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA¹KR-402.²The precise date and time of delivery of Hari Singh's letter forwarding the Instrument of Accession to Mountbatten have not been recorded. Indeed, Menon did not go to Jammu on 26 October. See Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition, The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948*, Karachi, 2002, 153. According to Major Cranston, Menon, Mahajan and Batra travelled with him by air from Delhi and reached Jammu in the morning on 27 October 1947. Menon did not return to Delhi until 4 p.m that day. See KR-406 and KR-410.³See Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 341-4.⁴See Annex I.⁵See Annex II.

Annex I to KR-407

NEW REGIME FOR KASHMIR¹
 POLITICAL TALKS BEGUN
 CHOOSING A PREMIER

SRINAGAR, 28 October 1947: Srinagar received calmly today the news that the State of Kashmir had acceded to the Indian Union.

The knowledge that Indian troops were pouring into Srinagar Airport and moving up to the "front line"—if the somewhat vague skirmishing around Baramula, 37 miles away, deserves that title—and the presence of hundreds of "National Conference" volunteers in the streets and public squares combined to keep the peace and helped to restore confidence. Thousands of Hindus and Sikhs, however, are still on the move by road southward to Jammu and by air to Delhi.

Negotiations for the formation of a new Cabinet in Kashmir were in progress today between the present Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Batra, and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, leader of the popular democratic party known as the National Conference, which includes Hindus as well as Muslims and stands for representative government with the Maharaja as constitutional ruler.

AN ANOMALOUS POSITION

A rather anomalous position arises, however, from the terms of the Maharaja's letter to Lord Mountbatten yesterday, in which he said that he intended "at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister."² Lord Mountbatten's reply noted with satisfaction "that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister." The question is, who is forming the new Cabinet—Abdullah or the present Premier, Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan?

Sheikh Abdullah, who flew back from Delhi yesterday, told me that he would gladly form a new Government, but would not accept office under the present Premier. It is expected that the negotiations will last some time.

Abdullah, aged about 45, is obviously the key man in the Kashmir political crisis, and his party certainly stands for inter-communal amity; its slogans are "*Hindu-Muslim ittehad zindabad*"—"Long live Hindu-Muslim unity"—and "*Hindu Muslim Sikh ek ho*"—"Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are one [*sic*]." He believes that the prime need is to quell the rebellion, "instigated by Pakistan," and to introduce constitutional reforms. Then there should be a referendum, preferably under the joint supervision of India and Pakistan, to decide to which Dominion Kashmir

should accede.

THREE CONSIDERATIONS

The Kashmiris ultimate decision, Abdullah said, should be governed by three considerations; the country's geographical and economic dependence on Pakistan; the fact that the luxuries produced by Kashmir's industries found their biggest markets in India, and the fact that Kashmir's main source of revenue was tourist traffic from Britain and America. He and his party preferred to keep an open mind, but if India and Pakistan would jointly undertake the protection of Kashmir from foreign aggression the State might be well advised to accede to neither, but to retain neutral status and serve as a meeting-ground for Hindu and Muslim ideas.

It is a moot point how far Abdullah's influence extends among the Kashmiri Muslims, who form about 85 per cent of the population, or whether he can ultimately persuade them that alignment with India rather than with Pakistan is in the best interests of the people, and this may be why he speaks of keeping an open mind; but in Srinagar his influence is paramount and his followers have undoubtedly prevented communal rioting at a critical time.

A British military liaison officer has arrived here to arrange for some 200 Britons to be flown to Rawalpindi tomorrow in Royal Air Force aircraft.

¹*The Times*, London, 29 October 1947.

²KR-402.

Annex II to KR-407

Charles W. Lewis to George Marshall

US National Archives, 845.00/10-2747

[Extract]

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
KARACHI,

27 October 1947

No. 196

Sir,

I have the honor to report a controversy which has arisen between the Government of Pakistan and the State of Kashmir over the latter's adherence to the Dominion of Pakistan or India which has recently become more heated and may possibly result in serious consequences.

As the [State] Department is aware, although the Maharaja and Government of Kashmir are Hindu, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim and would probably welcome adherence to Pakistan.

It appears, however, that the whole effort of the Maharaja is to bring the State into the Indian Union, if possible, but at all costs to prevent it from adhering to Pakistan, possibly because he may feel that his position as a Hindu ruler in a Muslim Dominion would be precarious.

Relations between Kashmir and Pakistan were not improved by the fact that the State of Chitral, where China, Russia, Afghanistan, and the Indian sub-continent meet, which had been allied with Kashmir since 1854, broke away and adhered to Pakistan quietly and without previous consultation with the Maharaja's Government, early in October. The feeling in Kashmir is that this is probably the result of an intrigue on the part of Pakistan officials who are now suspected of endeavouring to bring the whole of Kashmir into the Dominion in the same way.

The situation has been made still worse by alleged persecutions and mass murders of Muslims in Poonch, where it is claimed Muslim villages have been burned by Dogra troops and men, women, and children indiscriminately shot. Press reports say that according to Pakistan troops stationed on the Kashmir border, the flames of burning Muslim villages could be seen from the Murree Hills and on October 12, a strong protest was addressed to the Government of Kashmir by the Government of Pakistan requesting that immediate steps be taken to restore order in Poonch and that the Government of Pakistan be advised immediately as to what action had been taken.

[Four paragraphs omitted]

The relations between the Governments of Pakistan and Kashmir have been subjected to a further strain by reports of skirmishes between Pakistan and Kashmir border troops and a report on October 20, that six Muslim evacuees had been killed by Kashmir State troops on the Jammu-Sialkot border. On October 21, it was reported in *Dawn* that a "regular persecution of Muslims by Dogra military and police is in full swing all along the 45-mile border from Kathua to Suchetgarh parallel to Shakargarh and Sialkot in Pakistan." It was stated by this Muslim publication that "Kashmir is following the tactics of Kapurthala State where the State troops with the help of armed *jathas* converted the Muslim majority (over 65 percent of the population) into a minority by indiscriminately killing and by driving the Muslims out of the State."

This same publication declared in an editorial, on October 15, entitled "Plain Words to Kashmir"¹ that:

It goes without saying that the people of Kashmir are overwhelmingly against their State acceding to Hindustan. Of late, various parties have intensified the demand that their State should join Pakistan, and powerful neighbouring elements on Kashmir's northern border

have also left the Maharaja in no doubt as to what they desire. But all this would seem to have fallen on deaf ears and Sir Hari Singh seems becoming deeper and deeper involved in a course of action which is contrary to his people's will. It is also a violation of all canons of justice that Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of the Quit Kashmir Movement which had resulted, on the Kashmir Government's own showing in bloodshed and other acts of violence, should be at liberty while leaders of the Muslim Conference, whose offence was only of a technical nature, should still rot in jail. This clearly indicates the Maharaja's policy, which is to suppress the Muslim Conference and all other elements who oppose Kashmir's accession to Hindustan, and at the same time to accord privileged treatment to Sheikh Abdullah's party and other stooges of the Hindus who allow themselves to be utilized for the purpose of faking 'popular support' for an anti-popular and anti-democratic decision amounting to the political murder of the State's majority community.

On October 23 this same newspaper, in an article "What Next [in] Kashmir", which was intended to answer the allegations of that State as to pressure being brought to bear upon it by Pakistan to adhere to this Dominion, stated:

The very idea that the Government of Pakistan are encouraging armed infiltration into Kashmir is absurd. They have enough trouble on their hands already. But there is little doubt that the sympathies of Pakistan's people are naturally on the side of Kashmir's downtrodden peasantry who are showing such a heroic spirit of resistance against the tyrant Maharaja's armed emissaries of mischief consisting of regular Dogra troops and hired Sikh and Sangh hooligans. Until now this sympathy has taken the shape of only moral support, but if atrocities on Kashmir's people continue and large number of them are compelled to flee from the State, neither the Government nor the people of Pakistan can remain idle spectators. The Maharaja and Mr. Mahajan will do well to heed Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's warning on this point.

[Three paragraphs omitted]

A final cause of controversy between Pakistan and Kashmir is the confirmation of the news that the Kashmir Government is linking the State with the East Punjab via Pathankot by direct bridge over the Ravi River which will make it possible for vehicles and other transport to cross this River, thereby making the State independent of the two existing arteries of communication which link Kashmir with the outside world both of which pass through Pakistan. A belief exists in Pakistan that when the new communication line between Kashmir and Hindustan is complete the Maharaja of Kashmir will probably declare Kashmir's accession to Hindustan.

Many Muslim circles feel that such a declaration would be tantamount to a declaration of war against the heavy Muslim majority in Kashmir and the Dominion of Pakistan itself since the defence of Kashmir and its Muslim population is considered here as an integral part of the defence of Pakistan.

Although the present controversy may die down and a peaceful solution of the difficulties between Pakistan and Kashmir be found it is believed that in view of sensational charges and suspicions both here and in Kashmir the situation is potentially a dangerous one and may, unless handled with caution, result in a serious conflagration in the near future, which may include not only Pakistan and Kashmir but India as well.

Respectfully yours,
CHARLES W LEWIS, JR.
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

¹See Annex II to KR-388.

KR-408

*Louis Mountbatten to Vallabhbhai Patel*¹

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
27 October 1947

My dear Deputy Prime Minister,

I have just heard from General Rees that our troops landed successfully at Srinagar and are advancing to meet the tribesmen who are approaching from Baramula.

There is no doubt that if we could have sent our forces a fortnight ago to Srinagar or could have relieved the State Forces in Jammu to go to Srinagar, the position could have been held with comparative ease. Now, I must remind you that the risk is great and that the chances of keeping the raiders out of Srinagar are not too good.

Fortunately the tribesmen are presumably out for loot, and since the Valley has a very small proportion of non-Muslims they are bound to loot and massacre their own co-religionists whilst the forces of India support Sheikh Abdullah against them. This, I feel, will gain us a political advantage, and if Sheikh Abdullah's forces can be rallied in this way the tribesmen can probably be repulsed before they have done too much looting.

The supply by air or road at this time of year is a hazardous proceeding, as was pointed out by the Chiefs of Staff at the Defence Committee.

General Rees today spoke to a demobilised British officer who three days ago motored from Srinagar to Abbottabad.

He was held up and robbed by an advancing *lashkar* [band] of tribesmen who robbed him and also robbed and shot a retired British officer travelling with him. A Muslim ex-INA officer then intervened and helped to have these two British officers motored safely through to Abbottabad, together with the wife and daughter of the badly wounded officer to look after him.

The British officer gained the impression that the movement was very definitely organised; that there were ex-INA officers involved; that a staff for controlling Srinagar (e.g. Deputy Commissioner-designate, etc.) was *en route* to Srinagar; that the Muslim League is involved.

The M.T. used were civilian buses and petrol is very short. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on Kashmir State troops from whom there had probably been a number of desertions.

There was no indication anywhere of Pakistan Army officers taking part.

The tribesmen included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds; and it was clearly impossible to prevent them looting.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister.

Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 68-9.

KR-409

*Mehr Chand Mahajan to Vallabhbhai Patel*¹

JAMMU,
27 October 1947

My dear Sardar Patelji,

His highness and myself are deeply grateful to you for what you did for Kashmir yesterday. H. H. asks me to convey to you personally his sense of deep obligation for this timely help which was so quickly given. I only depend on your valuable advice and guidance. I apologise for any foolish words I may have said. Now the whole matter is in your hands. Kindly send me the Mysore model and I will send my views how far it can be adopted to a backward State like Kashmir. You can yourself with Bakshiji [Bakshi Tek Chand] finalise it and I will come when called for discussions.

With kindest regards and my thanks once again. It was a most

momentous and quick decision ever taken by politicians in India.²

Yours sincerely,
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 69.

²Refers to the landing of Indian troops in Srinagar.

KR-410

A. C. B. Symon¹ to Archibald Carter²

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI,
27 October 1947

My dear Carter,³

Developments in Kashmir have been so rapid during the last two days that I have thought it as well to put them down shortly in diary form. A copy is enclosed herewith.

2. I am dictating this at 4.00 p.m. while awaiting a copy of Mr. Nehru's reply to the message which I delivered to him this morning from Mr. Attlee.⁴ There are persistent rumours that Kashmir has acceded to the Indian Union, and I think that I shall receive confirmation of this very soon. I have received definite information that ten aircraft were sent off early this morning from Delhi to Kashmir loaded with troops and arms. I telephoned to Mr. V.P. Menon's office a few minutes ago but was told that he had not yet returned from Jammu.

3. As you will see from the diary, I have kept Sir L. Grafftey-Smith fully informed regarding developments here, and I am sending him a copy of this letter with its enclosures.

Yours sincerely,
A. C. B. SYMON

PS.

I have been in touch with Iyengar who confirms that Kashmir has requested accession to the Indian Union. This has been accepted provisionally by the Government of India. A final decision will be taken in the light of the wishes of the people. This, Iyengar says, is in accordance with the declared policy of the Government of India.

A. C. B. SYMON

¹See Victoria Schofield, *India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, London, 2000, 55.

²Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office.

³An unsigned note on the top right-hand corner reads: "Mr Rumbold, I have not shown to Sir A. Carter", Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office.

⁴KR-403.

Enclosure to KR-410
Notes by A. C. B. Symon
PRO, DO 133/65

[NEW DELHI,]
27 October 1947

DIARY OF EVENTS REGARDING KASHMIR
FRIDAY, 24TH OCTOBER

5 p.m.—Major Cranston telephoned from Willingdon Airport [Delhi] to say that he had arrived suddenly by air from Kashmir in company with Mr. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir State. He said that he had certain messages to deliver and would bring his report at 6 p.m. He added that the Deputy Prime Minister wished to see either the High Commissioner or myself as soon as possible. I told him that the High Commissioner was away but that I should be glad to see Mr. Batra at 7 p.m. (Mr. Batra did not, however, call).

6 p.m.—Major Cranston called and gave his report on conditions in Kashmir the gist of which was communicated to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Karachi, and to the Commonwealth Relations Office in my telegram No.¹ 1083.

SATURDAY, 25TH OCTOBER

7 a.m.—Major Cranston left by air for Lahore.

10 a.m.—Mr. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister, Kashmir State, called without previous notice and remained with me for an hour. A report on our conversation is attached.²

3 p.m.—Major Cranston telephoned from Government House, Lahore, to say that a rumour which had not been confirmed had been received from Rawalpindi to the effect that the invading tribesmen had proceeded as far as Srinagar; that they had established a so-called provisional government; that they were in possession of the airfield; and that the alternative route via Banihal through Jammu had also been cut by the raiders. Major Cranston said that the Governor would be glad if I would endeavour to obtain some confirmation of these rumours and in particular, ascertain whether Willingdon Airport was still in touch with the airport at Srinagar. He suggested that immediate consideration should be given to question of arranging air evacuation of British subjects who wish to leave Kashmir.

3. 30 p.m.—Report received from Willingdon Airport indicating that an aeroplane had landed from Srinagar at half past two; that the passengers were retailing [*sic* for relating] the same story about frontier incidences in

Kashmir which had been given to me by the Deputy Prime Minister and Major Cranston, and that the airport was still in direct wireless touch with Srinagar. This seemed to discount the rumour of the raiders having reached Srinagar.

4.p.m.—Telephoned Major Cranston at Government House, Lahore, to give him the above information. I suggested to him that no further action was called for at this end and that he should at once arrange to proceed to either Rawalpindi or Srinagar. Major Cranston mentioned that a report had just been received from Peshawar indicating that more tribesmen were moving down towards Kashmir and that they were out of hand. Efforts to stop the raiders had not been successful.

7.p.m.—Letter (copy attached) sent to Mr. Batra at Imperial Hotel. This was delivered by Major Fry who made the following report:

“The Rai Bahadur [Batra] promised to wireless a message through to us as soon as he landed at Srinagar, giving both a factual account of the position in the city and (so far as he could gather) in the State and his general advice in regard to the welfare of the British-European residents. He seemed in no way disconcerted by the rumours that have been current today of the situation, and was clear that the Banihal route would remain open; he appeared confident also that the raiders would be stopped at Uri. His Highness apparently drove in state through Srinagar yesterday for the Dusehra celebration, but left today for Jammu—or at all events was due to leave today for Jammu. The impression I gained was that, although there was naturally cause for anxiety in regard to the internal situation in the State, the Rai Bahadur was reasonably sure that matters could be brought under control. Rightly or wrongly, he attributed the incursion to the Pakistan authorities.”

7.15 p.m.—Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith telephoned from Karachi to say that he had been in telephonic communication with Major Cranston at Lahore and that, in the light of the latter's report, he felt that an immediate approach should be made to the Supreme Commander for air transport to evacuate such British nationals who wished to leave Kashmir. I told Sir Laurence that I considered that it would be wise to await the report which Mr. Batra had promised to send to me by wireless immediately on his return, but that if he felt strongly and made a specific request to me I would approach the Supreme Commander immediately. After some discussion, Sir Laurence said that the best course would be to leave me complete discretion as to whether an approach should be made to the Supreme Commander and if so, at what stage.

7.30 p.m.—Mr. Shattock called on General Wood, Q.M.G. (Supreme Commander's Headquarters) and General Hawthorn (Deputy Chief

of Staff) of the same headquarters to ascertain whether they had any information regarding this rumour. Neither had any but General Hawthorn showed him a report dated 25th October from the Pakistan Army which read as follows:

1. State troops from Srinagar and Poonch engaging tribesmen at Uri. Heavy battle continued October 24th. Rumoured tribesmen from Dir and Chitral advancing on Srinagar from North.
2. No reports of any attack [from] Kohala received.
3. Attacks on Muslim villages in Jammu and Mirpur inside State and across border by non-Muslims supported by State troops and police being reported in increasing number.

SUNDAY, 26TH OCTOBER

10.30 a.m.—Called on Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith, Deputy Supreme Commander (Army) at his residence. I gave him the gist of the information which had reached me during last 24 hours and he showed me the report dated 25th October from the Pakistan Army which had been shown to Mr. Shattock last night.

Sir Arthur Smith said that this was his only information. I told him that I was expecting a further report from Mr. Batra during today, but felt that I ought to give him this advance warning of our probable intention to seek the help of the Supreme Commander in providing air transport for the evacuation of British nationals from Kashmir. I told him that if the need arose prompt action would probably be necessary. He agreed as to this and said that he would consult Air Marshal Walmsley, Deputy Supreme Commander (Air) as soon as possible.

11 a.m.—Telegrams Nos. 1160 and 1161 from the Commonwealth Relations Office (latter repeating text of message from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Attlee) and also telegram No. 152 from U.K. High Commissioner, Karachi, received. While consideration was being given in the office to these messages unsuccessful attempts were made to contact Sir Girja Bajpai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations and Mr. V.P. Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States. Both these officers had been in conference continuously throughout the morning.

1 p.m.—Major Cranston arrived from Lahore with message from Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of the West Punjab, recommending that arrangements be made forthwith to evacuate European British nationals from Kashmir by air.

1.15 p.m.—Further visit to Lt. General Sir Arthur Smith, Deputy Supreme Commander (Army). The General could give no further information about the situation in Kashmir, but agreed that, in the light of

the latest information air evacuation seemed indicated. He said that he had mentioned the matter during the morning to the Supreme Commander, whose agreement to air evacuation could be expected. The General suggested that matters should be pursued with the Deputy Supreme Commander (Air). I asked Sir Arthur whether there was any intention of the Government of India to provide arms and ammunition and other form of help to Kashmir. He had no such information but said that the Supreme Commander's office had been asked to ensure that certain arms and ammunition at Jubbulpore should be held available for immediate movement by air. The General would not commit himself as to whether these arms were destined for Kashmir.

3.30 p.m.—After much trouble established contact by telephone with Mr. V.P. Menon at Prime Minister's residence. Mr. Menon said that he was leaving for Kashmir by air in ten minutes and that he would see me about noon next day. He said he could not spare time to see me before leaving. In view of the importance of establishing contact without delay I went to the Willingdon Aerodrome at once to try and see him before the aeroplane took off. I was told that the aeroplane was leaving from Palam Aerodrome to which place I went at once. I found Mr. Menon on the point of returning to Delhi because he had left it too late for the aeroplane to reach Kashmir before nightfall. I arranged with Mr. Menon to see him at his house about 5 p.m. While at Palam Aerodrome, I was able to arrange with Air Commodore Brackley for Major Cranston to proceed to Kashmir at 6 a.m. the next morning on the same machine which was to carry Mr. Menon and his party.

5 p.m.—Met Mr. V.P. Menon at his residence. He said that he had just come from a meeting of members of the Government; that he would leave next morning for Jammu and would be returning by lunch-time next day. He said that he would give me a full report at that time. His latest information regarding the situation was that the raiders were reported to have reached Baramula which is between 35 and 40 miles from Srinagar; that the power house between Uri and Baramula had either been destroyed or put out of action and that the Muslim element of the Kashmir State Forces had deserted. In reply to my enquiry as to the form of aid which the Government of India were considering affording to Kashmir, he said that he could not tell me anything definite except that the Government of India were determined "at all costs" to prevent the raiders from spreading East and South. The impression which I gained from our conversation was that the Government of India are, for the moment at any rate, mainly apprehensive of the danger to India of tribal infiltration which, unless nipped in

the bud forthwith, might well extend up to the border of East Punjab and that of adjoining States which have acceded to the Dominion of India. Mr. Menon considered that in the light of recent developments the removal of British civilians by either the direct road to Rawalpindi or Banihal route via Jammu was now unsafe. He thought that there was no cause for apprehension about the safety of British nationals who wished to remain in Kashmir, but felt that it would be prudent to arrange early removal by air of those persons who wished to leave. I told him that, in the light of this advice, which I had received from other quarters, I proposed to consult the Supreme Commander (Air) with a view to making arrangements for air evacuation.

6 p.m.—Visited Air Marshal Walmsley, Deputy Supreme Commander (Air) at his residence and gave him an outline of the position as known to me at that moment and formally requested him to arrange for the provision of air transport for the removal of those persons who wished to leave Kashmir. He said that the operation could be laid on provided that the Supreme Commander agreed and that he would see the Supreme Commander at 9 a.m. the next day. The operation could, however, only take place if the aerodrome at Srinagar was secure. He said that he would ask one of his Staff Officers (Group Captain Biggar) to visit me during the evening to discuss more detailed arrangements.

8 p.m.—Visit from Group Captain Biggar to discuss detailed arrangements for air evacuation. At 8.15 p.m., telephoned to Mr. Burnett at Karachi to inform him of the latest developments and to advise him of my decision to approach the Supreme Commander (Air) for facilities for air evacuation.

10 p.m.—Despatch of telegram Nos. 1089 and 1090 to Commonwealth Relations Office (repeated Karachi) reporting on the events described above.

MONDAY, 27 OCTOBER

10 a.m.—Telegram No. 1163 containing message from Mr. Attlee to Mr. Nehru received.

10.30 a.m.—Called on Mr. H.V.R. Iyengar to deliver message to Prime Minister. Mr. Iyengar consulted Prime Minister who said that a reply will be sent direct to Mr. Attlee during the day and that he would let me have a copy.

1 p.m.—Air Marshal Walmsley telephoned to say that the Supreme Commander had agreed to the proposals for air evacuation and that Group Captain Biggar had been instructed to proceed to Srinagar to establish contact with Major Cranston. The aircraft were already in place at the main aerodrome at Rawalpindi and would be available for

the evacuation. The plans were already under way but could only be implemented if the aerodrome at Srinagar was safe and that there was no shooting in the town. In the event of shooting, Air Marshal Walmsley thought that British residents would be safer by remaining in their homes.

3 p.m.—Telegram sent to Commonwealth Relations Office (repeated to Karachi), reporting decision of the Supreme Commander.

3.15 p.m.—Mr. Duke telephoned from Lahore and was given latest information.

4 p.m.—Telephoned to Mr. Burnett at Karachi to advise him of latest position.

4.15 p.m.—As there have been persistent rumours since lunch-time that Kashmir has acceded to the Dominion of India, I telephoned Mr. Iyengar, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, to ascertain the facts. He said that he would ring back in a few minutes and he has just done so. He said that Kashmir had requested accession to the Union and that this had been accepted by the Government of India provisionally. A final decision would be made in due course in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This was in accordance with the declared policy of the Government of India. He said that the reply to the message from Mr. Attlee was being considered by the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues at 5 p.m. and that he preferred that I should await a copy of the reply before making a report to London.

4.30 p.m.—Sent telegram to London reporting foregoing and confirming that ten aircraft loaded with troops took off from Delhi for Kashmir early this morning.

A. C. B. SYMON

¹&³Not traceable.

²See Annex.

Annex to Enclosure to KR-410

Note by A. C. B. Symon

PRO, DO 133/65

SECRET

NEW DELHI,
26 October 1947

Rai Bahadur Batra, Deputy Prime Minister, Kashmir, who was on a two-day visit to Delhi, paid a call on Mr. Symon on October 25th for the ostensible purpose of assuring him that everything possible was being done and would be done by the Kashmir Government to assist

Major Cranston in his task of evacuating those British nationals who wished to leave Kashmir in the immediate future. He also stated that he felt confident that those British nationals who were in the Srinagar area would be safe. It is also understood that Major Cranston who flew in the same plane with the Rai Bahadur to Delhi suggested to him that he might perhaps call on the High Commission during his stay in Delhi.

2. The opportunity was, however, naturally taken to ask him about the present position in the State. Though his views must be coloured by the fact that he is a Punjabi Hindu, they deserve some respect as he was for a number of years the Crown Representative's nominee as a Dewan of several Indian States, e.g. Suket and Jhalawar. Successive Residents of the Punjab States including Sir Conrad Corfield, had a high opinion of him. He has been in Kashmir since May.

3. He gave the following description of the strategic position in the State as he knew of it on October 24th:

DOMEL AREA

On October 22nd about 80 to 100 lorry loads and [*sic* for of] tribesmen (Afridis, Wazirs, Pathans etc.) from Hazara came into this area, looted and burnt houses and villages and are at present in occupation of Domel. They probably numbered about 2,000 and are armed with every sort of modern weapon. They fanned out into a northerly direction towards Uri and in a southerly direction towards Kohala (Punjab-State boundary village). Certain units of the Kashmir State Forces, south of Domel, have been temporarily cut off. The Rai Bahadur drew attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister of the N.W.F.P. on the 23rd October that "my people should refrain from entering Kashmir. We have given strict orders to our officers to prevent any attempt at infiltration of men or arms from the N.W.F.P. into territories of the Maharaja of Kashmir". This statement, the Rai Bahadur said, was made one day after this organised incursion had taken place and was a poor reflection on the bona fides of the Frontier Government.

POONCH AREA

Disturbances had taken place on September 9th after which everyone who could not be trusted was disarmed by the Kashmir Forces. Between that date and now a number of Muslim villagers of Poonch, (there are many ex-soldiers of the former Indian Army in this area) assisted by outsiders had managed to re-equip themselves with every kind of modern weapon, which he concluded, must have come from places in Pakistan territory. He also drew attention to the fact that a West Punjab Police Inspector in uniform was found shot dead after the earlier disturbances

at a place ten miles within State territory. The general situation in Poonch was doubly menacing because these armed Muslims were now linking up with Muslims from the Murree Hills who had also infiltrated into State territory. There was also the possibility that these Muslims might link up with the tribesmen who had come in from Hasari [Hazara].

MIRPUR AREA (NORTH OF JHELM)

There are threats of incursions, he stated, from this area also.

JAMMU AREA (NORTH OF SIALKOT)

There had been a number of raids by batches of outside Muslims on Hindu villages in State territory after which the raiders returned to their villages in the Punjab. In one case a Pakistan soldier in plain clothes (he was identified as such by his identity disc) was killed. There had been no trouble in Jammu town, i.e., between the local Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims; all the trouble in this area had been caused by outsiders, (information received in this office from Pakistan sources mentions attacks in increasing numbers on Muslim villages in Jammu, Mirpur inside the State, and across the border by non-Muslims supported by State troops and police).¹

SRINAGAR AREA

This was still perfectly quiet on October 24th. Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the National Conference Party, had just returned from Delhi. His present policy, according to the Rai Bahadur, was that Kashmir should not accede to either Dominion for the time being. The first essential was responsible Government for the people of Kashmir.

CHITRAL

The Rai Bahadur said that rumours were circulating that the Chitralis were biding their time till the passes from Srinagar were closed by snow after which they would make incursions into the northern territories of the State (Pakistan sources report rumours of tribesmen from Dir and Chitral advancing on Srinagar from the north).

4. The Rai Bahadur said that His Highness was now in personal command of the State Army and had recently issued an order of the day to his troops that if any of them were seen with their faces turned towards Srinagar they would be shot on sight. He concluded his summary of the position by stating that if Pakistan thought they could obtain Kashmir's accession by such acts of coercion as he had described, they were making the greatest mistake. In such circumstances, Kashmir would not accede to Pakistan until the last soldier of the State Forces had been killed.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

5. As regards the economic position, the Rai Bahadur said that Kashmir had signed Standstill Agreements with both Dominions.² Pakistan, however, had not been supplying them with their due quotas of petrol, sugar, salt and cloth, etc., with the result that the State was in great difficulties. He did not give the impression that he had asked the Indian Government to supply all these commodities instead, though he did hint that the Kashmir Government were managing to get in a little petrol and other goods on the new road from Jammu and Kathua which has its outlet at Pathankot in the Dominion of India. Though it was only a fair-weather road it had already been possible to use it. He also mentioned that he was trying to arrange air facilities for the export of silk, *pashmina* wool and fresh fruits, etc., to India through Delhi. The Dominion of India, he stated, was the habitual market for these commodities and their export by road to India through Pakistan had been held up by lack of petrol. It would be interesting to know whether Rai Bahadur during his visit to Delhi asked the Indian Government for any assistance in the form of arms and ammunition. The fact that the Prime Minister of Kashmir recently mentioned in the course of a public complaint to the Pakistan Government that the State might, under certain circumstances, be justified in asking for friendly assistance, may mean that it has been sought in this particular form.

LAPSE OF PARAMOUNTCY

6. The Rai Bahadur stated that the Maharaja considered that paramountcy had come to an end altogether too abruptly. It should have continued its protective agency for the States for some further time in order to enable the States as a whole to settle their new relations with the two Dominions without being rushed into taking any precipitous course inimical to their long-term interests. The Rai Bahadur stated that originally it had been proposed that India, as well as the States, would be independent when the British left. The partition of the country, the introduction of Dominion status for the two new countries, and the advice given that the States should accede to one Dominion or the other without delay, had put them in a weak position. There should have been a third Dominion of Rajast[h]an for them. The Maharaja of Kashmir had put these considerations to Lord Mountbatten before August 15th. The Rai Bahadur gave no indication of any change in Kashmir's present policy which is to avoid acceding to either Dominion until conditions in the sub-continent have settled down and peace is restored. As he drove off in his car, the Rai Bahadur added by way of a parting greeting, "The Maharaja sent a telegram a fortnight ago direct

to Mr. Attlee informing him of the whole position in the State and of its present difficulties".

A. C. B. SYMON

¹For Pakistan's point of view, see KR-405.

²Hari Singh wrote to Mountbatten on 26 October 1947 that Pakistan had accepted the Standstill Agreement with Kashmir. The Govt. of India desired further discussion on this issue before finalizing the arrangements. See KR-402.

KR-411

Zahid Husain to Ghulam Mohammed

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 46

NEW DELHI,
27 October 1947

Understand aeroplanes employed on transport of refugees are being used from today for carrying troops, etc. to Kashmir. Matter should be taken up with B.O.A.C.¹ whose craft also is included.

[ZAHID HUSAIN]

¹On 28 October, the Government of Pakistan, by telegram No. 678, asked their High Commissioner in London to seek the help of British Government to prevent the use of BOAC aircraft for transporting Indian troops and munitions to Kashmir. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

KR-412

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

No. 413

NEW DELHI,
28 October 1947

I have communicated to you text of telegram I sent to Prime Minister United Kingdom regarding Kashmir situation.¹ I have also sent to Prime Minister correspondence between Governor-General, India, and Maharaja of Kashmir regarding accession of Kashmir State to Indian Union.² I have sent a further message³ to Prime Minister U.K. informing him of imminent peril of Srinagar and Kashmir from raiders and

of action we have taken to give protection to people there. I want to invite your Government's cooperation in stopping the raiders entering Kashmir territory from Pakistan. These raids have already resulted in large scale death and destruction and if they are not stopped immediately will lead to ruin of Kashmir. The consequences of success of such irresponsible raiders anywhere will be far reaching all over India. Therefore in interest of both Pakistan and India such raids must be stopped. As raiders come across Pakistan territory it should be possible to stop them there. I wish to assure you that action Govt. of India has taken has been forced upon them by circumstances and imminent and grave danger to Srinagar. They have no desire to intervene in affairs of Kashmir State after raiders have been driven away and law and order established. In regard to accession also it has been made clear that this is subject to reference to people of State and their decision. Government of India have no desire to impose any decision and will abide by people's wishes but those cannot be ascertained till peace and law and order prevail. Protection of Kashmir from armed raids thus becomes first objective and in this we trust we shall have your cooperation.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹See KR-403.

²KR-402 and KR-407.

³Not traceable.

KR-413

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

[Extract]

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 418/Premier/6236

NEW DELHI,
28 October 1947

Your telegram No. I 357-1 J dated 25th¹ October reached me yesterday.

[Paras 1 & 2 omitted]

I would welcome an early opportunity of meeting you and discussing various problems that have arisen more specially developments in Kashmir about which I have informed you. I earnestly hope that there will be cooperation between Pakistan and India in stopping raids and putting down disorders and then leaving choice about future to people

of Kashmir. I am glad to learn that you are likely to visit Delhi for Joint Defence Council meeting soon.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹Not traceable.

KR-414

Claude Auchinleck to Chiefs of Staff, London

Telegram , PRO, DO, 142/429

IMMEDIATE/TOP SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]

28 October 1947

Gracey, officiating C-in-C Pakistan Army, reported by phone to me 0100 hours night 27 October that he had received orders from Jinnah which if he obeyed would entail issue Stand Down Order.

2. Flew Lahore morning 28th October and met Gracey who said orders which he had not repeat not obeyed were to send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Pass and to send troops into Mirpur District of Jammu.¹

3. Met Jinnah who is in Lahore and discussed situation at length explaining situation vis-a-vis British Officers very clearly. Gracey also emphasised military weakness of Pakistan while I pointed out incalculable consequences of military violation of what is now territory of Indian Union in consequence of Kashmir's sudden accession.

4. Jinnah withdrew orders but is very angry and disturbed by what he considers to be sharp practice by India in securing Kashmir's accession and situation remains explosive and highly dangerous in my opinion as further successes by irregular tribal forces now in Kashmir or massacre of Muslims in Jammu or Kashmir by State Forces or Indian Union troops which are quite possible might so inflame feeling on both sides as to force open conflict. Control by government in such circumstances likely to be ineffective.

5. Jinnah agreed to my suggestion that he and his Prime Minister should meet Mountbatten, Nehru, Maharaja Kashmir and his Prime Minister at round table conference to try find way out of present dangerous situation. Have passed this on to Mountbatten who also agreed in principle. Matter is now in hands of two Governors-General.

6. Will inform you if situation deteriorates in respect of position of British Officers.

7. Copies of this signal have been sent to both United Kingdom High Commissioners.

8. Reply by this channel.

[CLAUDE AUCHINLECK]

¹See Annex.

Annex to KR-414

Howard Donovan to George Marshall

Telegram, US National Archives, 845.00/10-3147

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 994

NEW DELHI,
31 October 1947

One. Kashmir developments assuming increasingly serious proportions. Drain on India's Military Forces, already overworked, bound to affect prospects for restoration law and order in north India and tribesmen and others invading Kashmir can presumably carry on guerrilla warfare indefinitely. All internal civil air services except Delhi-Calcutta suspended indefinitely from yesterday because planes needed "for work of national importance", i.e. to augment airlift of troops and supplies to Kashmir. Local *Time-Life* correspondent has received unconfirmed report that Jinnah ordered British C-in-C Pakistan forces to Kashmir but C-in-C refused to go. In press note issued last night Government of India says Pakistan was invited on October 28 to prevent raiders from entering Kashmir.

Two. Under circumstances, G[overnment] O[f] I[ndia]'s acceptance Kashmir's accession understandable but GOI has obviously acquired liability. Even if order sufficiently restored in Kashmir to hold plebiscite there is no assurance vote would favor accession to India.

Three. Only practical solution in Embassy's opinion is for GOI and GOP to agree to work for accession of Junagadh and Hyderabad to India and Kashmir to Pakistan but in view [of] past Indo-Pakistan relations prospects of statesmanlike solution discouragingly limited.

Four. I asked Bajpai late yesterday if he felt GOI had Kashmir situation in hand and he replied "I would not go so far as to say that" Bajpai either had very little information re[garding] military situation Kashmir or did not wish to commit himself. He said that Commanding Officer Indian troops had been killed in rear guard engagement and as result there was "certain amount of confusion for some time".

Five. Bajpai mentioned difficulty of supplying troops entirely by

air, especially with winter coming on.

Six. Re[garding] Hyderabad Bajpai said Nizam was having difficulty with Muslim extremists over question agreement with GOI.

[Last para omitted]

DONOVAN

KR-415

Faizullah Khan Niazi to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram, F. 118-2 (Vol. II)-GG/14

RAWALPINDI,
28 October 1947

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Karachi.

Kashmir is last citadel. If that lost Pakistan as good as lost. Prevent Mountbatten-Gandhi-Tara Singh clique from crushing and depriving our Muslim brethren there from right of self-determination. Secede from Commonwealth if necessary. Instantaneous action needed.

FAIZULLAH KHAN NIAZI

KR-416

Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

LAHORE,

29 October 1947

No. 377-G

I thank you for your message¹ communicated by your High Commissioner in Karachi. The position here is that on early morning of 27th, i.e. the day after Mr. Nehru telegraphed to you,² the India Government sent troops to Kashmir. This is culmination of a series of events which was briefly as follows:

On October 2nd, in reply to a remonstrance from Kashmir that Pakistan was not abiding by the Standstill Agreement regarding supply to them by Pakistan of essential commodities, I wired³ to Prime Minister explaining that failure of these commodities to reach Kashmir was due to dislocation of the communications due to disturbances and

assuring him that we would do everything to ensure that Kashmir received its supplies. I also said that we were seriously concerned with the stories that armed Sikhs were infiltrating into Kashmir State and again pressed on him the necessity for representatives of Pakistan and Kashmir jointly to consider question of supplies to the State and other questions. I received a reply⁴ to the effect that as Kashmir Government were dealing with disturbances caused by armed men infiltrating from Pakistan into Kashmir, they were so busy that they could not discuss matters in dispute between us but they would do when things settled down. Nevertheless we sent Shah,⁵ Joint Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Srinagar to decide things with Kashmir. The Prime Minister however refused to have any discussions with him and he had to leave. I also wired⁶ denying that armed men were allowed to infiltrate into Kashmir. Then I telegraphically⁷ (3 groups omitted) Prime Minister to state of affairs in Poonch and on border of Sialkot District where Muslims were being massacred by State troops. In his reply,⁸ dated October 15th, after denying these accusations, the Prime Minister proposed that an impartial enquiry be made into whole affair in order to "remove misunderstandings and restore cordial relations" and said that if this proposal was not accepted he had no option but to ask for assistance to withstand the aggressiveness of people on his border. He attributed the raid, of which he complained, and failure to supply commodities, as steps to coerce Kashmir into acceding to Pakistan. I replied on October 18th⁹ again denying accusations of raid from Pakistan and a case in which Kashmir troops attacked a village in Pakistan and in an encounter with police killed a Head Constable. I said I was apprehensive that tactics followed in East Punjab of massacring Muslims and then driving them out were to be followed in Kashmir. I protested against threat to call in assistance from outside the only object of which could be to suppress Muslims to enable Kashmir to accede to India by a *coup d'etat*. In conclusion, I agreed to his proposal for an impartial enquiry and asked him to nominate his representative when we would immediately nominate ours.

On October 18th,¹⁰ Prime Minister of Kashmir telegraphed me repeating the charges of failure to send supplies according to Standstill Agreement and of allowing armed men to infiltrate into the State. He also complained of articles in Pakistan newspapers and telegrams from private individuals. He drew the conclusion that Pakistan's attitude was unfriendly, even "inimical" and ended by saying that unless things improved he would be justified "in asking for friendly assistance" to prevent trespass on fundamental rights of State.

This telegram was also repeated to Governor-General and published in press. On October 20th,¹¹ the Governor-General telegraphed to the Maharaja, summarising the telegrams between the two Governments and pointing out that threat to call in outside help amounted almost to an ultimatum and showed that real aim of Kashmir Government's policy "is to seek an opportunity to join Indian Union as a *coup d'etat*". He endorsed Kashmir Government's proposal for an enquiry made in their telegram of October 15th¹² and accepted by Pakistan in their telegram of October 18th¹³ and said that impartial (4 groups omitted) proposal of Pakistan Government for a meeting between representatives of two States was an urgent necessity. Finally, he invited Maharaja to send his Prime Minister to Karachi to discuss recent developments in a friendly way. No answer was received to this telegram.

There is no doubt that State troops first attacked Muslims of Poonch. Women and children took refuge in Pakistan and burning villages could be seen from our border. There is no doubt that later they set out to massacre Muslims of Jammu. The Brigadier in command of Jammu-Sialkot border admitted to our Brigadier that his orders were to drive out Muslims from a three-mile wide belt and that he was doing this with automatic weapons and mortars. There is no doubt that armed mobs headed by State troops invaded Pakistan on several occasions. After one of these raids 1,760 dead bodies of Muslims were counted near one of our villages. There are now about one lakh of Muslim refugees from Jammu in West Punjab.

The refusal of Kashmir to send a representative to discuss things and to nominate a representative for an impartial enquiry and their failure to reply to Governor-General's invitation to Prime Minister to come, and their deliberate causing disturbances in their State by employing their troops to attack Muslims, the fact that by 9 a.m. on morning of day on which Kashmir's accession was accepted, Indian air-borne troops had landed in Srinagar, clearly show the existence of a plan for accession against the will of people, possible only by occupation of country by Indian troops. This plan is clear from the start.

Kashmir's action cannot be based on action of Pathans who infiltrated into Kashmir as they are not reported to have done so till October 20th. All that could be done short of use of troops which would have violently disturbed frontier was done to prevent their going to Kashmir.

In these circumstances, Government of Pakistan cannot recognise accession of Kashmir to Indian Union achieved as it has been by fraud

and violence.¹⁴

I welcome your proposal that I, the Prime Minister of India and Maharaja of Kashmir should meet to discuss matters. A meeting for this purpose is being held in Lahore tomorrow attended by Governors-General and Prime Ministers of Pakistan and of India and I hope we will reach a satisfactory conclusion.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-404.

²KR-403.

³KR-375.

⁴KR-379.

⁵See FOA, S-6/2, 6 October 1947. Not printed.

⁶See FOA, S-6/2, 10 October 1947. Not printed.

⁷See KR-383&384.

⁸See Enclosure to KR-389.

⁹See FOA, S-6/2, 18 October 1947. Not printed.

¹⁰See FOA, S-6/2, 18 October 1947. Not printed.

¹¹See KR-394.

¹²See note 8 above.

¹³See note 9 above.

¹⁴See Annex I, II, III.

Annex I to KR-416

KASHMIR'S ACCESSION BASED ON VIOLENCE AND FRAUD¹

Pakistan Refuses to Accept Ruler's Decision Promise of Plebiscite a Hoax

The Government of Pakistan stated in a communique on Thursday night [30 October] that in their opinion the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Dominion "is based on fraud and violence and as such cannot be recognised."

The communique added: "The reference to a plebiscite for Kashmir is merely put forward to mislead as it ostensibly seems attractive but as a practicable proposition it remains on paper. If the India Government are allowed to act freely and unfettered as they please by virtue of having already occupied Kashmir and landed their troops there, then this eldorado of plebiscite will prove a mirage."

The following is the text of the communique:

The Government of Pakistan have considered carefully the situation that has arisen from the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Dominion and the simultaneous dispatch of Indian troops to that State. In his letter of October 26² to the Governor-General of India, His Highness the Maharaja explained that the reason why he wished to accede to the Indian Dominion was in order to obtain the

help of India to repel the Pathan raiders, and the Governor-General, in his reply, made it clear that it was these "special circumstances" which led the Government of India to accept his accession.

His Highness also mentioned the fact that although he had asked both Dominions to come to a Standstill Agreement with his State, only Pakistan had done so. He alleged that Pakistan had not kept that Agreement.

ACCESSION UNACCEPTABLE

The Government of Pakistan cannot accept the version of the circumstances in which Kashmir acceded to the Indian Union. His Highness' Government have ignored or rejected all friendly approaches.

On October 2,³ the Prime Minister of Pakistan suggested to the Prime Minister of Kashmir that all questions outstanding between the two States should be discussed by representatives of the two Governments. The Prime Minister of Kashmir replied that at the moment he was too busy. Nevertheless, the Pakistan Government sent a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴ to Srinagar but he had to return as the State's Premier refused to see him.

On October 15,⁵ the Prime Minister of Kashmir, in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, threatened that unless Pakistan agreed to an impartial inquiry into matters in dispute between the two States in order to restore cordial relations, he would be compelled to ask for outside assistance to withstand the aggression and unfriendly acts of Pakistan people on the border. The Prime Minister of Pakistan at once accepted the proposal for an impartial inquiry but since then no further reference to this matter has been made.

INTOLERABLE ATTITUDE

On October 18,⁶ without waiting for a reply to his previous telegram, the Prime Minister of Kashmir in a telegram to the Governor-General of Pakistan repeated his charges against Pakistan and concluded by saying that he wished to make it plain that the attitude of the Government of Pakistan could be tolerated no longer.

On October 20,⁷ the Governor-General replied and asked the Prime Minister of Kashmir to come to Karachi and talk things over with him. No reply has so far been sent to this request. The Governor-General also pointed out that the threat to call in outside help amounted almost to an ultimatum and showed that the real aim of the Kashmir Government's policy was to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Union by means of a *coup de'tat*.

SECRET NEGOTIATIONS

In the opinion of the Government of Pakistan, the course of these

negotiations clearly shows that the Kashmir Government had never any intention of maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan and that, at any rate as early as October 15, they had made up their mind to call in outside assistance, presumably after ascertaining the attitude of the Government of India by secret negotiations which had been going on for weeks.

The correspondence between the two Governments closed with the Governor-General's telegram of October 20 offering to discuss matters with the Prime Minister of Kashmir.

The Pathan raid into Kashmir occurred on October 22. The Government of Pakistan cannot therefore accept His Highness' version that this raid was the reason for His Highness' request for the help of Indian troops in return for his accession. The Government of Pakistan also note that Indian troops arrived in Kashmir at 9 a.m. on the day on which the Governor-General of India sent his letter accepting the State's accession.

In his telegram of October 2, the Prime Minister of Pakistan told the Kashmir Government that Pakistan wished to do everything in its power to implement the Standstill Agreement with Kashmir and explained that failure to send essential supplies to the State under that agreement was due to the dislocation of communications because of the disturbances in the Punjab.

PAKISTAN'S DENIAL

The Government of Pakistan consistently denied raiding into Kashmir territory by people from Pakistan.^b On the other hand, there is conclusive evidence that Kashmir troops were used first to attack Muslims in Poonch and later to massacre Muslims in Jammu and even to attack Muslim villages in Pakistan near the border.

Recently, over 1,700 Muslim corpses were counted near a village in West Punjab and raiders from Jammu into that Province have left behind them military vehicles and the bodies of soldiers in uniform. The Muslims of Kashmir State did nothing to justify this oppression. It is only because of this action by the State that Kashmir is disturbed and this well-concerted action was purposely resorted to in order to create an excuse for calling in troops from India.

REASON FOR PATHAN RAID

It is this action too that has led to the raid of Pathans into Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan only with the greatest difficulty prevented a Pathan incursion into West Punjab to take revenge for what [had] happened in the East Punjab. The attack on Poonch and the massacre in Jammu further added to and inflamed, all the more, Pathan feeling and made the raid on Kashmir inevitable, unless the Government of Pakistan by use of troops, were prepared to create a situation

in the NWFP which might have incalculable results on the peace of the border. The sending of India troops to Kashmir under cover of accession has further intensified and inflamed the feelings of the tribes. The Kashmir Government must have been fully aware of the inevitability of the Pathan reaction. In the opinion of the Government of Pakistan, the accession of Kashmir is based on fraud and violence and as such cannot be recognised.⁹

¹The *Civil & Military Gazette*, 31 October 1947.

²KR-402

³KR-375.

⁴Major A.S.B. Shah was sent to Kashmir on 6 October 1947 for talks with the State authorities. See *FOA*, S-6/2, 6 October 1947 Not printed. Also see Annex III.

⁵Enclosure KR-389.

⁶KR-391.

⁷KR-394.

⁸On 14 November 1947, Henry Grady, U.S. Ambassador in India, wrote to Washington saying it was unlikely that Jinnah could have prevented the tribesmen from entering into Kashmir even if he had wanted to. If Jinnah planned to take Kashmir by force, he would rather have waited until the weather worsened enough to deter India from flying in troops. He also thought if Jinnah had planned the invasion, he would have ensured that the raiders refrained from killing Kashmiri Muslims and looting their property. "As it is, according to American correspondents returning from Kashmir, the depredations of the raiders are so bitterly resented by Kashmir Muslims that for the time being Sheikh Abdullah's following is perhaps stronger than ever" See *US National Archives*, 745-45 F/11-1447. Not printed.

⁹On 4 November 1947, the US Embassy reported to Washington that there was "little legal ground for such announcement as the consent of the Government of Pakistan was not required to make such an accession binding on any other Government... The Government of India took the same view of the accession to Pakistan of Junagadh in Kathiawar." It was further reported that "Pakistan will obviously champion the cause of the Kashmiris who have been... killed by Dogra troops in rather the same way as India had been attempting to protect the Indians in South Africa." See *US National Archives*, F. 845 00/11-447. Not printed.

Annex II to KR-416

TROOPS FROM INDIA RUSHED TO KASHMIR¹

State Accedes to Union

Interim Government formed

Battalion Moved By Air

New Delhi, Monday [27 October]—Kashmir has acceded to the Indian Dominion. This is only one of the the major developments of the last 24 hours.

Accruing from the new relation between the two Governments is India's obligation to defend the State against invasion. Unlike other States, this duty had to be discharged immediately.

By a dawn to dusk aerial operation, more than a battalion of Indian troops has been transported across the 9,000-ft Banihal range to the Kashmir Valley.

From the purely technical point of view, the operation constitutes a feat unique in the military annals of India, considering the short notice in which it was undertaken.

The third important development is the formation of an interim Government by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah under the aegis of the Maharaja. The Prime Minister, representing the Ruler, will stay.

The accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union is of a piece with Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. Neither is consistent with the principles on which India's partition was agreed to. The Indian Government justify the acceptance of the accession on the ground that Pakistan was the first to break away from an agreed proposition that the communal majority should determine which Dominion a State should join. The Government of India have, therefore, reiterated their desire that eventually, when peace returns, a reference to the people should be made. This is consistent with their demand that the people of Junagadh ought to have a voice in determining whether they really want to accede to Pakistan.

The troops flown to Srinagar today may, it appears, be the spearhead of reinforcement to be sent by road. It is, however, hoped that should the fight remain confined to the present number of insurgents and "invaders", not many more troops would be necessary to restore peace and regain control over the area now claimed to be administered by the Provisional Azad Government.

Hardly had the Indian troops arrived in Srinagar when they were despatched to Baramula to engage the invaders entrenched in that area during the last two days. They are said to have succeed[ed] in stemming the progress of the rebel forces, who had taken Baramula.

Sheikh Abdullah's volunteers are reported to have blown up a bridge between Uri and Baramula. If true, this would cut the rebel army into two.

The Prime Minister of Kashmir, Mr. Mahajan, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Mr. R. L. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister, flew to Srinagar this morning. Mr. V. P. Menon, Secretary, [States Department], accompanied the party. On the way the party landed at Jammu, where, it is understood, Mr. Menon accepted the accession of the State on behalf [of] the Government of India.

Sardar Patel was at the Willingdon Station when Mr. Menon returned.

¹The *Statesman*, 28 October 1947.

*Annex III to KR-416**Howard Donovan to George Marshall**Telegram, US National Archives, 845.00/11-147*CONFIDENTIAL
No. 999AMERICAN EMBASSY, NEW DELHI,
1 November 1947.

According official reports no material change in Kashmir military development. RIAF aircraft have strafed motor transport; Indian troops have dug in; situation "under control".

2. Mountbatten, Auchinleck, Baldev Singh expected meet Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan at session of Joint Defense Council in Lahore today.

3. In press statement headed by *News Chronicle* "Mahajan exposes Pakistan Government's lies". Kashmir Prime Minister says happenings due entirely GOP policy of coercion by invasion. Contradicting "glaring mis-statements" issued by GOP, Prime Minister says he did not decline to interview a GOP envoy¹ sent to Kashmir in October; that he did not receive a certain telegram² inviting him to Karachi; that Kashmir Government did not show Jinnah discourtesy when they suggested September was an inauspicious time³ for him to visit Srinagar; and that accession to India was not arranged until circumstances forced an immediate decision.

4. According press report from Allahabad, Tej Bahadur Sapru has telegraphed Maharaja wishing him success against "this outrageous and tragic invasion". Report from Lahore states volunteers being organized there to fight for "Kashmir Provisional Government". *Hindustan Times* editorial headed "Planned Aggression" says there is no room for imagining Jinnah or his Government would be willing [to] behave reasonably or with goodwill toward India; his faith in "magic effect of repetition of big lies is undiminished". New formations should be quickly rushed to replace troops sent to Kashmir "so that any calculation that it might weaken India may prove foolish". If Joint Defense Council powerless [to] prevent planned aggression, it is a mere encumbrance and should be abolished; but "at some stage or other" HMG's good offices may be useful. *News Chronicle* says invasion could not have taken place without tacit support GOP authorities. Removal USA labels from US military equipment supplied to Dutch in Indonesia "did not make fact of US intervention less glaring and mere fact Pakistan soldiers took off uniforms before embarking on Kashmir adventure does not minimize "Pakistan's complicity." Danger of prolonged hostilities cannot be minimized. If GOP leaders confident of Kashmir

people's desire join Pakistan, they should agree immediately to plebiscite under joint GOP-GOI supervision.

5. According local military sources strength of Indian forces not involved in Kathiawar, in Hyderabad area, or in Kashmir is now reduced to approximately that of all Pakistan forces.

HOWARD DONOVAN

¹A S.B. Shah.

²KR-394.

³See KR-363.

KR-417

C.B. Duke to L. Grafftey-Smith

PRO, DO 142/494

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
LAHORE,

No. PHO/18/47

29 October 1947

The news in the morning papers of October 28th of Kashmir's accession to the Dominion of India and the despatch by the Dominion of troops by air to Srinagar came as a complete surprise to everyone here. I am reliably informed that even Mr. Jinnah and the Governor knew nothing about it until they were informed of the report in the All India Radio news bulletin last night. It may be useful if I recount for record the stages as they appeared here leading up to the present climax.

2. It was on the morning of Saturday the 25th October that I first heard of the disorders in the Jhelum valley along the main road from Srinagar to Kohala and of the attack on Majors Rawley and O'Kelly who had left Srinagar with Mrs. and Miss O'Kelly on the 22nd October. I need not go into the details of that incident which I understand was separately reported to you by Cranston. The disorders along this road were stated to be due to tribal raiders including Mohmands, Wazirs and Afridis from the North-West Frontier, who were said to be operating in gangs under leaders who were not tribesmen and who in fact had no control over the tribesmen. It was suggested and has since been corroborated that these leaders were in many cases Muslim League volunteers from the North-West Frontier Province and parts of the West Punjab.

3. Cranston arrived from Srinagar via Delhi that morning, October 25th, and reported that as he was going up to Srinagar on the 21st

October he had seen bands of armed Sikhs walking along the road and it appeared that they were being armed and collected by the Kashmir Government. From the attack on Majors Rawley and O'Kelly, however, it was evident that by the 23rd October at any rate the tribal raiders were in control of the section of the road from Domel up to Muzaffarabad and it was further reported that the raiders had looted and burnt the town of Muzaffarabad itself and were on their way to Baramula. There were no reports then of Kashmir State troops being in action against the raiders. On the other hand, reports were current in Lahore that State Hindu troops, principally Dogras, assisted by armed Sikhs were looting and burning Muslim villages in the Jammu area, and I myself, when flying with the Governor from Rawalpindi back to Lahore on the 21st October saw a considerable number of villages burning along the Chenab River west of Jammu and just inside the Kashmir border.

4. The Maharaja of Kashmir who had recently come down to his winter capital at Jammu, returned to Srinagar accompanied by his Prime Minister, Mr. Mahajan, on the 23rd October by air. Rumours were received from Rawalpindi on the 25th that the tribal raiders had reached Srinagar itself, had taken possession of the aerodrome and established "a provisional Government" there. These rumours were, however, proved to be false by the crew of a civil aircraft which arrived in Delhi from Srinagar on the 25th afternoon and reported that all had been quiet in the capital and at the aerodrome that morning and that there were no signs of raiders there.

5. It is curious and I fear significant that there was no mention of the happenings in the Jhelum valley and towards Srinagar in either the *Civil and Military Gazette* or the *Pakistan Times*, the two English language and principal newspapers published daily in Lahore. I learnt from newspaper correspondents here that in fact the Editor of the *Civil and Military Gazette* had information on the disorders in that area by the evening of Friday the 24th October and had intended publishing it in his newspaper, but was either forbidden to do so or advised against it. The first paper which appeared here carrying this news was the *Delhi Statesman* of Sunday the 26th which had been supplied with the information by Mr. Batra the Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, who had flown from Srinagar to Delhi on the 24th October. British correspondents also complained to me that cables containing this story which they had attempted to send to their papers in London on the evening of the 24th or morning of the 25th had been seriously delayed or even suppressed.

6. Since it had become impossible to put into effect arrangements which had been made earlier in the week for the evacuation of Europeans from Srinagar by road to Rawalpindi, I recommended on the

25th October that steps should be taken to evacuate them by air. Since this would have to be arranged through the Supreme Commander in Delhi, I telephoned to Mr. Symon, Deputy High Commissioner there, in the absence of Sir Terence Shone, to inform him of the position as we knew it, and to ask him to initiate action to arrange the air evacuation from Srinagar. I also reported by telephone to the Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi.

7. No fresh information could be obtained on the 26th October but on the 27th I heard from Rawalpindi that there was a rumour that troops of the Indian Army had been moved into Kashmir; this, however, was stated to be unconfirmed. I also learned that the evacuation of Europeans by air from Srinagar to Rawalpindi had been arranged in Delhi for October 29th and that Cranston had flown up that morning with an officer of the Supreme Commander's staff to organise the movement.

8. Mr. Jinnah had arrived in Lahore on the evening of the 26th October, principally I understand to establish the new and more high-powered organisation for dealing with the problem of refugees and rehabilitation. I had obtained an appointment for an interview with him at 12.45 p.m. on the 28th, but when I went to Government House I found that the Quaid-i-Azam had left for a conference to be held in Liaquat Ali Khan's room as the latter was still confined to his bed. Others who had been summoned for this conference were Field Marshal Auchinleck, Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, and General Gracey, from Pakistan Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In the absence of Mr. Jinnah I saw his Secretary, Mr. Amin, who informed me in the course of conversation that there had been a massacre of Muslims in the *Idgah* in Jammu¹ on the day of the '*Id*', i.e. October 26th, in which he said eight thousand Muslims had been killed. I asked him if he was convinced of the authenticity of this story and particularly of the number of Muslims killed, and he asserted categorically that it was true but did not mention the source of his information. I found that the Governor had not heard this story and was sceptical about the figure, though he was prepared to believe that there had been some sort of incident during the '*Id*' in which possibly large number of Muslims were killed.

9. I learnt later on the evening of the 28th of the decision of Mr. Jinnah's conference earlier in the day to invite Lord Mountbatten, Mr. Nehru and the Maharaja of Kashmir to a conference in Lahore on the following day, the 29th, and that these invitations had been accepted. A telegram was also to be sent to Mr. Attlee, who I understand, had previously appealed to both Dominions in regard to the Kashmir situation. Military opinion here seems to have been opposed to the despatch of Pakistan troops to Kashmir.

10. I also saw Sir George Cunningham later in the evening, who told me that he estimated that about two thousand tribesmen had gone into Kashmir. Of these, more than half were Mahsuds from South Waziristan, the wildest and toughest of all the tribes on the North-West Frontier; while the rest were composed of small contingents of almost all the other tribes. Sir George said that if there had been the slightest sign of encouragement from himself or his officers there would have been thirty to forty thousand tribesmen in Kashmir by now and it was only by impressing upon their elders that the orders of the Quaid-i-Azam and of the Premier, Liaquat Ali Khan, were that the tribes should not intervene at present and that if their assistance was required anywhere for the defence of Islam they would be summoned by the Pakistan Government, that large number of tribesmen were dissuaded from adventuring into Kashmir. Nevertheless, Sir George Cunningham was sure that certain members of the Muslim League had encouraged and assisted tribesmen in going to Kashmir, disregarding the Pakistan leaders instructions and the Governor's own advice that any such action would be best calculated to drive the Maharaja into the arms of India which has proved to be the case.

C. B. DUKE

¹See KR-401.

KR-418

REBELS MARCH ON SRINAGAR¹

Advance Along Broad Front

India Sending More Troops

SRINAGAR, October 29: The military situation here has taken a turn for the worse within the past 24 hours, and, with rebel forces capturing the township of Baramula and advancing to within 18 miles of Srinagar in a three-pronged drive from the west and the north-west corner of the Vale of Kashmir, the capital city is gravely menaced.

It is reliably learnt that the rebels, reinforced by several thousand local Muslim peasants and now consisting of perhaps 10,000 persons, spear-headed by a well-armed and organized striking force with 3.7 in [ch] guns as well as mortars and small arms at its disposal, are fighting efficiently and have inflicted many casualties on the defenders of Srinagar. These latter consist of perhaps 1,000 Kashmir State troops with a stiffening of two companies of the 11th Sikh Regiment of the Indian Army.

In fairly severe fighting for Baramula township, which fell to the rebels on the night of October 27, the Indian troops suffered losses, and their commanding officer, a senior Indian, was killed. But now the rebels are

advancing along a broad front of perhaps 30 miles upon the capital, which at present is defended by a small force consisting of elements of the 11th Sikh Regiment and the 1st Punjab Regiment. The main purpose of this force is to hold Srinagar Airport, seven miles south of the capital.

200 BRITONS LEAVING

This dispatch is being written from the airport, which at present holds seven Dakota transports of the RAF and two chartered civilian transports. The latter have flown in petrol supplies from Delhi—petrol is so short here that the defending forces are badly handicapped—while the RAF aircraft are evacuating to Rawalpindi some 200 Britons, mostly elderly couples with a sprinkling of children. It is hoped that this number will leave today. The Indian military authorities here take a sufficiently grave view of the outlook to advise all Britons to get out without delay.

Further Indian troops are just beginning to arrive by air, and it is learn that the Indian Government intends to dispatch more troops, including a battalion of the Kumaon Regiment. The question is whether these reinforcements will arrive in time to save Srinagar city from the advancing raiders, for it seems possible that the existing forces are inadequate for the defence of the city. However, the Indians, who are under the command of Brigadier Katoch, are determined to hold the airfield at all costs so as to enable reinforcements to pour in.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army today ordered that British officers attached to the Indian Army will not take part in operations in Kashmir or Jammu. Any British officer now serving in Kashmir will be withdrawn as soon as possible.

¹*The Times*, 30 October 1947.

KR-419

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

No. 368-G

LAHORE,

30 October 1947

I have received your telegrams¹ including that of October 29th [28] to which I reply. The position is that Sikh attacks on Muslims in East Punjab in August greatly inflamed feeling throughout Pakistan and it was only with greatest difficulty that Pathan tribes were prevented from entering West Punjab to take revenge on Hindus and Sikhs there. Later when Muslims in Poonch² were attacked and those in Jammu³

massacred by mobs led by Kashmir State Forces and when it was evident that there was to be a repetition in Kashmir of what (happened) in East Punjab it became impossible wholly to prevent tribes from entering that State without using troops who would have created a situation on the Frontier that might well have got out of control.

Your recent action of sending troops to Kashmir on pretext of accession has made things infinitely worse. The whole of the Frontier is stirring and feeling of resentment among tribes is intense. The responsibility for what is happening is entirely yours. There was no trouble in Poonch or Jammu till State troops started killing Muslims. All along Kashmir Government has been in close touch with you. At the same time they ignored or refused our offers of friendly discussions. On October 2nd, I suggested⁴ that both Pakistan and Kashmir should appoint representatives to discuss supplies to Kashmir and mutual allegations of border raids. The Prime Minister of Kashmir replied⁵ he was too busy. When in spite of this we sent Shah, Joint Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and States, to Kashmir the Prime Minister refused to discuss with him. On October 15th the Prime Minister of Kashmir threatened⁶ that unless we agreed to an impartial inquiry into what was happening he would ask for assistance to withstand aggression on his borders. We immediately agreed⁷ to an impartial inquiry. Since then no more has been heard from Kashmir of this proposal.

The Pathan raid on Kashmir did not start till October 22nd. It is quite clear therefore, Kashmir's plan of asking for Indian troops—and it could hardly have been unilateral—was formed quite independently of this raid and all evidence and action taken shows it was pre-arranged. It would seem rather to have been made after failure of their troops to suppress people of Poonch and in anticipation of reaction which they expected to their massacre of Muslims in Jammu.⁸

I in my turn appeal to you to stop the Jammu killings which still continue. Yesterday West Punjab was again invaded by a well armed mob who after a fight with villagers retreated leaving two Gurkha soldiers in uniform dead behind them. As long as this sort of thing continues, passions are bound to become further inflamed.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-412 & KR-413.

²See KR-383.

³See KR-399.

⁴KR-375.

⁵KR-379.

⁶See Enclosure to KR-389

⁷See KR-394, para 5.

⁸See KR-401.

KR-420

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee**Telegram, FOA, S-6/2*

LAHORE,

30 October 1947

No. 369

Please refer our telegram of yesterday¹ conveying that a meeting attended by Governors-General and Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India was to be held today at Lahore to discuss Kashmir issue. This meeting could not be held owing to unfortunate illness of Mr. Nehru.² It is hoped we will be able to hold it on Saturday [1 November].

In the meantime, resentment among the tribes of North-West Frontier is rapidly growing and a very dangerous situation indeed may arise. To attempt to stop the tribes go into Kashmir now would involve us in a major frontier war. I have wired to Mr. Nehru³ to this effect pointing out that tribal movement began as a result of attacks on Poonch Muslims and massacre of Jammu Muslims⁴ by the State troops and that the present situation is due to India's action in sending troops to Kashmir. The killing of Muslims in Jammu and raids by State troops into Pakistan continue. The situation here and in NWFP is extremely critical.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-416.

²In fact, Nehru was not ill but stayed away from the meeting as he was "annoyed" with the Pakistan statement [Annex 1 to KR-416] on Kashmir. See S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 294-5. Patel was opposed to the Lahore summit as well. He pointed out that "...for the Prime Minister to go crawling to Mr Jinnah when we are the stronger side and in the right would never be forgiven by the people of India". See M. J. Akbar, *Kashmir: Behind the Vale*, New Delhi, 2002, 120.

³KR-419.⁴See KR-401.

KR-421

*Liaquat Ali Khan to M. Ikramullah**Telegram, FOA, S-6/2*

LAHORE,

30 October 1947

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 371-G

India is using aeroplanes of its civil aviation companies to transport

troops and equipment to Srinagar. Please examine if this action is contrary to International Civil Aviation Agreement to which India is a party. If it is to the contrary, protests to proper quarters be sent.

It would be fair to inform Indian Government that we propose to detain aeroplanes which are being used in Kashmir operations if they land on airfields in Pakistan. Troops found in such aeroplanes will be interned. This is ordinary procedure under international law.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-422

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

No. 255

[NEW DELHI,]

31 October 1947

Your telegram No. 368-G dated October 30th.¹ I have repeatedly expressed to you my sentiments regarding the cycle of retaliation which has plunged West and East Punjab in tragedy. Both in public and private I have condemned atrocities irrespective of community of perpetrators—Sikh, Hindu or Muslim. If Hindus and Sikhs have killed or driven out Muslims in any part of Kashmir I condemn their action without reserve. I find it impossible however to accept either your version of causes and course of attack on Kashmir or baseless suggestion that we have sent troops to Kashmir on pretext of "accession". We are perfectly willing to have all events investigated during last 15 months to find out what have been basic causes and on whom blame rests. What has happened in Kashmir stands apart and must be judged as such more specially in view of imminent danger of widespread disaster which Valley has had to face which would have the most far-reaching consequences in regard to relations between India and Pakistan.

2. The Government of India entirely agree that no raids from one territory to another should take place and they must be stopped by all means at our disposal. It is patent that they have had nothing to do even remotely with occurrences in or near State till they sent their troops to Srinagar on October 27th. Before accession [it] was not our

responsibility even though we were greatly interested in its future. We were not consulted by Kashmir Government about any steps they may have taken or any correspondence with you. Our knowledge of what occurred then was derived largely from statements appearing in the press. From these statements it appears that Government's account is materially different from what you have given and according to them many raids have taken place from West Punjab into Jammu Province. As a matter of fact today a considerable part of Jammu Province has been occupied by raiders from West Punjab. These raiders are provided, according to reports, with most modern weapons including flame throwers. In these circumstances, it is curious to state that aggression was from State.

3. No impartial person could regard military operations which for some weeks have been in progress against, as other than well organised, well planned and the result of most careful preparation. These operations certainly did not start on October 22nd. What started on October 22nd was raid from North-West Frontier Province. Its timing, mobility and speed are more suggestive of a concerted link between the operation which has been in progress on Kashmir's western borders than of a sudden tribal eruption inspired by communal happenings in Punjab. In addition to this we have reliable information that regular Pakistan troops in large numbers were concentrated near the Kashmir border, Kohala, as well as on Jammu border and that they were prepared to enter in wake of raids.

4. You say that all along the Kashmir Government has been in close touch with us. You also say that Kashmir's plan of asking for Indian troops was formed quite independently of recent raids. Indeed you even suggest that request of Indian troops was inspired by us. I repudiate both statements of alleged fact and insinuation. Until the Pathan raid started we had no request from State for military aid and question was never considered by us.² Some weeks ago, we were told by Government that essential supplies had been stopped by Pakistan Government and we were requested to send some of these essential supplies. A request was also made for arms which was referred, in common with requests from other States, to our States and Defence Ministries. This was sanctioned but as a matter of fact no arms were sent to them at all as this matter was not considered very urgent. It was at 11 p.m. on October 24th that an urgent and specific request was made to us for the first time for troops to be sent. We considered this on the 25th in our

Defence Committee and again on 26th morning. In view of imminent peril to Valley and possibility of large scale massacres a decision was arrived at regarding accession³ and to send air-borne troops the next day the 27th October. You will appreciate that it would have been easy⁴ for us to send these troops earlier if we had intended doing so and thus stop the raiders at an early stage of their career along Jhelum Valley road. Both military and other competent opinion have criticised us for being dilatory. At no time did we consider the question of sending troops previous to October 25th. The earlier visits of officials were concerned with supplies and no question of giving military help arose.

5. Kashmir's accession to India was accepted⁵ by us at the request of the Maharaja's Government and the most numerous representative popular organisation in the State which is predominately Muslim. Even then it was accepted on condition that as soon as the invader has been driven from Kashmir's soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then. Had we desired a pretext either for Kashmir's accession or for sending our troops there, we should not have (group omitted) of Kashmir and parts of Jammu province had been given to fire and sword and Srinagar itself was in peril of capture by the raiders with all its horrors.

6. I have no doubt that you realise that the raiders from the Frontier Province or along the Murree Road came from Pakistan territory and it is the easiest thing in the world to stop them at the two bridges which connect Pakistan territory to Kashmir. They were not so prevented and their equipment and arms including artillery and automatic weapons bear witness to every help being given to them. We are credibly informed that regular officers of the Pakistan Army are advising the raiders. Even now it should be easy for your Government to stop the passage of these raiders or their supplies to territory completely.

7. Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people of [Kashmir]—to the world.

8. You lay on us the responsibility for what is happening. I should have thought that this could more appropriately and fairly be placed on those who have been attacking and invading. To accuse us of provocation and aggression now, all that we have done is go to the rescue of people threatened with loss of life, property and honour, is a

similar perversion of truth and reason. It gives me no pleasure to write to you in this strain. I am convinced that if Pakistan and India are to live in peace, leaders on both sides must have trust in one another and act with understanding and restraint. Mutual mistrust and recrimination can only lead to consequences which would be to the advantage of neither India nor Pakistan. I have done everything possible to think and act in this spirit. It was not possible for me to refuse the request of the [Kashmir] Government to help them to prevent the raiding bands from committing massacres, arson and loot and ruining Kashmir. I should have thought that it was equally to your advantage to prevent this and hence my appeal to you to stop these raids at the source.

9. I have no knowledge of the raid you refer to in Jammu in your last paragraph. I am enquiring about it.⁶ We shall certainly do our utmost to stop all raids and I appeal to you to do the same. I understand however that there is concentration of Pakistan troops on the Jammu border.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹KR-419.

²Requests from Kashmir to India for military support had started pouring in from first week of October 1947. See Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 42, 43, 47 and 48.

³See KR-407.

⁴The operation order issued on 26 October by the Indian Army to their Parachute Brigade was intercepted by Lahore Area Headquarters in Pakistan and passed on the same night to the Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. See Fazal Muqeem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Karachi, 1963, 91.

⁵See note 3 above.

⁶Nehru informed Liaquat Ali Khan the same day that the Kashmir Premier had no information about any raid by armed mobs or State Forces on villages bordering Pakistan. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

KR-423

C. B. Duke to L. Grafftey-Smith

PRO, DO 142/494

No. PHC/19/47

LAHORE,
31 October 1947

There had been rather a dearth of information here about Pakistan's

intentions in regard to the Kashmir situation since the cancellation of the meeting which was to have been held in Lahore on the 29th October between Mr. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and other representatives of Pakistan on the one side, and Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Nehru and the Maharaja of Kashmir on the other. The subsequent refusal of the delegates of India to come to Lahore caused the greatest disappointment here and Nehru's excuse of alleged indisposition was regarded with scepticism. It was suggested that it might be due to poison administered to Nehru through the ear by Patel. Unfortunately Liaq[u]at Ali Khan who, as you know, had been unwell for some time is still confined to his bed and seems to be making very slow progress towards recovery. It was, therefore, not possible for him to go to Delhi.

2. I had an interview with Jinnah yesterday afternoon but he was extremely uncommunicative; he confined himself to emphasising the extraordinary and unreasonable attitude adopted both by the Maharaja of Kashmir in refusing to talk over the situation at an earlier stage with his representative, and the equally unreasonable action of the Government of India in sending in troops without any sort of attempt at negotiations and without even informing the Pakistan Government. I said that I thought that it had been unfortunate that there had been this incursion of tribesmen from the North-West Frontier into Kashmir which lent colour to the Indian Government's allegation¹ that they were merely sending their troops to repel external aggressors from Kashmir, but the Quaid-i-Azam was not to be drawn and did not pursue that subject. He informed me personally that his Government had sent a message to Mr. Attlee about the Kashmir situation but did not vouchsafe any of its content.

3. There have been several meetings in Liaq[u]at's bedroom presided over by Jinnah, one of the results of which presumably is the official statement² published in this morning's papers. While it refutes successfully I think the Kashmir and Indian suggestion that Pakistan had refused to negotiate, and even makes the best of the rather delicate matter from Pakistan's point of view, of the tribal incursion into Kashmir, the statement seems to me disappointing in that it is entirely retrospective—it gives no indication of the Pakistan Government's plans for the future nor any suggestion for the settlement of the present conflict in Kashmir. It is stated that Pakistan will not recognise Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union, but what this means in terms of action no one seems to know. The original draft suggested the immediate withdrawal of troops and the holding of a plebiscite forthwith under the direct supervision of the premiers of India and Pakistan, but this version was not approved, and was

replaced by the "eldorado" and the "mirage". India, in the meantime, has continued to send in troops, requisitioning civil aircraft for the purpose of reinforcing the Indian Air Force. The Indian National Airways service between Delhi and Lahore has been suspended for several days past but I was informed that they are starting again today, which may perhaps be taken as a good sign. But there is a general air of suspense and uneasiness here which seemed even to pervade the garden party which was given the day before yesterday [29 October] by the West Punjab Government in honour of Mr. and Miss Jinnah. It is reported that the Indian force in Kashmir now amounts to a brigade, and that there is a British brigadier there, which is taken very much amiss by people of all sorts here.

4. The present situation in Kashmir contains most dangerous possibilities from the point of view of the North-West Frontier apart from anything else. If effective efforts are to be made to stop the tribesmen getting into Kashmir before any settlement satisfactory to Muslim opinion is reached there, armed force would have to be used and this might easily lead to a flare up along the whole frontier. There are also reports already that tribesmen from across the Durand Line are beginning to join in and prolongation of unsettled conditions in Kashmir might well be expected to arouse ambitions of expansion in Afghanistan and possibly even further north. There are wider considerations, therefore, even then the relations between the Dominions of India and Pakistan make it imperative that peace should be returned in Kashmir without delay. But neither of the Dominion Governments seems to have much idea of how this should be done. The Indian Government presumably supposes that it can be achieved by force. British experience with the tribes in the similar mountainous country of the North-West Frontier does not bear out this view. It is true that the population of Kashmir is much less tough, but it is not much less inaccessible for regular military operations and practically the whole of the rural population in the hills of Kashmir proper, as distinct from Jammu, are Muslims, who may be expected to remain bitterly hostile to the efforts of the present Maharaja and the Indian Government's forces. Moreover, the Poonchis in Kashmir have a considerable proportion of ex-soldiers, 20000 [of] whom, according to the so-called "Azad Kashmir" organisation of Sardar Mohamad Ibrahim are armed with modern rifles, automatic weapons and mortars. It seems to me, therefore, imperative for the interests of the British Commonwealth generally no less than that [of] the Pakistan and Indian Dominions that every form of pressure on these two Dominions to show a spirit of compromise so as to reach a solution of

this problem should be exerted and that as soon as possible.

5. Lord Mountbatten has called a meeting to be held here tomorrow the 1st November, of the Joint Defence Council. There is no ostensible agenda for the Council except the Kashmir situation. Lord Mountbatten is to come to Lahore himself and it is to be hoped that he will be able to bring Pandit Nehru with him, but behind Nehru is believed to be Gandhi. There is a theory, which you may have heard as it is advanced, I believe, by Mohamed Ali that it was Gandhi who engineered the Maharaja of Kashmir's decision to accede immediately to India by getting at him through the Kashmiri Brahmins and astrologers on whom the Maharaja is said to have been leaning to a large extent since he got rid of Kak, his late Prime Minister, and his British officials. At present, however, a further speculation would be unprofitable and one can only await the outcome of the Joint Defence Council meeting.

6. Air evacuation of those Europeans who wished to leave Kashmir was completed yesterday without trouble of any kind or incident, but considerably fewer have come out than were expected. The original figure was about one hundred and ninety-five persons, including children and servants, but on the first day about one hundred and thirty came and yesterday only four. Six others (five Greeks and an Englishman) obtained a lift in an aircraft which went one day before the main evacuation started. These people have been accommodated in Rawalpindi, most of them, I understand, in a military camp under arrangements made by Mr. Powell. Cranston came out from Srinagar with the main party on the first day but returned with the aircraft yesterday morning and has not yet come back. He reported that efforts were being made to run a motor convoy by road via the Banihal Pass to Jammu and Sialkot and petrol was flown into Srinagar yesterday morning for this purpose, but I have learnt from Mr. Powell today that very little of it was taken and the greater part has been brought back. But Cranston had announced his intention of coming with the road convoy if it did run and as he has stayed in Srinagar. I presume that the attempt is still to be made. As so few passengers were flown out yesterday the aircraft [was] loaded up with more of the baggage of those who had been flown out before as they were allowed to bring only two hundred pounds each with them. Mr. Powell is letting me have a list as soon as possible of the Europeans who have been brought out so far. Amongst of [*sic*] those of whom there is no news are Captain Scott, A.D.C. to Lord Mountbatten and Captain Dalrymple, A.D.C. to

General Messervey. These two officers had gone up on a shooting trip into the hills beyond Srinagar.

C. B. DUKE

¹See KR-425.

²See Annex I to KR-416.

KR-424

Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru¹

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NEW DELHI,
31 October 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I know I do not need to assure you that no sort of information was given from Government House which could possibly have been used by [Philip] Noel Baker² in his statement in the House of Commons that there would be a meeting on Kashmir at Lahore on Saturday [1 November]; but I think you would like to know that I have verified that the U.K. High Commissioner here, [Sir Terence] Shone, had no knowledge of this meeting.³

The only possible source, therefore, must be from Pakistan. You saw how my letter was worded, which was based entirely on the meeting of the Joint Defence Council and our readiness to discuss Kashmir after this meeting, since Liaquat's illness prevented him from travelling to Delhi.

I am fully aware that this makes the position difficult, but I feel that a statement on the lines of the attached draft⁴ may help to restore the position.

I am coming round to see you about this as soon as the Emergency Committee meeting is over, and to discuss the line we should take up at Lahore, not only to expose the complicity of Pakistan but to clear ourselves of Liaquat's fantastic charges that we have in some way engineered the situation.

I have never been so certain in my life that the future welfare of millions depends upon the skillful handling of this all-important meeting, and I am proud to be able to accompany you and offer my assistance in a constitutional manner.

Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 70.

²British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

³See KR-414, para 5.

⁴Not traceable.

KR-425

STATE PEOPLE WILL DECIDE KASHMIR'S DESTINY
INDIA GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF POLICY¹

The help which the Government of India has given to Kashmir is against freebooters who are enemies of law and order and is in no way directed against the sister Dominion, with which India desires to live on terms of friendship, emphasizes a Press Note issued in New Delhi on Thursday night.

Though the raiders have come across Pakistan territory, the Note proceeds, the Government of the Dominion has disowned them as irresponsible. The Government of India can take note only of the official attitude of Pakistan towards the present crisis in the affairs of Kashmir. The raiders have no means of access to the Kashmir valley except through Pakistan. The Pakistan Government can help to bring the present grave situation to an end by closing this means of access. They were invited to do so on October 28.

After a general review of the situation, the Press Note declares that everything possible will be done to defend Kashmir, whatever the cost.

It also draws attention to the conditions on which the Government of India accepted Kashmir's accession. Consistently with their policy, as declared in the case of Junagadh, it has been made clear to H. H. the Maharaja that as soon as the invaders have been driven from the soil of Kashmir and law and order restored, the people of the State should decide the question of accession. The Government of India were also anxious that, in the national emergency now confronting Kashmir, the Government of the State should function as a people's Government. The decision of the Maharaja to ask Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government is, therefore, particularly gratifying to them. Both in the defence of Kashmir and in the determination of its future destiny the people of the State will now have a decisive voice.

Reviewing events in Kashmir, the Press Note stated that for some time past, the Government of India have been receiving reports of infiltration of armed raiders in the western parts of Jammu province of the State of Kashmir. These raiders had done a great deal of damage in that area and taken possession of part of the territory. On October 24, news arrived of a major raid from the NWFP via the Abbottabad road to Kashmir. Some 2,000 or more fully armed and equipped men, travelling in motor transport, crossed over to Kashmir territory near Muzaffarabad, sacked that town, killing many people, and proceeded along the Jhelum valley road towards Srinagar. Intermediate towns and villages were sacked

and burnt and many people killed. These raiders were stopped by Kashmir State troops near Uri for some time but the raiders got round the troops and burnt the power-house near Uri which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir.

The position on the morning of October 26 was that these raiders had been held by State troops, numbering nearly 200, and part of the civil population which had been armed, at Baramula, where the Kashmir valley begins. Beyond Baramula there was no major obstruction up to Srinagar, 35 miles away. There was immediate danger of these raiders reaching Srinagar and destroying and sacking that capital city and massacring large numbers of people, both Hindus and Muslims.

KASHMIR STATE TROOPS

Kashmir State troops were at this time, spread out all over the State. Most of them were deployed along the western border of Jammu province and had been split up into small isolated groups. Practically all the State officials had left the threatened area and the civil administration had ceased to function. Order was maintained, however, in the valley, by volunteers of the National Conference, the largest popular organization in Kashmir, which consists chiefly of Muslims but also of Hindus and others.

The progress of the invaders had been marked by murder, arson and loot. All that stood between Srinagar and the fate which had overtaken places on the route followed by the raiders was the determination of the people of Srinagar, Muslim and non-Muslim, and practically without arms, to defend themselves. Srinagar also had a large population of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab and there was little doubt that these would be massacred if the raiders reached them.

URGENT APPEAL

The Maharaja made an urgent appeal to the Government of India for help. He further suggested accession to the Indian Union. An appeal for help was also addressed to the Government of India by the National Conference. The members of this Conference, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, declared that they would fight the raiders to the death and protect their beautiful city and country, whatever the cost. Thus the appeal to the Government of India came not only from the State authorities but also on behalf of the people of Kashmir.

On October 26, H.E. the Governor-General of India received a letter² from the Maharaja of Kashmir in which, after reviewing the latest events in the State, H. H said: "With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation, as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally

they cannot send the help asked for by me without acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so."

The Government of India could not, in these circumstances, ignore either the request for accession or the pressing requests for military aid. Not only had the lives and property of the inhabitants of a neighbouring and friendly territory to be protected against grave and imminent peril but the security of Kashmir, whose northern frontiers join those of Afghanistan, the USSR and China, is also vital to the security of India which has a common boundary in the north with the southern frontier of Kashmir. Moreover, the massacre of non-Muslim refugees who had fled to Kashmir from West Punjab and other disturbed parts of Pakistan, which would certainly have occurred if Srinagar fell to the raiders, would have had grave consequences all over India.

ACCESSION ACCEPTED

It was accordingly decided to accept Kashmir's accession. It was also decided to send whatever military aid could be furnished. On October 27, the first contingent of Indian troops was sent to Kashmir. The sole object of this move was to defend Srinagar and to push out the raiders who have no right whatsoever to be on Kashmir territory.

The opposition which Indian troops have encountered affords further proof of the strength, organization and equipment of the invaders. They have been using not only small arms of the most modern type but also mortars and artillery. Baramula has had to be abandoned and our troops are now trying to defend Srinagar. Though casualties have been small, the Officer Commanding has been killed. Reinforcements are being sent.

¹The *Statesman*, 1 November 1947.

²KR-402.

KR-426

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 373-G

LAHORE,
2 November 1947

We have indisputable proof that aircraft engaged by India Government for military purposes in connection with operations in Kashmir have been flying over Pakistan territory without any authorisation

from Pakistan Government. Occasionally such aircraft on their return from Kashmir land on airfields in Pakistan.

Pakistan Government take strongest exception to this clear violation of Agreements and Convention on International Civil Aviation to which India is a party. Such flights in or across Pakistan territory must cease forthwith otherwise Pakistan Government will be forced to take such action as they consider necessary and responsibility for consequences will be solely that of India Government.

In order to distinguish aircraft engaged in bona fide civil aviation from those which are being used for military purposes in violation of International Agreements and Convention, the Pakistan Government have decided that all aircraft flying between India and West Punjab or N.W.F.P. shall with effect from November 3rd land at Walton Aerodrome, Lahore, both on outward and inward journey for the purpose of examination.¹ Aircraft which are found to be engaged in bona fide civil aviation will be given a certificate to that effect.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

On 4 November 1947, by telegram No. Primin-274, Nehru replied that Indian aircraft bound for West Punjab and NWFP had been instructed to land at Lahore first. "We take it that ban on proceeding direct to points in West Punjab and NWFP is not intended to apply to BOAC British registered aircraft which are used solely for evacuation of refugees both Muslims and non-Muslims. Landings at Lahore on both outward and inward flights by the aircraft will seriously affect evacuation programme. Alternatively suggest that clearance certificate be given by Pakistan representatives at Palam" [airport] See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

KR-427

Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru¹

[GOVERNMENT HOUSE,] NEW DELHI,
2 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

Ismay and I have been working most of the day trying to reconstitute as fairly as we possibly can the burden of our joint conversations with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr. Jinnah; and we both think that the enclosed accounts² are as fair as can be produced considering that no notes were taken at the time and the conversation with Mr. Jinnah alone lasted over 3 hours. I should be delighted for you to show these to the Deputy Prime Minister but would be grateful if you would not show them to anyone else without consulting me, because the whole basis of our talk was unauthorised and unofficial.

When we arrived, there is no doubt that both Liaquat and Jinnah felt that from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long worked out, deep-laid plot to secure Kashmir's permanent accession. We worked hard to dispel this illusion but do not guarantee we were successful.

I enclose a very rough note as a possible basis for discussion,³ after which I would suggest that you should draft a telegram to Liaquat sending your proposals for stopping this fighting.

Perhaps you and the Deputy Prime Minister would stay back after the Defence Committee tomorrow morning to discuss it.

May I congratulate you on your broadcast⁴ which I have just read and which is admirable and in striking contrast to Mr. Jinnah's statement?⁵

Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

PS. The enclosures referred to in the notes on the discussions are from my private files, but you of course are well aware of them.

M[OUNTBATTEN] of B[URMA]

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 71.

²Enclosures 1 and 2.

³See Annex I.

⁴See Annex II.

⁵See the *Pakistan Times*, 31 October 1947.

Enclosure 1 to KR-427

Note of a Talk with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan¹

LAHORE,
1 November 1947

Having made the excuse of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's illness to enable me to take Pandit Nehru to Lahore for a Joint Defence Council meeting, I felt it was essential that part of the J.D.C. meeting should take place in Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's presence. On arrival at Lahore, however, I discovered that he was still too ill to come to Government House. I therefore got rid of 24 of the 26 items on the agenda with Mr. Nishtar as the Pakistan Government's representative, and then the whole J.D.C. moved down to the Pakistan Prime Minister's House and continued the meeting in his bedroom. Liaquat was sitting up with a rug round his knees still looking very ill.

After the two controversial items had been disposed of everyone left the room excepting Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Lord Ismay and myself.

I began by giving him the statement by the Indian Chiefs of Staff on

the sequence of events in Kashmir (copy attached)² which I took back from him after he had read it.

I then proceeded to explain the position as I saw it, beginning with the accession of Junagadh and going on through the whole history of the Kashmir situation.

As so much of this is the same as I was later to repeat to Mr. Jinnah, it is not recorded here at length.

The burden of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's contention was that the Maharaja had categorically refused any form of negotiations or even discussions with Pakistan and that he had brought about a serious situation by allowing his Hindus and in particular his State Forces, to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas and across the border of Jammu. This had been more than the tribes could stand and this was the origin of their raid on Srinagar.

I asked him whether he expected us to believe that Afridis and Mahsuds could have come from beyond Peshawar in motor transport without the Government of Pakistan being at least aware of this. He did not deny knowledge of the movement but defended himself by saying that if they had made any attempt to interfere with the movement of tribes in their own buses, this would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the Frontier.

I told him that my Government were quite sincere in their offer of a plebiscite, and showed him the draft formula which would also cover Junagadh.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan appeared to be very depressed and almost disinclined to make any further effort to avoid war. Lord Ismay and I did our best to cheer him up, the former pointing out that, if the leaders on either side abandoned hope of peace, all was indeed lost.

As time was getting on and as Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan looked very tired, we said we would go back to lunch with Mr. Jinnah at Government House and after discussions with him, we would, if he wished, come back and continue our conversation with the Prime Minister. This he gladly accepted and bade us a very friendly *au revoir*.

(Note: Owing to the great length of the discussion with Mr. Jinnah, time did not permit of our returning to see his Prime Minister, but we sent a message excusing ourselves.)

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 72-3.

²Not traceable.

*Enclosure 2 to KR-427**Note of a Discussion with Mr. Jinnah in the Presence of Lord Ismay at Government House, Lahore¹*

[Extract]

1 November 1947

INTRODUCTION

In the course of three and a half hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation, Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well as talking about the overall policy affecting States. I have divided this note into four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the subjects were discussed nor of course were all the remarks made consecutively.

PART I—INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS STATES WHOSE ACCESSION WAS IN DISPUTE

2. I pointed out the similarity between the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir and suggested that plebiscites should be held under UNO as soon as conditions permitted. I told Mr. Jinnah that I had drafted out in the aeroplane a formula which I had not yet shown to my Government but to which I thought they might agree. This was the formula:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the Ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people".

3. Mr. Jinnah's first observation was that it was redundant and undesirable to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according to their majority population, and if we would give him the accession of Kashmir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India.

[PART II—HYDERABAD, *Paras 4-12 omitted*²PART III JUNAGADH, [*Paras 13-20 omitted*]³

PART IV—KASHMIR

21. I handed Mr. Jinnah a copy of the statement of events signed by the Indian Chiefs of Staff, which I had shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

He asked if he could keep it, but I made him return the original and gave him an unsigned copy. Although he expressed surprise at the remarkable speed at which we had been able to organise sending troops into Srinagar plain, he did not question the document or my statement.

22. Mr. Jinnah's principal complaint was that the Government of India had failed to give timely information to the Government of Pakistan about the action that they proposed to take in Kashmir.

23. I pointed out the speed at which events had moved. It was not until the evening of the 24th that reliable reports had been received of the tribal incursion, and it was not until the 25th that observers had been sent up to confirm these reports. Thus the decision to send in troops had not been taken until the 26th, by which date the Maharaja had announced his intention of acceding to India. There had not been a moment to lose. I added that I could not recall the exact time, but that it was my impression that Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on the 26th,⁴ immediately the decision to send in troops had been taken.

24. Mr. Jinnah complained that this information should have been sent much earlier—in fact on 24 October. "If," he said, "they had on that date telegraphed saying that a critical situation was reported to be developing in Kashmir and they had sent in observers to confirm these reports and suggested that Pakistan should co-operate in dealing with the situation, all the trouble would have been ended by now."

25. Lord Ismay agreed that the Government of Pakistan should have had the earliest possible notification. This was the first thing that had occurred to him on his return to Delhi from the United Kingdom, and, indeed, he was under the impression that it had been done. To the best of his recollection, Pandit Nehru had told him on the 28th that he had kept Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in touch with what was happening all the time. If this had not been done, the oversight must have been due to the pressure of events, and not because the Government of India had anything to hide.

26. Mr. Jinnah looked up his files and said that the telegram had arrived after the troops had landed, and that it did not contain any form of an appeal for co-operation between the two Dominions in this matter; it merely informed him of the accession and the landing of troops. Continuing he said that the accession was not a bona fide one since it rested on "fraud and violence" and would never be accepted by Pakistan. I asked him to explain why he used the term "fraud," since the Maharaja was fully entitled, in accordance with Pakistan's own official statement, which I had just read over to him, to make such

accession. It was therefore perfectly legal and valid.

27. Mr. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that I entirely agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I knew the Maharaja was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion; since the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible, it was clear that he would have to accede to India to obtain help against the invader. Mr. Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I countered as often with the above argument, thereby greatly enraging Mr. Jinnah at my apparent denseness.

28. From this point, he went on to say that the Government of India authorities had encouraged the Kashmir Government to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas. I repudiated this as obvious nonsense. He then said, "Very well, it was the Congress party that did it." I pointed out that if there had been any such massacre by Hindus in the Poonch area (which I did not deny) this had been done entirely by Kashmir Hindus and could hardly have been done with the object of inciting the tribes to invade Kashmir and come so close to capturing Srinagar, merely to afford the Maharaja an excuse for acceding to India for the purpose of obtaining help.

29. I then explained to Mr. Jinnah, at some length, the policy which I had consistently pursued in regard to Kashmir, namely—trying to persuade the Maharaja to institute progressive government, ascertain the will of the people and then accede to the Dominion of the people's choice before 15 August. I recounted how I had tried to persuade H.H. to do this during my visit to Kashmir in July, and how I had told him my views privately whilst driving in the car with him; but that when I had wished to have a formal meeting with him in the presence of his Prime Minister and my Private Secretary (Sir George Abell) on the last day of my visit, he had pleaded illness and gone to bed to avoid the meeting. On leaving Srinagar, I had instructed the Resident (Colonel Webb) to continue to give the Maharaja this advice officially; and finally Lord Ismay had gone up at the end of August with instructions to advise the Maharaja to hurry up and ascertain the will of the people. But the Maharaja had invariably avoided the issue, and had always turned the conversation to lighter topics.

30. Mr. Jinnah paid a handsome tribute to the correctness of my policy and admitted that it was I who had put the ex-Premier of Kashmir (Pandit Kak) in touch with him when he came to Delhi.

31. Mr. Jinnah next referred to the statement which he had issued to the press⁵ that day (copy attached) and enlarged on his difficulties in not being able to have any reasonable conversation, either personally or through representatives, with the Maharaja or even with his Prime Minister; and that, not only had the Maharaja brought his troubles upon himself by this attitude, but had greatly aggravated them by the massacres to which he had incited his Dogras against innocent Muslims. He said that even today at Jammu 90,000 Muslims were in danger of being massacred.

32. I told Mr. Jinnah that Pandit Nehru had expressed horror at the massacres that had taken place and had issued stringent orders that everything possible was to be done to stop them. Only the night before I had supplemented those instructions myself through an Indian Brigadier who had just returned from Kashmir and who fully agreed with the necessity for stopping any further killing of Muslims.

33. I informed Mr. Jinnah that we already had a brigade group of 2,000 men in Srinagar; that a 4th battalion would be flown in that day, and a 5th battalion within the next two days. I said that we should have no difficulty in holding Srinagar and that the prospect of the tribes entering the city in any force was now considered remote.

34. Lord Ismay suggested that the main thing was to stop the fighting; and he asked Mr. Jinnah how he proposed that this should be done. Mr. Jinnah said that both sides should withdraw at once. He emphasised that the withdrawal must be simultaneous. When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours.

35. I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders.

36. I asked him how he proposed that we should withdraw our forces, observing that India's forces were on the outskirts of Srinagar in a defensive role; all the tribes had to do was to stop attacking. I also pointed out that we could not possibly afford aeroplanes to fly the Indian troops back. Lord Ismay suggested that they should march back via Banihal Pass.

37. I asked Mr. Jinnah why he objected so strongly to a plebiscite, and he said he did so because with the troops of the Indian Dominion in military occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in power, such propaganda and pressure could be brought to bear that the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.

38. I suggested that we might invite UNO to undertake the plebiscite and send observers and organisers in advance to ensure that the necessary atmosphere was created for a free and impartial plebiscite. I reiterated that the last thing my Government wished was to obtain a false result by a fraudulent plebiscite.

39. Mr. Jinnah repeated that he and I were the only two who could organise a plebiscite and said that we should do it together. Lord Ismay and I went to great trouble to explain that I was a constitutional Governor-General and a Britisher, and that even if my Government would trust me sufficiently to see this through, I was sure that Mr. Attlee would not give his consent.

40. Mr. Jinnah complained bitterly that after the extremely generous gesture on the part of the Government of India in accepting his invitation to come to discussions at Lahore, the illness of one man should have prevented some other Minister from coming to conduct the negotiations; why, for example, could Sardar Patel not have come? It was a matter of the greatest urgency to get together on this problem, and he asked me how soon Pandit Nehru could come to Lahore.

41. I countered by saying that it was now his turn to come to Delhi since I had come to Lahore, and I invited him cordially to stay as my guest, when I would take him to see Pandit Nehru in his bedroom.

42. He said that this was impossible. I pointed out that I had been to see Pandit Nehru personally in his bedroom and that I had now been to see his Prime Minister in his bedroom, and that I failed to see what was improper in this suggestion. He assured me that it was not a question of going to anybody's bedroom, but that he was so busy he simply had no time to leave Lahore while his Prime Minister was on the sick list.

43. I asked him afterwards if there was any single problem more serious or urgent than Kashmir. I pointed out that when one was so busy one had to arrange work in order of priority. If he admitted that Kashmir was top priority, then all other work should stand aside for it and he should come to Delhi at once. He said he regretted that this was impossible, for the whole burden of events was on his shoulders at Lahore. I explained that he need [sic] only be gone for the inside of a day and that I was anxious to return his hospitality. He said, "I would gladly come a hundred times to visit you; I just cannot manage it while my Prime Minister is ill." I asked him to come as soon as his Prime Minister was well enough to travel, and he said, "We shall have to see."

44. Lord Ismay pointed out that the best way to stand well in world opinion was for him now to come and return my visit and discuss

Kashmir with Pandit Nehru. Mr. Jinnah said that he had lost interest in what the world thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he had asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan.

45. I ended the meeting, as I had started it, by making it quite clear that I had come unbriefed and unauthorised to discuss Kashmir, since I had not had a chance of seeing Pandit Nehru after he had informed me he would be unable to accompany me. I told him I was speaking not as Governor-General of India but as the ex-Viceroy who had been responsible for partition and was anxious to see that it did not result in any harm coming to the two Dominions. He said he quite saw this but hoped that I would be able to discuss the various proposals which we had been talking about with Pandit Nehru and send him a firm telegram. I undertook to convey this message to Pandit Nehru.

46. Round about 5.00 p.m. it was obvious that we were going to be too late to go and see Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan again, so Lord Ismay left the room to telephone our apologies to him. I took the opportunity of Lord Ismay's absence to 'tell off' Mr. Jinnah. I told him that I considered it was unstatesmanlike, inept and bad mannered for him to issue a statement which directly accused the Government of India of "fraud and violence" in Kashmir a few hours before he expected the Prime Minister of India to come and discuss this very question in a friendly manner; and that had he been feeling well enough to come, such a studied and ill-timed insult would have been enough to send his temperature up again. I finally pointed out that Pakistan was in my opinion in a much weaker position than India, not only from the obvious military point of view, but I was sure, the world would think they were in the wrong; and that this form of abuse before a discussion commenced could only put Pakistan even deeper in the wrong.

47. At the end, Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite clear that the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion of Pakistan at birth,⁶ and that if they continued with their oppression there would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. However depressing the prospect might be, he was not afraid; for the situation was already so bad that 'there was little that could happen to make it worse.'⁷

48. I pointed out that war, whilst admittedly very harmful for India, would be completely disastrous for Pakistan and himself.

Lord Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but, I fear, was not very successful. However, we parted on good terms.

SUGGESTED PROPOSALS TO PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO FORM THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION

49. (1) It is of paramount importance, not only to the Government of

India, Pakistan and Kashmir, but also to the cause of world peace, that the fighting in Kashmir should cease at the earliest possible moment.

(2) The best, if not the only, hope of achieving this object is a very early meeting between accredited representatives of the two countries.

(3) The Government of India, for their part, have no desire to maintain troops in Kashmir, once the valley is safe from attack and law and order have been restored. They are therefore prepared to give an undertaking to withdraw their troops immediately the raiders have left the country and returned to their homes.

(4) It is the sincere desire of the Government of India that a plebiscite should be held in Kashmir at the earliest possible date and in the fairest possible way. They suggest that UNO might be asked to provide supervisors for this plebiscite, and they are prepared to agree that a joint India-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.

(5) The Government of India suggest that both Governments should agree on the form of the public announcement to be made in regard to the procedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute. A draft is attached as a basis of discussion.

(6) They suggest that the above proposals should be the subject of a roundtable discussion at the earliest possible date.

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 73-81.

²See H-295.

³See PS-219, Vol. VIII, 373-4.

⁴Not traceable.

⁵Annex I to KR-416.

⁶On 5 October 1947, Ismay reported that he believed Jinnah was right in his assessment that Patel, who enjoyed real and absolute power closely mixed up with the RSS, and Nehru "had one aim and one aim only — the destruction of Pakistan." See Appendix II, 8, para 21, Vol. VI, 623.

⁷Annexes I and II.

Annex I to KR-427

R. D. Gatewood to George Marshall

Telegram, US National Archives, 845 F. 00/11-147

No. 35

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LAHORE,

[1] November 1947

Jinnah-Mountbatten-Nehru conference scheduled today on Kashmir crisis which officials here say will be taken to UNO if negotiations fail; Maharaja not attending. Pakistan Government views Kashmir accession based on fraud and violence and therefore unacceptable and as

definite threat [to] world peace. Secretary, Pakistan Cabinet, states all offers of cooperation and impartial inquiry made by Prime Minister and Governor-General were neglected by Maharaja,¹ still in Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah willing both India and Pakistan supervise proposed plebiscite.

Free Kashmir Government, issuing press releases through Muslim Conference Publicity Bureau established [at] Lahore since early October, says its forces composed of Pathans and other Muslims have [sic] and claim entry into Srinagar suburbs but latter doubtful as Indian troops and equipment flying into city every day since October 27 and air supplies from Delhi began October 25 as admitted by Menon, Indian States Department. Free Government deplores lack [of] Pakistan encouragement or assistance.

Eyewitness, arriving yesterday with other Europeans evacuated by RAF from Srinagar via Rawalpindi, reports long siege can be sustained by Indian troops though attacking forces armed with modern equipment. Only two (one doctor and one *Herald Tribune* correspondent) believed remaining Srinagar of their own accord.

Pakistan Government denies use [of] its troops in Kashmir and emphasizes many Muslim villages *in flee* [sic] into West Punjab where spirit of retaliation rising. Frontier Premier stated [on] October 29 [that] Pathans [were] ready to die rather than allow Indian invasion [of] Kashmir, "a Muslim state" belonging by right to Pakistan; also appealed to every Muslim in Pakistan "to get ready" and to other Muslim nations to face new threat to Islam. Meanwhile military stores from India still [not received] in Pakistan under Joint Defence Council agreement.

In [a] sober speech to 200,000 here [on] October 30,² Jinnah made no mention [of] Kashmir, repeated charge [that] conspiracy against Pakistan had been planned before partition (by persons unnamed), enjoined protection of what "some people think", acceptance June 3 plan was not mistake and rejection would have brought consequences "too disastrous to imagine". He exhorted Muslims to tolerance, faith and courage, concluding "No power on earth can destroy Pakistan".

GATEWOOD

¹See KR-416.

²Refers to a speech at a rally at the University Stadium, Lahore. See No. 137, Vol. VI, 219-21

Annex II to KR-427
Howard Donovan to George Marshall
US National Archives, 845.00/11-447

AMERICAN EMBASSY, NEW DELHI,

4 November 1947

No. 313

Sir,

With reference to previous despatches on the subject of Kashmir, and my telegram No. 1004 of November 3, 1947,¹ I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Department the text of Jawaharlal Nehru's address on the subject of developments in Kashmir broadcast on the evening of November 2,² and a press report of Mr. Gandhi's comments on the Kashmir situation made at his prayer meeting on the same day.

NEHRU'S BROADCAST

It will be recalled that Mr. Nehru said the Government of India was prepared, once law and order were restored in Kashmir, to hold a referendum "under international auspices like the United Nations"; that the Pakistan Government, "using language which is not the language of Government or responsible people", had accused the Government of India of fraud in connection with accession of Kashmir to the India Union, but the question arose who was responsible for fraud and violence in Kashmir. He asked whether the Pakistan Government was too weak to prevent armies from crossing its territory to invade another country or whether it was willing to have this happen. He said every step taken by the Government of India had been taken only after full consideration of the consequences; that to have failed to take these steps would have been "a betrayal of trust and cowardly submission to the law of the sword with its accompaniment of arson, rapine, and slaughter"; and that India would keep its pledge to protect the people of Kashmir "against the invader".

Referring to Sheikh Abdullah, Mr. Nehru said Indian troops could have accomplished little without the popular support of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs in Kashmir, and he congratulated the Maharaja on his decision to ask Sheikh Abdullah to head a popular government. Declaring that many dangers still confronted both Kashmir and India, Mr. Nehru said the first step in preparing for future eventualities was to end completely all forms of communal strife in India, since "external dangers" could be faced effectively only when there was internal peace and order.

In his review of events leading up to the accession of Kashmir and the despatch of Indian troops, Mr. Nehru said he had before him a list

of 95 villages in Jammu which had been destroyed during recent weeks "by raiders from Pakistan". He said the raiders possessed "the latest type of modern arms"; that on October 24, after the raid [*sic*] on the Abbottabad-Massara [Mansehra] Road had started, the Government of India received from Kashmir for the first time a request for accession and military assistance and that this was considered in the Defence Committee on October 25 and 26. When "urgent messages" were received both from the Maharaja and "that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah", the Indian Government decided to accept Kashmir's accession and sent troops on the condition that a plebiscite regarding accession would eventually be held. Mr. Nehru complemented Sheikh Abdullah on his National Conference followers' success in maintaining order in Srinagar, and pointed to the cooperation of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs as an example for the whole of India.

GANDHI'S COMMENT

At his prayer meeting on November 2, Gandhi said he was sorry to learn that raiders in Kashmir were being led by two ex-officers of the *Azad Hind Fouj* (the "Indian National Army" formed during World War II under Japanese direction). He said he could not escape the conclusion that the Pakistan Government was directly or indirectly encouraging the raids; that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was reported to have "openly encouraged the raid"; and that he was "amazed at the reckless charges which had been made by a Pakistan Minister against the Government of India".

SIGNIFICANCE

Thus the only two outstanding men in India who have been making determined efforts to restore communal harmony have, as a result of the Kashmir imbroglio, made public statements about Pakistan which will undoubtedly strengthen the hand of the communalists in India who have maintained all along that Pakistan is an enemy and that all Muslims remaining in India are actual or potential enemies. Under the circumstances it is difficult to see how Mr. Nehru could have avoided following the line taken, but there is little doubt that developments in Kashmir have made his position vis-a-vis the Hindu and Sikh extremists more difficult than ever.

Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador
HOWARD DONOVAN
Counselor

¹Not traceable.

²See the *Statesman*, 3 November 1947.

KR-428

Zahid Husain to M. Ikramullah

FOA, IU-4/12

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL
Report No. 19NEW DELHI,
2 November 1947

[Paras 1-11 omitted]

KASHMIR

12. In regard to Kashmir, there seems to be two schools of thought. One of them thinks that India should not have put its finger into this affair and that it would now be extremely difficult for us to find any face-saving device. In other words, this school of thought would be in favour of withdrawal provided some formula could be devised. The other school thinks that Kashmir should be made the battleground between India and Pakistan. It is not apparent how Kashmir can become a battleground when India is not able to have any line of communications with her.

I understand that by using civil aircraft for carrying arms, ammunition and troops India has violated certain international conventions. They did not even remove the markings showing the aeroplanes to be civil aircraft. I do not know whether the Provisional Azad Government of Kashmir is aware of this and has made mention of it in its statements. I am not of course in a position to verify the provisions of the conventions which are supposed to have been violated.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had arranged to go to Lahore to discuss the Kashmir question but I am informed Sardar Patel put his foot down and so Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had to be ill. He again made up his mind to go on the 1st November, but again he met with severe opposition and had to abandon his intention. It is also said to be due to the statement issued from Karachi in which the accession of Kashmir to Indian Union was stated to be based on fraud and violence.

13. One of the arguments given by India is that Kashmir is a strategic area and Pakistan would not be in a position to defend it. Several foreign representatives told me that this view has been solemnly put forward by India. I do not know whether this is correct, but I told the people who asked my view that this was exactly the argument against the formation of Pakistan. On this argument possibly U.S.A. would be

fully justified in occupying Turkey and other small countries who are not in a position to defend themselves against aggression from Russia. There would indeed be no place for small national [sic for nations] at all.

ZAHID HUSAIN

KR-429

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 375-G

LAHORE,
3 November 1947

We have received information that India aircraft bombed Kohala bridge on November 2nd and it is reported that two bombs fell in our territory. Portion of Kohala bridge is in Pakistan and any attempt to destroy it is an act of aggression against Pakistan. I must therefore protest against the attack on the bridge by your air forces and ask you to order your air forces to desist from any further attack on the bridge. To safeguard our interest in the bridge we are taking action to protect bridge.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-430

Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola to M. Ikramullah

FOA, S-6/2

LONDON,
3 November 1947

With reference to your telegram No. 678¹ dated 28th October 1947, regarding alleged use of BOAC aircraft for transporting Indian troops and munitions to Kashmir, I have contacted the Chairman of the British Overseas Airways Corporation on the 28th October and received from him an assurance which I cabled to you on the 29th October, telegram No. 200 copy of which is enclosed² for ready reference.

I am now enclosing a copy of Sir Harold Hartley's letter dated 31st October 1947 which further clarifies this matter.

If there are any other complaints in this connection, please let me know.

[HABIB IBRAHIM RAHIMTOOLA]

¹See KR-411, note 1

²Not traceable.

Enclosure to KR-430
Harold Hartley to Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola

FOA, S-6/2

CHAIRMAN'S ROOM, AIRWAY'S HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON W.I.,
31 October 1947

Dear High Commissioner,

I was sorry I was not able to speak to you before you left for Geneva to tell you that I had had a signal from India confirming my statement that the aircraft operating under the charter arrangements made by BOAC have not been used for transporting Indian troops and munitions to Kashmir. As I told you, we had done all we could to ensure that they would not be used for carrying armed forces and munitions, and we now have confirmation from our representative that they have not in fact been used in this way.

I am sorry to see in the paper again today statements that they have been used in connection with the operations in Kashmir, but that is quite untrue.

Yours sincerely,
HAROLD HARTLEY

KR-431

C. B. Duke to Grafftey-Smith

PRO, DO 142/494

4, RACE COURSE ROAD,
LAHORE,
3 November 1947

I write in continuation of my letter No. PHC/19/47 of the 31st October¹ on the Kashmir situation.

2. I have just had an opportunity of talking to one Moorehead (if that is how he spells his name), who is in India on a two months tour to do a series of articles for the *Observer*. He had been in Srinagar for some time and was amongst those flown out to Rawalpindi last Wednesday the 29th October and testified to the adequacy of the arrangements made for this evacuation. He said that about a week previously, although all was quiet and the Maharaja and his Prime Minister, Mr. Mahajan, were still there, both of these two were extremely nervous and had little grasp of the situation which was developing. Their demoralization was completed by Mr. V. P. Menon, the Secretary of the States Department of the Indian Government, who flew up to Srinagar and so alarmed them that they were convinced that accession to India offered the only hope of salvation for them. The Maharaja and his Minister then departed to Jammu leaving no authority or arrangements in Srinagar where the town administration consequently came to a standstill. The town was in total darkness anyway owing to the destruction of the Power station near Baramula. Sheikh Abdullah then stepped into the breach and organised his volunteers to perform police duties wearing red armlets and badges, and generally to maintain law and order in Srinagar, which apparently they did very satisfactorily. He also took it upon himself to close all banks in order to prevent a run upon them. Moorehead was considerably impressed by Sheikh Abdullah who appeared to display considerable sense and administrative capacity. When asked by Moorehead what exactly was meant by the proposal to hold a plebiscite to decide the question of Kashmir's future, Sheikh Abdullah was at first rather vague, but when pressed further he admitted that there was no electoral roll or machinery of any kind by which the general populace could make known their wishes, even if they understood the position sufficiently to have any, and eventually admitted with a somewhat embarrassed laugh that a plebiscite would represent the opinion of his own party which was the only sufficiently organised and coherent body to express one.

3. As to the military situation in Srinagar, Moorehead said that the Sikh troops, whose headquarters are on the landing ground, were feeling acutely unhappy about their position. The tribesmen were said to be attacking in considerable numbers and were quite well armed with automatic weapons and mortars as well as rifles, while the troops had no resources except what had been landed by air for them. If they lost the aerodrome, which apparently the Commander of the Sikh troops did not consider a particularly good position to defend, they were in serious danger of being completely cut off from their bases in India and entirely dependent for supplies on drops from the air. The

nature of the terrain would make it difficult for supplies to be dropped with accuracy and the odds were that the tribesmen would pick up as much as, if not more than, the Indian troops.

4. Moorehead also visited Peshawar from Rawalpindi. He gathered there that the tribes had been contemplating this incursion into Kashmir for some weeks and had been organising amongst themselves in a series of tribal meetings. He did not think that there was any Muslim League or official control of the tribal raiders, in fact his impression was that they were completely out of the control of everybody. There was, he said, a sort of council of war of leaders of the various tribes established in Abbottabad, which appeared to be entirely autonomous and independent of any authority in the North-West Frontier Province, since the Provincial Government were unable, or afraid, or perhaps just unwilling, to take them on.

5. There is a certain division of opinion in Peshawar and Rawalpindi as to the length of time the tribesmen may be expected to keep up their campaign in Kashmir. It is normally a safe assumption that no tribal army will keep the field for more than about two months, by that time it will probably disintegrate because individuals will make their own way home, either because they have got as much loot as they can carry, or because they have got no more ammunition, or because they are just tired of it. That has proved true in the past when the tribes have been meeting vigorous opposition and have been operating in country no more hospitable than their own. It is arguable that if the opposition put up by the Indian troops and Sheikh Abdullah's Government is not particularly effective, and if also, the population of Kashmir welcome and support the tribesmen, the latter might continue guerrilla warfare for a considerable time, and might even make an effort to settle permanently and in strength in Kashmir, which has always been regarded as something of a promised land; although there is a Pushto proverb to the effect that whatever sort of a barren mountain a man may come from "to every man his own country seems a Kashmir". Personally I am inclined to think that the tribesmen will probably regard the whole thing as an exceptionally good raid and go home when they have had enough, but if they are not hit hard at any time others may keep coming in to replace those who are satisfied and so the disorders and insecurity might drag on for a long time.

6. So much limelight has fallen upon Western Kashmir lately that publicity has to a large extent been diverted from what has been going on in Jammu and along the Pakistan border which runs along the edge of the Sialkot and Gujrat districts of the West Punjab. I have already

reported attacks on Muslim villages in Jammu and the apparent intention of the Kashmir Government to create a belt of devastation about three miles deep along its own side of the border. This policy seems to have been implemented with even greater violence than had been previously reported from Pathankot, just on the Indian side of the Indo-Pakistan border; westwards, along the Sialkot and Gujrat border, all villages in this belt are being cleared and burnt, the Hindus having been sent farther into the State and up toward Srinagar, while the Muslims are either killed or driven out to the West Punjab. The population of Jammu used to be about half and half Hindu and Muslim. There have also been raids on a considerable scale from Jammu territory, five or six miles deep into Sialkot district. In one such raid, in which four large villages were attacked on the 21st October, 1,750 Muslim villagers, men, women and children were killed according to the computation of a British officer who visited the area the day after the attack, apart from those who were wounded and got into hospital.

Lady Mountbatten was shown some of these, I understand, on her recent visit to Sialkot. These raids are reported to be carried out by Kashmir State troops, Dogras, Sikhs and Gurkhas, who first put down a barrage of mortar, grenade and automatic fire upon the village; then when the villagers scatter, a mob of Sikhs and Hindus rush through the troops and butcher as many of the villagers as they can catch isolated in the fields. The West Punjab Government is particularly vulnerable all along this northern flank as the headworks of the main Chenab Canal System are situated at Marala, a few miles inside the border from Jammu, from which a large area of country right down to Lyallpur [now Faisalabad] and Jhang is irrigated; while a little further west is the headworks of the Jhelum canal system which also irrigates a wide area in the west of the Province. The destruction of these headworks would cause the reversion of most of the best land in the West Punjab to the desert which it was before the canals were built.

7. There are still no indications of the intentions of the Pakistan Government regarding the Kashmir situation generally. A meeting has been convened today of Pakistan Provincial Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers. This had been summoned some time ago and was to be concerned only with financial matters, but it seems likely that the opportunity will be taken by Jinnah and Liaquat to discuss the political situation generally and possibly some decision regarding Kashmir may emerge in the course of the next few days.

C. B. DUKE

KR-432

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee**Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2*

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 376-G

LAHORE,
4 November 1947

I thank you for your telegram No. 327, of October 31st¹ and further message of same date regarding situation in the [word missing]. Conference which was arranged to be held in Lahore on November 1st did not take place because suddenly on morning of November 1st, Lord Mountbatten telephonically informed Governor-General of Pakistan that Pandit Nehru was not well enough to go to Lahore; that, therefore, he alone was coming to attend the meeting of Joint Defence Council of which he is Chairman; that he hoped to take opportunity of meeting the Governor-General of Pakistan; that since he was only a constitutional Governor-General he could not negotiate a settlement.

In this way the idea of a conference has receded into background, so far as Indian Dominion is concerned, for if India Government wanted it, the Deputy Prime Minister could have come in place of Pandit Nehru.

The two Governors-General met at Lahore and had a long discussion on November 1st. The upshot of discussion was that Governor-General Pakistan made following proposals to Governor-General India for acceptance of India Dominion:

1. To put an immediate stoppage to fighting, the two Governors-General should be authorised and vested with full power by both Dominion Governments to issue a proclamation forthwith giving forty eight hours' notice to the two opposing forces to cease fire. Governor-General Pakistan has no control over force of Provisional Government of Kashmir or tribesmen engaged in fighting but he will warn them in clearest terms that if they do not obey order to cease fire immediately the forces of both Dominions will make war on them.

2. Both forces of India Dominion and tribesmen to withdraw simultaneously and with utmost expedition from Jammu and Kashmir State territory.²

3. With sanction of two Dominion Governments the two Governors-General to be given full powers to restore peace, undertake the administration of Jammu and Kashmir State and arrange for plebiscite without delay under their joint control and supervision.

Lord Mountbatten was requested to place these proposals immediately before India Dominion and to get their acceptance of them. Governor-General Pakistan undertook to do likewise. Governor-General Pakistan is still awaiting a reply from Governor-General India.

On evening of November 2nd, a day after return of Lord Mountbatten to Delhi, Pandit Nehru broadcast³ what he calls decision of India Government and it is most unfortunate that he should have thought fit to do so in the manner and language he has used. Leaving aside the highly provocative attacks on Pakistan Government, the proposal he has put forward is full of most dangerous potentialities and will not bring peace to Kashmir. As long as forces of India Dominion are on Kashmir soil the struggle of Kashmir people will go on. What India Government call the restoration of law and order is no more than an attempt to oppressive killing, terror and driving out Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir until, like East Punjab, and Indian States in East Punjab the composition of population is entirely changed. Pandit Nehru's broadcast indicates clearly that India Government intend to complete their occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and get entire control over its territory under superficial attractive slogan that ultimately the fate of Kashmir will be decided by people of Kashmir. Pandit Nehru has even avoided use of word plebiscite and has spoken of referendum which might mean anything after India Government have established complete mastery over territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the holding of a plebiscite or referendum will be purely a farce.

In the meantime, feelings throughout West Pakistan and tribal territory are running very high and will soon get beyond all control. After ghastly massacres in East Punjab it is impossible to expect people to witness patiently a tragedy on an equal scale in Jammu and Kashmir. Very little news of Jammu is allowed to reach outside world but situation there is extremely grave. According to our information, thousands of Muslims are being massacred every day. In Jammu city itself, 90,000 Muslims are bottled up and are in imminent peril of their lives.

The problem is so inflammatory and dangerous that it requires an immediate solution. All this was fully impressed upon Governor-General India in talk that Governor-General Pakistan had with him. The Pakistan Government are convinced that the only solution which will avoid further bloodshed, bring peace to Jammu and Kashmir, get a free verdict of people of state and restore friendly relations between two Dominions is that proposed by Governor-General Pakistan. Immediate action essential. Every day that passes counts and makes situation more and more dangerously grave. I once more urge you to take immediate action without a moment's delay or else the consequences will be beyond

control and most disastrous having much wide repercussions not only in this sub-continent but throughout world.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹Not traceable.

²The American Embassy in London obtained a report on the situation in Kashmir from Paul Patrick of the Commonwealth Relations Office and despatched it to Washington on 4 November. According to it, "position [of] GOP would have been improved if Jinnah had offered Kashmir Pakistan troops" to drive tribal raiders out of Kashmir. The report goes on to suggest that the "offer would have made great difference" although it was unlikely to have been accepted in any case. See *US National Archives*, 845.00/11-447. Not printed.

³See Annex II to KR-427.

KR-433

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

No. Primin-270

NEW DELHI,
4 November 1947

I have received no reply yet from you to my telegram Primin-255 dated October 31st¹ regarding Kashmir.

Reference last paragraph of your telegram No. 368-G dated October 30th.² I have enquired from Prime Minister, Kashmir about alleged raid. His reply sent after investigation is that there was no raid from Kashmir side to West Punjab but there was a raid from West Punjab side into Jammu Province. This was resisted by villagers and state troops and 2 Gurkha soldiers were killed in Kashmir territory. Apparently their bodies were dragged away by raiders into West Punjab.

Am informed, in Jammu Province the situation is well in hand except in areas under occupation of raiders who are continuing their depredations. Kashmir Government is protecting Muslims in Jammu and border would be quite safe but for raiders from West Punjab.

I have repeatedly requested you to stop raiders from entering Kashmir territory from Pakistan both in Jammu Province and along Jhelum valley road. Our information is that these raiders are being helped by high Pakistan officials. Indeed Prime Minister of N.W.F.P. has openly declared that these raiders should be helped. We have definite information that senior officials of Frontier Province are giving every assistance to these raiders. We put it to you that this is not only against your own declaration but also is a breach of international law. We trust that you will take immediate steps not only to stop further raids from coming

into Kashmir State territory but order withdrawal of all those who are already in Kashmir State.

We are anxious to restore peaceful conditions in Kashmir and we invite your cooperation again to this end. This can only be done after withdrawal of (group omitted) State territory. As soon as raiders are withdrawn there would be no necessity for keeping our troops there.

I wish to draw your attention to broadcast³ on Kashmir which I made last evening. I have stated our Government's policy and made it clear that we have no desire to impose our will in Kashmir but to leave final decision to people of Kashmir. I further stated that we have agreed an impartial international agency like United Nations supervising any referendum.

This principle we are prepared to apply to any state where there is a dispute about accession. If these principles are accepted by your Government there should be no difficulty in giving effect to them.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹KR-422.

²KR-419.

³See Annex II to KR-427.

KR-434

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, SA(4)-6/2

IMMEDIATE
No. 285

NEW DELHI,
4 November 1947

Kashmir. Continuation of my telegram No. 270 dated November 3rd.¹ Further reports state that raids continue to be made from Pakistan side into Jammu Province. Your telegram No. 714, November 1st,² following villages within five miles of the border were sacked and burnt: Chak Palango, Shibo, Chak Bahadarpur, Swankha, Abdal, Raika and Majua. It is stated that armoured cars and three inch mortars were used by raiders. On November 2nd, there was raid on Hiranagar across the border from West Punjab. I have already informed you of sack and burning of Bhimbar town. Further particulars of this have reached us. Raiders came in military formation well equipped with automatic weapons and mortars. They had also armoured cars. After destruction of the town there was large scale massacre of men, women and children. According to report a thousand persons were

killed and over hundred women were kidnapped. The town was looted and many lorry loads of loot were taken away to West Punjab.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹KR-433.

²Not traceable.

KR-435

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹ to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

[SRINAGAR,]

4 November 1947

Your telegram dated twenty-fifth [24th].² Information received by you baseless. State subjects not inducing [*sic* for indulging] in raids. On contrary raiders pour in the State from Pakistan border adjoining State from all sides; indulge in murder, loot, arson and destruction of property; cases of kidnapping and rape also reported; in spite of protest times out of number raiders increasing in number and violence. Strongly protest against failure your Government [to] prevent violation of our frontier.

[SHEIKH MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH]

¹Sworn in as Head of Kashmir Administration on 31 October with "full powers to meet the present emergency." *The Times*, 1 November 1947.

²KR-400.

KR-436

MAHAJAN HAS REPEATED UNTRUTHS

PAKISTAN GOVT CONTRADICTS KASHMIR DEWAN'S STATEMENT

Lahore 3 Nov., "In a statement recently issued to the press,² the Prime Minister of Kashmir has repeated untruths which had earlier been contradicted by the Pakistan Government.³ It is unprofitable to prolong a controversy in which one party insists on misrepresenting facts, but Mr. Mahajan's attempt to mislead public opinion is so glaring that it calls for a reply", says a press statement issued by the Secretary-General, Pakistan Government in Lahore on Sunday [2 November].

Mr. Mahajan begins by attributing to the Pakistan Government a

statement which they did not make and then proceeds to contradict it. The Pakistan Government never stated that Mr. Mahajan declined to interview their representative. They only said that they sent a representative to discuss the various outstanding questions including those of supplies under the Standstill Agreement and the charges and counter-charges regarding border raids and Mr. Mahajan refused to hold discussions with him on those matters. This Mr. Mahajan's own statement fully bears out. He admits that he "made it quite clear that no negotiations were possible". Actually the Pakistan Government understated the facts for Mr. Mahajan had gone further and told Major Shah, the Pakistan Representative, that his presence in Kashmir was undesirable.

QUAID-I-AZAM'S TELEGRAM

Mr Mahajan denies that he was invited in a telegram sent by the Quaid-i-Azam to His Highness the Maharaja to come to Karachi for discussion. The relevant extract from Quaid-i-Azam's telegram to the Maharaja is given below:

'The proposal made by my Government for meeting with your accredited representative is now an urgent necessity. I suggest that the way to smooth out the difficulties and adjust matters in a friendly way is for your Prime Minister to come to Karachi and discuss the developments that have taken place instead of carrying [on] acrimonious and bitter controversy by telegram and correspondence.'

This telegram was sent to His Highness on October 20th and was released to the press on October 25 when, in spite of a reminder, no reply was received. Mr Mahajan may conveniently seek refuge behind a "mutilated" copy of a telegram but he could hardly explain away his ignorance of what appeared in the press.

Mr. Mahajan has advanced the ingenious argument that the Quaid-i-Azam was not allowed to go to Kashmir with a view to avoiding unpleasant incidents which might have taken place owing to the conflict between various political parties. This argument applied with far greater force to the visits of Mr. Gandhi and the President of the Indian National Congress who under exactly similar conditions were welcomed to the State.

OPPORTUNE PRETEXT

Mr. Mahajan goes on to state that the Quaid-i-Azam appreciated the State's viewpoint. On the contrary the fact is that the Quaid-i-Azam was deeply disappointed. It is true that he was not going to Kashmir for a political purpose but only for rest and change after very strenuous work but he had definitely indicated that during his visit he would like to have a friendly talk with the Maharaja.

Mr. Mahajan's denial of the charge that the Kashmir Government

was groping for an opportune pretext to accede to the Indian Dominion will deceive nobody. The public is by now fully aware of the course of events and of the goings on between Srinagar and Delhi-API.

¹See the *Pakistan Times*, 4 November 1947.

²See Annex III to KR-416.

³See KR-419.

⁴KR-394.

KR-437

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

MOST IMMEDIATE
No. 384-G

LAHORE,
6 November 1947

Your telegrams No. Primin-255¹ dated October 31st, 270² and 285³ dated November 4th regarding Kashmir.

In broadcast I made on evening of November 4th,⁴ I gave a review of Kashmir situation and of events leading up it. It is hardly necessary for me to go over the whole ground again or reply to your allegations in detail. But I must say that you are singularly misinformed about position in Jammu and Kashmir. In particular, your account of border incidents in Jammu and of conditions in Jammu is so contrary to facts that I can only conclude that Jammu and Kashmir Government are sedulously keeping truth away from you. Let me repeat that it is the Muslims in Jammu who are being massacred by thousands every day with active assistance of State police and military who are also organising raids into West Punjab. When Kashmir Government made offer of an impartial enquiry into these border incidents we accepted it at once. The Kashmir Government never broached the subject again. Your other allegations and insinuations are equally devoid of foundation and I emphatically repudiate them.

A day before your broadcast indicating policy of your Government a long discussion took place between Lord Mountbatten and the Quaid-i-Azam as a result of which the following proposals were put before Lord Mountbatten for communication to you and your Government.

*[Three sub-paras omitted]*⁵

Lord Mountbatten promised to let me know your Government's reply to these proposals but we have heard no more about them. Your Government's policy is vague. I still ask your Government to let me

have your reply to our definite proposals.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-422.

²KR-433.

³KR-434.

⁴Annex

⁵See KR-432, para 3.

Annex to KR-437

BROADCAST BY LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

4 November 1947

The following is the text of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's broadcast:

I am speaking to you tonight from sick-bed. I wish to talk to you about Kashmir, because the affairs of Kashmir have reached a critical phase and have now assumed international importance and because I know that Kashmir is uppermost in your mind as it is in mine.

In the exhilaration of self-styled gallantry and valour, some erstwhile sympathisers of the oppressed people of Kashmir seem to have forgotten the history of this beautiful land. Let us, therefore, briefly recall it for their benefit.

This piece of God's earth along with the human beings inhabiting its hills and valleys was, under the infamous Amritsar Treaty, sold by the British to a Dogra Chieftain for the paltry sum of Rs. 75,00,000. The present Maharaja inherits the people of Kashmir from his forefathers as though they were so much cattle. It is this immoral and illegal ownership that the gallantry and valour of Indian troops is defending today by spilling the blood of the oppressed slaves who had been bartered away by the British.

LOWEST DEPTHS OF MISERY

During the past hundred years of Dogra rule, this highly gifted and most attractive race of Kashmiris has been dragged down to the lowest depths of misery. In recent years, they have made many attempts to fight for their freedom. Time and again, they have been thwarted but time and again they have risen to defy tyranny.

The fight is not yet at an end. But, I would like my listeners to know that today the people of Kashmir are fighting not only for their freedom but also for their very existence, for their misfortunes have, in recent months, taken on a darker shade. They have been caught in the meshes of a widespread plan for the extermination of Muslims. This plan has succeeded in Alwar, in Bharatpur, in Patiala, in Faridkot and in Kapurthala. And all these, you will note, are States that have

acceded to the Indian Union.

Only yesterday, Muslims formed the majority of the population in Kapurthala. There are hardly any left there now. When we asked the India Govt. to protect the Muslims in these States, we were told that these events were the States' internal affairs and the India Govt. could not interfere.

After the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and East Punjab States, the forces of annihilation turned to Jammu and Kashmir. Towards the end of September, the INA and Rashtriya Sevak Sangh shifted their headquarters from Amritsar to Jammu and thousands of Sikh refugees, so-called, began to infiltrate into Kashmir. These so-called Sikh refugees came from East and not the West Punjab. They came armed with modern weapons and were provided with more weapons by the State authorities. They set about their former business in Jammu and Poonch repeating the horrible drama they enacted in the East Punjab and with the same type of characters playing the leading role.

BESTIAL DEEDS

At the beginning of October, news of the bestial deeds perpetrated on the innocent people of Kashmir began to trickle through. In a short time, the trickle became a torrent. Burning villages could be seen from the Murree Hills. Thousands of terror-stricken refugees poured into Pakistan.

It was at this stage that the people of Kashmir, in sheer desperation, turned on their oppressors. Kashmiris and specially the inhabitants of Poonch, have many relatives in Hazara and West Punjab. Consequently, feelings in many parts of Pakistan rose very high and some people from NWFP and tribal areas, stirred up by atrocities in Kashmir, rushed to the aid of their brethren.

It is the oppressed, enslaved and entrapped people of Kashmir struggling for their freedom (and now for their lives) and their sympathisers whom the Indian Government is helping to wipe out. The declared choice of the Indian Government is to strengthen the Maharaja's hands. How bloodstained these hands are is quite well-known to the leaders of India, even though they may choose to forget this fact now.

The stress has deliberately been shifted to the so-called raiders as if the people of Kashmir themselves had suddenly wiped off their minds, the memory of the century-old oppression, and had overnight, become enamoured of their tyrannical oppressors.

To present the rebellion of an enslaved people to the world as an

invasion from outside simply because some outsiders have shown active sympathy with it, is a dishonest re-writing of history.

Much has been made of modern arms that are alleged to have been used against the army and a tall structure of insinuation and innuendo has been reared on this detail. It is, however, forgotten that many of those who are fighting the invading troops of India come from the 60,000 ex-army men of Poonch who are not incapable of capturing the arms of their enemy.

TILTING AT WINDMILLS

Let us, therefore, not be misled by the laboured picture, so elaborately drawn, of the "gallant" Indian Army "saving the beautiful land of Kashmir and its people from invading hordes". It is not invading hordes but the patriots of Kashmir that the Indian Army is shooting and bombing. It is not Kashmir but a tattering despot that the India Government and their camp followers are trying to save.

In his broadcast, the Prime Minister of India has been tilting at windmills. The armies of Pakistan have not marched into Kashmir as the armies of India, in one guise or another, marched into Junagadh and Manavadar when these States acceded to Pakistan. The India Government regarded the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan as a threat to its security. The accession of Kashmir to India, is a much greater threat to the security of Pakistan. We do not recognise this accession. The accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud, perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly Ruler with the aggressive help of the India Government. The release of Sheikh Abdullah who had been convicted of high treason and the continued imprisonment of Muslim Conference leaders who had been convicted of mere technical offences is only a part of the conspiracy.

When the history of this tragic episode comes to be written, it will reveal the treachery of many self-styled patriots and lovers of justice. But the patriots of Kashmir will, sooner or later, prick this bubble, no matter how strong the force arrayed against them. Our heart goes out to them, our brethren in this mortal struggle. For, the choice before them is freedom or death. If the plans of their enemies succeed, they will be exterminated as Muslims in various other parts of India have been exterminated. It is presumably after such extermination that the India Government propose a referendum should be held. What use is a referendum after the voters have been driven away from their homes, or silenced in death?

The world knows how we have consistently and repeatedly tried to reach a better understanding with the Kashmir Government. The Kashmir Government has ignored or rejected all these approaches. On

October 2, I suggested to the Prime Minister of Kashmir that all questions outstanding between the two states including that of supplies under the Standstill Agreement and mutual accusations of border raids should be discussed by representatives of the two Governments.

MAHARAJA'S THREAT

The Prime Minister of Kashmir replied that at the moment he was too busy to discuss these matters. Nevertheless we sent a representative to Srinagar to discuss these matters with the State. The Prime Minister, however, refused to hold discussions with him and he had to return. On October 15, the Prime Minister of Kashmir in a telegram to me threatened that unless Pakistan agreed to an impartial inquiry he would be compelled to ask for outside assistance to withstand the unfriendly acts of the Pakistani people on his border.

I at once accepted the proposal for an impartial enquiry and made the Prime Minister of Kashmir to nominate a representative for this purpose. The Government of Kashmir have made no further reference to this matter.

On October 20, the Quaid-i-Azam in reply to a telegram from the Kashmir Government called attention to the repeated attempts of Pakistan to improve its relations with Kashmir and asked for the Prime Minister of Kashmir to come to Karachi and talk things over. No reply was sent to this request. The Quaid-i-Azam also pointed out that the threat to call in outside help amounted almost to an ultimatum and observed that the real aim of Kashmir Government's policy was to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Union by means of *coup d'etat*.

PLEA FOR ACCESSION

The refusal of Kashmir Government to send a representative to discuss things and to nominate a representative for an impartial inquiry and its failure to reply to the Quaid-i-Azam's invitation to the Prime Minister to come to Karachi, its deliberate causing of disturbances in the State by employing its troops to attack Muslims, the fact that by 9 a.m. on the morning of the day on which Kashmir's accession was accepted, Indian air-borne troops had landed in Srinagar, clearly show the existence of a plan for accession against the will of the people, possible only by occupation of the country by Indian troops.

Even though all sorts of accusations were made against Pakistan by the Kashmir Government (and it was to redress these alleged wrongs that the India Government claims to have sent military aid to the Kashmir Government) yet at no stage did the Indian Dominion ask the Pakistan Government about these accusations and allegations or try to find a solution of this problem by joint consultation. It was only after

India had accepted Kashmir's accession and sent forces into Kashmir that the Pakistan Government was informed of the action.

RECKLESS ACCUSATION

After unwarranted occupation of Kashmir by the India Government, the Quaid-i-Azam proposed that an immediate conference should be held at Lahore. It was to be attended by the Governors-General and the Prime Ministers of the two Dominions and the Maharaja and his Prime Minister. This invitation was accepted and the conference was to be held on October 29. At the last moment, the conference was postponed as Pandit Nehru fell ill. It was then arranged that the conference should be held on November 1 and attended by the two Governors-General and the two Prime Ministers. This conference also did not take place because on the morning of November 1, again at the last minute, we were informed that Pandit Nehru was not well enough to come to Lahore. In this way, the idea of the conference receded into the background so far as the Indian Dominion is concerned. If the India Government really wanted to discuss this most vital and urgent matter, surely the Deputy Prime Minister could have come in place of Pandit Nehru. On November 1, Lord Mountbatten came to Lahore alone to attend the meeting of the Joint Defence Council and took the opportunity to see the Quaid-i-Azam. At this meeting, certain suggestions were made to Lord Mountbatten, but no further communication has been received by me or the Quaid-i-Azam from the India Government. Instead, Pandit Nehru has chosen to hurl across the world reckless accusations against the Pakistan Government, regardless of the true facts. His broadcast was arranged after Lord Mountbatten's return to Delhi and what the validity of his accusations is, I have already told you. That is where the matter stands today. The issues are for you and the world to judge.²
Pakistan Zindabad

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 5 November 1947.

²For comments by Vallabhbhai Patel on Liaquat Ali Khan's broadcast, see Annexure to Annex.

*Annexure to Annex to KR-437
Henry Grady to George Marshall*

US National Archives, F. 745. 45/11-1447

[Extract]

RESTRICTED

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

NEW DELHI,

No. 335

14 November 1947

[Paras 1 & 2 omitted]

In his statement¹ issued November 6, Mr. Patel was considerably less restrained than Mr. Nehru. Implying that Liaquat Ali Khan's illness was affecting his reason, Mr. Patel said it would be useless on his part "to attempt to deal at any length with the many nightmares and imaginary visions of a widespread plan for the extermination of Muslims in the States" referred to in a broadcast made from Lahore [on] November 4. Mr. Patel described the invasion of Kashmir as "virtually an elaborately planned, fully equipped and professionally directed invasion from a friendly territory". He referred to "the ceaseless hysterical outbursts" of the Prime Minister of the North West Frontier Province and to the "venomous shafts of the Prime Minister of Pakistan"; he said facts had either been ignored or "given a distortion to suit the picture which the Prime Minister deliberately intended to overdraw".

Mr. Patel declared, "the whole conception and policy of the Government of Pakistan" was based on "perverted logic" and that it did not "lie in the mouth of the Pakistan Prime Minister to twist the constitutional relationship between the Union and the acceding States in such a manner as to convey that the Union did not intervene while tragedies were overtaking the Muslim population in the State". In closing, he said it was quite clear that so far as the Pakistan Government was concerned "distortion, misrepresentation, concealment, and grossly prejudiced and unbalanced versions" were "becoming the tricks of the trade" but that he was sure the world would not be deceived by the kind of propaganda "which was associated with the name of the late Dr. Goebbels".

Thus, as has been previously pointed out, the responsible leaders of two virtually sovereign Governments charged with the welfare of some 400,000,000 people continue the verbal warfare which characterized their quarrels when they were merely heads of political parties. As nearly as can be ascertained, Pakistan leaders have been somewhat more shrill and libellous than Indian ministers, but utterances on both

sides have shown a discouraging absence of restraint, much less statesmanship. I believe Mr. Nehru earnestly desires a peaceful solution of Indo-Pakistan problems, but in the atmosphere now existing rational treatment of these problems at top levels has become almost impossible.

On the basis of the Embassy's information it seems unlikely that Mr. Jinnah would have been able to stop the tribesmen from entering Kashmir even if he had wanted to. While there is little doubt that the invasion had the tacit, if not the active, support of certain officials in the North West Frontier Province, it would seem that if Mr. Jinnah had conceived a definite plan for taking Kashmir by force, he would have waited until weather conditions had made it impossible for the Government of India to fly in troops. It also seems likely that if Mr. Jinnah had planned the invasion, he would have managed it in such a way that the raiders would have avoided killing Kashmir Muslims and looting and burning their property. As it is, according to American correspondents returning from Kashmir, the depredations of the raiders are so bitterly resented by Kashmir Muslims that for the time being Sheikh Abdullah's following is perhaps stronger than ever.

Now that Indian troops are pushing raiders out of the Vale of Kashmir, and many tribesmen seem to be making their way back to their own territory with their loot, the Government of India must avoid the temptation of believing the Kashmir problem is on its way to being settled. It is all too likely—aided or unaided by Pakistan authorities—the tribesmen will return to Kashmir in the spring, and it may be quite impossible to hold a plebiscite—honest or dishonest.

In the meantime, the acrimonious inter-Dominion controversy over Kashmir is symptomatic of the depressing inability of the two Dominions—to date—to establish friendly relations.

Respectfully yours,
HENRY F. GRADY

¹See the *Statesman*, 7 November 1947.

KR-438

Publicity Secretary, Muslim Conference, to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram, F. 118-2 (Vol. II)-GG/19

SIALKOT CITY,
6 November 1947

Sequel Patel's fateful visit to Jammu. Maharaja Kashmir announced in

Muslim *mohallahs* in Jammu city on 5th Nov[ember] that all Musalmans of the city would be safely transferred to Pakistan. Accordingly all Muslims including workers [and] children collected in Police Lines ground. Sixty civil trucks employed began transporting Musalmans from Police Lines and instead of bringing them to Suchetgarh they were taken towards Kathua and on Samba road. These trucks were attacked by Dogra military and Sikhs. All Muslims were butchered from 5th Nov. morning to 6th afternoon. These sixty trucks are regularly plying from Jammu towards Samba bringing helpless Musalmans and ruthlessly butchering them all. Muslims gathered in Police Lines are ignorant of the fate meeting those preceding them in trucks. Four wounded men escaped 5th evening and reached Sialkot on 6th and told woeful tales. We appeal you kindly to intervene at this 12th hour and arrange evacuation of remaining Musalmans officially by sending Pakistan trucks. Urgency immediate action can be hardly over-emphasised.

[PUBLICITY SECRETARY, MUSLIM CONFERENCE]

KR-439

Clement Attlee to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

KARACHI,

7 November 1947

Many thanks for your message dated 4th November about Kashmir, No. 376-G¹

2. As indicated in a recent message to the Prime Minister of India, there is unfortunately a great lack of mutual trust between the Governments of Pakistan and India. The same applies to the majority of their supporters. I am sure that this makes it even more essential that, whatever the difficulties, continuous and constant contact should be retained between the two Governments.

3. I think that the proposal for the solution of the Kashmir trouble put forward in your message makes a promising starting point for discussions. As I understand, [in] the broadcast made by the Prime Minister of India on November 2nd,² he gave two undertakings which seem to be in conjunction with your own suggestions. First, he undertook that the Indian forces would be withdrawn from Kashmir as soon as order is restored. Second, he undertook that the will of the people should be ascertained, and he proposed that this should be done under the

authority and supervision of the United Nations. No doubt any consultation of the people will be difficult to carry through. But I cannot believe that Mr. Nehru's pledges have the sinister implications which you suggest. It seems to me, therefore, that both you and the Prime Minister of India have put forward proposals which, although they differ in form, are based broadly on the same principles.

4. I hope, therefore, that there is now a starting point for discussions. While I fully recognise that this is difficult matter, not only because of the passions aroused on both sides but from the very nature of the problem of disengaging forces that have begun to fight, I can see little hope for relief of the present grave situation, which might easily become much worse, unless the two Governments do get together and try to reach accord on a mutually agreed plan of action.

5. I am hoping very much that I may have news of a further early meeting between you and the Indian Prime Minister.

6. I was very sorry to hear of your illness. I send you my best wishes for your recovery.

[CLEMENT ATTLEE].

¹KR-432.

²See Annex II to KR-427.

KR-440

Note¹ by G. Ahmed

F. 701/92-5

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,
[MINISTRY OF INTERIOR] KARACHI,
7 November 1947

I enclose a copy, in case it has not been seen, of a leading article in *The Times*, London, dated 30.10.47 on "Crisis in Kashmir". *The Times* appears to have swallowed (a) the story that the Pakistan Government supported the rebel movement by organising an economic blockade of Kashmir and (b) the story that the Pakistan Government intended to send its own forces into Kashmir and were dissuaded from doing so as a result of the personal intervention of the Supreme Commander.

G. AHMED
Director

¹Mohamed Ali passed on this note to Jinnah.

*Enclosure to KR-440*CRISIS IN KASHMIR¹

It is profoundly to be hoped that even the unfortunate indisposition of Pandit Nehru will not further postpone the conference in which the Governors-General of the two Indian Dominions, with their principal Ministers, should have come together yesterday to grapple with the menacing situation in Kashmir. This is pre-eminently a case for the readiness to collaborate in peace-making in which the responsible leaders on both sides have not so far failed as the successive and perilous communal dissensions incidental to the transfer of authority have developed. Terrible as the bloodshed inflicted on the peoples of the Punjab by the savage disentanglement [*sic*] of races or religions has been, the diplomatic capacity of the two Governments has been even more severely tested by their competition for the adhesion of the States. The problem presented itself on a small scale in the little principality of Junagadh, more gravely in the great monarchy of Hyderabad, it is now raised in the most dangerous form by the quarrel over the mountainous marchland of Kashmir. This territory is in the position of a planet exposed to the conflicting attractions of two stellar masses and in danger of being torn asunder by the tides that they set up. Although four-fifths of its population are Muslims, the ruling class is predominantly Hindu, as is the princely dynasty; moreover a considerable and influential section of the Muslims supports the Congress Party of India against Pakistan. On the other hand, geographical communication with Pakistan is much easier than with India, and on Pakistan also the economic system mainly depends. The military forces are chiefly recruited from Dogras, who follow the Hindu religion.

Thus many conflicting factors have influenced Kashmir's choice between India, Pakistan, and the attempt to maintain an independent status. While the Maharaja and his Ministers hesitated, insurrection broke out among the Muslim tribesmen of the western province of Poonch, the rebels protesting against the presumed intention to adhere to India. The Pakistan Government, making a first false step, gave economic support to this movement by withholding supplies from Kashmir. It is further alleged by the Maharaja that Afridi soldiers from Pakistan have been filtering into his dominions. On Sunday he wrote to Lord Mountbatten to say that he had no option but to accede to the Indian Dominion and ask for help in maintaining order. Acting on the advice of his Ministers, Lord Mountbatten has accepted the adhesion, subject to confirmation by plebiscite, and Indian troops have been dispatched by air to Srinagar.

This transaction, however deplorable the animosities that have brought it about, is within the forms of the constitutional settlement. The reported intention of Pakistan to reply by sending forces of its own into Kashmir is a different matter; it would, in fact, be a hostile act against the Dominion of India, with which Kashmir is now lawfully associated. General Gracey, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan forces, did not fail to warn his Government of this; and the personal intervention at Lahore of the Supreme Commander, Field-Marshal Auchinleck, who pointed out that all the British officers in both armies would resign rather than be involved in a fratricidal Indian conflict, staved off an irrevocable step. It is not, however, in his power to do more than gain time. For the short remaining term of the office of Supreme Commander he has authority over the British officers serving India and Pakistan, without whose help it would be difficult for either side to take the field. That consideration apart, it may be assumed that a commander with long and intimate knowledge of India will only in extreme emergency propose the withdrawal of men so well fitted to exert a moderating influence on inflamed communal passions. But his office is held under the Joint Defence Council of India and Pakistan, and if the two Governments cannot agree he must be quickly reduced to helplessness.

What the rulers of India and Pakistan have now alike to realize is the deplorable fact that, within a few weeks of the achievement of their sovereign independence, they have been brought to the brink of war. In distracted Kashmir the rival factions are fighting for the approaches to the capital, which is now in grave danger. Columns of refugees are blocking the roads; members of the British community without direct responsibility for the work of pacification are being removed by air. Meanwhile, the suspicions engendered among the outside supporters of the two sides are exemplified by such baseless rumours as that which report that manufacturers in the British Isles are exporting arms to one or both. It is a situation in which the rights or wrongs of the dispute over Kashmir may be rapidly obscured by the emergence of more deeply rooted causes of enmity; and the challenge alike to Indian and Pakistani statesmen is not to plead their respective legal cases but rather to convince all their followers that the supreme interest of the whole Indian peninsula is in peace and mutual understanding. It is a land which in every conflict is exposed to the attack of an invader more deadly than either a Muslim or a Hindu army; and that invader, whose name is famine, already threatens Kashmir and indeed many other regions. Both Governments should use their influence to secure an orderly conduct of a Kashmiri plebiscite,

which in so primitive a country, cannot be an easy undertaking. But beyond all this, the crisis has shown the paramount need of some means of day-to-day contact between the two administrations, that their inevitable differences may be settled in continuous and amicable consultation before they come to so perilous a pass again.

¹*The Times*, London, 30 October 1947.

KR-441

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/1

No. Primin-304

NEW DELHI,
8 November 1947

Your telegram No. 384-G dated the 6th November¹ about Kashmir was received to-day.

2. I regret that I have to disagree completely with your account of what has happened or is happening in Jammu and Kashmir State. We have received and are receiving full information from our own representatives in both Jammu and Srinagar and this convinces us that your information is wholly wrong.

3. I regret also the tone and the contents of your broadcast of the 4th November regarding Kashmir which indicate no desire to find method of the settlement. It was merely an indictment which has no relation to the fact.

4. In the last paragraph of your telegram you say that Lord Mountbatten promised to let you know the views of the Indian Government to the proposals discussed between the two Governors-General but that you have heard no more about them. On this point there seems to have been a misunderstanding. Lord Mountbatten on his return from Lahore gave me full account of his talk² with Mr. Jinnah and in particular of the important suggestions which has been discussed, namely:

- i. The withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and men from Kashmir and
- ii. holding of plebiscite at the earliest possible date.

As regards the first proposal, Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that withdrawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be made simultaneously but that he (Lord Mountbatten) had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for

the Indian troops to withdraw from Kashmir Valley until the raiders had left Kashmir soil and law and order had been restored in Kashmir.

Lord Mountbatten had also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Government of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary. As regards the second point Lord Mountbatten reported that Mr. Jinnah had expressed the views that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. To meet this point Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should be conducted under the auspices of U.N.O. Mr. Jinnah had put forward the counter proposal that two Governors-General should be given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed out that it would be constitutionally improper for him to undertake this duty.

5. On the very day that I had this talk with Lord Mountbatten I made a broadcast³ in which the views of the Government of India on both these proposals were stated plainly and I followed it up with a telegram⁴ to you indicating that they might form the basis of discussion at our next talk. It is thus clear beyond any shadow of doubt that we did in fact put forward definite proposals as a basis for discussion between us as soon as possible after Lord Mountbatten's return from Lahore.

6. I would have been glad to explain to you personally at the meeting that had been arranged for tomorrow, the proposals we had put forward and the reasons for our inability to accept the proposals made [by] Lord Mountbatten to Mr. Jinnah. But since unfortunately you are unable to come, I must let you have my views to uphold them. They are as follows:

7. As regards your proposals one and two, a number of well-armed raiders have entered Kashmir to accompaniment of massacre, arson and loot. Our troops have been sent there to drive out these raiders and protect Kashmir. So long as these raiders remain there, and law and order have not been established, our troops must discharge their duty. Afterwards they will be withdrawn, as I have already undertaken.

8. The raiders are either under your control or they are not. If they are under your control you should withdraw them and, in any event, stop them coming through Pakistan territory into Kashmir. If they are not under your control and you can do nothing to stop them, then surely we are entitled to deal with them as we think best.

9. As regards proposal number three in your telegram of November 6th, we entirely endorse Lord Mountbatten's view (vide paragraph No. 7 above).

10. It will thus be seen that our proposals which we have

repeatedly stated are:

1. that Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir;
2. that Government of India should honour their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored;
3. that Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to U.N.O to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.

11. The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential, in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be acceptance of principle that, where Ruler of a State does not belong to community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is same as State's the question whether State has finally acceded to one or other Dominions should be ascertained by reference to the will of people.

12. The Major-General⁵ commanding our forces in Jammu and Kashmir has been given the most explicit orders to do everything in his power to ensure that no victimisation of any community is permitted.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹KR-437.

²See Enclosure 2 to KR-427.

³See Annex II to KR-427.

⁴KR-433.

⁵Kulwant Singh, Commander, Indian land forces in Jammu & Kashmir from November 1947 to May 1948.

KR-442

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2

IMMEDIATE

10 November 1947

No. 395-G

I have received your telegram No. 304 dated November 8th¹ regarding Kashmir and have also had an account of your discussions with Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and Mohamad Ali. I have also seen draft agreement² prepared by Lord Ismay, Menon and Mohamad Ali. I agree with you that early settlement of Kashmir question is essential to restore good relations between the two Dominions. Indeed every effort must be made to remove all causes of friction. For this purpose, a very early meeting

between us is necessary.

If I had been fit enough to travel, I should have come to Delhi, but unfortunately, I am still confined to bed. I therefore invite you to come to Lahore at an early date convenient to you for a discussion of outstanding questions and hope that you will be able to accept this invitation.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-441.

²Not traceable. However, see KR-445.

KR-443

A. B. A. Haleem to M. A. Jinnah

F. 849/7

3 REAY ROAD,
KARACHI,
12 November 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am herewith submitting two memoranda for your kind perusal and consideration. One of them deals with the Kashmir situation and the second one with the State of Jaipur.¹ They have been prepared by students of mine who possess intimate knowledge of the areas with which they deal.

With respectful regards,

Yours sincerely,
A. B. A. HALEEM

¹Not traceable.

Enclosure to KR-443

F. 849/8-10

TOP SECRET/IMMEDIATE

12 November 1947

NOTE ON KASHMIR

It appears that the Azad Kashmir Forces are giving way due to the shortage of men and material. Heavy artillery is in action against them and several times they have had to take to their heels leaving behind arms, ammunition and valuable instruments. Their leaders, it seems, at the time of commencing these operations had obviously eliminated

all chances of the Kashmir Government getting help overland, via Pathankot and Kathua, otherwise they would not have left the Banihal Pass, the most strategic place in Kashmir, for the cannons to be pushed across for their own annihilation; or there has been some miscalculation of timing in approaching Srinagar. Their position today would have been much better indeed had they captured Banihal before heading towards Srinagar and thus avoiding all risk of the enemy getting land reinforcements from India.

What I fear is that the Azad Forces may be completely routed and the enemy may then rush to capture (or strengthen) positions at Chilas and Domel (landing grounds) with a view to advance to Gilgit (by air and by land) to liberate it from the hold of refractory men and staff there, as well as to safeguard the Partap Bridge (near Ramgarh over the Indus) and the Burzil Pass. The enemy can check the inroads of the forces of the neighbouring chieftains from the North and the West by this device.

It may also be mentioned that 6,000 Dogras-strong are always stationed at Bunji (a strategic point of importance between Gilgit and Gurez. At Gilgit there is an armed force (now probably won over by refractory Khans), a big armoury (with old model rifles) and two million rounds of ammunition.'

It is also feared that the Indian Army after driving the invaders beyond Kohala may also want to break the bridge over the Jhelum at Kohala as we cannot expect from these brutes any respect for international law and conventions. If they break this bridge, Pakistan's main artery in that region will be cut off.

In continuation of my previous suggestions on this subject, I respectfully submit that some tangible help (of course clandestinely) must be rushed in for these helpless and struggling forces and the following steps be kindly taken without the least delay:

1. A small party of persons intimately knowing the country and its people must be flown at once to Peshawar to contact some known persons on transmitter at Gilgit (there is a good set of transmitter and receiver at Gilgit,) from Peshawar to proceed to Chitral (or from Risalpur to Chitral) via Durgai, Malakand and Lowari Pass, and from Chitral to Gilgit via Shandur. (This route to Gilgit is proposed in order to maintain all secrecy).
2. The party should have all the necessary (available) materials of publicity to create a passion for Islamic war among the people there. It is essential because the people on that side, though potential warriors, are yet ignorant; but by propaganda they can be turned into furious lions.
3. The deficiency in arms and ammunition of the bordering Khanates

as well as of the tribesmen joining the Azad Forces must be made good, but the exact position of men and material available must be first ascertained.

4. The bordering Khanates must establish an effective control over Gilgit at once.
5. The neighbouring Khanates, helped by tribesmen and other local men, must be made to capture the territory from Gilgit to Taragbal, establishing strong forces at Gilgit, Partap Bridge, Bunji, Chilas and Taragbal (if possible also at Burzil Pass; if not already blocked by snow).
6. Some officer of Pakistan in authority (or one of the members of the proposed party may be authorised on this behalf) must give assurance that they will not lose their annual subsidies.

Note

If measures suggested in the foregoing paras 1-6 are taken immediately and in right earnest, the position of the Azad Government in the north western areas of Kashmir State would become very solid and very hard to penetrate for the Indian Army. In this area air operations are not only difficult but ineffective.

Gilgit, if strongly held, would serve a very good base for all operations towards south, and territories upto Gurez in the south and Skardu to Laddakh in the south east can be captured (of course after strengthening positions at Zojila and Daras).

At Gilgit, arms and ammunition can be obtained and accumulated from Turkistan, China and Russia.

7. Another party should be immediately sent to Kohala (as already suggested), to establish liaison between the various organisations and people.
8. Azad Forces must be fully manned and well armed. Forces should be raised from inside as well as outside Pakistan and the larger the number the better.
9. Full advantage must be taken of the snow-season and positions at and near Pir Punjal Pass must be occupied in order to lead forces into various sectors from there. Positions at Poonch and Uri be strengthened.
10. Enemy must have taken strong positions at Banihal Pass, Ramban, Ramsu and Kud before bringing in re-enforcements from India overland.

It is therefore necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions and to establish strong pickets there.

11. It is absolutely necessary that the persons proceeding to Gilgit or going to Kohala should be provided with proper kits of things

essential for warding off the intensive cold of snow-clad high altitudes.

PS. The statement of Mr. Bakhshi which has appeared in this morning's papers to the effect that Gilgit will be attacked by the Kashmir Government forces after the winter season is over, is intended to mislead us. Probably an attempt will be made to land forces in Gilgit very soon. As the Gilgit airfield is flanked on one side by the Indus River and on the other by a range of hills, strategically-posted pickets can prevent the landing, which is never easy even under the best of circumstances.

KR-444

M. A. Hassan Ispahani to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET/IMPORTANT
No. C-15

WASHINGTON,
13 November 1947

United Nation[s] Organisation request full information of composition of Provisional Government of free Kashmir and of present developments.¹
[M. A. HASAN ISPAHANI]

¹On 16 November, Pakistan Embassy in Washington were asked, telegraphically, why the UN had asked for this information and who had approached the UN See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

KR-445

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET/IMMEDIATE
No. PRIMIN-338

13 November 1947

Repeated Foreign Karachi.

On return from Kashmir I have received your telegram No. 695G [sic for 395] dated November 10th.¹ I am surprised to see reference to some draft agreement. There is no such thing to my knowledge but some kind of a formula for discussion was placed before me and I was told by Menon that he did not agree with parts of it. Lord Ismay also informed me that he did not think it feasible. When I saw it I made it

clear to Mohamed Ali that we could not possibly consider it.²

An essential preliminary is complete withdrawal of all raiders and invaders into Kashmir territory from Pakistan. We cannot withdraw our troops from Kashmir or cease taking precautionary measures till Kashmir is free from these raids and there is no chance of further attack. Already Kashmir State has suffered greatly. My recent visit to Kashmir brought home to me the urgent necessity of every action being taken by us to drive away every single raider from State territory. The acts of vandalism that they have committed in Kashmir shocked me beyond measure. No organised authority can permit such savage behaviour in its territory. Hospitals, convents, churches, libraries, shops, in fact every place was ruined and looted. I saw large number of Muslim women with their ears-torn because ear rings had been pulled out. The population of Kashmir valley, which, as you know, is chiefly Muslim, complained bitterly of this outrageous behaviour and begged us to continue to protect them. We cannot leave them in the lurch.

News came yesterday of sack and large scale massacre at Rajori in Jammu Province by these raiders. We are going into these areas in Jammu Province to rid the people of this scourge.

During my stay in Kashmir our military officer[s] placed before me numerous instances indicating the complicity of Pak army soldiers in this invasion. I put it to you that the help given by Pakistan authorities to this barbarous raid is an act which must be resented very deeply by us and by the people of Kashmir. In order to clear up these charges against Pakistan authorities and army, it is desirable from your point of view as well as ours, to have a thorough enquiry into this matter, that is, what part the North West Frontier Province Government or civil officers or army of Pakistan have played in helping this raid into Kashmir.

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah is at present the head of the Kashmir administration and anything relating to Kashmir must necessarily have his approval and consent.

I would be glad to meet you to discuss these and other matters, but for the next few days I am completely tied up with important meetings of Congress Working Committee and All India Congress Committee; the Constituent Assembly follows immediately after. Our meeting, I hope, would be helpful, but it can only bear results when all raiders have been driven out of Kashmir and Pakistan Government has declared its firm policy to the exclusion of these raiders away from Kashmir.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

¹KR-442.

²See KR-447, para 4.

KR-446

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru**Telegram, FOA, S-6/2*
*[Extract]*IMMEDIATE
No. 00021/50LAHORE,
16 November 1947

I am issuing the following statement to the press today:

KASHMIR DISPUTE

In the Kashmir dispute, too, we have repeatedly urged a peaceful settlement by negotiation. The Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir have suffered grievously under the Maharaja's Government. Thousands have been killed, Muslim women have been abducted in large number and over 100,000 Muslims have been driven out of their homes into Pakistan in a cruel and inhuman manner.

This destruction of Muslims life, honour and property is still continuing by armed mobs with the help of the State and Indian Union forces with the set purpose of eliminating the Muslim population from the State and thousands of refugees are pouring into Pakistan. Dogra troops and gangsters from the State have made numerous incursions into our territory in the West Punjab.

We made repeated attempts to persuade the Kashmir Government to discuss these questions with us, but they were determined to join the Union of India against the will of the people of Kashmir by a *coup d'état*. The India Government in direct and clear repudiation of the principles on which they had questioned the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and without any reference to or consultation with the Pakistan Dominion whose security is vitally affected by events in Kashmir, occupied Kashmir by military force and have since the very first day of their entry into Kashmir been engaged in putting down the Muslims there by force.

Pakistan territory itself has been twice violated by the Indian Forces. Bombs have been dropped in our territory in the vicinity of Kohala bridge and our police post at Garhi Habibullah in Hazara District has been machine-gunned by the Indian Air Force.

CONFERENCE

Immediately after the unwarranted occupation of Kashmir by the India Government, a conference between the two Governors-General and the Prime Ministers of the two Dominions and the Maharaja and

his Prime Minister was arranged at the instance of the Quaid-i-Azam on October 29. At the last minute this conference was postponed as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru fell ill. Another conference was then arranged for November 1, but this also did not take place, because Pandit Nehru could not attend it. On November 1, the Quaid-i-Azam met Lord Mountbatten and put forward the following proposals for the consideration of the Government of India:

PROPOSALS

First, to put an immediate stop to fighting, the two Governors-General should be authorised by their respective Governments to issue a proclamation forthwith, giving 48 hours notice to the opposing forces to cease fire. We made it clear that we had no control over the forces of the Provincial [sic for Provisional] Govt. of Kashmir or the tribesmen engaged in fighting, but we were prepared to warn them in the clearest terms that if they did not obey the order to cease fire immediately the forces of both Dominions would make war on them.

Secondly, both the forces of the Indian Dominion and the tribesmen should withdraw simultaneously and with the utmost expedition from the State territory.¹ Thirdly, the two Governors-General should be vested with full powers by the two Dominion Governments to restore peace, undertake the administration of Jammu and Kashmir State and arrange for a plebiscite without delay under their joint control and supervision.

These were eminently responsible proposals. We made them at the risk of incurring the hostility of the Frontier tribes whose feelings had been intensely aroused over the atrocities committed on their brethren in Kashmir.

The day after these proposals reached the India Govt., the Prime Minister of India, instead of sending a reply officially gave a vague and evasive idea of his solution of the Kashmir question in a broadcast, merely harping on the slogan of plebiscite, but disregarding everything else. After waiting for some days I sent a reminder. The India Government's official reply showed that they were not prepared [sic] the contrary, it was categorically [sic] to accept any of our suggestions. On stated [sic] that they would first drive out all the so-called raiders by force of arms and as a recent telegram showed they are not even prepared to have a discussion until this has been done.

FORCING MILITARY DECISION

We have made repeated efforts to have a conference with the Indian Dominion to bring about a peaceful settlement, but on one pretext or another the India Government, with the might of military power behind

them, have flouted the idea. The attitude of the India Government indicates that they are determined to force a military decision on Kashmir and to reduce the plebiscite to a farce by eliminating Muslim population² by the cruel methods which are now in operation. Indeed it now seems extremely doubtful if there will be any attempt at all to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

Speaking to Pressmen at Srinagar on November 10, during Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to that place, Sheikh Abdullah is reported to have observed that there may not be a referendum at all, while this quisling, who has been an agent of the Congress for many years, struts about the State bartering away the life, honour and freedom of his people for the sake of personal profit and power, the true leaders of the Muslims of Kashmir are rotting in jail. His statement reveals an uneasy realisation that despite all the repression, the verdict of the people of Kashmir will go in favour of accession to Pakistan.

There is not the slightest doubt that the whole plot of the accession of Kashmir to India was pre-planned. It cannot be justified on any constitutional or moral ground. It is quite clear now that what the India Government are after is permanent occupation of Kashmir. They can maintain this unjust occupation only by liquidating the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir who are now suffering military repression in its worst form and who are struggling for their freedom and indeed, for their very existence against heavy odds. The India Government's whole conduct is based on "might is right" and on the belief that Pakistan is unable to fight them. If the India Government are allowed to follow their imperialist land-grabbing policy this will have repercussions not only in Asia, but throughout the world.

The fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations is to prevent might prevailing over right. The whole dispute should, therefore, be brought before the bar of international opinion. We are ready to request the UNO immediately to appoint its representative in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put a stop to fighting and repression of Muslims in the State, to arrange the programme of withdrawal of outside forces, set up an impartial administration of the State till a plebiscite is held and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession. We are prepared to accept a similar solution of the dispute regarding Manavadar and Junagadh.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹Enclosure 2 to KR-427, para 34. Also see KR-437.

²See Annex to KR-437.

KR-447

*Note by C. B. Duke**PRO, DO 142/494*

4 RACE COURSE ROAD, LAHORE,
[17 November 1947]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH LORD ISMAY IN DELHI

At my first interview on the 10th November, Lord Ismay discussed principally the Kashmir situation. I asked him when the Indian Government were going to reply to the suggestions¹ for a settlement put to Lord Mountbatten by Mr. Jinnah at their private conversation at Lahore on the 1st November. Lord Ismay informed me that he had been present at that interview and that Mr. Jinnah did not seem to have made any suggestions at all. The possibility was discussed of a settlement on the lines of what were claimed as Mr. Jinnah's proposals in Liaquat Ali Khan's telegram² to Mr. Attlee of which I sent you a copy with my letter No. [missing]. of the [words missing]. But Lord Mountbatten, while stressing that he was a constitutional Governor-General and as such was bound by the advice of his Ministers, pointed out at the time that the proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of the troops and the tribesmen was not practical politics. Mr. Jinnah had himself said that the tribesmen were independent people, not under Pakistan control; they were also scattered about in pockets and it would obviously be practically impossible to get them out by the mere issue of an order. The troops on the other hand were properly organised and could be withdrawn at any time; but it would be manifestly unfair and would place the troops in an impossible position if they were to cease fire and withdraw while the tribesmen were left at liberty to continue their depredations.

2. As for the proposal that a plebiscite in Kashmir should be held under the direct personal control of the two Governors-General, Lord Ismay reported Lord Mountbatten as pointing out not only the constitutional objections to such an arrangement from the point of view of the two cabinets, but the even more serious practical difficulties which the Governors-General would have in implementing any such responsibility. Obviously neither of them could spend weeks continuously in Kashmir. If either Muslim or non-Muslim officials were used in any particular case, there would be no guarantee of impartiality, and it was out of the question that the Indian Government, at any rate, would agree to the use

of British Officers. Lord Ismay informed me that Nehru's comments on the proposals discussed between Lord Mountbatten and Mr. Jinnah were that as long as the raiders remained in Kashmir, Indian troops must stay to try and preserve order, but that he had no desire to keep them there a moment longer than necessary for this purpose. Secondly, he said, assuming that Mr. Jinnah and the Pakistan Government agreed that the important thing was to put an end to the fighting in Kashmir, why should Pakistan object to India endeavouring to do so if Pakistan was unable to control the tribesmen themselves.

3. The Indian Government's proposals were regarded in Delhi as having been stated in Nehru's broadcast of the 2nd November.

*[Proposals omitted.]*³

4. The next step was Lord Ismay's meeting in Delhi with Mohamed Ali for Pakistan and V.P. Menon, Secretary of the States Department of the Government of India on the 7th November in an endeavour to find some formula which would be acceptable to both Cabinets. All recognised that the urgent and essential thing was first to stop the fighting in Kashmir. No agreement was, however, reached regarding simultaneous withdrawal of the tribesmen and the Indian forces. Lord Ismay suggested that the Governments might agree to "the principle of simultaneous withdrawal." This, however, Mohamed Ali felt would be too vague for Mr. Jinnah, while V.P. Menon thought it would inevitably be rejected by the Indian Cabinet.

5. There the matter rested when I first saw Lord Ismay, but on the evening of the 12th November, he told me, with obvious appreciation, of the cordial tone of a personal letter to Nehru which had just been received from Liaquat, asking Nehru to visit him in Lahore and apologising for his own inability to get to Delhi on account of his prolonged illness and greatly weakened condition.⁴ Lord Ismay hoped very much that Nehru would be permitted by his Cabinet to respond in a similar conciliatory spirit and to accept this invitation, but he could not forecast what the reaction of the Indian Cabinet would be, although he was certain that Nehru's own strong preference would be for acceptance.

6. I asked Lord Ismay whether he thought that the new Indian Governor-General Rajagopalacharia could influence his Cabinet in the direction of moderation. Lord Ismay replied that C.R. (as His Excellency is for obvious reasons of convenience usually called) was a charming old gentleman and in his day as Premier of Madras had been a good

administrator, but he had described himself to Lord Ismay as a spent force. He had deplored the bitterness and the provocative behaviour of the Indian Government over the numerous issues which had arisen with the Government of Pakistan and said that he had urged them to learn international manners and the power of self restraint from the British, but knew that he himself carried no weight with his Cabinet or with the present Congress Committee. I asked Lord Ismay how long he thought Nehru would last against Patel. Lord Ismay expressed the opinion that Nehru's principal strength lay in the support he received from Gandhi. But he thought it probable that Patel would outlast Nehru, who would either be squeezed out or collapse from over-work, and added that it would be a very bad day for Pakistan, as well as for India, when Nehru goes. In this connection I heard a rumour, unfortunately not until after my two interviews with Lord Ismay, that there was a plan afoot to send Nehru as Ambassador or in some other such capacity to America; this would of course mean the victory of the Patel party in the Cabinet.

*[Para 7 omitted]*⁵

8. In general, Lord Ismay said that the difficulty with the Indian Cabinet was that they are so wrong-headed that even when they took the right action they did it in a stupid and provocative way. He quoted as an instance the intervention in Junagadh which had just been announced on the 10th November. Lord Ismay said he was shocked to be told that all that had been done to inform the Pakistan Government in this case was that a telegram had been sent to Karachi at the same time as the intervention started. He told me that he found his position so intolerable owing to the precipitate and ill-considered actions of the Indian Government that he was resigning in about a month, as he felt that he could do no good by staying. He was accused by the Indian Government of being pro-Pakistan, while he felt that Mr. Jinnah, whom he had known well for many years, regarded him as an amiable ass who knew nothing about either Hindus or Mohammedans! He had had a personal appeal from Rajagopalacharia to stay as long as Lord Mountbatten stayed, but he felt that it would be serving no useful purpose to do so. He was distressed at the lack of faith in Pakistan in Lord Mountbatten's impartiality. The fact was he said that Lord Mountbatten fought very hard with his own Cabinet for proper treatment of Pakistan and it was a grave misfortune that Lord Mountbatten should be regarded as prejudiced in favour of India because of the actions of

his Cabinet which were frequently contrary to Lord Mountbatten's own views and advice.

¹See Enclosure 2 to KR-427. Also see KR-446.

²KR-432.

³See KR-441, para 10.

⁴See KR-442.

⁵This paragraph contained Ismay's comment on Patel and Jinnah which is more of a value judgment than an objective view.

KR-448

M. Ikramullah to M. A. Hassan Ispahani

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET/IMPORTANT

No. 902

KARACHI

19 November 1947

My immediately preceding telegram No. 901 dated 19th November 1947.¹ Following is text of reply to U.N.O's enquiry regarding the composition of the Provisional Government of Azad Kashmir:

President—Sardar [Mohammad] Ibrahim, Bar-at-Law, of Rawalakot in Poonch [and] Member of the State Assembly

Defence—Syed Ali Ahmed Shah of Mirpur, President of the Parliamentary Board of Muslim Conference

Finance—Syed Nazir Hasan Shah, B.A., LLB., Advocate of Poonch

Revenue—Ch. Abdullah Khan Bhatti of Jammu, President of the Jammu Provincial Muslim Conference

Home—Kh. Ghulam-ud Din Wani, M.A., LLB., Advocate, Baramula, Secretary General, Muslim Conference

2. Before giving an account of the present developments in Jammu and Kashmir State, it is necessary to mention a few basic facts: The population of Jammu and Kashmir State is predominantly Muslim (over 80 per cent) while the Ruler is a Hindu Dogra whose ancestors purchased title to the State from the East India Company a hundred years ago for a paltry sum of rupees seventy five lakh equivalent of million dollars. The army and civil services are mainly manned and dominated by the Hindus, the former by Dogras and the latter by *brahmins*. All the natural outlets from Kashmir, whether by river or road are into Pakistan. The security of Pakistan is vitally affected by that of Kashmir. It is through Kashmir that land and other routes from Pakistan

lead to U.S.S.R., (China and certain parts of Afghanistan). Geographical factors, population, cultural affinity, economic interdependence and strategic considerations, all link Kashmir and Pakistan together. The Maharaja of Kashmir, however, for dynastic and communal reasons, was in favour of an unnatural union with India.

3. There are two political parties in the State. One is the Muslim Conference, which is the main representative body of Muslims and which has been in favour of accession to Pakistan. The other is the National Conference led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who has been a paid agent of the Congress for many years.

4. Under Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which brought into being the Dominions of India and Pakistan on the 15th August, paramountcy over Indian States lapsed and they became independent and free to accede to either Dominion. The same section provided for Standstill Agreements in respect of communications, trade, etc. The Jammu and Kashmir State decided for the time being to remain independent but entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan Government. The disturbances in the East Punjab dislocated communications and affected the supply of various commodities to Kashmir leading to complaints from the Kashmir Government. On the other hand the Pakistan Government had complaints to make of the attacks on Muslim life and property in the State and of raids into Pakistan by armed bands from the State. Sometime in September, armed Sikh bands and Rashtriya Sewak Sangh who had been responsible for large scale destruction of Muslim life and property in East Punjab started infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir State and attempted to re-enact the same tragedy in the State. Armed mobs in the State, with the help of the Dogra troops and the State Police, killed thousands of Muslims, abducted their women and burnt their villages. Mortar and automatic weapons were used to drive Muslims from their villages. Fires of burning villages could be seen from the Murree hills. Armed gangs from the State including personnel of the State army made a number of raids into adjoining Pakistan territory and did a considerable amount of damage. The Pakistan Government repeatedly tried to arrange a discussion between their representatives and those of the Kashmir Government regarding these issues between Pakistan and Kashmir. But the Kashmir Government ignored or rejected all these approaches.

5. On second October,² the Prime Minister of Pakistan suggested to the Prime Minister of Kashmir that all questions outstanding between the two States including that of supplies under the Standstill Agreement

and accusations of border raids should be discussed by representatives of the two Governments. The Prime Minister of Kashmir replied that at the moment he was too busy to discuss these matters. Nevertheless, the Pakistan Government sent a representative³ to Srinagar to discuss these matters with the State authorities. The Prime Minister of Kashmir, however, refused to hold discussions with him and he had to return.

6. On the twelfth October,⁴ the Pakistan Government sent a strong protest to the Kashmir Government against the atrocities committed on the Muslims of the State. On the 15th of October, Mr. Mahajan who had been the Congress nominee on the Punjab Boundary Commission was appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir and on the very first day of his assumption of office, he sent a telegram to the Prime Minister Pakistan threatening that unless Pakistan agreed to an impartial inquiry he would be compelled to ask for outside assistance.⁵ The Prime Minister of Pakistan at once accepted the proposal for an impartial inquiry and asked the Prime Minister of Kashmir to nominate a representative for this purpose. The Maharaja's Government have since made no further reference to this matter. On 18th October, without waiting for a reply to his previous telegram, the Prime Minister of Kashmir in telegram to the Governor-General of Pakistan,⁶ repeated his charges against Pakistan and concluded by saying that he wished to make it plain that the attitude of the Government of Pakistan could be tolerated no longer and expressed the hope that the Governor-General would agree that he was justified in asking for friendly assistance to oppose trespass on the fundamental rights of the State. On 20th October, the Governor-General of Pakistan, in reply to Kashmir Government, called attention to the repeated attempts of Pakistan to improve its relations with Kashmir and asked the Prime Minister of Kashmir to come to Karachi for a discussion.⁷ No reply was sent to this request. The Governor-General of Pakistan also pointed out that the threat to call in outside help amounted almost to an ultimatum and showed that the real aim of the Kashmir Government's policy was to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Union by means of *coup d'état*.

7. Shortly before this, the Maharaja's Government released Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who had been convicted of high treason by them in 1946. On the other hand, the leaders of the Muslim Conference who are accredited and real leaders of Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State were and are still kept in jail although their offence was a merely technical one of having held a meeting in spite of a ban on public meetings. This move, viz releasing a paid agent of the Congress

like Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and keeping the real Muslim leaders imprisoned, was part of the plan for forcing union with India.

8. As stated above destruction of Muslim life and property in the State assumed large proportions in the State towards the end of September. This led to a large exodus of Muslims into Pakistan. The people of the State have many relatives in Hazara, N.W.F.P. and in the West Punjab. Consequently, feelings in certain parts of Pakistan rose very high and some people from the N.W.F.P. and the tribal areas fed up by the atrocities in Kashmir rushed to the aid of their brethren. The first incursion of the tribesmen into Kashmir occurred on 22nd October.

9. On 27th October, the India Government suddenly and without any reference to or consultation with the Pakistan Government who are vitally affected by events in Kashmir accepted accession of Kashmir in response to the Maharaja's request of 26th October for accession. India troops arrived in Kashmir at 9 a.m. on the 27th October, the day on which the Governor-General of India sent his letter accepting the State's accession.⁸ The sending of India troops under cover of accession further intensified and inflamed the feelings of the tribesmen and the people in West Pakistan. It will be noted that the first incursion of the tribesmen into Kashmir which is alleged to be the reason for the despatch of Indian troops occurred one full week after the Maharaja's Government had threatened to call in outside assistance.

10. This sequence of events seems to have been arranged as a matter of State policy. Disturbances were created to find an excuse for calling in troops from India. The deliberate refusal of the Maharaja's Government to consider every suggestion of the Pakistan Government for a meeting of representatives of both to handle the situation jointly and in friendly co-operation and at the same time their conspiring with the India Government enabled them to use the assistance given by the tribesmen to their brethren in Kashmir as the occasion for the putting into effect of the preplanned scheme for the accession of Kashmir as a *coup d'état* and for the occupation of Kashmir by Indian troops with the object of holding down the people of Kashmir who have been driven to rebellion by this well-calculated and carefully-planned oppression.

11. Since in the opinion of the Government of Pakistan the accession of Kashmir was based on fraud and violence they refused to recognize it.

12. As the repression of Muslims in the State grew, they turned, in desperation, on their oppression. Poonch which has a very large number of ex-soldiers from the Indian Army and the people of which are

among the finest soldiers in the world was the starting point of this revolt which began in October and gradually grew and spread. Warned by the happenings in the East Punjab, the Muslims of the State knew that they were not merely fighting for their freedom but for their very existence. Determined to fight to the very end, they formed the Azad Kashmir Government, the composition of which has been given out. Since the 27th October fighting has been going on between the forces of India on the one hand and the forces of Azad Kashmir Government on the other. The latter have practically no equipment except rifles and are assisted by a certain number of their sympathisers from the Tribal Areas. Nevertheless they managed to reach the vicinity of Srinagar twice but were driven back by superior might of the India Army who are equipped with every modern weapon. At present, to the best of our information, the India troops have reached Uri which is a place about 60 miles away from Srinagar on the road from Srinagar to Murree. A certain amount of fighting is also going on in Jammu and Poonch. The destruction of Muslim life and property in the State, particularly in Jammu and Poonch, has been intensified. Thousands of Muslims are being killed. Women are being abducted in large number and property is being looted or destroyed. Murder, rape, arson and loot have been let loose in the State with the help of State troops and Indian Union Forces. Thousands of refugees are seeking asylum in Pakistan and they bring the most horrible tales of atrocities. A systematic effort is being made to liquidate the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir State.

13. In the Kashmir valley the Maharaja's Government has appointed Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister. Sheikh Abdullah is now openly playing the role of a quisling.

*[Paras 14-20 omitted]*⁹

21. The Pakistan Government's approach to the problem is given in the concluding paragraphs of the statement issued by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the 14th [16]¹⁰ November 1947. They are as follows:

"There is not the slightest doubt that the whole plot of the accession of Kashmir to India was preplanned. It cannot be justified on any constitutional or moral grounds. It is quite clear now that the India Government are after permanent occupation of Kashmir. They can maintain this unjust occupation only by liquidation of the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir who are now suffering military repression in its worst form and who are struggling for the freedom and indeed for their very existence against heavy odds. The India

Government's whole conduct is based on might is right and on the belief that Pakistan is unable to fight them if the India Government is allowed to follow its imperialist and grasping policy. This will have repercussions on not only in Asia but throughout the world."

22. The fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations is to prevent might prevailing over right. The whole dispute should, therefore, be brought before the bar of international opinion. We are ready to request the U.N.O. immediately to appoint its representatives in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put a stop to fighting and to repression of Muslims in the State to arrange the programme of withdrawal of outside forces to set up an impartial administration of the State till a plebiscite is held and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State. On the question of accession we are prepared to accept a similar solution of the dispute regarding Manavadar and Junagadh.

¹See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

²KR-375.

³Major A.S.B. Shah was sent to Kashmir on 6 October, 1947. See FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

⁴KR-383.

⁵Enclosure to KR-389.

⁶KR-391.

⁷KR-394, para 5.

⁸KR-407.

⁹See KR-432 and KR-437.

¹⁰KR-446.

KR-449

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

LAHORE,

19 November 1947

No. 404-G

Your telegram Primin-338 dated November 13th regarding Kashmir.¹ If you will see document which you state was placed before you, you will find that it is headed draft agreement. This draft agreement was prepared by Lord Ismay;² Menon, Mohamad Ali represented, concludes a solution even though all or any of them might have doubts whether two Governments would accept it. Since you do not agree with it there is nothing more to be said about it.

You have mentioned certain instances of destruction of life and property. No one could condemn them more severely or regret them more than I do. Such acts must be condemned by every right thinking man wherever they occur. But I am pained to see that you appear to have taken no action regarding atrocities which are being perpetrated on Muslims of Jammu and Poonch. I have drawn your attention repeatedly to large scale massacres of Muslims and to abduction of women. The brutality and cold-blooded murders and crimes against women of which Dogra troops of Indian Union have been guilty in Jammu and Poonch are of most heinous kind. The thousands of Muslims who are pouring into Pakistan from Jammu and Poonch tell tales of woe too horrid to be repeated. Your Government appears to be completely indifferent to this murder, rape, abduction, loot and arson, the only purpose of which is to liquidate entirely the Muslim population of the State.

I repudiate emphatically the insinuation in your telegram that Pakistan Army authorities are giving help to so-called raiders into Kashmir. On [the] contrary, we have plenty of evidence that soldiers of Indian Union and of States that have acceded to Indian Union have been engaged in raids into Pakistan territory. I suggest you might appropriately have an enquiry conducted about these soldiers.

I notice that you are not prepared to have a discussion till those whom you call raiders have been driven out of Kashmir and that anything relating to Kashmir must have approval and consent of Sheikh Moham-mad Abdullah. This is hardly a constructive approach to Kashmir problem.³ In view of stand you have taken I see no other way to peaceful settlement except a reference of whole question to UNO. I sent you a copy of press statement I issued on November 16th in which we made this proposal. I hope you will agree that in the present circumstances, this is [the] only fair and peaceful solution.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-445

²See KR-442.

³See Annex.

Annex to KR-449
Henry Grady to George Marshall

Telegram, U.S. National Archives, 745. 45F/11-2147

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION OF MIDDLE
EASTERN AND INDIAN AFFAIRS,
NEW DELHI,

No. 1062

21 November 1947

One. In conversation with Embassy officer last evening [20 November], Lord Ismay expressed concern GOI's "hand to mouth" policy in relations with G[overnment] O[f] P[akistan]—particularly re Kashmir; said he was urging G[overnment] O[f] I[ndia] leaders to adopt long range view and trying to convince them of imperative necessity of setting up permanent joint GOP-GOI bodies to coordinate policies—particularly defense. He said Liaquat Ali Khan's statement [of] November 16¹ was "not very helpful" and when asked whether he thought Jinnah had any intention of negotiating Kashmir issue in near future, said it was difficult to say.

Two. Yesterday's defense ministry communique states K[ashmir] and J[ammu] State Force Garrisons at Jhanjar and Noshera relieved by Indian troops; while three "most gravely threatened garrisons" now being supplied by airdrops are those in Mirpur, Kotli and Poonch.

GRADY

KR-446.

KR-450

Liaquat Ali Khan to Mohammad Zafrulla Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE

19 November 1947

No. 409-G

You will have seen the statement issued by me to Press on November 16th¹ regarding Kashmir and Junagadh. I have stated at end that we are ready to request United Nations Organisation immediately to appoint its representatives in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put a stop to fighting and to repression of Muslims in State, to arrange the programme of withdrawal of our forces, to set up an impartial administration of State until a plebiscite is held and to undertake the plebiscite under

its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free, unfettered will of people of State on question of accession. Please let me know immediately as to when and in what form the matter should be taken before the U.N.O. I am asking Ikramullah to send you copies of all relevant correspondence and of press statement. It will of course be necessary immediately to prepare the ground for the step. I shall be grateful for an immediate appreciation of position regarding the time and manner of the reference and chances of its success.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-446.

KR-451

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

19 November 1947

No. 411-G

I have received reports that your Air Force has attacked Mangla Headworks and machine-gunned the staff there twice. The Mangla Headworks are on the land which has been taken by West Punjab Government from Kashmir Government on perpetual lease. I have already drawn your attention to attacks by your Air Force on Pakistan territory. It is essential to issue strict injunctions to your Air Force to cease all attacks on Pakistan territory or property, otherwise we shall be forced to take action against the offending aircraft.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-452

L. Grafftey-Smith to Arthur Henderson

PRO, DO 142/419

[Extract]

[KARACHI,
Undated, November]

REVIEW OF EVENTS IN PAKISTAN—14 TO 20 NOVEMBER 1947

[KASHMIR] STATE

29. Reaffirming that it was his "firm and undeviating objective, as

also the objective of the Pakistan Government, to eliminate by peaceful and honourable means all existing causes of friction between the two Dominions", Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, said on November 16th¹ that his Government were "ready to request U.N.O. immediately to appoint its representatives in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put a stop to the fighting and to the repression of Muslims in the State; to arrange the programme of withdrawal of outside forces; to set up an impartial administration of the State till a plebiscite is held, and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession". The Premier maintained that the Government of Pakistan had made every effort to discuss the problems at issue with the Government of Kashmir and the Government of India. He considered that the proposals made by Mr. Jinnah to Lord Mountbatten on November 1st (referred to in paragraph 40 of the Review of Events for the period October 31st/November 6th, 1947)² were eminently reasonable, and emphasised that they were made at the risk of incurring the hostility of the frontier tribes whose feelings had been so intensely aroused by the atrocities committed on their brethren in Kashmir. Mr. Nehru had, however, evaded the main issue in a speech which he made after the receipt of these proposals by his Government and had merely harped on the slogan of a plebiscite to the exclusion of everything else. The Government of India's official reply showed that they were not prepared to accept any of the suggestions of the Government of Pakistan but were determined to drive out the raiders by force of arms and were not ready to have any discussions until this had been done. The Government of India's policy was one of "Might is Right", and if they were allowed to pursue their imperialistic land-grabbing policy there would be repercussions, not only in Asia, but throughout the whole world. Since a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations was to prevent might from prevailing over right, it was necessary that the whole dispute should be brought before the bar of international opinion.

30. There have been no major developments in the military situation, but Indian troops have been steadily consolidating their hold over the Jhelum Valley Road. In Poonch, the insurgents still hold the upper-hand.

31. The success of the Indian troops has produced in Kashmir – and probably in Delhi—a stiffening of attitude towards the plebiscite question. On November 11th, Sheikh Abdullah, Leader of the Emergency

Administration, said that the referendum could not take place before next spring and, as a result of the conduct of the raiders, the people of Kashmir might well not bother about a referendum at all. Amplifying this statement on November 15th, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Sheikh Abdullah's deputy, said that a referendum had been promised provided the raiders withdrew within seven days from October 27th, but as there were still raiders in Kashmir the Emergency Administration of the State were not necessarily committed to a referendum. The Administration were not afraid of facing a referendum but it was no longer a question of holding one just to please Pakistan. In any case it could not be held until the raiders had been expelled from the Gilgit, Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur areas, and it was more likely that when normal conditions had been restored a general election would be held on the issue of the ratification of the State's accession to India.

32. The Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, has categorically denied the statement attributed to Pandit Nehru that the raiders were directed by officers of the Pakistan Army.

¹KR-446.

²Not traceable.

KR-453

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL, IMMEDIATE

21 November 1947

No. 368-PRIMIN

Your telegram No. 404, dated November 19th¹ I have nothing to add to what I have already said regarding the so-called agreement in my telegram No. 338, dated November 13th.² I have been assured by the parties concerned that this was no agreement at all but the points noted down for discussion.

2. Immediately after accession of Kashmir State to India we were entirely occupied militarily and otherwise in Kashmir Valley and we were not in touch with Jammu situation. We came to learn later that convoys of Muslims had been brutally attacked in Jammu. We took immediate steps to prevent evacuation of Muslims from Jammu and to protect them there. Another convoy had started already but this was

guarded by our troops and when this was attacked, troops inflicted very heavy casualties on attackers killing 150 of them and wounding nearly a hundred and capturing 500 of them. Since then there has been no evacuation, no convoys and no attacks. We have issued strictest possible instructions to commanders of our forces that they should do everything possible to protect Muslims in Jammu and these orders have been carried out with success during last fortnight. We deeply regret the attacks on Muslim convoys early in November and heavy casualties suffered by them. We should like to point out however that no troops of Indian Union have been guilty of offences that you attribute to them. They have effectively protected Muslims. It appears that the attacks on Muslim convoys were made chiefly by non-Muslim refugees.

3. Sheikh Abdullah has visited Jammu recently and has taken effective steps there to afford safety and security to residents.

4. The Poonch Area according to information available to us has been overrun by raiders and garrisons of State troops are mostly isolated and besieged. It is difficult to understand therefore how local Muslim population in this area could be victimised by non-Muslims.

5. We are quite sure that the soldiers of Indian Union Forces in Kashmir have afforded protection to Muslims according to strict directions or have been engaged in fighting raiders.

6. As regards troops of States that have acceded to Indian Union some of these were sent to Kashmir State but they arrived after attacks on Muslim convoys referred to above. There has been no allegation to our knowledge that they have participated in attack on Muslims and indeed they have not been physically in a position to do so.

7. I should like to draw your attention to certain resolutions passed recently by Indian Congress Committee in Delhi, defining the policy to be pursued in regard to migration of population, refugees etc. These resolutions represent generally the policy of our Government.

8. Your statement that we are not prepared to have discussion until raiders have been driven out of Kashmir must be based on some misunderstanding. We are ready for a discussion at any time. All that I have said and would repeat is that a settlement of Kashmir issue cannot take place unless raiders are made to leave Kashmir State territory.

9. I must express my great regret at the remark you have made in your press statement about Sheikh Abdullah. I regard him as a man of high integrity and patriotism. You know well his great influence in Kashmir; all communities look up to him but more specially and

naturally the Muslims of Kashmir. He has faced a very difficult situation with remarkable courage and ability. He is now head of Kashmir administration and undoubtedly represents in a very large measure the popular will of Kashmir. It would be improper in every way for us not to consult him in any matter relating to Kashmir State.³

10. The specific suggestions regarding reference to United Nations in your press statement are:

- i. "U.N.O should immediately appoint representatives in Jammu and Kashmir in order to put a stop to fighting and to repression to Muslims in State". Since United Nations have no repeat no force at their disposal we do not see how they can put a stop to fighting or to alleged repression of Muslims. This can only be done by an organised military force and is being done by our troops. The fighting would also stop as soon as raiders were made to withdraw and I have repeatedly asked your co-operation in stopping transit and supplies to raiders through Pakistan territory.
- ii. "To set up an impartial administration of the State". It is not clear to me what U.N.O can do in the present circumstances in Kashmir till peace and order have been established. We are convinced that Sheikh Abdullah's administration is based on [the] will of people and is impartial. Unless he who goes to Kashmir and sees things for himself can appreciate this. Moreover, we have pledged that so long as our forces are in Kashmir protection of all sections of community will be their first and sacred duty. This duty will be discharged without fear or favour.
- iii. "To undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of [the] people of State on question of accession". I have repeatedly stated as soon as the raiders have been driven out of Kashmir or have withdrawn and peace and order have been established, Kashmir should decide question of accession by plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as those of United Nations.⁴ It is very clear that no such reference to the people can be made when large bodies of raiders are despoiling country and military operations against them are being carried on. By this declaration I stand.

11. I have said enough to reassure you regarding our resolve to protect the Muslim population of Kashmir and our desire to have people of Kashmir themselves decide their own future under fair and

equitable conditions. I would repeat that we are ready for a discussion at any time. But if a discussion is to lead to a settlement the raiders must be out of Kashmir State. We cannot leave the people of Kashmir unguarded and in the danger of attack. We have pledged our word to protect them.

12. In your press statement you have said that you have no control over the tribesmen engaged in fighting in Kashmir. Even so it should be possible for you to deny them access to Kashmir through your territory and also to stop supplies of commodities like petrol which *prima facie* they could not obtain from any source outside Pakistan. If you have no control over the raiders and we do not stop and drive them out then indeed we are reduced to a state of affairs when all Governments cease to function and the raiders, the looters and the killers become masters of the situation. That surely cannot be tolerated by our Government or yours.

13. I did not suggest that Pakistan Army was participating in the raiding officially. We possess, however, incontrovertible evidence that members of the Pakistan Army, whether on leave or deserters have joined the raiders and that the military equipment which can only have come from Pakistan Army has been in the possession of the raiders.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

KR-449.

²KR-445.

¹On 24 November 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan by telegram No. 419-G regretted Nehru's evasive and contradictory stance over the main issue. He felt "extremely sorry" about Nehru's continued support to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who "is a quising and a paid agent to disrupt the Muslims of Kashmir". See FOA, S-6, 2. Not printed.

¹On 12 November 1947, India's Ambassador to US, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, apprised the State Department of India's desire that plebiscite in Kashmir be held "next spring" on the basis of adult franchise under UN supervision. She mentioned a plan under which India and Pakistan would agree beforehand to take the case to the Security Council with a joint request for appointment of a UN Commission to supervise the plebiscite. See *US National Archives*, F. 745. 45/12-2447. Not printed.

KR-454

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Dwarkanath Kachru*¹

NEW DELHI,
21 November 1947,

May dear Dwarkanath,

I have received your letter of the 20th November. I have also received your previous letters.

2. I am horrified to learn in some detail from you what happened in

Jammu on the 5th and 6th of November.² I am very glad indeed that Sheikh Saheb went to Jammu and tackled the situation with courage and ability. It is a difficult situation, but I am sure that Sheikh Saheb will be able to control it. All power to his elbow.

3. I think that the best course for Sheikh Saheb is to meet the Maharaja frequently and consult him. In the present circumstances, this procedure will yield results sooner than otherwise.

4. It is also important that Sheikh Saheb and General Kulwant Singh should fully cooperate with each other. I am glad this is happening.

5. I hope adequate steps have been taken to give relief to the 3000 Muslims who, you say, were collected outside the city in the open.

6. I am writing to you briefly now as it is late and I have much else to do. We are trying our best to send civil supplies from here.

7. Twentyone Kashmiri Muslims from Simla arrived here some days ago. We are sending them back to Srinagar by air.

8. I find that there are about 600 Kashmiri Sikhs in Delhi. These were brought by air early this month. It is unfortunate that they were brought and indeed they seem to have been hustled. They have come and asked me to help them to go back to Kashmir. They are typical Kashmiri Sikhs, more Kashmiri than Sikh.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

¹5. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* (Second Series), Vol. IV, New Delhi, 1987, 329-30.
²About 5,000 Muslims from Jammu city had been kept in an evacuee camp for eventual removal to Pakistan. The first convoy to Pakistan under the protection of Kashmir State Forces had been ambushed on 5 November 1947 by Sikh and Hindu refugees. The second convoy was attacked on 6 November but the attackers were beaten back by men of the Rajput Regiment escorting it. One hundred and fifty attackers were killed and 90 wounded in these two incidents. *Ibid.*, note 2.

KR-455

Clement Attlee to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE

22 November 1947

It is difficult for me and my Government to judge whether by chance there is any way in which we could be of service in helping towards a solution of the intractable problems produced by the march of events in relation to Kashmir.

2. Although the approach of your Government and that of the India Government is different, there seems to be agreement on both sides

that a reference to the people of Kashmir is the right way in which to obtain a decision on the question of final accession to Pakistan or India, although I assume that is hardly practicable to take this step before the spring. Mr. Nehru suggested in his broadcast of 2nd November¹ a referendum under international auspices like the United Nations and you also suggested in your statement of 16th November² that the United Nations might be asked to appoint representatives to assist in the settlement of the Kashmir problem.

3. I can see great advantages, if it proved practicable for the machinery for consulting people of Kashmir to be devised and administered under the supervision of independent persons acting at the request of, and on behalf of, the two Governments jointly. After full consideration, I am inclined to think that the speediest and most satisfactory way of putting this idea into practice would be to have recourse to one special organ of the United Nations, namely the International Court of Justice.

4. Would you like me to take private soundings from the President of the International Court of Justice to find out whether he is of the opinion that it would be practicable and would be willing to try to get together a small team of international experts, not connected with India, Pakistan or the United Kingdom, in the event of a joint request being preferred by the Governments of India and Pakistan for this to be done?

5. I should be delighted to take such a step if you and the Prime Minister of India think it would be helpful. I am sending an identical message to the Prime Minister of India.

[CLEMENT ATTLEE]

¹See S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 306c-10.

²KR-446.

KR-456

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan to Liaquat Ali Khan

FOA, S-6/2

HEADQUARTERS OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF AZAD KASHMIR,
[MUZAFFARABAD,]

No. AJ&K/4/139

23 November 1947

Dear Sir,

You are probably aware of the heroic struggle which the 4 million people of Jammu and Kashmir State are carrying on these days against

the oppressive tyranny of the Maharaja's autocracy which is unfortunately being backed with the full armed might of the India Government. The freedom-loving and democratic-minded people of the world have been watching our noble struggle with admiration and we are grateful particularly to the Islamic nations for their sympathy. Almost every day, hundreds of our people are cheerfully laying down their lives in this life and death struggle for our freedom, so that our motherland may be freed from the shackles of Dogra imperialism.¹

A stage has now been reached in our freedom struggle when it has become necessary to place the full facts before the bar of international opinion and thus expose the imperialist mentality of the India Government, which, without any regard to truth and justice, is backing a tyrant Maharaja who has been disowned by the people. In my opinion this can only be done by bringing the whole Kashmir issue before the United Nations Organisation. For this purpose, we solicit the good offices of the Pakistan Government which is our next door neighbour and with which we have social, economic, religious and geographical ties.

Our freedom movement, the background of which you are well aware of, dated back to exactly one century when the late East India Company, without any regard whatsoever to the sentiments and wishes of the people, sold the vast territory of Kashmir with its population to a petty Dogra chieftain, Gulab Singh, the great grandfather of the present Maharaja. This ignoble deed is without any parallel in the history of the modern world and as long this great wrong has not been undone, it will constitute a constant challenge to the democratic professions of the authors of Atlantic Charter and members of the United Nations Organisation. This sale deed, which was euphemistically called the Treaty of Amritsar, treated lakhs of people as many heads of cattle and signed away their destinies and those of their descendants to an unscrupulous feudal overlord for a sum of Rs. 50 Lakh [*sic* for 75 lakh]. Responsible leaders of India like Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru publicly condemned this so-called Treaty of Amritsar as an ignoble sale deed by the British and in August last, a few days before the transfer of power, Mahatma Gandhi declared that with the lapse of the British Paramountcy and withdrawal of British authority from the country, the Treaty of Amritsar will become null and void and the future relations between the Maharaja and his people should be settled by friendly negotiations between the two parties. Notwithstanding these categorical declarations, it is most unfortunate that the India Government has today aligned itself on the side of the Maharaja, who in the opinion of Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, has no legal or moral justification to rule any longer, and is waging a ruthless war against

our people, tens of thousands of whom have been done to death, their homes and villages ravaged and lakhs forced to seek refuge across the border in Pakistan. This is part and parcel of the India Government's imperialist game to grab Kashmir at any cost under any pretext in order to use it as a spring-board for aggressive purposes against other nations, including Pakistan. Our people are helpless victims of this diabolical conspiracy and they are caught up between the jaws of Indian greed and Dogra tyranny.

Ever since the British sold Kashmir to the Dogra ruling family in 1846, our people have been all through trying to shake off the Dogra rule which is alien to the land and which has not even the slightest interest in the welfare of the people. Only the armed might of Dogra soldiery has been holding us down relentlessly through generations. Yet our people did not get disheartened. The present uprising is the culmination of a series of freedom movements launched by the people during the last few generations. The history of Kashmir under Dogra rule has been marked with phases of widespread mass movements followed by ruthless repression to crush our aspirations, and chill our urge for freedom. Nevertheless we stuck to our guns and somehow through sorrow and suffering kept alive the torch of our freedom movement. Only last year our people raised the "quit Kashmir" slogan and with one voice demanded that the Maharaja should quit Kashmir and let people decide their future pattern of Government. The leaders of India, particularly Pandit Nehru, supported this movement and Pandit Nehru went to the extent of courting arrest on Kashmir territory. And today this very Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, has sent his soldiers, guns and bombers to kill our people and raze our country to dust in an attempt to foist the unwanted Maharaja's rule on us. It is this shameful act which we wish to place before the bar of international public opinion.

Ever since the transfer of power and outbreak of widespread communal disturbances in India resulting in mass murder of Muslims in the East Punjab, the Maharaja and his clique hit upon a devilish idea to liquidate the Muslim population in the State with the help of fanatic Sikhs imported from outside. In pursuance of this plan large number of plain-clothed Sikh soldiers were imported into the State with the active connivance of the India Government. They were armed with deadly modern weapons and took up positions at all strategic places in the State. Supported by the Dogra soldiery and State officials, the plan was first put in operation in Poonch and later in Jammu. Over a lakh of Muslim men, women and children were killed in cold-blood and several lakhs were forced to leave their hearths and homes and seek

refuge in Pakistan. The inhuman brutalities committed on our helpless and unarmed people defies description. Goaded by unparalleled repression and mass murder, the people had no other alternative but to rise in revolt to overthrow the Maharaja's rule. At this the pent-up bitterness found an outlet and even a section of police and military, not to talk of other State servants, rebelled and joined our forces. The Dogra edifice began collapsing like a pack of cards and the establishment of a genuine people's raj was within sight. The Maharaja and his handymen alongwith their quislings fled from Kashmir leaving the State to anarchy. At this stage the India Government stepped in and rushed its troops by road and air and has taken upon itself to suppress our freedom movement and put the Maharaja back on the saddle.

Right from the beginning we have always endeavoured for an honourable settlement but it is the India Government which is shirking the issue and avoiding an impartial referendum under the aegis of a recognised international authority. While carrying on false propaganda abroad that it is prepared for a referendum in Kashmir, it has turned down a specific suggestion to this effect made by the Pakistan Government. The game of the India Government is to avoid facing a referendum for the present and in the meantime carry out its plan of exterminating the Muslim population. Thus it is committing not only a crime against humanity by killing lakhs of people for obtaining a favourable verdict in a future referendum but is also deliberately misleading the democratic opinion in the world.

We, therefore, solicit your good offices to bring the whole issue before the United Nations Organisation and thus provide us a chance to tell the whole world the true facts. Hence we request that your accredited representatives may be instructed to bring the Kashmir issue before UNO during the present session.

With sincere greetings,

I remain,

Yours faithfully,

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHAN
Head of the Provisional Govt. of Azad Kashmir

Annex to KR-456
Note by J. R. Symonds¹

PRO, DO 142/494

8 December 1947

THE REVOLT IN POONCH

To anyone who visits that part of Kashmir which is held by Sardar Ibrahim's "Azad Kashmir Government", it is clear that the forces fighting against the Maharaja and Indian Dominion cannot simply be described as tribal raiders. In Poonch, 60,000 local men are serving in the Azad Army. During a mission in which I was primarily engaged in making arrangements for the security and evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs from the area, I had unusual opportunities of questioning the Poonchis on the reasons for their revolt.

[One para omitted]

Until 1941, the Raja of Poonch exercised considerable independence, and Poonchis were free from the discriminate communal laws and taxation of Kashmir. On his death, however, a minority ensued, during which the Maharaja obtained a High Court decision that Poonch was merely an *'Ilaga* and that the Raja derived all his authority from the Maharaja and not from the Crown.

The practical result of this to the Poonchi, returning after demobilisation, was to find a tax imposed on almost every sphere of his activity and Dogra troops billeted in his village to enforce those taxes. There was a tax on every cow, buffalo, sheep, goat and chicken. Every hearth and every window in his house was taxed; there was even a tax on his wife, and finally early this year the *zaildari* tax was introduced to pay for the cost of taxation. Hindus and Sikhs were largely exempt from payment.

To this grievance, and the loss of income resulting from the end of the war, was added the uncertainty of Kashmir's future as the date of partition and transfer of power drew near. For Poonch, a close relationship with Pakistan was essential. Pakistan was the only source of food and the only prospective employer of Poonch's great export, military manpower. Agitation in favour of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan was thus widespread, culminating in large public meetings in August. The Maharaja responded by authorising his troops to arrest and imprison local leaders and disperse meetings by fire without further reference to the civil authorities. The Dogra Army used these powers drastically, and feeling on both sides was violently heightened by news of the massacres of both Hindus and Muslims in the Punjab.

The revolt started in Nila But on August 27th. A young *zamindar*, Abdul Qayyum, with 4 companions and three rifles, fled into the mountains and harassed Dogra patrols. When a price was put on his head, and arms were collected by the Dogras from all local Muslims, he achieved his first spectacular success. Strolling into the Dogra headquarters, and marshalling behind him imaginary platoons, he enquired genially if he was still to be arrested, and removed 1,100 firearms. Qayyum owed his subsequent victories not so much to the brilliance of his military operations but to the indiscriminate reprisals of the Dogras, who burnt whole villages, though only few of their inhabitants were involved with the rebels. By the end of September most of the District was in arms, and by mid November all Dogra garrisons had been slaughtered or expelled except in Poonch City.

The Azad Army is cheerful, though ill-clad and ill-armed. Probably 75% are ex-servicemen who have put on their old uniforms and reverted to their old ranks. Every day's march is preceded by prayers and discipline appears very fair for an unpaid guerrilla army. Both officers and men when asked what they were fighting for invariably replied, "to get rid of the Dogras". They go on to mention taxation and sometimes their desire to join Pakistan, but primarily they see themselves fighting for freedom from an alien rule.

The more thoughtful of the officers admit that the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen has done their cause far more harm than good. In Qayyum's sector considerable efforts are being made to keep the tribesmen out and to provide decent conditions for Hindu and Sikh non-combatants, in accordance with the teachings of *Quran*. But it is a bitter fight on both sides. Muslim feelings were particularly exacerbated by the murder of 65 political prisoners and 40 women in Bagh before the garrison abandoned the city. The prisoners were cut into quite small pieces and their remains thrown into the castle ditch. Stories on the other side from Hindu survivors from Mirpur which was captured last week by Kashmiris and tribesmen, are equally unpleasant.

[*One para omitted*]

Much progress towards a solution of the Kashmir problem could be made if the Governments of India and Pakistan could agree in principle on the mutually unsatisfactory solution of partition. If Poonch and Mirpur were conceded to Pakistan and Jammu to the Maharaja, Pakistan might be enabled to put pressure on the tribesmen to withdraw, and a subsequent plebiscite in the Valley could be held under the joint auspices of India and Pakistan. Such a solution would demand concessions and loss of prestige on both sides. Jammu had previously a Muslim majority

which has been converted into a Hindu majority in the past 6 weeks, and if it is conceded to India, Pakistan will force [sic for face] strong Muslim criticism. The India Government will face equal abuse from Hindu nationalists at the concession of territory which has even nominally been a part of the Union. But unless a solution is found very soon, hysterical forces both in India and Pakistan may prove too strong for their Governmetns to control.

¹A member of staff of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (June 1948-April 1949).

KR-457

Liaquat Ali Khan to Clement Attlee

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE

24 November 1947

No. 420-G

Repeated Foreign Karachi, Pakistan High Commission London (Retaxandum please pass), Pakistan High Commission New Delhi and Foreign New Delhi (for Prime Minister India).

Many thanks for your telegram of November 22¹ regarding Kashmir. Your suggestion of having recourse to International Court of Justice appears to be based on an inadequate appreciation of realities of situation in Kashmir. You have focused your attention solely on the last process in the solution of the Kashmir question, namely the holding of a plebiscite and have ignored the essential prerequisites for a free and unfettered exercise of the will of the people. These are: firstly, cessation of fighting and withdrawal of all outside forces Indian or tribesmen as well as of large number of armed Sikhs and Rashtriya Sewak Sangh who have entered the State since beginning of trouble. Secondly, the establishment of an impartial interim administration which would put a stop to repression of Muslims and give free and equal opportunity to all political parties in the State. Without these two essential prerequisites there is no chance of free verdict of the people of the State on the question of accession.

2. The oft repeated promise of India Government and Pandit Nehru that they are willing to have a plebiscite in Kashmir are intended to mislead the world. There is no dispute that plebiscite must be held as

early as possible to ascertain free will of people of Kashmir. This is not the question in dispute; it is axiomatic. The real issue is how this is to be done. You say the question has become intractable. It has been made purposely so by India Government. If India Government is honestly and genuinely desirous of a fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question they should immediately agree that fighting must cease and not take shelter behind the slogan that raiders must be driven out. It is not the so-called raiders but the people of Kashmir who are fighting against heavy odds to end Dogra tyranny and to prevent Kashmir from falling into the hands of India Dominion. The Azad Kashmir forces are almost wholly composed of the sons of the soil and even foreign observers have testified that wherever they have gone they have been welcomed as Forces of Liberation. We are ready to exercise all our influence on Azad Kashmir forces to stop fighting and to see that any tribesmen with them are not only stopped from fighting but are made to leave Kashmir. These tribesmen, it should be remembered, are the kith and kin of those for whom they are fighting.

3. The India Government are also trying to mislead the world by stating that people of Kashmir asked them through Sheikh Abdullah to send their troops to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has been a paid agent of Congress for the last two decades and with the exception of some gangsters whom he has purchased with Congress money, he has no following among Muslim masses. It is astonishing that Pandit Nehru who knows these facts should proclaim this quisling to be the acknowledged leader of Muslims of Kashmir.

4. The India Government's insistence upon the retention of their troops in Kashmir until they have restored law and order to their own satisfaction can only mean that Indian troops will stay in the State until they have crushed by military force all opposition to their permanent occupation of Kashmir. The methods by which maintenance of law and order is used to consolidate an alien rule are well-known. The Muslim population of the State has been feeling impact of those methods in full force. The true leaders of Muslims and politically conscious among them are with their families the special targets of this repression. In spite of protestation of India Government the number of Muslim refugees into Pakistan swells day by day and is now over 200,000 (two hundred thousand). All these refugees bring with them horrible tales of most inhuman atrocities. I repeat that what India Government is after is permanent occupation of Kashmir and they know they cannot achieve this object until they have changed composition of population by converting Muslim majority into a minority. Behind their high-sounding phrases stands this hideous reality—their elimination and

demoralisation of whole population by violent means and any proposal which fails to tackle this basic fact offers no real solution.

5. The above analysis shows that first fighting must stop and all outside forces must withdraw and secondly which is no less essential that Kashmir administration must be taken over by an impartial and independent authority immediately. Not until these conditions are fulfilled is there any hope of getting a free plebiscite which in our opinion need not wait till the spring.

6. I hope you now realise the actual position. If you would consider these basic facts you will, I hope, support our proposal that U.N.O should immediately send out a Commission to undertake the task outlined in para 5 above. This Commission should have under it an International Police Force to maintain law and order. The composition of this Force can be left to decision of U.N.O Commission. We on our part would be prepared to accept force drawn solely from Commonwealth.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

·KR-455.

KR-458

STATEMENT BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT¹

NEW DELHI, Nov. 25: "I am glad to have this opportunity of explaining to the House the course of events that have led to our intervention in Kashmir with the aid of armed forces, and the attitude of the Government of India to the grave problems that have arisen in that State.

"The House is aware that on the lapse of Crown Paramountcy on August 15, this year, Kashmir did not accede to either Dominion. We were of course vitally interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir, because of her geographical position with her frontiers marching with three countries, namely Russia, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through Kashmir State.

"Nevertheless, we did not put the slightest pressure on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion, because we realized that Kashmir was in a very difficult position. We did not want a mere accession from the

top but an association in accordance with the will of her people. Indeed, we did not encourage any rapid decision. Even in regard to a Standstill Agreement no speedy steps were taken by us, although the matter was under consideration, even though Kashmir had entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan soon after August 15.

"We learnt later that serious external pressure was being applied on Kashmir by the Pakistan authorities refusing to send to Kashmir supplies vital to the needs of the people, such as foodgrains, salt, sugar and petrol. Thus an attempt was being made to strangle Kashmir economically and thus force her to accede to Pakistan. This pressure was serious because it was not easy for Kashmir to obtain these essential supplies from India on account of the difficulty of communication.

"In September news reached us that tribesmen of the North-West Frontier Province were being collected and sent to the Kashmir border. In the beginning of October events took a grave turn. Armed bands moved into Jammu Province from the neighbouring districts of West Punjab, committed serious acts of depredation on the local inhabitants, burnt villages and towns and put a large number of people to death. Refugees from these areas poured into Jammu.

RETALIATORY MEASURES

"On the Jammu side of the border the local inhabitants, chiefly Hindu and Rajput in that area, took retaliatory measures and drove out the Muslims living in those border villages. In these border conflicts a very large number of villages were destroyed or burnt by both parties on either side of the frontier.

"The raiders from West Punjab into Jammu Province were increased in numbers and spread out over that province. The Kashmir State Army, which had to meet these raids at numerous points, soon found itself broken into small fragments and gradually ceased to be a fighting force. The raiders were highly organized, had competent officers and modern arms. They succeeded in occupying a considerable part of Jammu Province, more especially in the Poonch area. Poonch town, Mirpur, Kotli and some other places held out.

"About this time the State authorities asked us to supply them with arms and ammunition. We agreed to do so in the normal course. But in fact no supply was made till events took a more serious turn. Even at this stage no mention was made of accession to India.

"The leader of the popular organization in Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference, was released from prison during this period and we discussed the situation in Kashmir with him, as well as with representatives of the Maharaja of

Kashmir. We made it clear to both of them that while we would welcome the accession of Kashmir, we did not want² any hurried or forced accession and we would rather wait for the people to decide. Sheikh Abdullah was himself of this opinion.

LARGE ARMED BANDS

“On October 24 we heard that large armed bands, consisting both of tribesmen from the Frontier and ex-servicemen, had broken through Muzaffarabad and were marching to Srinagar. These raiders had crossed Pakistan territory and they were equipped with b[r]en-guns, machine-guns, mortars and flame-throwers and had at their disposal a large number of transport vehicles. They moved rapidly down the valley, sacking and burning and looting all along the way.

“We gave earnest consideration to this situation in our Defence Committee on October 25 and 26. The position on the 26th morning was that the raiders were marching towards Srinagar and there was no military detachment capable of stopping them. They had been stopped for two days near Uri by the State forces under a gallant commander who resisted this advance to the point of death. These two days thus gained were very valuable.

“We were asked at this stage, both on behalf of the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah, to accept the accession of the State to the Indian Union and to intervene with the armed forces of the Union. An immediate decision was necessary, and, in fact, it is now clear that if we had delayed the decision even by 24 hours, Srinagar would have fallen and suffered the tragic fate that befell Muzaffarabad, Baramula and other places.

RUIN OF KASHMIR

“It was clear to us that we could not possibly accept in any circumstances this ruin of Kashmir by brutal and irresponsible raiders. This would have been a surrender to frightfulness and fanaticism of the worst type and it would have had the most serious consequences all over India.

“To intervene at that stage was no easy matter and was full of risk and danger. Yet we decided to face this risk and intervene, because any other course would have meant ruin to Kashmir and danger to India.

“In accepting the accession, however, we made it perfectly clear to the Maharaja that his Government must be carried on in future according to the popular will and that Sheikh Abdullah should be charged with the formation of an interim government on the new model adopted in Mysore. Sheikh Abdullah, in our opinion, had undoubtedly the

support of the large majority of the people of Kashmir, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Further, we made it clear that as soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by reference to the people.

AIR TRANSPORT

"I shall not detain the House by dealing with the course of the military campaign that followed. The facts are well-known and redound to the credit of our military organization, our troops and our airmen. It must be remembered also that our operations have been very largely based on air transport in difficult circumstances. Our civil airline and their air-crews functioned with remarkable success.

"One fact, however, which contributed to our success, at least as much as the military operations, was the maintenance, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, of the civil administration and the morale of the civil population. The civil population, completely unarmed, with the enemy within a few miles of the city, behaved in a manner which showed extraordinary courage and coolness. They did so because they had a great leader and because Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs all joined together under him to throw back the enemy and to save Kashmir, their common heritage. This fact is one of the most remarkable event of recent times in India and one from which the rest of the country may take a profitable lesson. It was certainly a factor of the most vital importance in the saving of Srinagar.

"The present position is that our troops have relieved Poonch and are within eight miles of Kotli. The terrain in which they are functioning is difficult and mountainous and the roads and approaches have been destroyed by the raiders. Progress is therefore slow. In the Poonch area, occupied by the raiders, several massacres of non-Muslims have taken place, involving large numbers of persons.

"I should like to say here that certain events happened near Jammu early in November which I regret very deeply. Muslim convoys of evacuees were being taken away from Jammu when they were attacked by non-Muslim refugees and others and a large number of casualties were inflicted. The troops escorting them did not play a creditable role. I might add that none of our troops were present or had anything to do with this.

ORDERS TO TROOPS

"We have issued the most stringent orders to our troops to protect the people, to function with impartiality and indeed to make friends with the local population. I am glad to say that they have carried out

these instructions.

"The House is aware that the Pakistan Government has protested emphatically against our action in Kashmir. In doing so they have used language which is not becoming of any Government and have alleged fraud and conspiracy on our part.

"I need only say that I am completely convinced that every action that the Government of India have taken in regard to Kashmir has been straight and above board and I can defend it at any time before the world. We have indeed been over-scrupulous in this matter, so that nothing may be done in the passion of the moment which might be wrong. The behaviour of our Army has all along been good and worthy of our traditions.

GENESIS OF TROUBLE

"I cannot say this of the Pakistan Government. Their case is that the genesis of the trouble was extensive killing of Muslims in East Punjab and Kashmir and that the raid on Kashmir was a spontaneous reaction to this on the part of the tribesmen. I think this is completely untrue.

"I regret deeply that in parts of Jammu Province Muslims were killed and driven out. This, of course, has had nothing to do with our Government or our forces. But this mutual killing has been a very tragic feature during these past months in the Punjab, and Jammu was powerfully affected by this.

"We have sufficient evidence in our possession to demonstrate that the whole business of the Kashmir raids both in Jammu Province and in Kashmir proper was deliberately organized by high officials of the Pakistan Government. They helped the tribesmen and ex-servicemen to collect; they supplied them with implements of war, with lorries, with petrol and with officers. They are continuing to do so. Indeed, their high officials openly declare so.

"It is obvious that no large body of men could cross Pakistan territory in armed groups without the goodwill, connivance and active help of the authorities there. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the raids on Kashmir were carefully planned and well organized by the Pakistan authorities with the deliberate object of seizing the State by force and then declaring accession to Pakistan.

ACT OF HOSTILITY

"This was an act of hostility not only to Kashmir but to the Indian Union. It is only necessary to see the semi-official organs of the Muslim League and the Pakistan Government to find out the attitude of that Government. If we had allowed this scheme to succeed, we would have been guilty of betrayal of the people of Kashmir and a grave

dereliction of duty to India. The results of these on the communal and political situation all over India would have been disastrous.

"The Pakistan Government have proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of our forces and the raiders from Kashmir. This was a strange proposal and could only mean that the raiders were there at the instance of the Pakistan Government. We cannot treat with free booters who have murdered large number of people and tried to ruin Kashmir. They are not a State although a State may be behind them.

"We have gone to Kashmir to protect the people and as soon as this duty is discharged our forces need not remain there and we shall withdraw our forces. We cannot desert the people of Kashmir till danger is passed.

"If the Pakistan Government is sincere, they can stop the entry of these raiders and thus accelerate the return of peace and order. After that let the people of Kashmir decide and we shall accept their decision. But if this armed conflict continues, no opportunity is given for the people to decide by peaceful means and the decision gradually takes shape by the sacrifice and power of the people in this conflict.

IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

"In order to establish our bona fides, we have suggested that when the people are given the chance to decide their future, this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as UNO.

"The issue in Kashmir is whether violence and naked force should decide the future or the will of the people. The raiders, encouraged by Pakistan, have sought to enforce by the sword accession to Pakistan against the obvious wishes of large number of the people in Kashmir. We cannot permit a success of this method to achieve political ends. It is a tragedy that Pakistan should ally itself to such methods instead of devoting herself to the urgent tasks of economic and social reconstruction.

"Kashmir has gone through fire and I am sure that the House would like me to communicate their sympathy to the people of Kashmir for the tribulations they have been going through in recent weeks. This fair land, which nature has made so lovely, has been desecrated by people who have indulged in murder, arson, loot and foul attacks on women and children.

"The people have suffered greatly from shortage of the most vital necessities of life and yet, under the inspiring lead of Sheikh Abdullah, they have stood together in the hour of calamity and showed to the rest of India an example of what communal unity can achieve. Whatever the future may hold, this chapter in the history of Kashmir will be worth reading and we shall never regret that in their hour of distress

we have been able to be of assistance to this gallant people.

"Kashmir and India have been bound together in many ways from ages past. These last few weeks have formed a new link which none can sunder."

¹The *Statesman*, 26 November 1947.

²See KR-369, para 11.

KR-459

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

26 November 1947

No. 424-G

Under Standstill Agreement the Posts and Telegraphs arrangements in Jammu and Kashmir State are made by Pakistan Posts and Telegraph Department. Report has been received that whole postal staff of Jammu Cantonment and some other staff with their families have been massacred. You will agree this is most deplorable. It is essential that your Government should take adequate measures for protection of our staff working in such areas in State as are under your control. I shall be glad to know the arrangements made.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-460

Muhammad Zafrulla Khan to M. Ikramullah

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

SECRET

27 November 1947

No. C-27

Your telegram dated 22nd.¹ Have also seen your secret telegram 902² and 904.³ Presume documents in mail bag refer to Kashmir. Assembly session closing this week, excludes possibility of immediate action there. Have informally consulted Secretary General⁴ and his Legal Advisors, also contacted Leader of British Delegation. Various alternatives indicated require careful consideration at Karachi before action is taken. Propose therefore leaving New York 29th; Stopping Damascus to see

President Syria being only Muslim member of Security Council.
[MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN]

¹This telegram mentioned the dispatch of important papers by mail, advising too that Zafrulla stay on for some more time after 29 November. FOA, S-6/2. Not printed.

²KR-448

³Not traceable.

⁴Trygve Lie.

KR-461

Report by W. P. Cranston

PRO, DO 133/65

[Extract]

27 November 1947

[SITUATION IN KASHMIR AND MOVEMENT OF BRITISH RESIDENTS
IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1947]

This report is being made in continuation of my earlier report of the 18th October 1947.¹ I regret the delay in its preparation, which is due chiefly to my admittance to hospital.

After completing my report to the U.K High Commissioner in Pakistan at Karachi on the 18th October, I flew to Rawalpindi on the 19th October. Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of the West Punjab, and Mr. C. B. Duke, the Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore, had gone there that morning in connection with transport arrangements. We held a conference on Monday morning, the 20th October, together with the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi and Mr. R. Powell, late Inspector General of Police, Kashmir State, who had just retired and who undertook to make all the arrangements for despatch of transport from Rawalpindi and the reception of British people arriving there. It was arranged that sufficient lorries of the Punjab Transport Service would be sent from Rawalpindi to Srinagar whenever required to bring out those British residents who wished to leave in groups. Road security between Kohala on the Kashmir border and Rawalpindi was also to be provided by the Rawalpindi civil authorities. Arrangements for accommodation of the British people was to be made in Rawalpindi by Mr. Powell in conjunction with the Military authorities. I went from Rawalpindi to Srinagar on Tuesday the 21st October by the ordinary road passenger bus. There was no sign of hostility on the road but near Domel there were many groups of middle-aged Sikhs,

many of them carrying rifles of various kinds. It was said that these Sikhs had been called in from the villages by the Kashmir Government and were being armed by them and enrolled in the Kashmir Army and Police. They certainly had a most provocative effect on the people in that area, especially since orders had been issued at that time that Muslims were not allowed to carry arms of any description, not even small knives. I think the bus on which I travelled was the last one to go through from Rawalpindi to Srinagar before the tribesmen who invaded Kashmir cut that road at Domel which they did do on that night, the 21/22 October.

In Srinagar, on the 22nd October I informed the British people of the transport arrangements that had been made and started registering those who wished to leave. During the day reports were received that tribesmen were sniping the road at Domel. That evening three lorries which had attempted to go down to Rawalpindi were forced to return to Srinagar. On Thursday, the 23rd October, I saw Mr. R. L. Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, and also Sheikh Abdullah and they both said that the road was under fire and also that orders had been issued forbidding civil transport to use this road for some days until the situation became clearer.

As our plans for road transport were now upset, I flew to Delhi by civil airline on Friday, the 24th October. There I arranged with the Deputy High Commissioner to go to Lahore and to try and arrange with the Governor of the West Punjab for transport to be sent to Srinagar via Sialkot, Jammu and the Banihal Pass. I then flew to Lahore on Saturday the 25th October and held discussions with Sir Francis Mudie and Mr. Duke, as well as telephone conversations with the High Commissioners in Karachi and Delhi and Military authorities in Rawalpindi. In consequence of information received we decided that it was too risky to attempt to use the Banihal/Jammu road and that air evacuation was the only safe course left. I therefore returned to Delhi by air on Sunday, the 26th October. In the absence of the High Commissioner at Delhi, Sir Terence Shone, the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr. Symon, was authorised by the High Commissioner in Pakistan, Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith, to arrange for the evacuation of all British civilians who wished to leave Kashmir to be carried out by the Royal Air Force. I had meetings with Mr. Symon, Air Marshal Walmsley, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Supreme Headquarters, and Mr. V.P. Menon, the Secretary of the States Ministry, and others, and the movement for evacuation by air by the RAF from Rawalpindi was arranged subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander, Sir Claude Auchinleck, which was obtained the following morning. I returned to

Srinagar on Monday morning, the 27th October, in a special plane which carried Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan, Prime Minister of Kashmir, Mr. R. L. Batra, Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. V.P. Menon, Secretary, States Ministry, Government of India, and Sheikh Abdullah, who was later to become head of the new Kashmir Government. I received full verbal and written promise of support and help from them to carry out the general movement from Srinagar. Tuesday, the 28th was spent in preparing the British people for the airlift. On account of the non-arrival of a large quantity of petrol which I had arranged should be flown up from Rawalpindi on Tuesday, I was not able to arrange the extra transport required to carry all the people and their luggage to the Aerodrome, 8 miles outside Srinagar. Owing to the Pakistan Government boycott, practically no petrol or motor transport was obtainable from the State authorities and we had to rely entirely on our own arrangements and our own vehicles for all the work that was done. In practice, the whole air move of the two main airlifts was carried out by means of the two lorries of Nedous Hotel and a few private cars. The shortage of transport and difficulties of movement considerably handicapped us in all our preparations and prevented us from taking full advantage of the aircraft available on the days they came to Srinagar. Orders for the main airlift by the R.A.F., which was to take place on Wednesday the 29th October, were received on the night of Tuesday, the 28th. Warning notices were sent out immediately and the main evacuation by air took place on Wednesday, the 29th. About 128 British people were flown to Rawalpindi that day, together with their luggage on the scale of 200 lbs per adult and 100 lbs per child. In the afternoon I realised that due to the difficulty of movement and shortage of transport, we would not be able to move all the people and luggage which we had intended to on that day. As the RAF had received orders to help on that day only and not subsequently, I therefore flew to Rawalpindi that afternoon in one of the last planes, to arrange for the airlift to be continued on the following day. In Rawalpindi, I saw General Gracey, the Acting C-in-C, Pakistan Army (in the absence of General Messervy in England) and various other Military and R.A.F. authorities concerned. They were most helpful and it was arranged that the R.A.F. should go the next day also. I returned to Srinagar on the 30th October and also brought seven hundred gallons of petrol, 44 gallons of mobile oil and 10 car batteries which, in addition to 100 gallons of petrol received the previous day, was to provide sufficient petrol for British residents in Kashmir to remain mobile throughout the winter and also to enable those who had private cars and who

wished to drive those cars away to obtain sufficient petrol to do so.

[Remaining paras omitted]

W. P. CRANSTON

¹Annex.

Annex to KR-461
Report by W. P. Cranston

PRO, DO 133/65

18 October 1947

Whilst in Srinagar from the 10th to the 14th October, 1947, I took every opportunity of trying to find out what was the general political situation there. I naturally could not approach the authorities on this matter and just had to obtain my information from conversation with all types of people and in a manner that did not give any impression that I was trying to obtain unauthorised information. My general impression was that the situation at that time was perfectly quiet and calm in Kashmir apart from Poonch State. The future, however, is very uncertain and depends entirely on when the Maharaja makes his announcement as to whether Kashmir should remain independent or accede to either of the two Dominions. So far His Highness had given no indication whatsoever of his intentions but the general impression was that he would make an announcement either when he went to Jammu early in November or if and when he should go to Bombay a little later, and it was thought probable that he would then declare the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. This would cause an immediate reaction throughout the State by the Muslim population which numbers about 80 to 90% and which is strongly opposed to any union with the Indian Government. If this happened it is also most probable that the tribes on the north and north-western borders of Kashmir would invade the State. I was informed that at that time 20,000 Hazara tribesmen, 15,000 from Chitral and 10,000 from Hunza States were ready to invade Kashmir as soon as they considered the Maharaja was declaring for accession to India. The Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawab of Dir have formally warned the Maharaja that if he accedes to the Indian Union they will invade his State. Sheikh Abdullah, the Muslim nationalist leader, is said to have favoured Kashmir remaining as an independent State. He is, however, believed to have made an agreement with the Maharaja that if the Maharaja should accede to the Indian Union he would support him. In such an event, however, it is extremely

doubtful whether Sheikh Abdullah's Muslim followers would continue to support him. It is possible that if the Maharaja should announce his intention of acceding to the Indian Union whilst he is in Jammu, the State of Jammu which contains many Dogras would support him and join the Indian Union, but the remainder of Kashmir State would break away and join Pakistan. Another theory is that Jammu should join the Indian Union and the rest of Kashmir and Poonch should join Pakistan, and at the same time the Maharaja would retain the sovereignty over both sections of his State. The military authorities, however, do not think such a proposal feasible. There is at present considerable disturbance in Poonch State. After the demonstration and consequent agitation of the 26th August, concerning which a separate report is already in the office, the Maharaja withdrew many troops from Poonch State and declared that he would refrain from further action against the people there and that there would be no victimisation. However, one brigade of troops was left in Poonch State and distributed in small units throughout the State and this force has continued to oppress and victimise the villagers. Several trustworthy persons have told me that they have seen villages in Poonch State burning. I also saw many refugees from Poonch State on the main Srinagar-Kohala road fleeing from the State and also making small rafts on which to cross the river which divides Poonch from the main Srinagar road. When I left, there were reports that the remaining Dogra troops who had met fierce resistance from the villagers and who had suffered casualties were being withdrawn. There is no reliable confirmation of this and some military authorities consider it is possible that troops are not being withdrawn out of the State but merely being concentrated in two or three centres so as to form a stronger force to take more decisive action when this should prove necessary. Many highly exaggerated stories are circulating that the villagers have inflicted extremely high casualties on the Dogra troops, even amounting to the destruction of one battalion. These figures can, however, be discounted. A new development, which I noticed as I left Kashmir on the 14th October, was that large number of Sikhs were leaving the Muslim villages in southern and western Kashmir and proceeding on foot to Srinagar where they would receive some protection from the Hindu Government and later might be able to make their way down to India if necessary, via the Jammu road. These Sikhs had not actually been attacked but had left their isolated villages from fear of retaliation by Muslims. Political feeling in the State and some slight tension is increasing on account of the ban on exports imposed by the Pakistan Government. The State relied almost entirely on imports of sugar, salt, tea, foodgrains, cotton cloth, kerosene oil and petrol and the total stoppage of these imports is

causing much hardship to the people there and will become increasingly felt as the winter approaches. I learned in Rawalpindi that the complete stoppage of these imports was largely the work of Mr. Haque, the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, who in conjunction with his cousin, Mr. Ikramul Haque of the Defence Department, is trying to obtain considerable influence and power in that part of the Punjab and to monopolise as far as possible the control and movement of the petrol, transport and other necessary articles. No direct authority appears to have been given to Mr. Haque for this action, and the Commissioner of Rawalpindi Division personally admitted to Wing Commander Milroy Hayes, Defence Secretary of the Pakistan Government, that the matter was not in his hands at all but being controlled entirely by his Deputy Commissioner. Sir Francis Mudie, the Governor of the West Punjab, intends to enquire into this matter during his visit to Rawalpindi between the 19th and 21st October.

During my interview with General Gracey, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi on the 15th October, [he] stated that if an emergency should occur in the State and the State Government provided military escorts on the road between Srinagar and Kohala, these escorts should be composed of Muslim troops and not Hindu troops, since in the latter event the troops themselves would form a cause of provocation to Muslim tribesmen and would invite attacks to be made on themselves, which would probably not occur if the escorting troops were Muslims. An important point which he also asked me, particularly to bring to the notice of the High Commissioner in Karachi, was that the Pakistan Army authorities and the Central Pakistan Government or [sic] intended requesting the British Government that they be all [sic] to hire a complete Royal Air Force Transport Squadron from Britain for use with the Pakistan Air Force until such time as the Pakistan Air Force itself was sufficiently strong to undertake all its transport requirements. General Gracey considered that the addition of such a squadron which could be depended upon in all circumstances would greatly facilitate the general work of transportation in Pakistan not only for military purposes but at times especially during emergencies when the military had to assist in the movement and transportation of civilians. He suggested that if the High Commissioner also strongly recommends this proposal to His Majesty's Government it would greatly increase the chances of the proposal being approved. I mentioned this matter to Sir Francis Mudie, who also considered it would be of a great value and hoped that the High Commissioner would give it every support.

KR-462

*S. Abdul Majid to M. A. Jinnah**F. 118-2 (Vol. II)-GG/22*

53 DALHOUSIE ROAD,
RAWALPINDI,
29 November 1947

Your Excellency,

It is rather too much to suggest caution to Your Excellency, who carved out Pakistan by the grace of God Almighty, but I take the liberty to say that the changed tone of Mr. Nehru in connection with Kashmir is certainly the beginning of another plot. Repeated stress that Pakistan should compel the Liberation Forces to withdraw is another fraud. It is meant to paralyze the Azad Kashmir Forces' will to win freedom which is *Insha Allah* near at hand and to get time for a final assault, to annihilate the Kashmiri Muslims. The silence of Patel has astonished the world and must be attributed to some plot. We were deceived by juggling with words and the eloquence of *Ahimsa* creed in August last and have suffered tremendously. I am sure Your Excellency will place no reliance on what a Hindu says and will turn the Indian aggressors out of Kashmir first before the Azad troops are asked to stop firing.

Yours most obediently,
S. ABDUL MAJID

KR-463

*Note by M. A. Jinnah**F. 42/14*

[LAHORE,]
30 November 1947

KASHMIR

No commitments should be made without my approval of terms of settlement. Mr. Liaquat [Ali Khan] has agreed and promised to abide by this understanding.

[M. A. JINNAH]



M. A. Jinnah with Liaquat Ali Khan



M. A. Jinnah with Liaquat Ali Khan, Mohamed Ismail Khan, and Abdoolah Haroon

KR-464

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan**FOA, S-6/2*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

No. Primin-406

NEW DELHI,

1 December 1947

I have received disturbing reports from more than one reliable source of presence of large numbers of tribesmen from frontier in districts Gujrat, Jhelum and Sialkot particularly in Gujrat. The number in Gujrat district alone has been estimated at over ten thousand. My information is that these tribesmen have been gathered for the purpose of making an attack on Jammu. Incidents have, in the meantime, taken place in which parties of these tribesmen have roughly handled Indian Officers employed on convoying non-Muslim refugees and this has happened in spite of intervention of local officials. In one case in Gujrat tribesmen forcibly seized some of our trucks. I am drawing your attention to serious state of affairs and hope you will take action before situation gets completely out of hand. So far gathering of tribesmen for the purpose of making attack on Jammu is concerned I have repeatedly made my views known to you.

I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have been brought to Gujrat from Bhimbar area and they are being sold like cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an officer on staff of Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to Gujrat district and I hope you will ask West Punjab Government to give him all facilities.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

KR-465

*Deputy High Commissioner in India to Prime Minister**FOA, S-6/2*

SECRET

JULLUNDER,

2 December 1947

I find Kashmir troubles have further disturbed feeling against our Dominion among non-Musalmans in East Punjab. They neither face realities of situation nor stand up to reasoning and are bent upon

laying whole blame on us. During my tours of Hoshiarpur district I found that Kashmir Government sent one Col. Parkash Chand ex-Indian National Army to contact influential people to help in raising a Dogra Battalion for Kashmir State but so far he has not had much success.

[DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER]

KR-466

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE
No. 429-G

LAHORE,
5 December 1947

In my telegram No. 411-G dated November 19th 1947¹ I brought to your notice instances of attack of Pakistan territory by the Indian Air Force. In spite of that such attacks have continued. I give below some specific instances:

On November 20th an Indian plane again machine-gunned Mangla (Jhelum district) between ten and eleven hours. It opened blast six times and bullets fell in the area within one thousand feet of the canal regulator. On November 25th 1947 RI aircraft machine-gunned the additional policemen who were on duty at village Hanj in Pakistan territory, one of the policemen died of wounds. On the same day two aircrafts flew repeatedly over villages in Pakistan territory in Gujrat district and one aircraft threw a heavy bomb on village Dhan in Gujrat district; the bomb missed its target and fell five hundred yards west of the village in Jammu State territory killing three men and a buffalo. At 5-30 p.m. the same day an aeroplane flying over village Asabala in Pakistan (Gujrat district) machine-gunned a caterpillar used for road construction but fortunately no [one] was hit because the labourers hid themselves under the trees. On November 30th at about 9 a.m. an Indian aircraft threw a bomb in area of village Malki, Gujrat district. The bomb did not explode and it [is] still intact. On December 1st an Indian aircraft flew on Pakistan territory at noon and fired some burs[ts] and machine-gunned three villages. On December 2nd aircraft No. T-6560 flew very low over village Bajra Ga[r]hi (district Sialkot).

We have been reluctant to take any military action against such aircrafts so far for the sake of inter-Dominion relations but matters have not improved and I am bringing these instances to your notice

again with hope that you will see that the thing does not recur.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

¹KR-451.

KR-467

Minutes of Inter-Dominion Conference on Kashmir¹

LAHORE,

8 December 1947

H[is] E[xcellency] opened the discussion by emphasizing that the whole future welfare of India depended on an agreement over Kashmir being reached between the two Dominions. The effect that such an agreement would have on world opinion would also be very great. Unfortunately since the last meeting between the two Prime Ministers on the subject at Delhi some ten days previously, events had occurred which had produced a setback in the outlook of both sides to the problem. He invited both Prime Ministers to give their opinion as to how matters now stood.

Pandit Nehru started by pointing out that, whatever might happen in the future, as the result of a plebiscite, Kashmir was at the present time part of the territory of India. Invaders had come into Kashmir through Pakistan territory. In his view, they had undoubtedly been assisted by persons in authority in Pakistan. There had been no attempt at an open disavowal by the Pakistan Government of this. Regular soldiers of the Pakistan army, and equipment supplied by that army, had been captured in Kashmir. There were concentrations of regular and irregular forces in Pakistan territory, close to the borders of Kashmir. This all really amounted to nothing less than an act of war—and as such it had been treated by newspapers in Pakistan, which talked of the Indian troops as “the enemy”. The present position was an impossible one; it must move either one way or the other.

Pandit Nehru said that he freely admitted that there had been atrocities on both sides. But during the last month there had been very few, if any, on the India side. In fact it was a physical impossibility that there could have been more than a very small number. On the side of the raiders, however, there had been, and continued to be, large-scale looting, destruction, massacre and abduction of women. It was the duty of India to fight the invasion until Kashmir was free of invaders. The first step, before there was talk of a plebiscite or anything else,

must be the withdrawal of the raiders.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he did not accept the view that the recent atrocities had been one-sided. Many thousands of Muslims had been killed in Jammu—some, while being evacuated from there. Many incidents had occurred since Kashmir had acceded to India. In particular, some women of good families had been abducted, taken back to Jammu, and there kept naked and raped.

Pandit Nehru said that the last attack on Muslims being evacuated from Jammu had taken place on November 5 over a month previously. This had happened before Indian forces had arrived in Jammu and restored the situation. Apart from this one incident, very few Muslims had been killed since the accession. Calculation made by subtracting the number of refugees who had arrived in Pakistan from the census population of Muslims did not hold water. There will still be a large number of Muslims in Jammu, including some in the local Home Guard. Every effort was being made, and would continue to be made, to recover abducted women. Any specific incidents on which information was provided would be energetically investigated.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that it was very difficult for the Government of Pakistan to provide such detailed information.

At H. E's suggestion, both Prime Ministers agreed that two teams, each consisting of a high-class representative of each Dominion, should be formed to tour both sides investigating the truth of the various reports that were received of atrocities and other incidents.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then drew a parallel between events in Junagadh and those in Kashmir. He reminded Pandit Nehru of how India had recognized the "sanctity" of Junagadh territory. The "Provisional Government" of Junagadh had been set up in Indian territory: It had been provided with arms by India; and then invaded and captured territory belonging to Junagadh. The Head of the "Provisional Government" had made public statement saying that its success was due to the assistance which had been provided by the Deputy Prime Minister of India.

Pandit Nehru, while openly admitting that India had been in some ways in the wrong about Junagadh, claimed that the parallel with Kashmir was not tenable because of the vast difference in scale between the two.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that many of the raiders who had come into Kashmir were armed with modern weapons, including some which had been issued by Pakistan ordnance depots. He could produce proof that the N.W.F.P. Government had helped to arm the raiders and given them every other sort of assistance.

His Excellency stated that General Messervy had categorically assured him that the Pakistan army had not issued arms to the raiders—on the contrary, orders had been given that this was not to be done. General Messervy had also told him that there might be a few Pakistan soldiers on leave taking part in the Kashmir fighting.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that there were 300,000 armed people on the frontier. This fact had been put on record by the ex-Supreme Commander. They had arms factories of their own, which produced first-class weapons. Some Pakistan army rifles might have been taken by soldiers on leave. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that the raiders also obtained arms from Afghanistan and Russia.

Pandit Nehru said that he considered that Pakistan territory was being used as a major base for operations against Kashmir. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad replied that many of the stories which were being circulated, and which might have led to this belief, were not true. But the feeling of the people of Pakistan with regard to Kashmir was very strong. They realized its strategic and economic importance to Pakistan. They felt that India's action in Kashmir was planned to encircle and strangle Pakistan. Pandit Nehru said that this feeling was not, in his opinion, spontaneous. It had been whipped up by the whole administration, and in particular by the Premier of the N.W.F.P.

Pandit Nehru also claimed that Pakistan must be supplying petrol for the raider's vehicles. This Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan denied. He said that the vehicles had been given to the tribes before partition by the British, and drew their petrol allowance in the normal way.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar said that he took it that the Pakistan Government was now ready to admit that raiders had passed through Pakistan territory. Did Pakistan recognize it as its duty, as a country having an international existence, to stop these raiders? or did Pakistan disown all responsibility?

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan replied that he could not stop them. Any effort to do so would mean going to war with the tribes,² which he was not prepared to do. As it was, the Government of Pakistan was under continual attack by the people for the attitude they had taken in regard to Kashmir. However, the Government of Pakistan had not recognized the accession of Kashmir to India. The murders of the Muslims in Kashmir had been the cause of the tribesmen attacking. These had been started with incursions of Akali Sikhs and R.S.S. bands....

Pandit Nehru then gave a description of past history in [sic] Pakistan from his point of view. According to this, the Kashmir troubles had started with incursions from Pakistan.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad then turned the conversation to the feelings

of the people of Kashmir itself—particularly the feelings of the Poonchis, who had rebelled against the Maharaja's Government. He appealed to Pandit Nehru, as an ex-rebel, to appreciate the point of view of these rebels.

The meeting next considered the basic policy of either Government with regard to Kashmir. The representatives of each Government were agreed that the ultimate aim must be to hold a fair plebiscite, whereby the will of people could be ascertained as to which Dominion the State should accede to. There was, however, a fundamental difference as to what should be the first step forward towards achieving this object. The Indian representatives claimed that it must be a declaration by the Pakistan Government that it would do its utmost to influence the raiders at present in Kashmir to withdraw, and to stop any further raiders going in. The Pakistan representatives claimed that an essential prerequisite to this action was a declaration by India that Indian troops would be withdrawn and that there would be an impartial administration in the period preceding the plebiscite.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that, once this assurance had been given, Pakistan would use the utmost force to ensure the withdrawal of the invaders.

Pandit Nehru said that it was out of the question that Indian troops should be altogether withdrawn. The Indian troops were disciplined, they would obey order; Pakistan could not control the irregulars. If all the Indian troops were withdrawn, Kashmir would be at the mercy of the armed men of Poonch. If they remained, he guaranteed that the Poonchis themselves would be free of harassment—nothing was further from his mind than to send punitive parties against them.

His Excellency pointed out that the only Indian troops at present in the Poonch area were those engaged in protecting 45,000 non-Muslims in the city of Poonch itself.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that the only practicable way of getting the raiders out was to have a change of administration. If this was done, Pakistan would do all in their power to withdraw the raiders.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he had discussed the draft agreement with the Azad Kashmir Government, who had said that they could not accept it in view of what had happened under the present administration. In the Kashmir Valley, no Muslim could be a member of the Muslim Conference without being arrested or at the least victimized.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that, if these Muslim Conference members were aiding and abetting the raiders, as they were known to be, the only way of dealing with them was to lock them up. It was out of the question that the administration should be changed.

H.E. pointed out that there was provision in the draft agreement for

all political prisoners to be released prior to the plebiscite. He also stressed the point that, if a U.N.O delegation was in Kashmir preparing for the plebiscite, it would be approachable by all parties, who would be able to lay before it their various complaints.

Pandit Nehru then took the line that the Government of India had already gone far further than they need have done. They had gone out of their way to offer a plebiscite. There was no necessity for them to have done this. Now they were told that they must change the administration.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar backed this up by saying that he wondered whether it was realized how unpopular the Government of India had become, both in Kashmir and India, on account of their pledge that there would be a free and impartial plebiscite. How could they now order the administration to be changed? There was no precedent for such a suggestion.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan brought up the change of Governors in the N.W.F.P. as an example of how an administration could be changed before a plebiscite. H.E. explained the full circumstances which had led to Sir Rob Lockhart taking over from Sir Olaf Caroe.³

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad again said that the essential prerequisite was an immediate promise of an impartial plebiscite—either a coalition, or someone from neither main political party.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that the plebiscite would take some time to prepare—especially if, as both sides agreed, it was to be conducted on adult franchise. During the intervening period of six months, or whatever it might be, there must be an administration of some sort. The present administration had done three great things—it had stopped the fighting in the area which it controlled, it had knit the people together on non-communal lines and it was the first fully responsible government which had ever been set up in Kashmir overthrowing the Maharaja's autocratic rule—(which, incidentally, had been supported at one stage by the Muslim Conference). It would be fatal to upset it. He could see that circumstances might arise in which a coalition would be possible. But that question did not arise at the present time. The right conditions, must first be brought about. Anyway, it was not for the Government of India, but for the people of the State themselves, to decide upon the form of government.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar gave his view that, if a coalition was put in at the present time, there would be grave risks of communal trouble in both Kashmir and Jammu. The great merit of the present administration was that it had brought communities together.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that he was sure that a coalition would not result in communal trouble. He also said that a "fully

responsible government" presupposed an election or plebiscite. It could not come before.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then gave his view that the people of Kashmir were bound to vote, in the plebiscite, in favour of whatever administration was then in power. The Kashmiris were an illiterate and oppressed people, and they would be bound to favour the authority in possession. If an Englishman went as administrator, they would vote to join the United Kingdom!

His Excellency suggested that the call of Islam would surely have a much greater influence upon the people of Kashmir. Religion was a factor of great importance among the illiterate. Also, the difficulties facing the present administration were so great that he would be amazed if it retained its hold on the people.

His Excellency then suggested that the two Governments, might at least make a joint statement agreeing that all possible steps should be taken to stop the massacres in Kashmir and restore abducted women.

This suggestion met with no response from either side.

His Excellency suggested that the Government of India should put out a unilateral statement, on the lines of the draft agreement. The policy of India at least would then be clear to the world, and it might help Pakistan to induce the raiders to withdraw.

Pandit Nehru replied that he would not make such a unilateral statement. The question of a plebiscite in Kashmir did not arise until the raiders were thrown out. The first task must be to clear the State of outside elements. If necessary, he would throw up his Prime Ministership and take the sword himself, and lead the men of India against the invasion. Nothing else in India mattered—until Kashmir was cleared up though it might take five years or ten.

His Excellency suggested that U.N.O should be asked to send out observers or advisers in some capacity to help the two Dominions solve the impasse which had been reached. The U.N.O representatives could hold meetings with the two Prime Ministers. They could discuss the draft agreement, and ways and means of implementing it. They could set up a committee consisting of the principal containing parties in Kashmir. Would the two Governments agree to making a joint approach to U.N.O or that one or other should make the approach?

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he would agree to U.N.O advising on the impartiality of the administration before the plebiscite.

Pandit Nehru said that he would entirely reject the idea. Only when hostility had ceased was he prepared to ask U.N.O to send representatives for the plebiscite. The plebiscite only came into the picture when peace was restored.

His Excellency's final suggestion was that a joint statement should be put out in which the Government of Pakistan would undertake to do their best to induce the raiders to withdraw and no further raiders to go in; and the Government of India would undertake to call in U.N.O advisers straightaway.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan made it clear that it was fully within his power to agree to issuing a statement calling upon the tribes to withdraw straightaway. If he did so, however, without being able to make one concrete offer in return his appeal would be taken no notice of. Not only would it be a dishonest thing to do, and as such lead to further deterioration between the two Dominions, but it would also result in such a deterioration of the position of the Government of Pakistan *vis-a-vis* its own people that the very existence of that Government would be endangered.

His Excellency asked whether he could count on Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's full support to the proposal that U.N.O should be brought in, in whatever form this might be. This Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan undertook to do.

The full meeting then reassembled, with the addition of Mr. Mohamed Ali and Mr. H.M. Patel. The agreement which had been reached between the officials on the allocation of defence expenditure after August 15 was first taken and confirmed. A draft statement on the settlement of outstanding financial and economic issues was then considered. This was agreed, with minor changes, but considerable pressure had to be exerted by His Excellency on Pandit Nehru before he would agree that it should be published the following afternoon.

His Excellency then described the talk which he had had with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan before the meeting. Nearly all the rest of the time was devoted to efforts to induce Pandit Nehru to accept a reference to U.N.O.

Pandit Nehru was extremely adamant. He went to the extremity of saying that he intended to clear Kashmir with the sword, whatever happened.⁴ He asked under what section of the Charter any reference to U.N.O could be made. He asked how Pakistan came into the picture at all. He reiterated his insistence that the first step was to drive out the raiders.

His Excellency drew attention to the great benefits an approach to U.N.O would have. It was the only way to solve the present impasse, and stop the fighting—and to stop the fighting was the main thing at the moment.⁵

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan reiterated that he would not mind in what manner the approach to U.N.O was made. He would even agree that it should be in the form of an accusation by India that Pakistan was assisting the raiders. He agreed with His Excellency that the first thing that the

U.N.O. Commission would probably do would be to ask Pakistan to use their influence to withdraw the raiders and stop further influxes. In these circumstances, his own position would be so immensely strengthened that he would be able to issue the appeal with impunity.

The position, as finally left, was that Pandit Nehru should examine the U.N.O. Charter and see if there was any way in which he could agree to a reference being made.

S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 361-8.

¹In an interview with US Ambassador, Paul H. Alling, on 17 March 1948, Jinnah said the only way to prevent tribesmen going into Kashmir was to have Pakistan troops fire on them. Such action might, however, have triggered a bloody conflict. The only other way was to convince them that a fair plebiscite could be held in Kashmir. See KR-481.

²Olaf Caroe, Governor of NWFP in 1946-47, had been on leave since before the referendum held in July 1947 and Lt. Gen. Rob Lockhart appointed acting Governor.

³According to the November 1947 appraisal of the military situation in Kashmir by the Commonwealth Office, London, as communicated to Washington, "G[overnment] o[f] I[ndia] is becoming nervous of the Kashmir situation and ... has acted too emotionally." See *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/11-447. Not printed.

⁴The US Charge d'Affaires in London, quoting the Commonwealth Relations Office sources, reported that the Liaquat-Nehru negotiations on Kashmir had ended in a stalemate and that the British Government's attitude towards those negotiations was something like "hands-off". See *US National Archives*, F. 745.45/12-1547. Not printed. The US envoy in New Delhi reported, on 12 December, that the deadlocked Kashmir talks had been somewhat vitiated by Nehru's sentimental approach. See *ibid*, F. 845.00/12-1247. Not printed.

KR-468

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE
No. Primin-443

NEW DELHI,
11 December 1947

Your telegram No. 411-G dated November 19th.¹ Mangla Headworks. The statement that land on which Headworks are constructed has been perpetually leased by Kashmir Govt. to West Punjab Government is not correct. I have seen terms on which permission was granted to Punjab Govt. to construct headworks and first 18 miles of upper Jhelum Canal within territory of Jammu and Kashmir State and these make it quite clear that land remains the property of the *Darbar* and that the only right which was conferred was that of a licensee to make use of the land for specific purpose of canal. I am making this point lest there should be any misunderstanding of correct legal position.

Kashmir Government inform me that their State forces were guarding canal and headworks and they were maintaining a garrison at Mangla Fort. The garrison was besieged and [illegible] for supplies by air. No further information has been received from garrison and presumably it has been destroyed. Pakistan Government has apparently posted its own Police on Headworks and this amounts to interference by neighbouring Government on State territory.

In view of position stated above it is clear that Pakistan Government has no right to encroach on Mangla and we must ask that any forces which may have been sent by Pakistan should be withdrawn. Meantime I would inform you that Headworks were not (repeat not) bombarded as alleged and instructions have been given that they should not be bombarded. The bombing referred to by you was against hostile forces which had besieged State garrison but outside the area of Headworks.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

'KR-451.

KR-469

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE
No. Primin-448

NEW DELHI,
12 December 1947

Ever since my return from Lahore I have given most earnest thought to settlement of all outstanding matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. My colleagues share my desire for such a settlement which is essential for well-being by both India and Pakistan. It is our good fortune that agreements have already been arrived at in regard to many matters in controversy. But you will appreciate that it is difficult to make any progress if conflict and indifference continue between the two countries. Such a conflict is likely to affect all our other relations and may lead to a deterioration of situation.

2. The major cause of this conflict at present is Kashmir. We have discussed this matter with you at great length without resolving our differences or finding a way out of the impasse. I reiterate the arguments which have been repeatedly advanced in support of our position. You are fully seized of them.

3. We have given further thought, in the light of our discussion in Lahore, to the question of inviting United Nations to advise us in this matter. While we are prepared to invite U.N.O observers to come here and advise us as to proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in what other capacity the United Nations help can be sought. According to your own declaration to us you are not party to present struggle in Kashmir. We cannot treat with irregular invaders as a State. No Government can deal with such raids which have brought death and destruction to Kashmir, except through military means. We owe an obligation to the people of Kashmir to restore peaceful and normal conditions and we have pleasure ourselves to this end. We would be glad to cooperate in an attempt to restore peace by settlement.

4. I trust that you will appreciate the logic and reasonableness of our position and our earnest desire to find a solution that is honourable to all concerned. I hope to meet you when you visit Delhi on December 22, and to attend the next meeting of the Joint Defence Council and to discuss this matter further with you. I confess however that I find myself unable to suggest anything beyond what I have offered already, namely, to ask U.N.O to send impartial observers to advise us regarding the plebiscite.

I hope that your health continues to improve

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

KR-470

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

Telegram, FOA, S-6/2

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE
No. 1134

KARACHI,
16 December 1947

Your telegram No. Primin-448 dated 1st [12] December [1947]¹

As you know, I am most desirous for a settlement of all matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. So are my colleagues. And I agree with you that the major issue outstanding between the two Dominions is Kashmir and, as I pointed out before, also Junagadh. During our discussions in Delhi and Lahore I explained to you how vital a place Kashmir occupies in relating [*sic*] to Pakistan. The security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir, and the ties of religion, cultural affinity and economic inter-dependence bind the two together still closer. The security and well-being of the people of Kashmir is of the

highest importance to the people of Pakistan. We are therefore vitally interested in peaceful and honourable conditions for the people of Kashmir so that freed from all pressure external or internal they might of their own free will decide to which Dominion they wish to accede. The test of any course of action should, therefore, be whether it leads to creation of conditions in which a really free plebiscite can be held. To my mind, the problem can only be solved by an act of statesmanship in the light of the basic realities of the situation and not by legal disputations as to how Pakistan is a party to the dispute or how U.N.O can be brought in. I hope when we meet on the 22nd December we shall be able to discuss the matter in this spirit.

Many thanks for your enquiry about my health. I am feeling better now.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

KR-469.

KR-471

*Record of talks on Kashmir between Liaquat,
Nehru and Mountbatten¹*

NEW DELHI,
21 [22] December 1947

I told Pandit Nehru that he would find Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in a very chastened mood, since he obviously was frightened at the situation, which appeared to me to be getting out of his control. I thought he would accept any appeal to U.N.O in order to break the impasse and bring the fighting to an end, although his desire was to link the plebiscite with the appeal to cease fighting. Pandit Nehru said that this was out of the question, that Government of India would never agree to this, and that he intended to tell Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan so. I begged him to let me explain this in a quiet and tactful manner, for I feel I would probably get him to accept it provided it were not done in a provocative way.

I told Pandit Nehru that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was most anxious to know whether it was intended to repudiate the payment of the balances due to Pakistan or to delay them until a settlement was reached on Kashmir. Pandit Nehru said that there was no question of repudiation and that India meant to stand by her obligations in this matter, though the date of payment was one which the Cabinet had not yet settled, as

they were waiting to find out how matters were going to turn out in Kashmir. I begged him not to mention this latter fact to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, since I considered that we could never get any agreement with him under undue pressure, and that, so far from this factor being helpful, I considered it would wreck the prospect of any settlement. He agreed with this.

[Paras 2-9 omitted]

10. At about 11 p.m. we went to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's room. The Governor-General accompanied me although probably it was not his previous intention to do so. No doubt he felt that his presence might be helpful in bringing about a more friendly approach.

11. We were with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan for little more than an hour, till soon after midnight. I must say that I found him very much toned down and chastened, indeed almost, if I may say so, humble in his approach to the problem. Unlike previous occasions, there was hardly any argument or discussion.

12. Lord Mountbatten started off by saying that there was no intention on the part of the Indian Government to repudiate the financial agreements arrived at and that this matter would not go up before the Arbitral Tribunal. Further that we were thinking in terms of a reference to U.N.O and that we stood by our previous statement to the effect that the people of Kashmir would have to decide after peace and order were established about their future.

13. I then stated our position in regard to Kashmir. I said that nearly three months ago when we had intervened in Kashmir we had made a unilateral offer for a plebiscite under U.N.O auspices after peace was established and all the raiders had departed or been pushed out. This offer had been repeated but there had been no response. Indeed the aggression had continued with every kind of violence and had been supported by the Pakistan Government. The invaders had been collected, transported, put in camps near the Kashmir border, armed and trained, all in Pakistan territory, and they had then been sent in batches inside Kashmir State. We considered that aggression of one State against another as a hostile act against India. Obviously we could not tolerate this, nor were we prepared to carry on this petty war in the way we have thus far done. We had sent relatively small forces into Kashmir in the hope that hostilities would cease and the raiders would be withdrawn. No such thing had happened and we would necessarily have to take a more serious view of the matter and if no other development took place, we may have to strike at the base of operations and the lines of communications of the raiders. But as we were anxious to avoid far-reaching developments and being members of the U.N.O we

intended making a reference to U.N.O charging Pakistan with acts of aggression and asking U.N.O to call upon Pakistan to desist. In the alternative we would have to take such further action as we thought fit and proper.

14. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan did not say much in reply to this except that he would welcome U.N.O's intervention as he was anxious that a third party should come into the picture. He complained of Sardar Patel's speech at Jaipur in which he was alleged to have said that India was prepared for war with Pakistan if the latter desired it.² Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that we had decided at Lahore that no provocative speeches should be made and no responsible person in Pakistan had made any speech or statement of a provocative nature since then. Unfortunately Sardar Patel had done so and this did not help in producing the atmosphere we desired.

15. I said that I had not myself read Sardar Patel's speech fully and I did not know what exactly he had said or what the context was. The speech had hardly anything to do with Kashmir and any reference could have been only casual and in some other context. I pointed out the way Pakistan newspapers were behaving and more specially the demand in a leading article of a Karachi Urdu daily calling upon the Muslims to kill Sardar Patel. Our High Commissioner in Karachi had written to Pakistan Government on this subject. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that his attention had been drawn to this and he greatly regretted it. He was taking steps against that newspaper. He said further that newspapers in Pakistan and India were thoroughly irresponsible, more specially the Indian language ones, and he wished that something could be done to stop them. Lord Mountbatten expressed his own disapproval of the way many newspapers indulged in inflaming public opinion and had expressed his opinion that every newspaper should be licensed by Government, the licence being withdrawn in case of misbehaviour.

16. Lord Mountbatten said that as we were thinking of making a reference to U.N.O it would be a good thing if the draft was shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan before it was sent.

17. I said that we would naturally send a copy to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, but the reference being in the nature of a charge against Pakistan it could not possibly be a joint reference. It would be for Pakistan to reply to it and for the Security Council then to take action.

18. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he did not think it necessary to see our draft reference. What was necessary was that both parties should be eager to stop this fighting.

19. In the whole course of the conversation no mention was made

about the internal administration of Kashmir or about the armed forces of the Indian Union that might be left in Kashmir later on. These were the two points on which a great deal of argument had taken place on previous occasions.

20. Lord Mountbatten asked Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan if it would not be difficult for him to get the raiders out owing to the state of public opinion in Pakistan. He agreed that it was not going to be an easy matter.

21. There was some talk about raids on Pakistan territory by air and land.

22. I informed Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that all the relatives of Ghulam Abbas, President of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, were alive and were in Pakistan except for one girl who was apparently in Amritsar and would be sent to Pakistan. The story about the murder and abduction of these people was thus not true.

23. Our talk then went on some other matters. I referred to Mehr Chand Khanna's case. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he was meeting him the next day.

24. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan asked me if I had seen the Muslim League resolution about having a minorities charter. I said that I had not read it carefully but I had glanced through it. I added that so far as we are concerned, our Constituent Assembly had already carefully considered this matter and laid down provisions for the protection of minorities. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that it would be a very good thing if both India and Pakistan would agree to similar provisions and would issue a joint statement to that effect which might be embodied in our constitutions. This would go a long way to lessen the feelings of fear and suspicion that exist. I agreed that it would be desirable to come to an agreement on these issues.

25. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then enquired about the order of precedence in India as to where the Prime Minister and Ministers came into the picture.

The whole conversation with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, which lasted a little over an hour, was almost entirely free from argument which had previously accompanied such discussions. It seemed to me quite clear that for some reason or other Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was eager and anxious for a settlement. He hardly raised any difficulties to what I said, though of course he did not agree to everything. He expressed a strong desire that India and Pakistan should have friendly relations

and should put an end to conflict' and misunderstanding.

S Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 381-7. The first two paragraphs of the document are part of record of talks of Mountbatten with Nehru, prior to the latter's discussions with Liaquat. Paras 10 to 25 are, however, Nehru's own version.

Patel said at Jaipur that India would not give up on Kashmir even if the struggle lasted ten years, but ultimately it would be for the people of Kashmir themselves to determine their future, and that would be possible only after the incursions into Kashmir had ended once and for all. On 28 December 1947, he declared that India would do everything possible to save Kashmir and never abandon it. See *US National Archives*, F. 745 45 12-2947. Not printed.

On 23 December 1947, Howard Donovan, American Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi, reported to Washington Sheikh Abdullah's view that chances of India and Pakistan reaching agreement on Kashmir were slight and that the issue "should be settled only by force of arms." Abdullah also ruled out a plebiscite in that the Kashmiris had demonstrated their wishes by vigorous defence of the Valley against the Pakistan-supported raiders. See *US National Archives*, F. 745 45 12-2347. Not printed. On 28 December 1947, Abdullah said that if Pakistan could not stop the "raiders", it should let Indian troops enter Pakistan to prevent raiders concentrating on the Kashmir border. See *US National Archives*, F. 745 45 12-2947. Not printed.

KR-472

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*¹

PRIME MINISTER,
NEW DELHI,
22 December 1947

SECRET

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

On various occasions, I have drawn your attention to the aid which the invaders of the Jammu and Kashmir State are deriving from Pakistan. Those who come from Tribal Areas have free transit through Pakistan territory, and many of these invaders are nationals of Pakistan. They are operating against Kashmir from bases in Pakistan. Much of their modern military equipment has been obtained from Pakistan sources; mortars, artillery and Mark V mines are not normally the kind of armament which tribesmen or civilians possess. Motor transport, which the invaders have been using, and the petrol required for it, could also be obtained in Pakistan only. Food and other supplies are also secured from Pakistan; indeed, we have reliable reports that the invaders get their rations from military messes in Pakistan. According to our information, large number of these invaders are receiving military training in Pakistan under officers of the Pakistan army and other Pakistan nationals.

2. The forms of aid, enumerated in the preceding paragraph, which the invaders are receiving, constitute an act of hostility and aggression against India because they are being used against a State which has acceded to the Indian Dominion and is a part thereof.

3. The Government of India, while protesting against the action of the Pakistan Government in furnishing or allowing such assistance to be furnished, and urging that the Pakistan Government should stop such help and call upon the invaders to withdraw, have so far taken no action which might involve entry by Indian forces into Pakistan territory. They have been hoping, all these weeks, though with diminishing hope, that the Pakistan Government themselves would put a stop to aid to the invaders which is help to India's enemies. Since protests have failed to bear fruit, the Government of India now formally ask the Government of Pakistan to call upon Pakistan nationals to cease participation in the attack on Jammu and Kashmir State, and to deny the invaders

- i. all access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against Kashmir State;
- ii. all military and other supplies;
- iii. all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

4. The Government of India have always desired and still earnestly desire to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan. They sincerely hope that the request which they have now formally made will be acceded to promptly and without reserve. Failing such response, they will be compelled to take such action,² with due regard to their rights and obligations as a member of the United Nations, as they may consider necessary to protect their own interests, and those of the Government and people of Jammu and Kashmir State.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

M. Ikramullah handed a copy each of this letter and of Liaquat's reply of 30 December 1947 to Charles W. Lewis, Charge d'Affaires, US Embassy, Karachi on 3 January 1948, for transmission to the US State Department. See *US National Archives*, F 745.45/1-548, No. 6.

²Reaction to this threat was closely monitored by US Embassies in Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, Charles Lewis talked to Jinnah, Liaquat, Zaftrulla Khan, Mohamed Ali and M. Ikramullah and did not detect "any trace of anxiety or nervousness." He reported that Pakistan appeared "thoroughly convinced" that Kashmir's accession to India was part of India's deliberate policy to immiserate and asphyxiate Pakistan progressively. See *US National Archives*, F 745.45/1-148.

KR-473

*Mehr Chand Mahajan to Vallabhbhai Patel¹*JAMMU,
24 December 1947

My dear Sardar Patelji,

I sent you a copy of Sheikh Abdullah's letter to H. H. before his release on the 20th. I wonder why it has not reached you. I send herewith another copy of the same letter.²

This humble subject who promised steadfast loyalty now wants to prosecute H. H. before the people's tribunal and demands his abdication. His latest offer is that H.H. can have the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and leave the rest of the territory to a Muslim republic like Pakistan. He is actively canvassing support of Muslim Conference leader Abbas who is in jail and with whom he is having interviews.

Practically in all matters he is ignoring and bypassing H.H. and is daily showing increased communal tendencies.

If you permit, I will send you specimens³ of his administrative skill and knowledge and communal tendencies and where he has ignored H.H. with the help of National Guards in Srinagar. He thinks he can do what he likes. On hearing from you, I will send you some instances of complete misrule and maladministration on fascist lines.

I am in a most embarrassing position. I wish you could somehow get me out.⁴ I have tried but without success. H.H. will not let me out.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 128-30.

^{2&3}Enclosures

⁴On 29 December 1947, Gopalaswami advised Patel that "we should strengthen Sheikh Abdullah's hands... the interests of Kashmir in the present situation make it impossible for him [Mahajan] to continue there..." See Gopalaswami to Patel, *ibid.*, 131. Not printed.

*Enclosure 1 to KR-473**Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah to Maharaja of Kashmir*

26 September 1947

May it please Your Highness,

It is after about one and a half year's incarceration as long wished—I had an opportunity of having detailed talks with Thakur

Nichantchandji [brother of the Maharani]. What unfortunate things happened during this period in the State I need not mention. But this is now realised by every well-wisher of the State that many of the regrettable happenings of the past have mainly been due to the misunderstandings which appear now to have deliberately been created by interested people in order to achieve their own ends. R. B. Ramchandra Kak, the ex-Prime Minister, through his mischievous methods and masterly manoeuvrings, brought these misunderstandings to a climax and succeeded in his attempt, though temporarily, to a certain extent. He painted me and my organisation in the darkest colours and in everything that we did or attempted to do to bring Your Highness and your people closer, base and selfish motives were attributed to me. But God be thanked that all these enemies of Your Highness and State stand exposed today.

In spite of what has happened in the past, I assure Your Highness that myself and my party have never harboured any sentiment of disloyalty towards Your Highness' person, throne or dynasty. The development of this beautiful country and the betterment of its people is our common aim and interest and I assure Your Highness the fullest and loyal support of myself and my organization. Not only this but I assure Your Highness that any party, within or without the State, which may attempt to create any impediments in our efforts to gain our goal, will be treated as our enemy and will be treated as such.

In order to achieve the common aim set forth above, mutual trust and confidence must be the mainstay. Without this it would not be possible to face successfully the great difficulties that beset our State on all sides at present.

Before I close this letter I beg to assure Your Highness once again of my steadfast loyalty and pray that God may grant me opportunity enough to let this country attain under Your Highness' aegis such an era of peace, prosperity and good government that it may be second to none and be an ideal for others to copy.

Your Highness' most obedient subject,
S. M. ABDULLAH

Enclosure 2 to KR-473

Some Instances of Abdullah's Administrative Skills

1. President of the Praja Sabha has been removed without reference to H. H. though under law only H.H. can remove him.

2. High Court is not functioning. H.H. or Chief Justice are the only authorities above High Court, but under his orders the High Court is

not allowed to come to Jammu as it ought to under H.H.'s order. One Judge is a Muslim and as he does not wish to come here, we have no High Court for over 2 months. His attention was drawn by H.H. to this but he ignored the order. C. J. is in Calcutta, one jury here and one in Srinagar.

3. Governor Jammu was transferred to Srinagar and suspended and kept under restraint there without any specific charge or any enquiry and without previous reference to H.H. Once H.H. was consulted and certain decision was made but this was ignored.

4. [J.N.] Zutshi,¹ dismissed for corruption after enquiry, has been allotted to a responsible post.

5. An accounts officer has been appointed Chief Secretary though the office of Chief Secretary is reserved for the executive and judicial branch of service. Considerable number of officers will be superseded.

6. Court Chief Inspector has been appointed *Tehsildar* without any executive training. Sub-Inspector Police made A.S.P. without being even an inspector on communal consideration. Income-tax officer appointed *Wazir*. Parties of one profession appointed in different branches of services on communal grounds.

7. Large number of officers and men are in custody without charges and trial.

8. Corruption in National Conference workers is rampant in selling transport and giving trade concessions.

9. Gazetted and non-gazetted officers are made to obey orders of volunteers on threats of dismissal or arrest.

10. Emergency officers are appointed who are not public servants with no powers and duties. They are said to be advising men but wield real power.

11. Shahmiri, Adalatkhan, Dar were retired by H.H. before I came on grounds of disloyalty. Against express direction of H.H., they have been reinstated.

¹A confidant of Sheikh Abdullah; he and Baldev Prasad Sharma, Director of Information, J & K, were arrested along with Abdullah in 1953 and later released.

KR-474

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Clement Attlee¹**Telegram, L/P&S/13/1936, IOR*NEW DELHI,
28 December 1947

In the message that I sent you through our High Commissioner in London on the 12th December² I had expressed the hope that my conversations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan during his visit to New Delhi on 22nd and 23rd of this month might lead to solution of Kashmir problem. Unfortunately, though our talks were friendly, they yielded no result. To bring home to him the gravity of the situation, I handed to him personally a letter briefly specifying the forms of aid which the invaders of Kashmir were deriving from Pakistan and our request that such aid should be stopped promptly and without reserve.³ The text of my letter was shown to your High Commissioner in New Delhi on the 24th and he has, probably, already informed you of its substance. So far, in spite of a reminder which was issued on the 26th instant, Pakistan has sent no reply.

2. Meanwhile, the pressure of the invaders, practically all along the frontier of Jammu Province and Kashmir, has greatly intensified. Our troops have been under heavy attack all along this line. At Jhanjar, one of the outposts which they held, they were attacked by 6,000 men armed with automatic weapons, including medium machine-guns and mortars. At this point our troops were outnumbered by 30 to one. Naoshera has been the scene of very severe fighting during the last two or three days. Nearly 19,000 invaders have massed in the Uri area, at the entrance to the Kashmir valley. Our intelligence reports indicate that approximately 100,000 tribesmen and Pakistan nationals are located in different districts of the West Punjab and many of them are receiving military training preparatory to joining in the battle against us.

3. These developments have created a military situation which is full of peril not only to Jammu and Kashmir State, but to us. Unless Pakistan takes immediate steps to stop all forms of aid to the attackers, who are operating from bases in Pakistan and therefore strategically enjoy a great advantage over us, our only hope of dealing with them effectively would lie in striking at them at their bases. This would involve our entering Pakistan territory. Such a step would be justified

in international law as we are entitled to take it in self-defence. What is happening now is definitely an act of aggression against us by Pakistan. However, as we are most anxious to act in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations we are asking the Security Council to repeat to the Pakistan Government the request which I made in my letter of 22nd December, namely that Pakistan should take immediate and effective action to deny to the raiders:

- i. access to and use of its territory for operations against Jammu and Kashmir State;
- ii. military and other supplies;
- iii. all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

This request is without prejudice to the freedom of the Government of India to take, at any time, such military action as they may consider necessary in exercise of their right of self-defence.

4. I sincerely hope that the Government of Pakistan will respond favourably to this request. It has always been, and still is, our earnest desire to live on terms of peace and friendship with our neighbouring Dominion. But this relationship cannot be achieved by one-side effort on our part. Pakistan must reciprocate.

5. The full text of our reference to the Security Council, which will be telegraphed to Trygve Lie on the 30th December, is being communicated to your High Commissioner.

¹S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 406-07.

²Nehru had stated that differences over the Kashmir issue had not been resolved and that a further discussion with Pakistan was expected at the JDC meeting on 22 December 1947. *Ibid.*, 374.

³See KR-472.

KR-475

Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru

US National Archives, F. 745. 45/1-548¹

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER,
KARACHI,
30 December 1947

Dear Pandit Nehru,

Please refer to your demi-official letter² dated the 22nd December in which you have brought formal charges against the Pakistan Government for aiding and abetting the so-called 'invaders' of Kashmir in their fight against the forces of the Maharaja and of the Indian Dominion.

2. Despite the ominous hint contained in paragraph three, I trust I am right in assuming that your letter is not an "ultimatum" but a forerunner of a formal reference of the matter to the U.N.O. If so, nothing could be more welcome, for, you will recollect, this is exactly what the Pakistan Government has been suggesting throughout as the most effective method of ironing out our mutual differences. I am, therefore, sincerely glad to find that you propose at last to adopt this particular line of approach to our problems.

3. I must, however, confess my disappointment that your proposal apparently restricts the reference to the single issue of Kashmir. The episode of Kashmir considered by itself would look like a sentence torn out of its context. It is but an act in the unparalleled tragedy which is being enacted before our eyes ever since the announcement of the scheme of partition. A reference³ to the U.N.O, therefore, in my opinion must cover much larger ground and embrace all the fundamentals of the differences between the two Dominions. As I see it, it is neither Kashmir alone nor Junagadh and Manavadar, nor even the terrible tragedy of wholesale massacres of Muslim men, women and children in extensive areas of the Indian Dominion, but a totality of these horrors and iniquities, indicating but one consistent, sinister pattern which should rightly form the subject matter of international investigation. If the root causes of the evil, which is vitiating our relations, are not determined and removed it is much to be feared that fresh incidents will continue to threaten the peace not only between the two Dominions, but in a much wider field.

4. The case of Kashmir is simple and our attitude has been explained frankly and repeatedly both in our communications to you and our official statements to the press. The Pakistan Government has not accepted and cannot accept the so-called "accession" of the Jammu and Kashmir State to India. We have said it before and repeat that the "accession" was fraudulent inasmuch as it was achieved by deliberately creating certain conditions, with the object of finding an excuse to stage the "accession". It was based on violence because it furthered the plan of the Kashmir Government to liquidate the Muslim population of the State. The accession was against the well-known will of an overwhelming majority of the population and could not be justified on any grounds whether moral or constitutional, geographical or economic, cultural or religious.

5. The sole responsibility for the disturbances which occurred in the State must squarely lie on the Maharaja and his Government who, despite the advice tendered by the Pakistan Government, persisted in their policy of repression of Muslims. Repression was followed by

resistance particularly in the area of Poonch which is inhabited by a large number of ex-soldiers. The resistance in its turn was met with more repression till the Dogra savagery, supported by the brutality of Sikh and Rashtriya Sewak Sangh bands, created a reign of terror in the State. This state of affairs naturally aroused strong feelings of sympathy throughout Pakistan particularly among Muslims living in the contiguous areas who had numerous ties of relationship with the persecuted people of the State. Some of these people went across to assist their kinsmen in their struggle for freedom and indeed for existence itself. The stage was thus set for the pre-planned intervention by the forces of the Indian Dominion to quell this spontaneous popular rising against the culmination of the age-long tyranny of the Dogra rule. The repeated warnings of the Pakistan Government went unheeded. This hasty and ill-advised action completely changed the picture and the Frontier tribesmen, a ferociously freedom-loving people, naturally took up the challenge in support of their Kashmiri co-religionists fighting for their survival and liberation. If the Government of India had extended to the Pakistan Government the courtesy of consulting it before embarking on its enterprise and suddenly landing troops in Kashmir, or even notifying Pakistan of its proposed action thus providing an opportunity for discussion and consultation, it might have been possible to avert the tragedy of Kashmir. The action of the Government of India served to swell the torrent of popular resentment until it became impossible for the Pakistan Government to stem it without embarking on large-scale military operations.

6. As regards the charges of aid and assistance to the 'invaders' by the Pakistan Government, we emphatically repudiate them. On the contrary, and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movements by all means short of war. This has caused bitter resentment throughout the country, but, despite a very serious risk of large-scale internal disturbances, the Pakistan Government has not deviated from the policy.

In view of this background, it would not be surprising if some nationals of Pakistan were taking part in the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir along with the forces of the Azad Kashmir Government. You must have already heard of an International Brigade composed of representatives of many nations in the world who are likewise fighting on the side of the Azad Kashmir Government. In regard to the modern military equipment that you allege to be in the possession of the Azad Kashmir forces, our information is that these forces are poorly equipped

and such few modern weapons as they might possess, have either been captured from the Dogra and Indian troops or have been in the possession of the ex-soldiers of Poonch since the days of the British. As you know, there are large number of Poonchis in the Pakistan Army and if some of them, while on leave in their homes rendered assistance to their kith and kin in defence of their hearths and homes, it is scarcely to be wondered at.

7. On the contrary, it is the India Government which must answer the charge of conspiracy with the Maharaja of Kashmir in repudiation of the very principles on which it had only one month before opposed Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. The plea that the accession is only temporary pending restoration of peaceful conditions is too flimsy to stand examination, particularly in the light of recent negotiations in the course of which a perfectly fair and workable plan of withdrawal of opposing forces followed by a referendum under impartial aegis, suggested by us, was turned down by your Government. But all this fits in with the general 'pattern' of the India Government's political attitude towards Pakistan ever since it became evident that partition was the only possible solution of our constitutional problems.

8. The story begins as early as the middle of 1946 following the demonstration of Muslim solidarity throughout the country after the last Provincial elections. It became clear that Pakistan was the unalterable goal of the Muslims. The inevitability of the partition of the country, which now became evident to all, gave rise to a wave of deep resentment among the Hindu and Sikh population of the sub-continent. As a direct result of this, severe communal rioting occurred in several towns and Provinces of India such as Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, Bombay, Garhmukteshwar, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Amritsar. Such communal strife had not been unknown previously, but what was astonishing was the unprecedented scale of killings that took place in Bihar and Garhmukteshwar, proving beyond doubt the existence of a well-settled plan of extermination of the Muslims. It was during these disturbances that the Rashtriya Sewak Sangh came to be known as the author of some of the most brutal massacres. The orgy of blood, however, died down in due course, but, as later events proved, only temporarily.

9. The political activity which took place in the early part of 1947 produced a lull, but soon after the partition plan was announced on the 3rd June 1947, clear indications began to be received that the country was going to be plunged into a blood bath by the fanatical Sikhs and militant Hindu groups headed by the Rashtriya Sewak Sangh

who had made no secret of their opposition to the partition scheme, in spite of its being accepted by the representatives of all the three major communities.

10. The process of partition itself was marked by all manner of obstructions aimed at depriving Pakistan of its rightful share of financial and other assets. Even in cases in which agreement was reached the implementation was delayed or sabotaged.

11. At this stage the main chain of events which eventually brought untold suffering to millions of people of East Punjab, Rajputana and the United Province was set in motion with a carefully prepared attack on a special train carrying Pakistan Government employees and their families from Delhi to Karachi on the 9th August 1947. As the plan unfolded itself, it became clear that the Sikhs encouraged and actively assisted by the Hindus had determined to liquidate by violent and bloody means the entire Muslim population of East Punjab. The object of the plan was to kill or drive out Musalmans in order to settle the Sikh population which was being pulled out of West Punjab under a planned scheme. The *modus operandi* was to disarm the Muslim population and then to leave it at the mercy of armed bands who were actively assisted by the army and the police. There is abundant evidence that this plan had the full support and active assistance of the officers of Patiala, Kapurthala and Faridkot. Alwar and Bharatpur had already set the example in eliminating their entire Muslim population but they were soon outdone. Kapurthala, which like Kashmir was a Muslim majority State, has today not a single Muslim left. Similarly, large tracts of Muslim majority areas which under the Boundary Award had been most unjustly included in East Punjab were depopulated. The whole country was ravaged by fire and sword, vast numbers were butchered and countless women were abducted. Indeed decency forbids mention of some crimes committed against women. Millions were forcibly and ruthlessly driven out of their homes. The process went on sector by sector and culminated in the tragedy that was enacted in Delhi, the capital of India. According to the Government of India itself there was a complete breakdown of administration for a number of days. The destruction and desecration of mosques, tombs and holy places and forcible conversions on a mass scale were special features of these happenings.

12. This plan of liquidation of the Muslim population is still proceeding despite the pious professions of the Government of India. The latest example of this is provided by the happenings in the holy city of Ajmer. The Government of Pakistan find it difficult to believe that

under the circumstances the Government of India are innocent of all complicity in this vast scheme of 'genocide' started by the Sikhs and Hindus and encouraged and supported by persons in authority as a means of destroying the newly created State of Pakistan. The Musalmans of India are being subjected to calculated insults and humiliations. All sorts of tests of loyalty are being demanded from them. The one on which particular emphasis is laid is that they should denounce Pakistan and try to undo the partition and express their readiness to fight Pakistan on the side of India in the event of war between the two Dominions. It is a matter for deep regret that even today responsible members of the Government of India, including yourself, openly declare their intention or hope of bringing Pakistan back into the Indian Union, well knowing that this can be done only through conquest by arms. Such an attitude can only mean that the Hindu and Sikh leaders while giving their agreement to the partition plan did so without any intention of permitting its implementation and, further, that India is determined to undo the settlement by all means available at its disposal. In other words, Pakistan's very existence is the chief *causus belli* so far as India is concerned. It is this impossible position which manifests itself time and again in all of India's dealings with Pakistan, whether political, economic or financial and, unless an effective remedy is found, it is difficult to see how a direct clash can be avoided with the best will in the world.

13. The events which took place following the announcement of the accession of Junagadh and Manavadar States to Pakistan lend further support to the contention of the Pakistan Government that the Government of India intend by all possible means at their disposal to destroy Pakistan.

14. In accordance with the agreed scheme of partition and the Indian Independence act, 1947, Indian States were under no compulsion to join either of the two Dominions. Notwithstanding this clear provision, the Government of India by a combination of threats and cajolery forced a number of States into acceding to the Indian Union. The Rulers of Junagadh and Manavadar were similarly threatened with dire consequences, but they stood firm and exercised their right of joining Pakistan in preference to India. This was the signal for India to launch with full force her attack, using every possible weapon in order to force the States against their will, to change their affiliation. Protests were made to the Pakistan Government, pointing out that a State which had a Hindu majority population could not accede to Pakistan, as the country had been divided on a communal basis. Another reason

given was that Junagadh was not physically contiguous to Pakistan and that its accession to Pakistan was calculated to cause disruption in the integrity of India. Simultaneously with these protests, the Government of India put large bodies of Indian troops on the borders of Junagadh and encouraged the neighbouring Hindu States, which had acceded to India, to do likewise. In clear violation of the Standstill Agreement the Junagadh State was subjected to an economic blockade involving stoppage of all territory [sic]. Lines of communication, including railway and telegraph, were operated in such a manner that it became impossible for the State or the Muslim population of Junagadh to communicate with the outside world. A strong press campaign calculated to destroy the morale of the State administration and to create panic among the population was launched both inside and outside the State.

Another line of attack was adopted by setting up the so-called 'Provisional Government' with headquarters first at Bombay and later at Rajkot, which claimed the right to liberate the non-Muslim population of the Junagadh State. The so-called '*Azad Fouj*' of the 'Provisional Government' was created and armed by the officers of the Indian Dominion. The 'Provisional Government' not only proceeded to seize by force State property in Rajkot, but by methods of sheer 'gangsterism' created conditions in which it became impossible for the State administration to function. At this point the Government of India sent its troops and occupied the State under the plea of alleged 'invitation' by the Dewan. Since then an orgy of murder, arson, rape and loot has been let loose in Kathiawar by the military forces of India in exactly the same manner as in Northern India and hundreds of thousands of Muslims have had to flee from the State. According to newspaper reports, Mr. Samaldas Gandhi, the head of the so-called Provisional Government, has openly thanked a member of your government for all the assistance received. All this was done in sheer disregard of the international code of conduct and ordinary neighbourly decency. In the interest of peace between the two Dominions, Pakistan refrained from sending a single soldier to Junagadh. Occupation by force of Junagadh, which is Pakistan territory, is a clear act of aggression against Pakistan.

15. In the case of Manavadar, even the thin camouflage of a semblance of justification was not considered necessary and the State was taken under military occupation without the slightest explanation being given. A similar fate befell the *talukdari* States of Sardargadh, Bantwa, Sultanabad and Mangrol. The unfortunate rulers of some of these

States have been kept in detention and have been subjected to considerable pressure to wean them from their affiliation to Pakistan.

16. This brief account of India's dealings with a friendly State can leave no doubt in the mind of any impartial person that the new India does not feel herself bound by any moral or international code of rules. The military *coup d'état* by which the occupation of Junagadh and Manavadar and other States was achieved is one piece with the general scheme of destroying the integrity and the very existence of Pakistan to which reference has been made. We have formally drawn your attention to the various acts of hostility culminating in actual seizure of Pakistan territory by the India Government in Junagadh, but have not received even the courtesy of a reply. Perhaps now that you propose to take the case of Kashmir to the U.N.O you would be good enough to let us know why in spite of our clear request you have not withdrawn from the territories of Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol, etc?

In this connection, it is of interest to note that the arguments advanced by India for refusing to accept the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have been conveniently and completely ignored in connection with the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Dominion. This again is fully in keeping with the general political attitude of India towards Pakistan.

17. These are not the only examples of aggression against Pakistan territory. Numerous raids by armed bands assisted by the police and military have taken place across the border into Pakistan. The Royal Indian Air Force have made repeated attacks on Pakistan territory causing damage to life and property.

18. Another illustration of the same attitude is provided by the refusal of the India Government to implement the recent financial agreement of all outstanding cases which had been referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. The India Government is deliberately withholding the payment of rupees fifty-five crores of the cash balances which is the legal due of the Pakistan Government according to this agreement. This is the latest manifestation of their desire to strangle Pakistan financially and economically which characterized the partition proceedings. In the case of military stores, there has been a similar refusal to implement the agreement. The Supreme Commander, who was appointed as a neutral authority under the Joint Defence Council to carry into effect the partition of the armed forces and military stores, was forced, despite the protestations of the Pakistan Government, to leave by your Government long before he could complete his task. At the time this was done the Indian representatives on the Joint Defence

Council pledged the word of the India Cabinet that Pakistan would receive her due share of military shares. This pledge, like other similar pledges of the India Government, has not been honoured and the slight trickle of military stores to Pakistan shows signs of stopping altogether.

19. To sum up, our counter charges against the Dominion of India are as follows:

(1) That India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme but her leaders paid lip service to it merely in order to get the British troops out of the country;

(2) That India is out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself;

(3) That the systematic sabotage against the implementation of partition, the stoppage of such essential requirements as coal and rail transport, the deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds and arms and equipment, the wholesale massacres of Muslim population are all designed toward one aim, namely, the destruction of Pakistan;

(4) That India's forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar and other States in Kathiawar which had acceded to Pakistan, as well as the fraudulent procurement of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State are acts of hostility against Pakistan whose destruction is India's immediate objective.

20. I however note with pleasure your assurance that the Govt. of India have always desired and still earnestly desire to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan. On behalf of the Pakistan Government, I fully and sincerely reciprocate this desire. I am constrained, however, to observe that the Government of India have at no stage afforded any practical proof of their desire to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan, more particularly in the case of Junagadh and Kashmir. On my side, I can assure you that the earnest desire of the Government of Pakistan to live on terms of friendship with India has in many instances restrained the Government of Pakistan from taking action which would not only have been legally justifiable but was in several instances urgently called for and yet was not adopted in the hope that the attitude of the Government of India might, even during these later stages, be more favourably affected towards Pakistan. I find it more and more difficult to persuade myself to continue to entertain that hope. The course of events, very briefly set out above, would normally have been treated as a chain of aggression justifying extreme action on the part of the aggrieved Government. Now that your letter of the 22nd December 1947 has indicated an intention on the part of the

Government of India to invite the intervention of the United Nations, a course which the Pakistan Government has so far ineffectively suggested to the Government of India, for the resolving of their differences, I have taken this opportunity to invite your attention to the main heads of the differences between the two Governments that stand in the way of an amicable adjustment of our relations. It is my most earnest hope that these differences may be speedily composed and that our relations will, thereafter, ever continue to be on the most cordial, co-operative and friendly basis. I trust you will agree that the intervention of the United Nations, whatever form it is to take, should be invited in respect of all these matters, so that all pending differences may be speedily resolved.

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

¹US National Archives, Enclosure 2 to No 6, F. 745. 45/1-548. Also see KR-472, note 1.

²KR-472.

³KR-484.

KR-476

Charles Lewis to George Marshall

Telegram, US National Archives, F. 745.45/1-248

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

U.S. EMBASSY,
KARACHI,

No. 3.

2 January 1948

Following message from Prime Minister [Liaquat Ali Khan] acting in absence of Minister Foreign Affairs has just been handed to me by Ikramullah, Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

"The Pakistan Government appreciate the message from the US Government regarding the Kashmir question and reciprocate their feelings of friendship. The Pakistan Government have throughout been making strenuous efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the various questions outstanding between the two Dominions including that of Kashmir: but unfortunately every proposal made by them had been turned down by the India Government. The Pakistan Government, therefore, welcome the approach to the UNSC [U.N. Security Council]. They wish to assure the Government of the U.S that at no stage did they have any intention of taking any provocative or precipitate action, and that they are firmly determined to continue their efforts to

reach a peaceful settlement of all outstanding questions and that they will continue in the future as in the past to do their best to restrain any irresponsible elements in Pakistan". British colleague informed; Repeated New Delhi.¹

[CHARLES] LEWIS

¹On 4 January 1948, Howard Donovan of US Embassy, New Delhi, saw Nehru and urged that India take no action that might aggravate the situation in Kashmir. Nehru assured him that India would take no such action. See *US National Archives*, F. 745. 45/1-448. Not printed.

KR-477

INDIA'S DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN: LIAQUAT EXPOSES UNION'S SABOTAGE MOVES: PROCUREMENT OF KASHMIR ACCESSION ACT OF HOSTILITY¹

Karachi, Jan, 3: The Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan at a two-hour press conference here this evening, accused the Government of India of having never whole-heartedly accepted the partition scheme. Her leaders paid lip-service to it merely in order to get British troops out of the country.

India was out to destroy the State of Pakistan, which Indian leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India, he continued. The Pakistan Prime Minister made the following charges against the Government of India.

Systematic sabotage against the implementation of partition; stoppage of coal and rail transport; deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds, arms and equipment; and the wholesale massacre of Muslim population which are all designed towards one aim, namely the destruction of Pakistan.

That India's forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar and other States in Kathiawar, which had acceded to Pakistan, as well as the fraudulent procurement of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, are acts of hostility against Pakistan, whose destruction was India's immediate objective.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who was addressing his first press conference in Karachi as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan said: "We desire that all these matters should be referred and enquired into by U.N.O. We want a peaceful solution of all our disputes with India.

"We have been trying our utmost since August 15 to have friendly and amicable relations with that country. We never had, nor have we

now, any intention of taking any aggressive action against India, although the provocation on many an occasion was very great. We shall continue to do our utmost to find peaceful and fair solution of all our problems.

"We believe that any conflict between the two Dominions will be suicidal for both of them."

The Prime Minister of Pakistan continued: "I hope that a peaceful solution will still be found of all the differences that exist between India and Pakistan." He added: "Throughout, the Government of India's attitude has been to take unlawful possession of Kashmir by means of force and coercive methods to which Pakistan can never be a party.

In his statement at his recent press conference,² Pandit Nehru has said that they would be justified in attacking imaginary concentrations of the so-called invaders on Pakistan territory. If any such attempt is made, it would be an act of aggression unprovoked and uncalled for against Pakistan. "I hope Pandit Nehru and his Government will not take any such precipitate action. We are however, prepared for any eventuality"

IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

"Pandit Nehru has levelled serious charges against us in his statement. We have been anxiously desirous of referring all outstanding disputes to an impartial tribunal. We are willing that an impartial tribunal should go into all the charges, whether against Pakistan by India or against India by Pakistan, and insist on finding a peaceful solution of all the disputes.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan disclosed in an answer to a question that the Pakistan Government had received an intimation from the United Nations Security Council of the reference of the Kashmir issue by India to that body. He said that his Government did not still officially know what the charges made by India Government against Pakistan apropos of Kashmir were, as the original telegram received by the Pakistan Government was in a code which could not be decoded here. The repetition was also in the same code. They were now expecting a copy of India's telegram by air mail.

He made the following points:

"We will put our case and our case will be put by the best man we can get in Pakistan."

"We have not recognized Azad Kashmir Government de jure" was his reply to a question. To another question his reply was "At no stage has the Pakistan Government ever suggested that Kashmir be partitioned.

There is no justification for any such suggestion or proposal. According to the 1941 census, even in Jammu Province, the Muslims were 62% of the population. Pakistan is not prepared to consider any such proposal".

CASH BALANCES

Referring to Pakistan's share of cash balances, the Prime Minister said: "These cash balances are not the property of the India Government. These 5,50,000,000 of rupees are the share of Pakistan and no orders of the Government of India are needed for its payment. The Reserve Bank of India, which is holding these balances, was to discharge its obligations faithfully towards the two Governments for whom it is acting.

"This effort to stop payment of Pakistan's share of cash balances is intended to put pressure on the Pakistan Government to fall in line with the Government of India in handing over 3,000,000 Muslims of Kashmir against their will to the tender mercies of the Maharaja and the Government of India."

CHARGES FALSE

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who is also Pakistan Defence Minister, said: "I have seen Pandit Nehru's statement at the press conference. Certain charges have been made against the Pakistan Government. It is said that Pakistan is guilty of aggression against India. The charges are totally untrue and false. Pakistan has, from the beginning, desired to have the friendliest of relations and that has been its policy throughout. We have not deviated a hair's breadth from this. On Nov. 16, from Lahore I stated my firm and undeviating objective, and also the objective of Pakistan Government, to eliminate by peaceful and honourable means all causes of friction between the two Dominions and to establish conditions to enable Pakistan and India to live in amity. We have throughout pursued this policy". Regarding Pandit Nehru's "allegation" that he had not replied to the letter regarding Kashmir delivered to him personally on December 22, at Delhi, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said "the Government of Pakistan's reply was handed over to the High Commissioner for India in Karachi on December 30." Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan added that he had not received any reminders regarding the letter personally handed to him by Pandit Nehru.

MASSACRE OF MUSLIMS

"Human memory is short, therefore, I will give you the background to the Kashmir dispute. I recall to your minds that towards the end of last September the wholesale massacre of Muslims in Jammu Province

[was committed] by armed bands of Sikhs and Hindus, who were assisted by the armed forces of the Maharaja.³ This massacre of Muslims, arson, loot, rape and abduction went on and we drew the attention of the Kashmir Government to all these happenings in early October.

"But, unfortunately, the Kashmir Government took no notice of it. We suggested to the Kashmir Government that we might send an officer of the Pakistan Government to discuss the situation and also the complaints they had been making about the non-supply of goods through Pakistan territory. The reply came about October 6 that our officer would not be welcome. The Officer had already left and arrived there. The Prime Minister of Kashmir, Mr. Mahajan, refused to have any discussion with him.

"And now I want to show to you that this excuse that Indian troops have gone to Kashmir because of the entry of the so-called raiders from the NWFP is not an honest one.

"On October 15, long before any one had entered Kashmir territory, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, in his telegram to us, stated that unless the alleged raids into Kashmir territory, which could have existed only in the imagination of the Prime Minister of Kashmir, were stopped immediately, Kashmir would have to ask assistance from outside. He also stated that he suggested an impartial commission be appointed to enquire into the whole affair. I at once accepted that proposal of the Prime Minister but no reply came from Prime Minister.

FRIENDLY ASSISTANCE

"Then again on October 20, he sent a telegram to the Governor-General of Pakistan stating that he wished to make it clear that the attitude of the Government of Pakistan could be tolerated no longer and that he was justified in asking for friendly assistance.

"All this shows that the conspiracy and plans for the occupation of Kashmir by Indian troops were laid well in advance and the excuse that India sent her troops because of the so-called invaders having entered Kashmir territory, was only intended to deceive the world."

"Even on the admission of India, no tribesmen entered Kashmir territory before October 23.

"It is rather significant that the very day that the Governor-General of India signed the Instrument of Accession Indian troops had landed in Srinagar by 9 a.m. on October 27.

PAKISTAN'S PROPOSALS

"It was proposed by the Pakistan Government immediately that a conference should be held to consider this serious situation. A conference

was fixed for October 29 at Lahore which was to be attended by the Governors-General of Pakistan and India and the two Prime Ministers, the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Prime Minister. This conference could not be held because Pandit Nehru at the last moment fell ill and could not come. The date of the conference was postponed from October 29 to November 1 when only the Governor-General of India came to Lahore and Pandit Nehru was unable to come with him. The two Governors-General had long discussions and Governor-General of Pakistan made [some] proposals⁴ for the settlement of Kashmir issue:

"Now it will be admitted to by every unbiased person that the proposals were very fair because they left the question of the accession of Kashmir to either Pakistan or India to the unfettered will of the people of Kashmir. These proposals were rejected by the Indian Government.

ANOTHER SOLUTION

"I again in my statement⁵ of November 16 offered another solution—a peaceful solution and a fair proposal for the consideration of the Government of India. It was to the effect that the whole dispute be brought before the bar of international opinion.

"We were ready to request the UNO immediately to appoint its representatives in Jammu & Kashmir State in order to put a stop to fighting and repression of the Muslims in the State to arrange a programme of the withdrawal of outside forces, set up an impartial administration of the State till the plebiscite is held and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free will of the people of the State on the question of accession.

"I also stated that we were prepared to accept a similar solution of the dispute regarding Manavadar and Junagadh.

"This proposal was also rejected by the Government of India.

"Since then we have discussed the Kashmir issue on every occasion. We have been meeting the representatives of the Government of India in connection with the meetings of the Joint Defence Council.

INDIA'S STAND

"Unfortunately, the Government of India and its Prime Minister are determined to keep Kashmir by force and not allow the people of Kashmir a free choice. Their stand throughout has been that the fighting must be stopped. All those who have been fighting in support of the oppressed Muslims of Kashmir should withdraw and the Indian troops should remain in occupation of Kashmir State and that the present administration under Sheikh Abdullah, who is a puppet in the hands

of the Government of India, should continue and then the Government of India will make arrangements for holding a referendum.

“For this purpose they offered to get UNO observers. I do not think any one who is fair-minded would say that in a plebiscite held under such circumstances (when you have troops of a foreign Government in occupation of a country and the administration is in the hands of the puppets of that Government) the people’s unfettered will could be ascertained.

“This has been the stand of the Government of India throughout. On the contrary, our stand throughout has been that there [should] be no troops of India in Kashmir after the fighting has stopped and there should be an impartial administration set up in the State and a plebiscite should be held under the control and direction of an impartial authority.

“This is the only way in which you could get a true verdict of the people of Kashmir on the question of accession.

KASHMIR FIGHTING

“Quite a lot of fuss is being made and propaganda being done that the fighting which is going on between the troops of the Government of India and the troops of the Azad Kashmir Government is really a fight between India and the so-called invaders from outside Kashmir. Let me tell you, and this is borne out by impartial foreign observers who have visited Kashmir, that a very large proportion of those who are fighting this battle of freedom and independence are none others but Kashmiris themselves.

“The impression is being created throughout the world by false propaganda, which is carried on by the Government of India that the people who are carrying on this struggle are all outsiders and invaders who have come in Kashmir for loot. This is absolutely false. There are some who are helping the Forces of the Azad Kashmir Government who have come from tribal areas, because of the reports they are receiving of the general massacre of Muslims that had been going on in Kashmir by armed bands of Sikhs and Hindus and troops of the Maharaja.

100,000 PATHANS

“Pandit Nehru in his Statement at his press conference has said that there are 100,000 Pathans concentrated in Pakistan and are undergoing military training. This is absolutely false. As a matter of fact what has happened is this. There are some Pathans who have come from Afghanistan. They are called *Patwindas*. They have been coming every year during the

winter months into the Punjab and before India was divided, they used to go all over the Punjab and even to some other parts of the country.

"They come with their sheep every year because in their areas in Afghanistan during the winter months there is no fodder or grass for their animals.

"This year, because of the situation in the East Punjab, they are all concentrated in the West Punjab and they have been unable to spread about as they used to in the past. Therefore, the impression is created that all these Pathans have been imported for the purpose of being made to take part in the fight that is going on in Kashmir.

"There are no other tribesmen in the West Punjab and there is no concentration of the type as described by the Prime Minister of India.

RAIDS FROM JAMMU

"Pandit Nehru has said that there have been no raids on Pakistan territory by Indian Forces. Not a day passes when there is no raid from Jammu into the adjoining Pakistan territory by armed bands of Jammu people assisted by Indian troops. I have drawn the attention of the Prime Minister of India to this repeatedly. Protest after protest has been lodged against this aggression. Our territory has been bombed from air and machine-gunned and there have been a number of casualties.

"According to a telegram received today from the West Punjab Government in Gujrat District, there was an attack by three army trucks from Jammu State, one entering the area of the Pakistan village of Awan Sharif and firing with bren-guns and rifles. Fire was returned by our police for half an hour and the attack was repelled.

"A report from Sialkot District states that raids of Jammu mob assisted by State Forces, took place on the Pakistan village of Bajra ghari, resulting in one killed and one injured. The raiders lost nine men. On December 31, two Indian aircraft hovered over the Pakistan villages of Suchetgarh, Wains and Salakur, shelling the last two before returning to Jammu. I have got a number of instances of this nature.

"I have been informing Pandit Nehru everyday and have got tired of protesting.

"For Pandit Nehru to say that these reports are grossly exaggerated or untrue is a travesty of trust [*sic* for truth].

"In spite of all this provocation and aggression that is going on against Pakistan territory, we have refrained from taking any action. Pandit Nehru has stated that after he had handed over his letter to me on December 22, he sent me two reminders asking for a reply. I received no reminders from Pandit Nehru.

REPLY TO NEHRU

"Anyhow on December 30, I sent a most immediate telegram telling Pandit Nehru that a reply to his letter of December 22, which he gave to me in Delhi would be handed over to their High Commissioner in Karachi that very day and it was done. The letter was given to the Deputy High Commissioner.

"Pandit Nehru must have received my telegram but apart from that there is some discrepancy in his statement and the telegram which I received today shows that the reference to the U.N.O was not made by India before December 31.

"The telegram came in code which could not be decoded at the Foreign Office here and we asked for a repetition.

"I am sorry that Pandit Nehru has not referred to the reply which the Pakistan Government sent them, thus creating an impression that they were forced to take unilateral action because the Pakistan Government had not replied to their letter of December 22."

Referring to Pakistan share of the cash balances, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said: "It was agreed between the two governments that Pakistan's share was 75 crores. We have already received 20 crores. This has no connection with any other issue and it is immoral for them to refuse to pay money to Pakistan by giving out that this settlement had any relationship with the Kashmir issue.

"At the Partition Council meeting in Delhi towards the end of November (it was either on November 27 or 28) it was agreed that Pakistan's share was to be 75 crores and that of uncovered debts at 17.5%. This related to one another and was reached on its merits.

NOT LINKED WITH KASHMIR

"No reference to Kashmir or any other question was made at all.

"This is borne out by the fact that a statement [was] agreed to on this and other matters between the two governments at Lahore on the night of December 8 and it was decided that Sardar Patel would read that statement to the Indian Constituent Assembly on December 9 at 4 p.m. and that the Pakistan Government would issue that statement in the form of press communique simultaneously. This was done.

"No condition was laid down that the settlement was linked with Kashmir or any other matter."

In answer to a question he said that the Joint Defence Council was not meeting in Lahore tomorrow.

"I am always friendly with everybody", The Prime Minister said smilingly.

POPULATION FIGURES

Finally he gave the following population figures about Kashmir

and Junagadh.

According to the 1941 census, even in Jammu province the Muslims have a population of 62%. The Muslim population in Jammu province according to the census was 1,240,000 and the non-Muslim population was 780,000.

In Kashmir the Muslim population is 1,962,000 and the non-Muslim population 153,000.

In Ladakh the population was 163,000 Muslims and Buddhists and others 40,000. In Gilgit there are 115,000 Muslims and practically no non-Muslims—API.

¹The *Pakistan Times*, 4 January 1948.

²S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, V, 167-74. Also see the *Hindu*, 3 January 1948.

³In a talk with the Maharaja on 5 August 1948, Sheikh Abdullah charged him with killing the Muslims in Jammu and said that "even C.R. Chopra, the Governor of Kashmir, and Brig Udey Chand, I. G. Police had admitted that I [the ruler] must have had a hand in this". Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 214. Later, on 7 November 1947, Nehru admitted that "the attempt to evacuate Muslims from Jammu was an amazingly stupid thing to do". See S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, IV, 320d.

⁴See KR-432.

⁵KR-446.

KR-478

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*¹

NEW DELHI,
5 January 1948

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

Your letter of the 30th December was received in New Delhi on the 1st January.² I had gone to Lucknow for the day and did not therefore get it until the 2nd. On the 3rd I had to visit Ajmer and yesterday, the 4th, was fully occupied with celebrations of Burma's independence and other business. This will explain the delay in my sending you a reply.

2. I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by my attempting to answer, at length, the counter-charges that you have laid against India in Paragraph 18 [19] of your letter. Pakistan's accusation that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was procured by conspiracy, fraud and force has been repeatedly made by you and was frequently denied and refuted by us. So far as the cases of Junagadh and Manavadar are concerned, we maintain that there is no parallel between them and that of Kashmir.

3. Any impartial person familiar with the tragic happenings in the Punjab will recognise the complete baselessness of the suggestion that India organised the wholesale massacre of the Muslim population in any part of its territories. Massacres of non-Muslims began first in 1946 in Calcutta, and in March 1947 in the West Punjab. What happened in India against Muslims was by way of retaliation against the atrocities perpetrated on non-Muslims first in Calcutta, and, later, in territories which are now part of Pakistan, e.g., Noakhali and the West Punjab. We have not only not encouraged, but openly and consistently condemned retaliation. We have also done everything in our power to protect Muslim minorities in India. We claim that we have done so more effectively than Pakistan.

4. I am not aware that there has been any stoppage of essential requirements, such as coal and rail transport, as a kind of sanction against Pakistan. Where delays have occurred these have been due entirely to other causes, e.g., shortage of wagons, or, in the disturbed areas of the Punjab, to dislocation of traffic owing to the disturbances.

5. There has been no deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds and arms and equipment with intent to apply pressure on Pakistan. As I have already tried to explain to you, we stand by the financial agreement that was recently reached. Payment has been deferred because we cannot, while operations against Jammu and Kashmir State are being conducted from bases in Pakistan, with Pakistan's connivance and assistance, reasonably be expected to make available funds which might be used to intensify military operations against us.

6. The first two charges, viz., that India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, and that India is out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself, are completely devoid of foundation, and I must emphatically repudiate them. Had we not desired to accept the partition scheme, nothing would have been simpler for us than to refuse acceptance when the scheme was first put forth. India has no responsibility for the sequence of events which you regard as evidence of India's resolve to destroy the State of Pakistan. It is true that some of us have expressed the view that India and Pakistan must draw closer to each other. The facts of history and geography fully justify this conclusion. Two neighbouring States such as Pakistan and India can either be friends, or live in a state of veiled or of open hostility. No responsible Indian leader has ever thought that friendship between India and Pakistan, which is more desirable than mistrust or enmity, should be achieved by forcible compulsion of Pakistan into political union with India.

7. In conclusion, I would add that while I fully share your hope that our approach to the United Nations Security Council will help to lay the foundation of friendlier relations between Pakistan and India, it is not possible for us to invite the intervention of the Council on all the matters which you have mentioned. Peace between India and Pakistan is not threatened either by past events or by the entirely imaginary hostile motives that are attributed to us, but by the hostilities that are now in progress in general in Kashmir State between the Indian State Forces on the one hand and the invaders, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, operating from bases in Pakistan and with assistance drawn from Pakistan, on the other. This is an issue at once clear-cut and urgent, and, unless valuable time is to be wasted on acrimonious debates, this is the issue for the settlement of which the Security Council must, in our opinion, exclusively apply itself.³

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

¹S. Gopal, *Selected Works*, V, 176-8.

²See KR-475.

³On 24 February 1948, V.P. Menon, at a meeting with Counsellor Howard Donovan of the US Embassy in New Delhi, told him that if the Security Council decided the Kashmir issue in favour of Pakistan, Nehru might resign. See *US National Archives*, F. 845. 00/2-2448, No. 177. Not printed.

KR-479

Louis Mountbatten to King George VI

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D

NEW DELHI,
26 February 1948

Sir,

With humble duty I beg to submit to Your Majesty copies of two aide memoires which I have had prepared on :

- (a) Junagadh And Kashmir,
- (b) India and the Commonwealth.¹

And which are being taken home of the Prime Minister by Mr. Gordon Walker who leaves Delhi today.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your Majesty's Humble and Devoted Servant,
[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

¹Not traceable.

Enclosure to KR-479
Aide-Memoire by the Governor-General of India on
Junagadh and Kashmir

25 February 1948

INTRODUCTION

I have been given to understand, from conversations I have had with various persons, that three major misunderstandings exist in connection with the Government of India's policy and actions in Junagadh and Kashmir. These misunderstandings are, I am told, current among responsible opinion in the United Kingdom. It is with the object of clearing them up that I am writing this aide-memoire, which will set out the history of the various events concerned.

2. The three misunderstandings to which I refer are:-

First That the Government of India took possession of Junagadh State by force¹ after its legal accession to Pakistan, and has largely vitiated its case in Kashmir by its actions in Junagadh,

Secondly that the Government of India brought pressure to bear, at various times, on the Maharaja and Government of Kashmir in order [to] induce that State to accede to the Dominion of India,

Thirdly that the Government of India planned the despatch of Indian forces to Kashmir some time in advance of the date on which these forces were sent.

3. None of these statements is true; I shall deal with them one by one from my personal knowledge, for I was present at all the meetings at which the various decisions were taken.

[Paras 4-26 omitted²]

KASHMIR

Efforts to Persuade the Maharaja to Ascertain the will of his People and Accede to one Dominion or the Other

27. I will now attempt to deal with the second misunderstanding to which I have referred above, namely that pressure was brought to

bear, by the Government of India, on the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Government to accede to India.

28. I freely confess that I envisaged the possibility of serious trouble in Kashmir from the start if the State acceded to one Dominion or the other without first ascertaining the popular will. I therefore made every effort open to me to induce the Maharaja of Kashmir to ascertain the will of his people by any accepted means and quickly accede to one Dominion or the other. (For the choice, I felt, must lie with the people: the geographical compulsions to which I have referred in connection with Junagadh did not, of course, apply to Kashmir, which was, from this point of view, obviously free to accede to either Dominion).

29. I tendered this advice personally when I visited the Maharaja in July 1947. I told him that I appreciated his particular difficulty in being a Hindu ruler with a Muslim majority population; but urged him to find out what his people wanted, and accede one way or the other preferably before the 15th August. I instructed Colonel Webb, the Resident in Kashmir, to continue to give this advice after my visit, and he subsequently reported that he had done so, but to no avail. I myself also gave the same advice to the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Pandit Kak, and when he came to Delhi, I put him in touch with both Sardar Patel and Mr. Jinnah as representatives of the two future Governments (the latter with Pandit Nehru's and Sardar Patel's knowledge). When nothing had happened by the end of August, I asked Lord Ismay, who had gone to Kashmir for a holiday, to try once more and induce the Maharaja to make up his mind; but His Highness skillfully evaded Lord Ismay's attempts to give advice. The Maharaja was apparently incapable of coming to any decision. He did nothing. Events were left to take their course.

30. In the middle of October, I saw Sheikh Abdullah, and also advised him that there should be no accession until the will of the people had been ascertained. He said that this was also his own view. This policy was fully in accord with the views of my Government.

Absence of Pressure by the Government of India

31. My Government put no pressure to bear on the Maharaja to cause him to accede to India. Visits by Mahatma Gandhi and Acharya Kiripalana [Kirpalani] (the then Congress President) to Kashmir have been quoted in support of a claim that India representatives (though admittedly not members of the Government) did bring pressure to bear. All that I can say with regard to Gandhi's visit is that he gave me his promise that he would not discuss political matters of this kind at all. Acharya Kirpalani's visit took place in May 1947, and I am assured by my Government that the question of accession was not discussed at

all and that the only question of major importance that was discussed was Sheikh Abdullah's release from goal. [sic for gaol]

32. Indeed the Government of India went out of their way to abstain from any acts which might be interpreted as inducement. As a particular example, when the Kashmir Government requested them for 5,000 gallons of petrol which Pakistan had been unable to provide, they sent only 500 gallons as the minimum amount necessary to prevent a complete breakdown in Srinagar.

Events on 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th October

33. It was on 24th October, when I was dining with Pandit Nehru, that I heard the first reports that a column of tribesmen had entered Kashmir in buses from the direction of Peshawar, and were already on the outskirts of Uri. A Defence Committee meeting was summoned for the following morning (25th October), and [it] took place in my presence. The main decision taken at this meeting was that efforts should be made to fly supplies of arms and ammunition to Srinagar, so as to give the forces defending that city a chance of repelling the tribesmen. The question of accession was mentioned, as was the possibility of Sheikh Abdullah being brought into the Kashmir Government. But no final decisions on these matters, nor on the question of India troops being sent to Kashmir, were reached. It was also decided at this meeting to send the Secretary of the States Ministry, accompanied by Army and Air Force Staff Officers, to Kashmir. They returned the following day with the information that the raiders were already advancing on Baramula, and that only immediate action would prevent them from taking Srinagar. They also brought a request by the Maharaja of Kashmir for military help and his offer of accession.

34. At a further Defence Committee meeting on 26th October, again in my presence, these were considered. Agreement was reached at this meeting that the accession should be accepted only subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in Kashmir when the law and order situation allowed this; and that a responsible Government should be immediately established. So far as military help was concerned, it was only at this meeting on 25th October that it was finally agreed that an infantry battalion should fly to Srinagar.

35. The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India had been signed in Jammu just before these troops left. Before this operation took place, the three Chiefs of Staff and I pointed out its very grave risks to my Ministers, but they, headed by Pandit Nehru, took the line that a possible alternative to sending in troops and to allow[ing] a massacre to take place in Srinagar, (which would have resulted in turn in a

major holocaust in India), through failure to respond to the appeals, was that the Government of India might fall, that an extremist Government might take its place, and that war between the two Dominions might result. Incidentally, a further consequence would doubtless have been that the 250 British inhabitants in Srinagar would have been murdered by the raiders, since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Government of Kashmir were in any position to safeguard their lives.

The Possibility of Sending Indian Troops to Kashmir Without Accepting Accession

36. Another question which has arisen is whether it would not have been possible for the Government of India to have sent troops to Srinagar without accepting the accession of Kashmir. In my view, this would surely have ended up in war. There would have been nothing to have prevented Pakistan sending their troops in. I must point out that Mr. Jinnah, when he heard that Indian troops were being flown to Srinagar, did in fact give an order for a brigade of Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir and occupy the Banihal pass, in order to cut the land line of communications of the Indian troops. When this order was conveyed on the telephone to General Gracey, the latter insisted on first obtaining Field Marshal Auchinleck's permission for the move, as he considered it probable that it would bring war between the two Dominions; and British officers were involved. It was not until Field Marshal Auchinleck's visit to Lahore the following day that the order was finally rescinded. The only thing that enabled him to induce Mr. Jinnah to do this was that Kashmir had acceded to India and was thus part of Indian territory.

The Absence of Prior Planning to Send India Troops to Kashmir

37. In giving my description of events at the end of October, I have already made it clear that no steps were taken to plan the despatch of Indian troops to Kashmir before 25th October. But I have had great difficulty in persuading the Pakistan leaders—and understand that world opinion as a whole is not yet persuaded—that this operation was not pre-planned. Presumably this is because there is no previous case, to my knowledge, of an air borne operation using civilian aircraft having taken place successfully at such short notice. It was indeed a remarkable effort. In confirmation of what I have said, I would refer to the document, signed by the three (British) Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, which is attached as Appendix A. 6.³

CONCLUSIONS

38. It may be of assistance if I attempt to summarize the conclusions

of the facts I have set out above. They are as follows:-

a. Quite apart from the issue of majority populations, the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in violation of the principle of geographical compulsions to which the Pakistan leaders had themselves subscribed. The accession of Kashmir was not. Moreover, from the strategic and economic point of view, while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India had considerable interest in Kashmir. There were two further special factors involved in the case of Kashmir but absent from that of Junagadh, the actual use of force and tribal invasion to overthrow the Maharaja's regime, and the presence of an important inter-communal political organization in the State. Taking into account all these "other factors" the accession of [Junagadh] to Pakistan was wholly frivolous⁴ while that of Kashmir to India is, at the very lowest arguable. But in view of all the special circumstances attaching to both accessions, the government of India accepted the principle of a confirming plebiscite for the action taken in both States;

b. The entry of an Indian Administrator accompanied by Indian troops into Junagadh was on an invitation by the Dewan, who had obtained his Ruler's consent, and by the Executive Council of Junagadh State, supported by representative [of] public opinion; and was carried out, under the guidance of the senior member of the Junagadh State Council, without a shot being fired;

c. The Government of India in its acknowledgment of the principle that, despite the geographical and other compulsions involved, the people of Junagadh should be free to choose to which Dominion their State should accede, will be repaired [*sic* for prepared], if the present referendum is questioned by U.N.O, to hold another in the presence of U.N.O representatives;

d. I gave, and caused to be given, continual advice from July 1947 onwards to the Maharaja of Kashmir that he should take steps to ascertain the will of his people by some recognized method and accede quickly to one Dominion or the other; but I was unable to persuade him to act on the advice;

e. No pressure was brought to bear by the Government of India on the Maharaja or Government of Kashmir, at any time, to induce him to accede to the Dominion of India; indeed my Government went out of its way to avoid doing anything which might be construed as this;

f. No plans were made for Indian troops to be sent to Kashmir before the information came through, on 24th October, that tribesmen were inside Kashmir territory and advancing on Srinagar; a directory [*sic* for directive] was given to the Chiefs of Staff to prepare such plans on 25th October; and to put them into effect on 26th October;

g. The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India had been signed before these troops left;⁵ if they had not been sent, Srinagar would have been sacked, the European inhabitants of that city would probably have been massacred, and the Government of India might have fallen because of its failure to respond to Kashmir's appeal to prevent these happenings, giving way to an extremist Government with the likelihood of an inter-Dominion war; if the troops had gone without the Instrument of Accession being signed, Pakistan troops would also have entered Kashmir, and there would again have been every likelihood of war between the two Dominions.

¹See PS-179, Vol. VIII, 298.

²Enclosure to PS-238, Vol. VIII, 402.

³See note 1 above.

⁴On 8 December 1947, Nehru admitted, at the Inter-Dominion Conference in Lahore, that "India had been in some ways in the wrong about Junagadh". See KR-467.

⁵This statement is not underpinned by facts. On 27 October 1947, a 3-member team composed of Mahajan, Batra and Menon had left Delhi in the morning for Jammu and returned in the afternoon the same day after obtaining the signature of the Maharaja on the Instrument of Accession. Indian troops landed at Srinagar airport at 9 a.m. that day. See KR-406.

KR-480

Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan

F. 14 (3) PMS

NO. 540/PM

NEW DELHI,
6 March 1948

My dear Nawabzada,

Will you please refer to your letter dated the 23rd February¹ in which you refer to the alleged violation of Pakistan territory by regular Indian and Kashmir State troops and armed bands of civilians from across the border of Jammu and Kashmir State, and ask that I should use all my influence and authority to stop such raids.

2. I am having the incidents referred to by you very carefully investigated and I shall write to you further about the results of this investigation. I would like to assure you, however, in the meanwhile, that we have given the strictest instructions to our defence forces not to violate Pakistan territory; and the investigation of previous complaints made by you has amply demonstrated that these instructions have been loyally carried out by our troops.

3. I would like in this connection to recall to your mind our conversation when we last met in Lahore at a Joint Defence Council meeting. You then gave me a long list of frontier violations. I pointed out to you that even if

the allegations were correct, their total effect was insignificant in the context of events in Kashmir. I must frankly repeat that it does seem to me extraordinary that you should send me this complaint at a time when armed raiders from Pakistan and from the tribal area are streaming in thousands into Kashmir territory devastating villages, looting property, murdering people, and abducting large numbers of women.

4. You refer in your letter to Gandhiji's supreme sacrifice and to the necessity of the best minds in both countries thinking seriously of the gulf between India and Pakistan. I am glad you have referred to Gandhiji and I agree entirely with you that both India and Pakistan should examine and constantly keep in review their conduct in the light of Gandhiji's approach to the problem. I would inform you, however, that, as I have stated in my statement to the Constituent Assembly this morning, I had had the benefit of the constant advice of Gandhiji in the matter of our handling of the Kashmir situation, and the action that we have taken there had had his full support.

Your sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

¹Not traceable.

KR-481

Paul H. Alling to George Marshall

US National Archives, 845 F.00/3-2248
[Extract]

SECRET
No. 133

AMERICAN EMBASSY, KARACHI,
22 March 1948

[INTERVIEW WITH M. A. JINNAH]

Mr. Jinnah had inquired through his *aide de camp* whether my wife, my daughter and I would care to accompany him and his sister on the Governor-General's launch on Wednesday, March 17, to the nearby beach of Sandspit and take tea with them at their beach cottage, and we, of course, accepted. A car was sent for us at our hotel and we were conducted to the dock where the launch was drawn up alongside. On the trip out to the dock I observed that police were stationed along the route at intervals of perhaps two hundred yards. On the return trip considerable number of people lined the streets and there were frequent shouts of "*Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad*." During the trip to and from Sandspit

and during tea there, all of which lasted over three hours, I had an opportunity to discuss various matters with the Governor-General, the more important of which I cite below. These subjects are of varying degrees of interest and importance and the only reason that I lump them all together is to give an idea of Mr. Jinnah's personality and interests.

[Paras 2-6 omitted]

BRITISH, HINDUS AND KASHMIR

7. Mr. Jinnah then turned to the question of his relations with certain British and Hindu leaders. He recounted his last conversation with Mr. Churchill in England, which, I judged, took place during the war, probably about 1942. He said he found Mr. Churchill adamant on the question of Indian independence; he would not even listen to such a proposal. Mr. Jinnah finally pointed out that if the Muslim League once joined hands with the Congress Party a complete collapse of British rule in India could be brought about within forty-eight hours. Mr. Churchill appeared impressed by that argument.

8. Mr. Jinnah said he fully realized the important part played by American public opinion in bringing about the final independence of India and Pakistan. He had observed, however, what he considered a strange reaction on the part of Congress leader to criticism of certain Indian policies by the American press. He cited, for example, the stories current in India that the U.S. was partial to Pakistan in the current Kashmir dispute before the U.N. He thought the explanation was that India for many years had a most favorable press in the U.S., but now that the country had its independence and must be held responsible for political acts, some of which were bound to cause unfavorable impressions, Indian leaders were shocked to learn that the American press did not continue to support their acts as was the rule prior to independence. He likened the Indian leaders to "the favorite son" who, spoiled by his father, eventually gets into trouble and is surprised and hurt when the father rebukes him.

9. Mr. Jinnah felt that the Indian leaders, and Lord Mountbatten in particular, had been less than fair and just to Pakistan in their original handling of the Kashmir issue. He then recited at great length his version of the beginnings of the difficulty. It was obviously his firm conviction that the whole issue was a [plot] or conspiracy on the part of the Indian leaders. First they had, through the use of agents, created fears among the Muslim population of Poonch. Accordingly, Muslim leaders there held a meeting, which was perfectly legal, and drew up a

petition to the Maharaja requesting him to accede to Pakistan. Immediately the Maharaja had sent his Dogra troops to Poonch and they began a campaign of suppression, arson, slaughter and rape. The Muslim population naturally reacted and were joined by their fellows from nearby territories. Mr. Jinnah said that immediately on the outbreak of the troubles he had communicated with the Indian Government and urged that both parties "put their heads together" with a view to working out some solution. He had urged this not only once but three or four times but met only a negative response or no response. Finally he was confronted with the actual acceptance of accession of Kashmir to India. Meeting shortly thereafter with Lord Mountbatten for discussions Mr. Jinnah reproached him for failure to advise the Pakistan Government of the accession proposal and afford at least an opportunity for comment before action was taken. Mr. Jinnah said he felt that it was highly discourteous for the Governor-General of one Dominion to fail to consult with the Governor-General of another before taking action in such an important matter. Lord Mountbatten weakly replied he was sure he had sent Mr. Jinnah a telegram on the subject before accepting accession, but Lord Ismay, who was present, said unfortunately that was not the case.

Thereupon Lord Mountbatten had no further comment. It was quite clear that the Governor-General of Pakistan held the Governor-General of India in low esteem.

10. I asked him whether he cared to express an opinion regarding the Maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh. He said he was naturally partisan in his views, but he could say that he had never seen in his life such squalor, disease and general poverty as he had found among the Muslims of Srinagar. He added that it was incredible to him in this day and age to find absolutely no sanitary facilities in the city and what made the situation particularly distressing was that such conditions existed within sight of, if not almost on the very doorstep of, the Maharaja's ultra-luxurious palace.

11. The Quaid-i-Azam went on to say that Pakistan had been criticized for failure to prevent tribesmen from entering Kashmir to defend the homes of their racial brethren. He said there was only one way to attempt to prevent such incursions and that was to order Pakistan troops to fire on the tribesmen. Any such action, however, would have precipitated such a widespread conflict that no one could have foreseen the outcome. As a matter of fact, it was to avoid such possibilities of conflict that Pakistan troops had been withdrawn from the frontier provinces. The Governor-General then characterized the

tribal situation now as "a million times more dangerous" than it was a few months ago. Unless the tribesmen could be convinced that a fair plebiscite could be held in Kashmir no power on earth could persuade them to lay down their arms, and once they broke the bounds there was no telling where they would stop.

12. I told the Quaid-i-Azam that my own country was most anxious to see friendly relations develop between the two Dominions and that I knew my Government would be deeply appreciative of anything he could do toward that end. He replied that nothing was nearer to his heart. What he sincerely wished was an association similar to that between the United States and Canada. He said he understood we had no formal alliance with Canada, but he did not have the slightest doubt that either country would come immediately to the defence of the other in case one was threatened. I said that I had been told that several months ago Pakistan had offered India a defensive alliance of twenty years duration against all "outsiders". He replied that this was not exactly the case. (From this I inferred that the offer which the Finance Minister, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, had told me about ... was, as he had said, strictly on his own responsibility). Mr. Jinnah said that no offer had been made in the formal sense and certainly, so far as he was concerned, he had never envisaged a time limit of twenty years on any defensive arrangements. He himself had, however, on numerous occasions informed Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru and other Indian leaders that Pakistan desired a defensive understanding with India on a military level. He had pointed out to these leaders that if India was attacked from any quarter he knew that Pakistan would be next on the list, and, of course, the same held true of India in the event of an attack on Pakistan. What he wanted, therefore, was an understanding on a military basis, with no time limit, similar perhaps to our arrangements with Canada. He kept referring again and again to United States-Canadian relations as the model for India-Pakistan relations.

[Paras 13-14 omitted]

Respectfully yours,
PAUL H. ALLING

KR-482

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan**F. 14 (3) PMS*

No. 685/PM

NEW DELHI,
22 April 1948

My dear Liaquat Ali Khan,

Please refer to my letter No. 540/PM dated the 6th March 1948¹ regarding the alleged violation of Pakistan territory by regular Indian and Kashmir State troops and armed bands of civilians, from across the border of Jammu and Kashmir State.

All the alleged incidents were thoroughly investigated and no confirmation could be obtained of their having taken place. We have, however, as already intimated to you in my previous letter, given the strictest instruction to our defence forces not to violate Pakistan territory and have no doubt that these instructions have in the past been and in the future will be loyally carried out by our troops.

I regret the delay in writing but the investigation of the alleged incidents necessarily took some time.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

¹KR-480.

KR-483

V. F. Erskine-Crum to R. V. Brockman

Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/84-B
[Extract]

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
26 April 1948

P. S. to Governor-General,

I saw General Bucher from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Sunday 25th April.

This is an account of the interview.

[Paras 2-7 omitted]

KASHMIR

8. General Bucher said that he and the Defence Minister had each received a long letter from the Prime Minister asking them why operations in Kashmir were going so slowly and ponderously. The Prime Minister had summoned a meeting on this matter (and on Hyderabad) for Tuesday 27th April.

9. General Bucher reiterated that he had not the least intention of being forced into widespread action against Poonch and Mirpur Districts. Anyway, this was genuinely militarily impossible. The next stage, as already indicated, would be either

- a. the evacuation of the non-Muslims in Poonch city; or
- b. an advance towards Domel.

General Cariappa had been told to plan for one or the other.

GENERAL CARIAPPA

10. General Bucher said that General Cariappa had proved the most complete disappointment. His attitude at present was quite intolerable. He had failed to carry out a number of orders. He had demanded that the R. I. A. F. in Kashmir should be put under his command. He had suggested (presumably out of jealousy of General Thimmayya) that he should set up a tactical headquarter of his own in Jammu, and exercise direct control over two divisional areas.

11. General Bucher said that the Defence Minister was fully aware of General Cariappa's failings. He had been asked whom he would recommend for his own successor. Although General Rajendra Singh was next senior after Cariappa, he thought that General Srinagesh would probably do the job best.

SARDAR PATEL

12. General Bucher gave an account of an interview he had had with Sardar Patel the previous evening. Sardar Patel had said that he always thought it would have been best to have marched on Lahore immediately after partition and had advocated:-

[Sub-para a. omitted]

- b. the subsequent concentration of all available formations of the Indian Army in Kashmir and the over-running of the whole of the State.

13. General Bucher had in reply said:

[Sub-para a. omitted]

- b. that there was no point in over-running the rest of Kashmir, as the inhabitants would not vote for India anyhow;

c. That the obvious solution was to partition Kashmir.

14. In the few seconds which remained before the doctors intervened, Sardar Patel, bouncing up and down on his bed

(a) cursed the British in general and General Bucher in particular;

(b) said that unless something was done quickly the Congress Party would be finished.

[Para 15 omitted]

V. F. ERSKINE-CRUM

KR-484

Report of Security Council on Jammu and Kashmir Question¹

A. INCLUSION IN THE AGENDA

The representative of India to the United Nations, in a letter dated January 1, 1948,² and addressed to the President of the Security Council stated that a situation coming under Article 35 of the Charter, continuation of which was likely to endanger international peace and security, existed between India and Pakistan resulting from the aid that invaders, comprising Pakistan nationals and tribesmen from areas adjacent to the north-west frontier of Pakistan, were drawing from Pakistan for operations against the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He requested the Security Council to call on Pakistan immediately to stop giving such assistance, since it was an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan did not desist from such action, the Government of India might be compelled in self-defence to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders. The situation was therefore of extreme urgency, the letter stated, and called for immediate action by the Security Council to avoid a breach of international peace.

This matter was admitted to the agenda of the Security Council at its 226th meeting on January 6, 1948, when, pursuant to Article 31 of the Charter, the representatives of India and Pakistan were invited to participate in the discussion. Consideration was postponed until January 15, at the request of the Pakistan Government, to enable the Pakistan Foreign Minister to reach New York.

Under cover of a letter dated January 15, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan submitted three documents replying to India's charges, leveling counter-charges and calling upon the Council to take action on the latter charges. The main points of the charges concerned India's action in Jammu and Kashmir, the unlawful occupation of the State of Junagadh

and other States by Indian forces, mass destruction of Muslims in a pre-arranged program of genocide, and failure to implement agreements between the two countries.

As a result of a letter dated January 20 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council requesting consideration of matters in the Pakistan complaint other than the Jammu-Kashmir question, there was discussion at the 231st meeting on January 22 of a change in the agenda, which had up to then been entitled "Jammu and Kashmir question". This was now altered to the "India-Pakistan question", with the understanding that the Kashmir question would be discussed first as a particular case of the general India-Pakistan dispute, though this would not mean that consideration of the other issues in the Pakistan complaint would be postponed until consideration of the Kashmir question had been completed.

B. THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR QUESTION

(1) *Telegram from the President to the Parties:* By identical telegrams dated January 6, 1948, the President of the Security Council, prior to the Council's examination of the Indian communication of January 1 addressed an urgent appeal to the Governments of both India and Pakistan to refrain from any step incompatible with the Charter and liable to result in an aggravation of the situation, thereby rendering more difficult any action by the Security Council. In their replies the two Governments assured the President of the Council that they would refrain from any action which might be contrary to the Charter.

(2) *Statements by the parties:* At the 227th meeting on January 6, 1948, the representative of India³ stated that the Government of India had been compelled to bring the Kashmir question before the Security Council by the failure to reach agreement in direct negotiations, which failure had resulted from the intransigence and lack of co-operation of the Pakistan Government. He stressed that the solution of this matter was urgent, not only to safeguard the residents of the State, but to avoid the risk of war between India and Pakistan.

After the Indian Independence Act had come into force on August 15th, 1947, the representative of India explained, Kashmir had started negotiations with both India and Pakistan with regard to accession to one of them. India, while vitally interested in the decision, had not put any pressure on Kashmir to accede to the Indian Dominion, whereas Pakistan had applied coercive pressure. It had withheld supplies of vital commodities to the State, in contravention of the Standstill Agreement previously negotiated. Side by side with economic strangulation, armed incursions had begun to take place from West Punjab into the

territory of Jammu and Kashmir State. To counteract the mass raid of tribesmen which started on October 22 and to stop their advance on Srinagar, the Kashmir Government, on October 26, 1947, supported by Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the most influential and popular organization in Kashmir, had acceded to the Dominion of India and had asked for arms aid. The Government of India had accepted the accession on the understanding that the will of the people regarding it could be made clear in a plebiscite or referendum when law and order had been restored. The Government of India had had no plan to send any military assistance to Kashmir before October 25.

The representative of India cited evidence to support the charges that the Pakistan Provincial and Central Governments were aiding the rebellion with arms and supplies and that Pakistan nationals and servicemen "on leave" were participating in the raids. He requested the Security Council to use its influence and power to persuade the Government of Pakistan to prevent its nationals from participating in the raids and to deny aid to the invaders.

At the 228th and 229th meetings on January 16 and 17, the representative of Pakistan replied¹ to the representative of India and amplified the charges made in the documents submitted to the Council by the Government of Pakistan. He reviewed the history of the recent period leading up to partition and communal strife, which, he charged, had arisen from the acts and attitude of the Hindu extremist elements and of the Sikhs. He also outlined the development of an alleged Sikh conspiracy to secure a partition of the Punjab and to exterminate or expel the Muslims of the Eastern Punjab.

He maintained the Government of India had not dealt properly or adequately with attacks on Muslims, even in the Indian capital.

As regards the issues in Jammu and Kashmir, he denied that Pakistan had applied pressure to the Kashmir Government, pointing out that the breakdown in supplies was due to confusion and strife in the border areas arising from the attacks of the State forces and Sikh and Hindu bands on the Muslim population of Kashmir. The State Government, he said, had planned and carried out attacks on Muslims in order to create a situation favorable to its accession to India. It was in self-defence, and because of indignation aroused by these acts, that the Kashmir Muslims and those tribesmen that were helping them were fighting against the State troops.

The representative of Pakistan stated that the Kashmir government had refused or ignored offers of friendly discussion, had ignored acceptance of its own demand for an impartial inquiry, and had called in Indian troops

without informing Pakistan of its intended action. In the same way, the Indian Government, which claimed that it had tried to reach a settlement with Pakistan by negotiation, had not informed Pakistan of the movement of Indian troops into Kashmir until after it had taken place. The Indian Government had not, in fact, he asserted, really tried to settle the issues by direct negotiation.

He called for the evacuation from Jammu and Kashmir of all elements foreign to the State, including tribesmen and Indian Army troops, as the best step to a just solution of the question.⁵

(3) RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF JANUARY 17, 1948

At the 229th meeting on January 17, the President, speaking as the representative of Belgium, stated that, in view of the urgent nature of the question, he was submitting the following draft resolution (S/651)⁶ before the Council came to a consideration of matters of substance:

The President added the following words to the third paragraph of the draft resolution, in accordance with a suggestion made by the representative of Colombia: "in which they announce their intention to conform to the Charter".

The representatives of Colombia, Syria and Canada supported the draft resolution. The representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that the proposed resolution would add nothing to what had already been done in the matter. The Security Council should study the question more exhaustively and adopt as soon as possible a resolution on the merits of the question designed to improve the situation in Kashmir and restore friendly relations between India and Pakistan. The representative of Argentina said that he would support the Belgian draft resolution though he would have preferred something more effective.

The Belgian draft resolution was adopted by 9 votes in favor, 0 against, and 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

(4) CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES AND THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT

Following the adoption of the Belgian resolution the representative of the United Kingdom proposed that the President of the Council should meet with the representatives of the two Governments concerned and that under his guidance they should try to find some common ground on which the structure of a settlement might be built. The proposal met with the approval of the parties concerned and the President declared his readiness to assist. No objection was voiced to the proposal by any representative on the Security Council.

In the course of the Council's consideration of the Kashmir question, therefore, four successive monthly Presidents of the Council (the

representatives of Belgium, Canada, China and Colombia) held conversations with representatives of the two parties. The proposals and draft resolutions, which were placed before the Council were largely the outcome of these continued consultations of the Presidents with the parties concerned.

(5) RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF JANUARY 20, 1948

At the 230th meeting on January 20, the President, speaking as the representative of Belgium, submitted a draft resolution⁷ (S/654) which had been drawn up as a result of his talks with the representatives of the parties.

The representative of Pakistan noted that the proposed Commission would constitute machinery which could deal with all matters pertaining to the India-Pakistan dispute when the Council so desired.

The representative of India replied that this Commission could only be concerned with the Kashmir issue, since the other issues had not yet been discussed by the Council. However, the Commission could cover other matters if the Council so desired after discussing such matters.

The representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Syria, China and Colombia supported the Draft Resolution.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. noted with satisfaction that India and Pakistan had expressed readiness to settle the question by peaceful means with a view to restoring good neighbourly relations between those States. The Soviet delegation could not, however, approve the principle governing the establishment of the Commission. The Commission should consist of States represented in the Security Council. The Representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. supported this view.

The Security Council adopted the Belgian draft resolution by 9 votes in favor to 0 against, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

At the 231st meeting on January 22, the President, on the basis of his conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan, reported that the parties were agreed in principle on the desirability of a plebiscite to determine the accession of the State of Kashmir.

At the 232nd, 234th and 235th meetings on January 23 and 24, the Council heard further statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan. The representative of India denied the accusations of the representative of Pakistan, which, he said, had been made in the hope of obscuring the true issue, on which the Government of Pakistan had no real answer. The representative of Pakistan, on the other hand, stated that the Indian representative had denied reports which were true. He further cited evidence to show the lack of aid from Pakistan to

the invaders.

(6) PROPOSALS OF THE PARTIES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

At the 236th meeting on January 28, the President reported on the conversations he had continued with the representatives of India and Pakistan.

In response to a suggestion by the President, the representatives of India and Pakistan had on January 27 submitted written proposals.

The document submitted by the representative of India stated that the first objective to be achieved was the cessation of fighting.⁸ For this purpose the Government of Pakistan should use all its efforts to persuade invading tribesmen and others to withdraw from Kashmir to deny to such invaders passage through Pakistan territory and to refuse them assistance in any other form. The next objective should be the restoration of peace and normal conditions, which the Government of India estimated would probably require about six months. To achieve this, (a) all citizens of the State who left it on account of the recent disturbances were to be invited to return to their homes and to exercise all their rights as citizens, (b) there was to be no victimization, (c) all political prisoners in the State were to be released and (d) no restrictions were to be imposed on legitimate political activity.

Though after the cessation of hostilities the strength of the Indian troops in the State would be progressively reduced, the Indian Government insisted that it would be necessary to maintain Indian troops in adequate strength in Jammu and Kashmir to ensure not only against possible future attacks from outside, but also to assist the civil authorities to maintain law and order. The emergency administration which had been set up under Sheikh Abdullah would immediately be converted by the ruler of Kashmir, the Maharaja, into a Council of Ministers in which Sheikh Abdullah would be Prime Minister and his colleagues would be appointed by the Maharaja on his advice. The ministry would, as far as possible, function as a responsible ministry.

Finally, the Indian proposals provided that the interim government, immediately upon the restoration of normal conditions, should convoke a National Assembly based upon adult suffrage, which Assembly should then constitute a national Government. The National Government would then proceed to have a plebiscite taken on the question of accession. The plebiscite would be taken under the advice and observation of persons appointed by the United Nations.

The Pakistan proposals, which were submitted in the form of a draft resolution provided that the Security Council should direct its Commission established under the resolution of January 20, 1948, to

arrange for:

- a. the establishment of an impartial interim administration in the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
- b. the withdrawal from the territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the armed forces of the Indian Union and the tribesmen; also all trespassers whether belonging to Pakistan or the Indian Union;
- c. the return of all residents of Jammu and Kashmir State who left or were compelled to leave the State as a result of the disturbances;
- d. the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the free, fair and unfettered will of the people of the State as to whether the State should accede to Pakistan or to India.

The President summed up the ideas that the above proposals had in common as: (1) the first objective was the cessation of fighting; (2) India and Pakistan must co-operate with a view to attaining this first objective; (3) The freedom of the proposed plebiscite must be ensured by adequate measures.

He reported that on the basis of these points he had submitted his own suggestions to the parties in the form of a draft resolution. This draft resolution took note of the agreement of India and Pakistan that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided through a plebiscite to be held under the authority of the Security Council. In this connection, the Commission of the Security Council established by the resolution of January 20, 1948, was to take into consideration "that among the duties incumbent upon it are included those which would tend towards promoting the cessation of acts of hostility and violence, and which are of a particularly urgent character". The resolution stated further that "in the pursuit of this aim, the Commission shall use every diligence to ensure that its mediatory action be exercised without delay and that its proposals to the Security Council be submitted as soon as possible". Such proposals were to include measures designed to ensure cooperation between the military forces of India and of Pakistan with a view to attaining the objectives mentioned above and to maintaining order and security in the future. The Commission was also to report to the Security Council on the results of its mediatory action and as to the fulfillment of such conditions as would be necessary to guarantee the liberty of the plebiscite.

Opening the discussion on his report to the Council, the President expressed the view that the Council should concentrate on the idea of

a plebiscite, concerning which there were grounds for agreement.

The representative of India thought that it would be putting the cart before the horse to discuss a plebiscite before discussing the measures necessary to bring about the cessation of fighting.

The representative of Pakistan contended that the representative of India was over-simplifying the matter and that, in fact, the only common ground that might lead to a general settlement without great delay was a plebiscite. He considered that it should be discussed first.

The representative of the United Kingdom said that the plebiscite proposal should be discussed first. The best way to stop the fighting was to assure those engaged in it that a fair settlement ensuring their rights would be arrived at.

(7) BELGIAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

At the 237th meeting on January 29, the President, speaking as the representative of Belgium, stated that measures to end the violence and to conduct a plebiscite were two aspects of the same problem: that of restoring order and tranquility in Jammu and Kashmir. He therefore introduced two draft resolutions. The first stated that "the Security Council is of the opinion that such plebiscite [to determine the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India] must be organized, held and supervised under its authority". The second resolution contained the following provisions:

"(1) In the accomplishment of its functions, the Commission of the Security Council [established by the Council's resolution of January 20] shall take into consideration that, among the duties incumbent upon it, are included those which would tend towards promoting the cessation of acts of hostility and violence, and which are of a particularly urgent character.

"(2) In the pursuit of this aim, the Commission shall use every diligence to ensure that its mediatory action be exercised without delay."

The representatives of the United States, Canada, China, France and Syria supported the draft resolutions submitted by the President.

The representative of the United Kingdom, while supporting the two draft resolutions, suggested that the Commission should be regarded primarily as one to apply a settlement made in the Council. He thought that the crucial point regarding a plebiscite was that it would have to be considered fair by all concerned.

The representative of India opposed both draft resolutions. He considered that the one relating to the cessation of fighting was far too innocuous to achieve its aim; the concrete proposals that India had

tried to make to that end had apparently been brushed aside. He asked that the aid furnished by Pakistan to invading tribesmen should be considered a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter.

At the 239th meeting on February 3, 1948, the representative of India suggested that the Belgian draft resolution regarding the cessation of fighting should be amended to include a recommendation from the Security Council to Pakistan to stop its aid and refuse supplies to the invaders of Kashmir and a recommendation to the Commission to regard as particularly urgent the promotion of measures to bring an end to the fighting and acts of hostility as quickly as possible.

With regard to a plebiscite, he submitted that the actual taking of the plebiscite was a matter entirely for the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its people. The Maharaja of Kashmir, he stated, was prepared to take the steps necessary for the establishment of a responsible government as soon as peace was restored. To bring in an outside administration, however, would represent an amount of encroachment on the ordinary sovereign powers of any state to which no state would be willing to agree. He therefore suggested that the Belgian resolution regarding a plebiscite be amended to the effect that "the Security Council recommends that the plebiscite be taken under the advice and subject to the observation of persons appointed by the Council".

He stated that unless both draft resolutions were agreed to in the form he had suggested it would be difficult for the Indian delegation to agree to either by itself, as, together, these resolutions would represent the maximum concessions which the Indian delegation was prepared to make.

At the 239th and 240th meetings on February 3 and 4, 1948, the representative of Pakistan stated that the views of India and Pakistan differed not on the question of stopping the fighting, but on how it might be stopped. All proposals which India had thus far advanced left a gap between the withdrawal of the tribesmen and the end of the fighting. Once the tribesmen had been withdrawn or had been forced out, the fighting would not end, as argued by the representative of India. He explained that the Pakistan proposal which had been submitted to the President on January 27, in the form of draft resolution, was based on the expressed views of the members of the Council.

Noting that the acceptance of accession was provisional and that the final decision would be taken by means of a plebiscite, he said that it was therefore irrelevant to inquire whether the holding of a plebiscite came under international jurisdiction or not.

He objected to the Indian proposals on the ground that they called

for the retention of Indian troops in Kashmir to maintain law and order, and for an interim regime to be headed by Sheikh Abdullah during the period leading up to the plebiscite.

The Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the two draft resolutions presented by the representative of Belgium, in the light of observations and conditions expressed during the Council's discussion to the effect that hostilities had to be ended by a fair and acceptable settlement, which should be followed up by a plebiscite which would appear fair to all concerned.

The representative of Argentina said that his delegation would not be able to vote for any resolution which did not provide that a plebiscite be prepared, held and conducted under the authority of the Security Council. The matter having been referred to the Council, the latter had a perfect right to decide the solution that it wished to see adopted. He was convinced that, if the people of Kashmir were assured that they themselves would decide their future, they would lay down their arms and the tribes would withdraw.

The representative of the United States stated that an interim government need exist only for such time as was necessary to set up machinery for the holding of a fair plebiscite, after which time such a government would have no more authority. In his view, what was involved was the external sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir. He cited authorities to support the view that the Maharaja would not lose his sovereignty through the formation of an interim administration, but would merely be exercising it to meet an emergency. India, he considered, was fully authorized to go through with all the negotiations that were necessary to bring about a solution of this problem.

At the 241st meeting on February 5, the representative of China expressed the view that the Security Council might well recommend to the Government of Pakistan that its legal and moral influence should be thrown in the direction of pacification, and that the tribesmen should be stopped from further fighting. In addition, he recommended that the Council should appeal to the Government of India to withdraw its troops gradually from Kashmir. He suggested that, after the fundamental principles had been determined by the Council, large discretionary powers should be left to the Commission.

The representative of France stated that the attention of the Security Council should be directed to the plebiscite question. He associated himself with the opinion that a plebiscite would not bring into question either the person or the sovereignty of the Maharaja. He suggested that, prior to the holding of a plebiscite, an interim authority composed of

the chiefs of the National Conference and of the Muslim Conference should be established.

The representative of the United Kingdom thought that what was wanted was a real and total cessation of fighting, and considered that it would be easier for the Security Council itself to obtain the agreements and concessions which might be required on both sides. He maintained that a plebiscite was vital to end the fighting and that it must be fair in the view of all concerned. He thought that the Belgian draft resolutions were inadequate, as they did not meet with the approval of both parties.

(8) COLOMBIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

Also at the 241st meeting on February 5, the representative of Colombia presented a memorandum which was later, at the 245th meeting on February 11, submitted as a draft resolution. This resolution took note of the agreement of the parties that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be settled by a plebiscite under international auspices. It declared that in the view of the Council the plebiscite was the most desirable and democratic method of determining the future status of the Jammu and Kashmir State, provided the will of the people was given free, fair and unfettered expression and further that an interim administration, which would command the full confidence and respect of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, was essential to the attainment of the aims and purpose of the Colombian resolution. The resolution provided that the membership of the Commission set up under the resolution of January 20 should be increased to five: one member to be chosen by India, one by Pakistan, and three by the Security Council. It provided also that the Council should recommend to Pakistan to use all efforts to persuade the invaders to withdraw. In this connection the Commission should seek to ensure co-operation between the military forces of India and Pakistan to bring about the cessation of fighting in Jammu and Kashmir and to maintain order and security until the question of accession was determined by the plebiscite. The Council should further recommend that the emergency administration of Jammu and Kashmir be reorganized on the advice of the Commission, giving adequate proportional representation to the different groups and interests in the population. After the fighting had ceased (a) all citizens of Jammu and Kashmir who had left on account of the recent disturbances were to be invited to return and to exercise their rights without any restrictions on legitimate political activity, (b) there was to be no victimization and (c) all political prisoners were to be released. The plebiscite would be organized under the advice and

supervision of the Commission.

Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, as representative of India, said that the subject of the dispute before the Council was not the administration of the State of Kashmir, but the aid being given by the Pakistan Government to tribesmen invading the State. He headed the emergency administration of Kashmir, he said, because the people of his country wished him to be at the helm of affairs. He pointed out that anyone replacing him could not be impartial, for the people of Kashmir were in favor either of Pakistan or of India. Pakistan's request for an outside administration meant that the people of the State should have no hand in the running of the country. As far as the Indian Army was concerned, he saw no reason to fear that it would interfere with the exercise of a free vote, as a Commission of the Security Council would see to it that troops would be stationed only at certain strategic points.

The representative of India, at the 242nd meeting on February 6, stated that the questions of accession and the holding of a plebiscite were matters that came within the ambit of internal sovereignty. Referring to the memorandum submitted by the representative of Colombia, he stated that the paragraph dealing with recommendations to Pakistan should be strengthened. He stated further that he could not agree that the Commission should have any jurisdiction with regard to the reorganization of the emergency administration or that the Commission could exercise any functions of an executive character.

The representative of Pakistan said that Sheikh Abdullah's statement showed how much impartiality could be expected from an administration under him.⁹ No one had expressed any desire to deprive the people of Kashmir of their due share in the administration of their own country; all that was suggested was that the authority of the administration should be in impartial hands during that interim period. He charged that the object of the Indian scheme was to prevent a plebiscite from being held until the power and authority of Sheikh Abdullah's Government had been consolidated over the whole of Kashmir. He stated further, at the 244th meeting on February 11, that the Azad Kashmir Government (the provisional Government organized by the Muslim insurgents of Jammu and Kashmir) would not lay down arms if the only part that the United Nations was to take in a plebiscite would be to observe it. A commission that merely observed, or even supervised, the actual polling and recording of votes, would not be able to gauge what pressure might be brought upon the people.

(9) REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT

AT the 244th meeting of the Council on February 11, the President

reported a request from the representative of India to adjourn proceedings on the India-Pakistan case, to enable his delegation to return immediately to New Delhi for consultation.

After some discussion at the 244th, 245th and 246th meetings about the desirability of such a precedent as would be involved in the return home to the Indian delegation during the consideration of a dispute in which India was a party, the President stated that, unless a grave emergency arose, the Council would direct its attention to aspects of the India-Pakistan question other than that of Jammu and Kashmir.

(10) CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE JAMMU-KASHMIR QUESTION

At the 265th meeting on March 9, after the return of the representative of India, the Council resumed its consideration of the Jammu and Kashmir question.

The representative of India, reporting on the consultations he had held with his government, stated that it had explored all avenues of reaching a settlement. The settlement which his Government desired would put an end at the earliest possible moment to the fighting that was going on and would lay the foundations for a more permanent understanding between the two countries. He hoped that the Security Council would realize that the highest priority must still be given to the measures that should be taken to stop the fighting in Kashmir.

With regard to the proposal to substitute a neutral administration for the one now functioning, he considered that a fundamental constitutional issue was involved. Any attempt to demand that the internal administration of a sovereign state should be put into the hands of an outside agency, he stated, was an unthinkable proposition; he urged the Security Council not to press the idea. In this connection, he drew attention to a proclamation which had been issued by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir since the Council had last considered the matter, and which made the following points: (1) full responsible government was conceded to the people of the State; (2) suitable machinery should be set up as early as possible to frame a constitution to that end; (3) the emergency administration would be converted into a regular Council of Ministers under the existing State constitution. He had received a cable from the head of the new Council of Ministers stating that he was endeavoring to include in his Cabinet representatives of schools of political opinion other than his own.

With regard to the question of the retention of the armed forces of India, he stated that if there was anything short of complete withdrawal that could be done for the purpose of ensuring non-interference with the

plebiscite, the Indian delegation would be quite prepared to receive suggestions. The retention of the armed forces was an obligation of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for ensuring its defence from external aggression and for adding it to maintain internal law and order. He was anxious, the representative of India declared, that the machinery for conducting the plebiscite should have as much independence as possible, consistent with the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State and of its proper relations with the Government of India.

The representative of Pakistan said that the position of the Indian delegation on the question under discussion was exactly the same as when the proceedings had been adjourned. What had been represented as a great concession—the non-interference of the armed forces of India with a plebiscite in Kashmir—had been implicit in the situation all the time. He stated that the Government of India and the Maharaja of Kashmir, in issuing the proclamation referred to by the representative of India, had taken a step which, far from contributing to a solution of the problem, made that solution much more difficult. He asserted that, if a plebiscite were held under the conditions proposed by the representative of India and the result disclosed a majority to be in favor of accession to India, it was unlikely to be accepted as a fair and just decision. He contended that it was impossible to eliminate the possibility of pressure by a partial administration.

If, among the conditions submitted by the Pakistan delegation as essential for the holding of a free plebiscite, there was any condition to which even a suspicion might attach that its acceptance would in any way put pressure upon any portion of the electorate to vote in favor of Pakistan, the Pakistan delegation would withdraw that condition. As for the conditions insisted upon by the representative of India, there was clear evidence and well-founded apprehension that they would in themselves amount to pressure and coercion upon the people to vote on the other side.

(11) CHINESE DRAFT RESOLUTION

At the 269th meeting on March 18, 1948, the President, speaking as the representative of China, introduced a draft resolution which provided that the Security Council recommend to the parties acceptance¹⁰ of the following Articles of Settlement:

The Government of Pakistan would undertake to use its best endeavors (a) to secure the withdrawal from Jammu and Kashmir of intruding tribesmen and Pakistan nationals; (b) to prevent any further intrusion into the State by denying transit through and bases in Pakistan

territory, and by forbidding the furnishing of military and other supplies to all elements engaged in hostility or violence against the State; (c) to persuade all intruders that the present Articles of Settlement, accepted by India and Pakistan, provided full freedom to all inhabitants of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of accession of the State, and that therefore they should cease fighting and co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

The Government of India for its part was to withdraw its troops from Jammu and Kashmir progressively, but if, for purposes of defence and security, a certain portion was left, those troops should be stationed at such points as not to afford any intimidation, or appearance of intimidation, to the inhabitants of the State. The Government of India was to establish in Jammu and Kashmir a plebiscite administration with the sole and full authority to administer a plebiscite on the question of accession of the State. The top officers of the plebiscite administration were to be neutral international personalities nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but would consider themselves, for the time being, as officers of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They would have the authority to nominate their subordinates and to frame the regulations which would govern the plebiscite. In order to respect the sovereignty of a member State, however, such nominees were to be formally appointed and regulations formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Further, the Government of India was to undertake to prevent any threat, coercion or intimidation on the voters in the plebiscite and was to cause this undertaking to be known to all concerned as an international obligation binding on all public authorities in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of India should use, and should request the Government of the State to use, its best endeavors to effect the withdrawal from the State of Indian nationals not normally resident therein who entered it for unlawful purposes since August 15, 1947.

The Government of India should also urge the State government to ensure that (a) all citizens who had left the State on account of the disturbances were invited to return and were free to exercise all their rights as citizens; (b) there was no victimization; (c) all political prisoners were released; (d) minorities in all parts of the State were accorded adequate protection.

The Commission of the Security Council was to certify to the Council after the plebiscite whether the plebiscite had been really free and

impartial. The Government of India was to use its best endeavors to ensure that, in the composition of the interim government of Jammu and Kashmir, provision was made for adequate representation of all major political groups in the State. The Government of India was to appoint an official of high standing, to be stationed in the State during the interim period, who would have the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Government all international obligations arising out of the Articles of Settlement. The Security Council, finally, was to instruct its Commission to offer its good offices and mediation in the implementation of the above Articles of Settlement.

The representative of Pakistan, referring to this draft resolution, recalled that the Government of India had undertaken that its troops in Kashmir, for the sole purpose of repelling the raiders, would not be kept there a moment after that object had been attained and law and order restored. This would have to be achieved before the plebiscite could be held. With regard to the proposals in the Chinese draft resolution for ensuring a fair plebiscite, he asked how, though overt pressure might not be applied, the Commission could ensure elimination of other forms of pressure, and on what basis the Security Council would judge whether the plebiscite had or had not been fair or impartial if some evidence of pressure did come to the notice of the Commission.

Regarding the proposal for the appointment by the Indian Government of a high official to be stationed in the State with the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Government all international obligations arising out of the Articles of Settlement, he stated that the Commission might accept this officer's interpretation of conditions so that, given the delicacy of the situation, this proposal might operate to the prejudice of Pakistan and in favor of the Dominion of India. If the proposed resolution failed to bring about a settlement that would persuade the Azad Kashmir Government to lay down its arms, it would fail to achieve anything, the representative of Pakistan stated, and he doubted whether terms of this draft resolution could have that effect upon the Azad Kashmir Government.

The representative of India stated that, before a plebiscite could be considered, the fact that those fighting the Governments of Kashmir and India had received aid from Pakistan had to be recognized; and an undertaking had to be obtained from the Government of Pakistan that it would do its utmost to prevent such assistance. In the matter of the withdrawal of troops from the State, he took it that the Security Council recognized that, even after fighting had stopped, troops would have to be retained to maintain law and order, and that, in the circumstances,

such troops could only be Indian Army troops.

The Government of India was willing, he stated further, to eliminate the influence of the administration in practically all matters relating to the conduct of the plebiscite; he thought this about the utmost that the Security Council could afford to request in this respect. While he might have something to say later about details, he thought that the Government of India was quite prepared to consider the Chinese draft resolution on its merits without serious modification.

The President, speaking as the representative of China, stated that apparently his draft resolution was opposed by the representative of Pakistan as not going far enough and not providing adequate safeguards. He thought that the Security Council should aim at the maximum agreement possible between the two delegations, but that some margin of disagreement would remain.

The representative of France considered that the Chinese draft resolution constituted a kind of synthesis of previous draft resolutions, and he hoped that the Security Council would carry on its work on the basis of amendments to this draft resolution. He thought that the territory of Jammu and Kashmir clearly had to be provided with forces necessary to guarantee the maintenance of law and order. Experience seemed to him to show that a satisfactory plebiscite could be held only where there was an authority and a force to ensure public order.

(12) RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF APRIL 21, 1948

At the 284th meeting on April 17, 1948, the President, speaking as the representative of Colombia, together with the representatives of Belgium, Canada, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, introduced the draft resolution.

Commenting on the draft resolution, the President stated that it represented the most considered views of the sponsors on the best approach they could propose to this problem.

The representative of Canada stated that this draft resolution would fail to achieve its purpose if the two parties themselves did not continue to make every effort to come together and cooperate in respect to its implementation.

The representative of China stated that he did not know of any previous plebiscite where the safeguards for freedom and impartiality had been so numerous and strict as those provided for in this draft resolution. He noted that nothing in the draft impaired the inherent right of self-defense in the event that the calculations of the sponsors were wrong and a large invasion of Jammu and Kashmir were to take place. Referring to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution dealing with the

representation of major political groups in the conduct of the administration, he stated that this provision was for the purpose of ensuring that there would be no undue administrative interference with the plebiscite.

The representative of the United Kingdom doubted whether any peaceful settlement could be obtained at all unless the problem could be solved on the basis of the formula given in paragraph 6. He was convinced that the measures in this draft resolution would lead to an honest plebiscite and a fair and just result; and he was certain that there was nothing in the resolution which the Indian government could not safely and honorably accept.¹¹

The representative of the United States stated that this plan was not a final solution. It did not pretend to be more than a recommendation, involving the creation of a subordinate organ representing the Security Council to help the two parties in accordance with their request.

The representative of France supported the draft resolution.

At the 285th meeting on April 19, the representative of India stated that it was a matter of profound disappointment to the delegation of India that the Chinese draft resolution on March 18 had been twisted out of shape in its essential particulars. That scheme had been so attenuated in the draft resolution now before the Council that the delegation of India was unable to agree to it.

He stated that the Government of Pakistan had made no attempt since the resolution of January 17 to prevent any intrusion of raiders into the State or any furnishing of aid to those fighting in the State. The failure of the present draft resolution to mention the persistent and continuing breach of an international obligation and to call upon Pakistan to repair that breach was a grave one. The accession of Kashmir to the Dominion of India subsisted and would continue to subsist unless the plebiscite to be held went against India. Until then, Pakistan had no constitutional position in Jammu and Kashmir and there could be no case for allowing the intervention of Pakistan at any stage. The whole of the State, including the area now under the control of the rebels and raiders, would have to come under one government after the fighting ceased; and India, which under its instrument of accession was responsible for the defence of the State, would have to station garrisons on the State's western frontiers. He also opposed paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, which dealt with the representation of major political groups in the conduct of the administration, stating that to think of a coalition government in such circumstances was to invite a paralysis of the Kashmir administration during the period that was in

contemplation. Reduction of the strength of the Indian Army in Kashmir should not be carried below the minimum required not only for the maintenance of law and order, but also for defence against external aggression. He could not agree to paragraph 5, which was a round-about method of trying to introduce Pakistan forces into the Jammu and Kashmir State. He opposed the provision vesting direction and supervision of State forces and the police in the Plebiscite Administrator, and that giving the Administrator the liberty of communicating directly with an outside government.

The representative of India stated that if the draft resolution was carried despite the objections and opposition of the delegation of India, his government would have to decide its course of action in the circumstances so created.

The representative of Pakistan contended that, with regard to the two main matters in dispute, the withdrawal of the armed forces of India and the setting up of an impartial administration, the draft resolution did not proceed on the principles which the Security Council itself had thought essential. If both Dominions were vitally interested in the plebiscite, and if fair conditions had to be brought about to prevent any prejudice to either party's position, the draft resolution was too one-sided. The continuation of Sheikh Abdullah at the head of the Kashmir Government was bound to influence heavily in favor of India, the fairness and impartiality of the plebiscite.

The draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan stated further, did not provide for the contingency that the Pakistan Government, in order to discharge obligation under this resolution, might have to have at its disposal a certain number of its forces. He stated that if "forward areas" (see paragraph A 2 (c) (ii)) meant any areas at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir (Muslim) forces, they would not agree to lay down their arms and allow occupation of their areas by an Indian army. He thought there was a contradiction between paragraphs 5 and 9. He asked the meaning of paragraph 6, which he thought should be made clearer. Past victimization had to be neutralized if there was to be no victimization.

He submitted some suggestions for amendments to the draft resolution. One suggestion called for the stationing of Pakistan troops in predominantly Muslim areas, and of Indian or State troops in predominantly non-Muslim areas. He also proposed that there should be equal representation in the government of the State for each major political group—namely, the National Conference, the Muslim Conference and the Azad Kashmir, which would each be invited to designate

an equal number of responsible representatives.

At the 286th meeting on April 21, the representative of Syria stated that if the Government of Pakistan was not convinced that a free plebiscite would be guaranteed by the joint resolution, it could not be expected to convince others. In that case, the Indian forces in Kashmir would continue to fight with the tribesmen and with the opposing party, in order to try to establish peace, and the proposed resolution would not be effective in leading towards a peaceful solution of the matter. As long as the draft resolution did not have the support of both parties, he preferred to abstain from voting.

The representative of the United States stated that paragraph 6, concerning the representation of major political groups in the interim administration, did not mean that the predominately Muslim character of the population of the State should be a criterion, or that any undue advantage should be given to one group merely because it held power at the present moment.¹² The principle involved was that of neutralization of the Government in so far as the issue of accession was concerned.

The Council then adopted the draft resolution (S/726)¹³ paragraph by paragraph. At the 287th meeting on April 23, Belgium and Colombia, in accordance with the terms of the resolution adopted at the previous meeting, were added to the Commission by 7 votes in favor to 0 against, with 4 abstentions (Belgium, Colombia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). At the 289th meeting, on May 7, 1948, the President designated the United States as the third member of the Commission, in view of the failure of Argentina (selected by Pakistan) and Czechoslovakia (selected by India), to agree upon a third member.

The representative of India at the 290th meeting on May 7, read a letter addressed by the Prime Minister of India to the President of the Security Council. The Government of India regretted that it was not possible for it to implement those parts of the resolution of April 21 to which their objection had been clearly stated by the Indian delegation. If the Council should still decide to send out the Commission referred to in the preamble of the resolution, the Government of India would be glad to confer with it.

C. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER MATTERS

While the Council adjourned its consideration of the Jammu and Kashmir question to permit the representative of India to return to New Delhi for consultation, it turned to the question of Junagadh and other States, the first of the other matters in the Pakistan complaint against India.

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF JUNE 3, 1948

At the 304th meeting on May 26, the President stated that, in connection with matters in the India-Pakistan question other than the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, the best solution would be to enlarge the Commission's terms of reference to cover these matters, so that, at a later date, they could either be dealt with by the Commission or taken up again in the Council.

The representative of India stated that he could not agree that the matters other than the Jammu and Kashmir questions were of sufficient importance to be referred to the Commission.

The representative of Pakistan contended that the issues other than Jammu and Kashmir, while less urgent, could not be regarded as of lesser significance in the totality of relations between the two Dominions.

At the 312th meeting on June 3, 1948, the representative of China said that he considered the question of Junagadh¹⁴ to be comparable to that of Kashmir, though priority should be given to the latter. He suggested that Pakistan should drop its charges of genocide and non-implementation of agreements.

The representative of Pakistan stated that he was unable to accept the suggestion of the representative of China that the questions of genocide and non-implementation of agreements should be dropped by his Government.

The Council adopted resolution (S/819)¹⁵ by 8 votes in favor to 0 against, with 3 abstentions (China, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

At the 315th meeting on June 8,¹⁶ the President drew attention to a letter dated June 5, 1948, from the Prime Minister of India, expressing surprise at the decision of the Council to extend the task of the Commission to study matters other than the Jammu and Kashmir question in the Pakistan complaint.

The representative of China said that he could not help thinking that the letter was based in part upon a misapprehension. The Security Council had in fact not deliberated on these three questions, but had only instructed the Commission to gather information and report. A straightforward explanation of that kind would remove the misunderstanding to the effect that the Security Council had made up its mind or had intended to cast some slur or slight on the Government of India.

After some discussion, it was decided that the President should reply to the Prime Minister of India in accordance with the suggestions made by the representative of China. The President did so in a letter

dated June 9, 1948.

D. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

After holding preliminary meetings in Geneva starting on June 21, 1948, the Commission of Mediation proceeded to the sub-continent of India, where it stopped in Karachi from July 7 to 9 before proceeding to New Delhi. The Commission immediately initiated inquiries with India and Pakistan concerning the question of a ceasefire,¹⁷ and after hearing views from both Governments, it undertook, on August 10, to draft a ceasefire proposal.

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, as the Commission of Mediation became known, on August 13, 1948, adopted a resolution¹⁸ calling for a ceasefire order to apply to all forces under the control of India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date. Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the resolution called upon both Governments concerned to accept certain principles as a basis for the formulation of a true agreement. Among these principles were the following: the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from Jammu and Kashmir; the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident there who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting; after the withdrawal of such tribesmen and Pakistan nationals and while Pakistan forces were being withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir, the withdrawal from that State of Indian forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission; the temporary maintenance in the State of Indian forces which in agreement with the Commission were considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order; the stationing by the Commission of observers where it deemed necessary; and the undertaking by India to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order would be safeguarded and all human and political rights guaranteed. The resolution finally called upon India and Pakistan to reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined in accordance with the will of the people. To that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, the resolution called upon both Governments to agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression would be assured.

In a letter,¹⁹ dated August 20, 1948 to the Commission, the Prime Minister of India declared that his Government had decided to accept

the Commission's resolution.

In a letter and memorandum dated August 19²⁰ and a letter²¹ dated September 6 to the Commission, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan asked for certain clarifications and elucidation to the Commission's resolution. The letter of September 6 stated that Pakistan agreed to accept with certain reservations the proposals contained in the Commission's resolution.

In a letter,²² dated September 6, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan, the Chairman of the Commission declared that the Commission was prepared to consider at an early occasion the questions raised by Pakistan.

At the request of the Commission, its resolutions and correspondence were distributed to the Security Council.

The Commission on September 19 adopted the following resolution and instructed the Secretary-General's personal representative with the Commission to transmit it through the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council:

"The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having decided to leave for Europe to prepare an interim report to the Security Council on the present situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, hereby resolves to appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to use their best endeavors during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as further to prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement, which both Governments have declared to be their most sincere and ardent desire."

¹UN, *The Year Book of the United Nations*, 1947-48, New York, 387-99 and 401-03.

²For details of the Indian complaint to the UN, see Durga Das, *Sardar Patel Correspondence*, I, 345-50.

³For the speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Chief Indian delegate, at the meeting of the Security Council held on 15 January 1948, see *The Official Records of the Security Council*, 1948, 10-30. Not printed.

⁴For the speech of Mohammad Zafrulla Khan at the Security Council meetings held on 16-17 January 1948, see *ibid.*, 35-120. Not printed.

⁵For reply to Mohammad Zafrulla's speech, see Setalvad's statement, *ibid.*, 171-203. Not printed.

⁶Annex I.

⁷Annex II.

⁸V.P. Menon told Counsellor Howard Donovan that the war in Kashmir was costing India about Rs 10-12 lakh per day and that they could hardly afford an extended war. See *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/2-2448, No. 177. Not printed.

⁹"M. A. H. Ispahani commented in a letter written to Jinnah: "We had the pleasure of hearing Sheikh Abdullah making an ass of himself. He lost control of his tongue with the result that he even blasphemed by uttering that 'not even God Almighty, if appointed to take charge of the Interim Government, would remain neutral' ... Zafrullah Khan tore Abdullah mercilessly to shreds" Z. H. Zaidi, ed., *M. A. Jinnah Ispahani Correspondence 1936-48*, Karachi, 1976, 572.

¹⁰Zafrullah Khan had advised the Chinese chief delegate, then President of the Security Council, that the draft Resolution of 18 March 1948 was unacceptable to Pakistan. He was optimistic that Pakistan's position would not be disregarded. See Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 584.

¹¹On 5 April 1948, Ispahani, writing to Jinnah, feared that Attlee and Cripps were out to appease India and endorse her unreasonable views. He suggested that Pakistan warn Britain that Pakistan might have to review its membership of the Commonwealth. See Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 584-5.

¹²On 20 April, M. A. H. Ispahani, in a letter to Jinnah, stated that it "is indeed a tragedy that justice, honesty and fair play occupy no place in the so-called great organisation of the U.N. It is most regrettable that every question, in the final analysis, is judged on the strength of the parties to a dispute and not on the merits of the case that is brought before it for decision". See Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 588.

¹³Annex III.

¹⁴See Annex IV.

¹⁵Annex V.

¹⁶See Annex VI.

¹⁷See Enclosure to Annex VI.

¹⁸Annex VII.

¹⁹Annexure I to Annex VII to KR-484.

²⁰See Annex VIII.

²¹Annexure III to Annex VIII to KR-484.

²²Annexure IV to Annex VIII to KR-484.

Annex I to KR-484

Security Council Resolution 38 on Kashmir of 17 January 1948 [S/651]¹

The Security Council,

Having heard statements on the situation in Kashmir from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan,

Recognizing the urgency of the situation,

Taking note of the telegram addressed on 6 January 1948 by its President to each of the parties and of their replies thereto,² in which they affirmed their intention to conform to the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any act which might aggravate the situation;

2. *Further requests* each of those Governments inform the Council immediately of any material character in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the Council, and consult with the Council thereon.

DECISION

At its 229th meeting, on 17 January 1948, the Council decided that the President should invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take part in direct talks under his guidance in an effort to find some

common ground on which the structure of settlement might be built.

See Nos. 1-15, *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, 226th meeting, 4-5.

²See *ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1948, documents S/639 and S/640.

Annex II to KR-484

Security Council Draft Resolution of 20 January 1948

[S/654]

The Security Council,

Considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan, such an investigation is a matter of urgency,

Adopts the following resolution:

A. A Commission of the Security Council is hereby established, composed of representatives of three Members of the United Nations, one to be selected by India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the third to be designated by the two so selected. Each representative on the Commission shall be entitled to select his alternates and assistants.

B. The Commission shall proceed to the spot as quickly as possible. It shall act under the authority of the Security Council and in accordance with the directions it may receive from it. It shall keep the Security Council currently informed of its activities and of the development of the situation. It shall report to the Security Council regularly, submitting its conclusions and proposals.

C. The Commission is invested with a dual function (1) to investigate the facts pursuant of Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties; to carry out the directions given to it by the Security Council; and to report how far the advice and directions, if any, of the Security Council have been carried out.

D. The Commission shall perform the functions described in clause C: (1) in regard to the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir State set out in the letter of the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated 1 January 1948, and in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 15 January 1948; and (2) in regard to other situations set out in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 15 January 1948, when the Security Council so directs.

E. The Commission shall take its decision by majority vote. It shall determine its own procedure. It may allocate among its members, alternate members, their assistants, and its personnel such duties as may have to be fulfilled for the realization of its mission and the

reaching of its conclusions.

F. The Commission, its members, alternate members, their assistants, and its personnel shall be entitled to journey, separately or together, wherever the necessities of their tasks may require, and, in particular, within those territories which are the theatre of the events of which the Security Council is seized.

G. The Secretary-General shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may consider necessary.

Annex III to KR-484

Security Council Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948 [S/726]

The Security Council,

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,

Having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan,

Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting,

Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,

Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,

Reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948;

Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 (1948) of 20 January 1948 shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, representatives of... and..., and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President of the Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five;

Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end,

Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan:

A. Restoration of peace and order

1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:

- (a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State;
- (b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

2. The Government of India should:

- (a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission, set up in accordance with the Council's resolution 39 (1948), that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation, in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;
- (b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage;
- (c) When the Indian forces have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
 - (i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;
 - (ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
 - (iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.

3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the

Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator.

4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.

5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification.

B. Plebiscite

6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.

7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.

8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.

9. The Government of India should, at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions.

10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator.

(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.

(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.

(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.

11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.

12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State, and that there will be freedom of the press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.

13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose.

14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State releases all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:

- (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;

(b) There is no victimization;

(c) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.

15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.

C. General provisions

16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.

17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.

Adopted at the 286th meeting.

The five members of the United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan were: Czechoslovakia (nominated by India on 10 February 1948); Belgium and Colombia (appointed by the Council on 23 April 1948—see the decision below); Argentina (nominated by Pakistan on 30 April 1948); United States of America (designated by the President of the Council on 7 May 1948, in the absence of agreement between Argentina and Czechoslovakia on the member to be designated by them).

DECISION

At its 287th meeting, on 23 April 1948, the Council, pursuant to its resolution 47 (1948), appointed Belgium and Colombia as the additional members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

Adopted by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Belgium, Colombia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Annex IV to KR-484

M. A. H. Ispahani to M. A. Jinnah¹

[Extract]

NEW YORK,
6 [4] June 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I had this pleasure on May 19.

Government have been informed of yesterday's proceedings of the Security Council and also of the resolution that was adopted by it. I

must confess my disappointment with the resolution but must at the same time admit that nothing better seemed possible. In fact, on several occasions yesterday, I thought that we would get a worse deal and once or twice I even felt that the Security Council would decide not to charge the Kashmir Commission of Mediation with any other duties beside those allotted to it by the resolution of April 23. One or two representatives suggested that the Commission should not be burdened with any other matter which meant that Pakistan's charges against India as contained in our Foreign Minister's letter of January 15 to the President of the Security Council were either to be dropped or not considered for an indefinite period. The representative of China suggested that excepting Junagadh which may be taken up for study and report as, when and if the Commission thought fit, the remaining charges of Pakistan against India should be dropped. He appealed to me to withdraw them as India considered that they cast a slur on her. I replied that I could not comply with the distinguished representative's request and reiterated that the charges preferred by my Government were wholly real and were not made with the intention of casting a slur on India but with the sole purpose of ending certain conditions, the continued presence of which constituted a threat to international peace.

Once again the scene of activity has shifted from Lake Success to the sub-continent of India. I have no doubt that our Government will not spare effort to convince the Commission, if such convincing is still necessary, that our stand is the correct and honest one and the stand of India is just the opposite. All the five nations that constitute the Mediation Commission have nominated top ranking men and I am certain that much reliance will be placed on and weight given to the reports that the Commission will, from time to time, send to the Security Council. In the circumstances, I am sure the Commission will be properly looked after.

During the last five or six weeks, it has grown more and more patent that the members of the Security Council are no longer interested in the Indo-Pakistan dispute. Furthermore, they have shown themselves unwilling to arrive at a decision that will not be well received by India. Particularly the big powers are out more to appease India than do justice. It took me three weeks to get the President of the Security Council to call the meeting of May 27th. It was my constant pressure and protest that eventually persuaded the President, Parodi of France, to summon a meeting of the Council on the 27th of May. Parodi could have got the Council to come to a decision on that very day. He, however, ran shy of it and left his successor, Faris Khouri of

Syria to call a meeting for the purpose.

[Four paras omitted]

With my best wishes to Miss Jinnah and yourself,

Very sincerely yours,
HASSAN

¹Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 600-02.

Annex V to KR-484

Security Council Resolution 51 of 3 June 1948 [S/819]

The Security Council

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 38 (1948) of 17 January, 39 (1948) of 20 January and 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948;
2. *Directs* the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to proceed without delay to the areas of dispute with a view to accomplishing in priority the duties assigned to it by resolution 47 (1948);
3. *Directs* the Commission further to study and report to the Security Council when it considers it appropriate on the matters raised in the letter of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, dated 15 January 1948, in the order outlined in paragraph D of Council resolution 39 (1948).

DECISIONS

At its 382nd meeting, on 25 November 1948, the Council invited the Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to take a place at the Council table.

At the same meeting the Council decided: (1) to inform the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan that it could count on the full support of the Security Council and that the Council wished it to continue its work for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful solution, and (2) to bring to the attention of the Governments of India and Pakistan the need for refraining from any action which might aggravate the military or the political situation and consequently prejudice the negotiations being carried on the purpose of arriving at a final and peaceful understanding in the matter.

Annex VI to KR-484
M. A. H. Ispahani to M. A. Jinnah¹

[Extract]

No. QIA-31

NEW YORK,
23 June 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am grateful to you for your letter of May 18.² It took three weeks in transit.

[Two paragraphs omitted]

On the 3rd of June, a brief report of the day's proceedings of the Security Council was cabled to you in Quetta. On the 9th, without reasonable notice to us, a meeting of the Security Council was called. The first intimation that I had of this meeting was through the columns of the *New York Times* the same morning. The meeting, as you know, considered Nehru's latest letter to the President of the Council. The Pakistan Delegation went to Lake Success in time to canvass as many members of the Council as they could meet. My line of approach was:-

1. If any further appeasement of India is decided upon by the Security Council or if there is any amendment of the Resolutions of April 23 or June 3, it would become impossible for Pakistan to continue silent. In fact, I told them that it would become urgently necessary for us to review the entire situation.
2. India wanted the Security Council to act as her rubber stamp, to do exactly as she wants it and not as the Council considers right. Fortunately, for us, Nehru's note did Pakistan good. The majority of the members were really annoyed with India. Dr. Tsiang, the Head of the Chinese Delegation sensed this hostility and was the first to speak when the Council meeting opened. His was a very mild and sensible speech. It drew out the fangs of those who wanted to strike India. Furthermore, I am sure, it was on his advice that Pillai did not speak. Tsiang knew that if Pillai spoke, he would add to the irritation and make matters worse for India. Dr. Arce of Argentina protested at the approach of both the President and Dr. Tsiang. He said that the resolutions were both clear and required no explanation whatsoever. However, it was decided to send a reply to Pandit Nehru signed by the President. The President, Faris Bey Khouri in the course of the discussion on that day put in his appeal to the parties now fighting in Kashmir to cease fire. This was done at my request because even

at that time I felt this appeal necessary because of India's all-out effort to obtain a speedy decision by sheer weight of arms. After the meeting I had a long talk with Khouri, in the course of which I appealed to him to do his best for us. He said he would. The letter he told me would make the following points clear to Mr. Nehru:

- (a) The Resolution of April 23 stands; that a copy of Nehru's letter would be handed to the Commission for attention.
- (b) That the Resolution of June 3 is clear. It does not seek to cast a slur on India. The Security Council has not passed judgment on Pakistan's complaints in regard to Junagadh, genocide and non implementation. Further, Kashmir occupies topmost place, the other matters to be taken up by the Commission at its discretion.
- (c) The Security Council appeals to the parties fighting in Kashmir to cease fire forth with.
- (d) The Commission has been instructed to proceed to the sub-continent of India as quickly as possible.

I am impressing upon him the urgency of points (c) and (d) for almost three weeks before the 9th of June.

In view of all this, the actual letter addressed by the President of the Security Council to Pandit Nehru came as a great surprise to me because it did not contain several of the very important points which Mr. Khouri promised to embody in that letter. It appears that his colleagues on the Council must have cut out those points in order to sweeten the pill for India. Diplomacy, I am afraid, is an unclean game and no one, not even one's closest friend is worthy of full confidence and reliance.

Recent news from Kashmir does not appear too good. The Indian "steam roller" offensive, it is advertised by Indian agents in London and Washington, is in full swing. Yesterday, I had a telegram from Zafrulla as per copy enclosed. Although ill, I lost no time in taking action thereon. Faris Khouri was contacted telephonically and so was Dr. Arce of Argentina. Baig, my Counsellor, a first-rate and experienced officer in whose efficiency I have confidence, was fully briefed by me and sent to New York to put our point of view across quietly, tactfully and yet most effectively. I am glad this has been done to my satisfaction. I am enclosing a copy of my cable³ despatched to Zafrulla this afternoon. As you will appreciate, no effort has been spared to impress the urgent necessity for sending out the Commission in spite of India's now patent, delaying tactics. It is imperative that the front should hold for another fourteen days. The onward march of Indian troops must be halted at all cost[s] by the valiant soldiers who are

fighting for the freedom of Kashmir.

[Three paragraphs deleted]

With kind regards,

Very sincerely yours,
HASSAN

¹Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 607-11.

²See *ibid.*, 595. Not printed.

³Not traceable.

Enclosure to Annex VI
*M. Zafrulla Khan to M. A. H. Ispahani*¹

Telegram

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

KARACHI,
19 June 1948

Your telegram dated June 9, 1948,² states that the Security Council agreed that the President might call upon parties engaged in fighting to cease fire to give a fair chance of success to the Commission's work.

India is making an all-out effort to subjugate, by ruthless military action, territories under control of the Azad Kashmir Government. As you know, the population of those territories is almost wholly Muslim and is completely opposed to accession of the State to India. Result is that, in such areas as have, after bitter struggle, fallen under the sway of the Indian Government, large scale extermination of Muslims has taken place. Any further extension of India's military conquest at the expense of the Azad Kashmir territory will, it is feared, lead to further extermination of the Muslim population and an exodus of about a million Muslims into Pakistan. This would create a most serious problem for Pakistan and would throw an intolerable burden on the economy of West Pakistan which has already been overstrained and disorganised by the influx of 5-1/2 million Muslims from Eastern Punjab, Delhi and neighbouring areas of the Indian Dominion.

Indian Government have also indulged in more serious violations of Pakistan's frontiers. We have already supplied you with details of the attack on Garhi Habibullah which the Indian Government denied at first but for which later they tendered an apology.

As the Indian Army approaches the North-West Frontier and as stories of atrocities committed by them on Muslims of Jammu and Poonch spread, there is serious danger of the entire North-West Frontier rising

up in arms. Such a conflagration would be full of dangerous potentialities not only to the peace and security of Pakistan but to the whole world.

In view of the fact mentioned above, it is essential that the Commission should reach here as early as possible and try to arrange a cease fire. I suggest that you might bring these facts to the notice of the President of the Security Council informally and discuss with him ways and means of getting the Commission reach here earlier than anticipated. Perhaps one way might be to ask Arce to have the instruction of his Government cabled to Argentinian Representatives on the Commission to press for the early arrival of the Commission. A similar approach might be made to Ambassador Austin if you consider it advisable.

ZAFRULLA KHAN

¹Zaidi, *Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence*, 604-6.

²Not traceable.

Annex VII to KR-484
Resolution Adopted by the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW YORK,]
13 August 1948

Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and

Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation.

Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposals:

PART I

Ceasefire order

A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a ceasefire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date

or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.

- B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(For the purpose of these proposals "forces under their control" shall be considered to include all forces, organised, and unorganised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides).

- C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the ceasefire.

- D. In its discretion, and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the ceasefire order.

- E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II

Truce Agreement

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

A.

1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

B.

1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the ceasefire those forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

C.

1. Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or a communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission will be made public.

PART III

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

*Annexure I to Annex VII to KR-484
Jawaharlal Nehru to M. Josef Korbel*

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW DELHI,]
20 August 1948

Excellency,

On the 17th of August, my colleague, the Minister Without Portfolio, and I discussed with you and your colleagues of the Commission now in Delhi the resolution which you had presented to us on the 14th instant. On the 18th, I had another discussion with you, in the course of which I tried to explain to you the doubts and difficulties which members of my Government and representatives of the Government of Kashmir whom we consulted, had felt as the result of a preliminary but careful examination of the Commission's proposals.

2. During the several conferences that we had with the Commission when it first came to Delhi, we placed before it what we considered the basic fact of the situation which had led to the conflict in Kashmir. This fact was the unwarranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan Government on Indian Dominion territory in Kashmir. The Pakistan Government denied this, although it was common knowledge. In recent months, very large forces of the Pakistan regular army have further entered Indian Union territory in Kashmir and opposed the Indian Army which was sent there for the defence of the State. This, we understand now, is admitted by the Pakistan Government, and yet there had been at no time any intimation to the Government of India by the Pakistan Government of this invasion. Indeed, there has been a continual denial and the Pakistan Government have evaded answering repeated inquiries from the Government of India.

In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council¹ of the United Nations adopted on the 17th January, 1948, the Pakistan Government should have informed the Council immediately of any material change in the situation while the matter continued to be under the consideration of the Council. The invasion of the State by large forces of the regular Pakistan Army was a very material change in the situation, and yet no information of this was given, so far as we know, to the Security Council.

The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Government is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international law and usage, but has also created a very grave situation. It is only the earnest desire of my Government to avoid any extension of

the field of conflict and to restore peace, that has led us to refrain from taking any action to meet the new situation that was created by this further intrusion of Pakistan armies into Jammu and Kashmir State. The presence of the Commission in India has naturally led us to hope that any arrangement sponsored by it would deal effectively with the present situation and prevent any recurrence of aggression.

3. Since our meeting of the 18th August, we have given the Commission's resolution our most earnest thought. There are many parts of it, which we should have preferred to be otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental facts of the situation, especially the flagrant aggression of Pakistan Government on Indian Union territory. We recognise, however, that, if a successful effort is to be made to create satisfactory conditions for a solution of the Kashmir problem without further bloodshed, we should concentrate on certain essentials only at present and seek safeguards in regard to them. It was in this spirit that I placed the following considerations before Your Excellency:

1. That paragraph A. 3 of Part II of the resolution should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as
 - a. to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops,
 - b. to afford any recognition of the so-called "Azad Kashmir Government," or
 - c. to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State.
2. That from our point of view the effective insurance of the security of the State against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no less important than the observance of internal law and order, and that, therefore, the withdrawal of Indian troops and the strength of Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be conditioned by this overriding factor. Thus at any time the strength of the Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be sufficient to ensure security against any form of external aggression as well as internal disorder.
3. That as regards Part III, should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the State by means of a plebiscite, Pakistan should have no part in the organisation and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter of internal administration in the State.
4. If I understood you correctly, A. 3 of part II of the resolution does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions which we have objected in paragraph 3 (1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that

the Commission was not competent to recognize the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.

As regards paragraph 3 (2), the paramount need for security is recognised by the Commission and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.

Finally, you agreed that Part III, as formulated, does not in any way recognise the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite.

5. In view of this clarification, my Government, animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace and thus to uphold the principles and prestige of the United Nations, have decided to accept the resolution.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,
Prime Minister, India

¹Annex I to KR-484.

*Annexure II to Annex VII to KR-484
Jawaharlal Nehru to M. Josef Korbel*

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW DELHI,]
20 August 1948

Excellency,

You will recall that in our interview with the Commission on the 17th August,¹ I dealt at some length with the position of the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the Jammu and Kashmir State in the north. The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars or Pakistan troops. The Commission's resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or defence in this large area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us. (The only

exception that we should be prepared to accept would be Gilgit). We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Prime Minister, India

Annexure I to Annex VII to KR-484.

Annexure III to Annex VII to KR-484

M. Josef Korbel to Jawaharlal Nehru

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW DELHI,]

25 August 1948

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication¹ dated August 20, 1948, regarding the terms of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which the Commission presented to you on the 14th of August 1948.

The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation it being understood that as regards point (I) (c) the local people of the evacuated territory will have freedom of legitimate political activity. In this connection, the term "evacuated territory" refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command.

The Commission wishes me to express to Your Excellency its sincere satisfaction that the Government of India has accepted the Resolution and appreciates the spirit in which this decision has been taken.

I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEF KORBEL

Chairman

¹Annexure I to Annex VII to KR-484.

Annexure IV to Annex VII to KR-484
M. Josef Korbel to Jawaharlal Nehru

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW DELHI,]
25 August 1948

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 20 August 1948¹ relating to the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the North.

The Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the peculiar conditions of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in its resolution of 13 August 1948. It believes, however, that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the Resolution.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEF KORBEL
Chairman

¹Annexure II to Annex VII to KR-484.

Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Zafrulla Khan to Alfredo Lozano¹

FOA, F. 1-35

[KARACHI,]
19 August 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 13th August, forwarding the resolution² adopted by the United Nations Commission at its thirty-ninth meeting and stating that this resolution is intended to present the principles which may serve as a basis of discussion. At our informal meeting on 14th August, you reiterated that the proposals contained in the resolution were only meant to serve as a basis of discussion, and you kindly offered to clarify and elucidate any points arising out of these proposals.

2. The Government of Pakistan have given their most serious consideration to the proposals made by the Commission, but regret that they are not in a position to indicate their views with regard to them without obtaining clarification of a number of important points. The matters with regard to which further elucidation is required are set out in the attached memorandum. It would be greatly appreciated if

the Commission could provide the elucidation requested.

3. While reserving their views with regard to the proposals formulated by the Commission, the Government of Pakistan would like to submit certain observations with regard to the Commission's approach to the question of "ceasefire". As the Commission is aware, the Pakistan representatives, in their discussions with the Commission during its stay in Karachi from July 31st to August 13th, put forward the view that the proposals regarding "ceasefire" should be completely divorced from all other proposals. In the view of the Pakistan Government, the truce proposals contained in Part II of the Commission's Resolution are so closely interlinked with the final solution of the Kashmir question that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. This was fully recognized by the Members of the Security Council who sponsored the Resolution of 21st April.³ Senator Austin explained that the Resolution had a certain unity and all its parts were inter-related. For example, the proposal with regard to the withdrawal of tribesmen could only be implemented if there was satisfaction in respect of the reconstitution of the State Government and the creation of other conditions in which the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan could be determined by means of a free and impartial plebiscite.

4. It is the considered opinion of the Pakistan Government that there are only two practical ways of dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir situation, namely:

(i) to bring about a "ceasefire" pure and simple, such as is in Part I of the Commission's Resolution; or

(ii) to attempt at the very start a complete and final solution of the entire Jammu and Kashmir question.

The Pakistan Government regret to note that the Commission has not adopted the first alternative, which would have put a stop to the fighting immediately, and, in the calmer atmosphere thereby created, would have greatly improved the chances of a final settlement being reached. The result of extending the scope of the Resolution beyond Part I must inevitably be to bring the whole field of the dispute under immediate discussion and thereby to delay the attainment of "ceasefire" until a final solution of the whole problem can be agreed upon.

I have the honour to be, etc.

ZAFRULLA KHAN.

*Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan*

¹Vice-Chairman, UN Commission for India and Pakistan on Kashmir.

²Annex VII to KR- 484.

³Annex III to KR-484.

Enclosure to Annex VIII
Memorandum Regarding Points in the U.N. Commission's Resolution
of 13th August, 1948 Requiring Further
Elucidation

PRELIMINARY

It had been explained to the Commission that it is only the Azad Kashmir Government that can authorize the issue of ceasefire orders to their own forces. The Pakistan Government wish to be informed what steps the Commission has taken or proposes to take to secure the agreement of the Azad Kashmir Government to its proposals.

PREAMBLE TO COMMISSION'S RESOLUTIONS

2. The preamble to the resolution of the Commission states that certain conditions are essential to the implementation of the Commission's endeavours "to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation". The Government of Pakistan are unable to appreciate the exact significance of this statement. The preamble to the Security Council's Resolution¹ dated the 21st April 1948 clearly affirms the desire of both India and Pakistan "that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite", and instructs the Commission to "place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and the holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission", and recommends certain measures to the two Governments as being in its opinion "appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan".

It is thus clear that the dispute between the two Dominions relating to Jammu and Kashmir is "whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan", and that the settlement of this dispute is to be brought about by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is presumed, therefore, that the expression "a final settlement of the situation" employed by the Commission in the preamble to resolution means in the words of the Security Council the creation of "proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan". If the expression "a final settlement of the situation" has any implication,

direct or indirect, whether falling short of or going beyond the quotation set out from the Security Council's Resolution, the Government of Pakistan wish to be apprised of it.

PART I OF COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION

3. The Pakistan Government are unable to appreciate the exact significance of the opening words of paragraph D of Part I of the Resolution.² If and when a ceasefire has been arranged, the Commission will be under the inescapable necessity of appointing military observers for the purpose set out in the paragraph. The number, duties, functions and posting of these observers will, no doubt, be at the discretion of the Commission. The Pakistan Government wish to be certain that the Commission are not in any doubt that if a ceasefire order is agreed to, its observance will inevitably require supervision by neutral military observers appointed by and acting under the authority of the Commission.

PART II OF COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION

4. The discussions before the Security Council on the subject of Jammu and Kashmir proceeded on the basis that India did not desire a military solution of the problem, but would be content to abide by the results of a free and impartial plebiscite. It was recognized by the Security Council that the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir had flared up as the result of military and other repressive measures adopted by the ruler against his subjects, and that the only method of securing a cessation of the fighting was to create conditions which would satisfy every body concerned that the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan would be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. While the Security Council was still engaged on the consideration of the Kashmir case, India was steadily building up its Armed Forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This building up process did not cease on 21st April 1948, but was continued and intensified. The Indian Army mounted a big offensive in the beginning of April, thereby causing a material change in the situation. This offensive action has continued ever since. The publicly declared intention of the Government of India was to secure a military decision in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting the United Nations Commission with a *fait accompli*. This situation not only put in jeopardy the entire population of the areas under Azad Kashmir Government, and led to a big influx of refugees into Pakistan, but also constituted a direct threat to Pakistan's security.

It was this which compelled the Government of Pakistan to move their troops into certain defensive position.

Paragraph A. 1 of Part II of the Commission's Resolution states that

the presence of Pakistan troops in the territory of the State constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council. This is obviously a one-sided and inadequate description, since, as pointed out above, the build up of India's forces, and their launching an all-out offensive had already materially changed the situation. Even as a factual statement, apart altogether from the feasibility or otherwise of the proposal based upon it, the paragraph should have included the facts mentioned above which necessitated the presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan are unable to appreciate the Commission.

5. Without at all implying that the proposals set out in the resolution of the Commission could form the basis of discussion, the Pakistan Government feel that the possibility of the truce being broken by the Government of India cannot be ruled out. It would materially assist the Pakistan Government in their appreciation of the various proposals contained in the resolution, if the Commission would be so good as to take the Pakistan Government into its confidence as to the measures or guarantees which the Commission may have in mind to safeguard the security of Pakistan and the population of the areas under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government against any subsequent aggressive action by the Government of India and of the Sikh and RSS volunteer bands. In particular, the Pakistan Government would be glad to know whether the Commission intend to secure the services of an international or neutral force for this purpose and, if so, what the strength of such a force would be.

6. Paragraph A. 2 seeks the agreement of the Pakistan Government to the using of their best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of tribesmen, etc., who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. The Commission is no doubt aware that the Security Council was convinced that it would not be possible to persuade the tribesmen and other sympathisers of the Azad Kashmir Government to withdraw unless they were satisfied as to the security of the Muslim population of the State and the establishment of conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite. The Government of Pakistan are unable to discover any proposals in the resolution of the Commission designed to secure and guarantee these conditions. Would the Commission kindly indicate what measures it proposed to adopt to convince the tribesmen and other elements concerned that these conditions have been or will be established, and that no danger or prejudice would result to the Muslim population of the State even if the terms of the truce were subsequently broken by the Government of India.

7. It has been explained to the Commission that a large number of Sikh and RSS volunteer bands have entered the State since the 15th August 1947, and have been operating in the areas occupied by the Indian Armed Forces, committing all kinds of atrocities upon and terrorising the Muslim population. There is no proposal in the resolution of the Commission to the effect that such elements must withdraw from the State. The Pakistan Government wish to be informed what proposal the Commission has in mind in this connection.

8. In paragraph A. 3 the Commission proposed that, pending a final solution, the territory at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government will be administered by that Government under the surveillance of the Commission. The Commission no doubt realises that the population of this territory is almost wholly Muslim and is in full support of the Azad Kashmir Government. On the other hand, the majority of the population of the territory under the control of the Government of India is opposed to the regime established by the Government of India. The Government of Pakistan would wish to be enlightened as to the reasons which, while necessitating or rendering desirable the surveillance of the Commission over the Azad Kashmir Government in respect of the territories of the latter, would not with much greater force call for the surveillance of the Commission over the regime operating in the rest of the State. Since the Commission considers that it is in a position to take certain territories under its surveillance, there would appear to be no objection, in principle, to the Commission taking the whole of Jammu and Kashmir under its surveillance.

9. The Commission has asked for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from Jammu and Kashmir, though these troops are in wholly Muslim areas and have been welcomed by the local population. On the other hand, the Commission is aware of the serious objection to the quartering of non-Muslim troops on a predominately Muslim population. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, wish to be informed of the reasons which necessitate the retention of any portion of India's Armed Forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

10. Assuming that a truce could be agreed upon on the basis of the Commission's proposals, the Government of Pakistan would appreciate an indication from the Commission of the manner in which the Commission proposes, in accordance with the concluding portion of paragraph B. 1, to secure a synchronised and simultaneous withdrawal of the Pakistan forces and the bulk of the Indian Forces from the State.

11. The Pakistan Government wish to know whether the surveillance of the Commission over the territories of Azad Kashmir implies any control over the Azad Kashmir Forces which would under the

Commission's proposals remain intact. If so, what control does the Commission contemplate exercising over the State forces, the local militia raised by Sheikh Abdullah and over any Indian Armed Forces that may be left in the State under the Commission's proposals?

12. The Security Council's Resolution of 21st April 1948, contemplates the maintenance of law and order throughout the State with the aid of local forces. Does the Commission contemplate that any additional forces would be required for the maintenance of law and order in any part of the State? If so, the Pakistan Government would welcome an indication of the Commission's view whether it intends to call upon both India and Pakistan to provide such forces as contemplated in Article 5 of the Security Council's Resolution of 21st April 1948.

13. The Security Council's Resolution of April 21st 1948, sets out in Articles 11, 12 and 14 a number of conditions for the restoration of human and political rights, including the return of those who had left or been compelled to leave the State since 15th August 1947. The Pakistan Government wish to be informed whether paragraph B.3 of the Commission's resolution is intended to cover and guarantee all these conditions from the moment a truce is agreed upon.

PART III OF THE COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION

14. The observations submitted in paragraph 2 above apply with equal force to Part III of the Commission's resolution. The Government of Pakistan would welcome an elucidation of this Part. It states that "the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people" and that the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan shall "enter into consultation with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured". It may be pointed out that some of these conditions are set out in the Security Council's Resolution of 21st April 1948. It is presumed that consultations between the two Governments and the Commission would be designed to secure the implementation of these conditions and the devising of any further conditions that may become necessary or may appear to be desirable.

The most important of the conditions agreed upon by the Security Council were that:

a. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir would be reconstituted so as to ensure that the major political groups in the State would share "equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at ministerial level" (Article 6), and the interim administration so formed would, in the words of Senator Austin, be such as "would command the confidence

and respect of all the people of the State and would be a symbol to the people on both sides that the Government of the State was officially neutral on this issue " of accession to India or Pakistan .

b. A Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and would be vested with wide powers, including power of direction and supervision of State Forces and Police (Articles 7, 8 and 9) .

c. The appointment of special magistrates to deal with certain types of cases (Article 10).

The Pakistan Government presume that the object of the concluding portion of Part III of the Commission's resolution is to secure agreement on the implementation of these among other conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.

¹Annex III to KR-484.

²Annex VII to KR-484.

Annexure I to Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Josef Korbel to M. Zafrulla Khan

FOA, F. 135

[NEW DELHI,]
27 August 1948

Sir,

On behalf of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, I have the honour to reply to your letter dated 19 August 1948¹ referring to the letter of the Chairman of the Commission of 13 August 1948, and enclosing a memorandum containing points of inquiry with regard to the Commission's resolution. The Commission, in the memorandum herewith enclosed, meets your request for further elucidation on the points presented by you.

The Commission has noted your observations as to its approach to the question of ceasefire, and appreciates the point of view of the Pakistan Government that an unconditional ceasefire is indeed a desirable step. In fact, the Commission's activities during its early deliberations were directed along these lines, and earnest consideration was given to the issues involved. Dr. Lozano, Vice-Chairman of the Commission travelled to Karachi in order to ascertain the points of the Government of Pakistan, while other members of the Commission were ascertaining the points of view of the Government of India in

New Delhi. The presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, however, is a material change in the situation as considered by the Security Council in its resolution of 21 April 1948, which creates obstacles to the effective and immediate implementation of an unconditional ceasefire.

Once the Commission was apprised of the stipulations of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India in respect of a ceasefire, it proceeded to draw up fair and equitable proposals which, it was felt, should meet with the approval of both parties. As a link between an unconditional ceasefire and a final settlement, which will necessarily be subject to negotiations, the Commission has recommended a truce agreement as set forth in Part II of the resolution. The terms of this truce agreement, and the principles upon which it has been conceived, without jeopardizing immediate cessation of hostilities, are intended to create an atmosphere favourable to consultations among the two Governments and the Commission in which a final and peaceful solution might be agreed upon.

The Commission sincerely hopes that the Government of Pakistan, as a step towards the satisfactory solution of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and in the interest of furthering international peace and security, will find it possible to signify its acceptance of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948.

I have the honour to be, etc.

JOSEF KORBEL
Chairman

¹Annex VIII.

Enclosure to Annexure I to Annex VIII to KR-484

Reply of the United Nations Commission for India & Pakistan to the Pakistan Government's Memorandum regarding Points in the Commission's Resolution of 13 August, 1948.

1. (a) On 18 July 1948, during the interview between Dr. Alfredo Lozano and Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, the latter emphasized that in submitting the condition that the proposal for a ceasefire order should have the consideration or approval of the Azad Kashmir forces, his only aim was to ensure that their views be taken into account—whether by the appearance of representatives of the “Azad Kashmir” before the Commission or through the Pakistan Government as intermediary.

(b) In answer to the questionnaire placed by the Commission before the Government of Pakistan on 4 August 1948, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that “the Pakistan Army is at present responsible for the

overall command... of Azad Kashmir forces”.

(c) During the expose made by the High Command of the Pakistan Army on 9 August 1948, it was stated that the Azad Kashmir Forces were operationally controlled by the Pakistan Army.

(d) In view of these assurances, the Commission understands that the Government of Pakistan will ascertain and reflect the position of the Azad authorities in arriving at their decision with regard to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948.

2. The expression “a final settlement of the situation” does not fall short of nor go beyond the terms of the Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948 and is in harmony with it. The Commission, however, is not committed to a rejection of a peaceful solution which might be agreed upon by the two Governments, provided that such solution reflects the will of the people.

3. The Commission is in no doubt that the observance of the cease-fire order will require neutral military observers. These observers will be appointed by the United Nations and will act under the authority of the Commission.

4. The Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948, which sets forth the terms of reference of the Commission was adopted with cognizance of the presence of Indian troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir, however, constitutes a material change in the situation inasmuch as the Security Council did not contemplate the presence of such troops in that State, nor was it apprised thereof by the Government of Pakistan. The Commission cannot accept the statement in the memorandum that the Commission's description in this respect is “one sided and inadequate”.

5. In drawing up the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission did not and could not proceed on the assumption that one or the other party would violate the truce. The implementation of the resolution presupposes good faith and cooperation between the two parties.

As the Government of Pakistan are aware, the United Nations does not have at its disposal an international force. The use of a neutral force has not been contemplated by the Commission. However, the Government of Pakistan will have noted that the resolution provides for neutral military observers to be stationed where the Commission deems it necessary.

6. The Commission reaffirms its conviction that good faith and active collaboration on the part of both Governments are essential to the implementation of the resolution. Under the terms of the resolution, the Government of India are bound to assist local authorities in

maintaining law and order in areas now occupied by Indian troops; further, the Government of India undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

The Commission is convinced that confidence in the purpose and objectives of the resolution will be promoted by the appeals that the two Governments make to all concerned for the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to a satisfactory solution.

Acceptance of the truce agreement will lead directly to consultation between the two Governments and the Commission to determine fair and equitable condition whereby the free expression of the will of the people will be assured.

7. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, Indian forces as provided for in Part II B. 2 will assist local authorities in the maintenance of law and order. Upon acceptance of the truce agreement, withdrawal of elements mentioned in the memorandum will be considered in the implementation of Part III and under the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948.

8. Surveillance of territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir other than those now occupied by the Pakistan Army and forces under their control is not provided for in the resolution. The administration of such areas remains under the jurisdiction of the Government of the State.

9. A portion of the Indian armed forces will remain in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the purposes indicated in Part II B. 2 of the resolution.

10. In accordance with Part II B. 1 of the resolution, the Indian Government, when apprised that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, agree to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Synchronisation of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission.

11. The Commission does not contemplate measures of control over forces remaining within the State of Jammu and Kashmir beyond the provisions of the resolution.

12. The Commission has not contemplated the use of forces for the maintenance of law and order other than those envisaged under the terms of its resolution of 13 August 1948.

13. Paragraph B 3 of Part II of the Commission's resolution, which related to the truce agreement, is not intended to deal with the questions raised in paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 of the Security Council's

resolution of 21 April 1948. These questions, relating to the plebiscite will logically arise in the implementation of Part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948.

14. Part III of the Commission's resolution envisages that both Governments reaffirm their desire that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir be decided in accordance with the will of the people, and that upon the acceptance of the truce agreement, their representatives enter into consultation with the Commission in order to establish the conditions under which the free expression of the will of the people will be assured.

*Annexure II to Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Josef Korbel to M. Zafrulla Khan*

FOA, F. 1-35

[NEW DELHI,]
3 September 1948

Excellency,

On 19 August 1948¹ you were kind enough to present to Minister Dr. A. Lozano, then Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, a letter dated 19 August 1948 with a Memorandum attached asking for clarification of a number of points in the United Nations Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948.

The points contained in the Memorandum were answered by the Commission's letter dated 27 August 1948.²

Moreover, during the two meetings which the Commission had with you on 31 August and 2 September, ample opportunity was given for further clarification of certain points of the Resolution.

At your request the Commission is glad to offer you the following interpretation of points on which you asked for additional elucidation:

1. In connection with paragraph A 3 of Part II of the Resolution, the term "evacuated territory" refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command, it being understood that the population of these territories will have freedom of legitimate political activity.

2. The Commission reaffirms that, according to its Resolution, United Nations neutral military observers will be posted on both sides of the ceasefire line with the object of ensuring that the conditions of the truce are adhered to. In case of a breach of any of these conditions, a report will be made to the Commission, and the Commission, on being satisfied that action in respect of the report is necessary, will call upon

the authorities in either area to take the desired action.

3. As regards paragraphs B I and 2 of Part II, the Commission while recognising the paramount need for security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, confirms that the minimum strength required for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order, would be determined by the Commission and the Government of India. The Commission considers that it is free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan on the subject.

4. As regards Part III:

- a. You are respectfully referred to paragraph 2 of the Commission's Memorandum accompanying its letter dated 27 August, which clarifies the position of the Commission on this subject.
- b. The Commission will be guided by the terms of the Security Council's Resolution of 21 April, 1948, setting forth the conditions for a plebiscite, subject to such modifications as the Commission might determine with the agreement of the Governments of Pakistan and India.

5. Regarding publication, the Commission has the honour to inform you that it will publish, after having received the answers of both Governments to its resolution; the full text of the resolution and the correspondence relevant to it as exchanged between the Commission and the two respective Governments.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

JOSEF KORBEL
Chairman

¹Annex VIII to KR-484

²Annexure I to Annex VIII to KR-484

*Annexure III to Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Zafrulla Khan to M. Josef Korbel*

FOA, F. 1-35

[KARACHI,]
6 September 1948

Sir,

The Government of Pakistan have had under serious and anxious consideration the proposals made by the Commission in its resolution of the 13th August, 1948 and the clarification and elucidations of its provisions that the Commission has since furnished in the course of discussion and in writing. They are now in a position to transmit to the

Commission their views on these proposals as clarified and elucidated by the Commission.

2. They desire to make it quite clear at the outset that these views are the views of the Government of Pakistan and are not as such in any sense binding upon the Azad Kashmir Government, nor do they in any manner reflect the views of the Azad Kashmir Government. They note that it is the intention of the Commission to hold discussions with the Azad Kashmir representatives as individuals, and they do not doubt these representatives will convey to the Commission the views of their Government on the proposals of the Commission. The Government of Pakistan would at all times be prepared to lend their good offices to persuade the Azad Kashmir Government to accept the view of the proposals of the Commission which the Pakistan Government themselves take, but such acceptance must rest finally with the Azad Kashmir Government themselves. As has already been explained to the Commission, political control over the Azad Kashmir Forces vests in the Azad Kashmir Government, and it is the latter Government alone that has authority to issue a ceasefire order to those forces, and to conclude terms and conditions of a truce which would be binding upon those forces.

3. It must further be stressed that the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir was initiated by Azad Kashmir, now represented by the Azad Kashmir Government, and that that Government is a necessary party to any settlement of the Kashmir question. Indeed this view is implicit in the proposals of the Commission itself, inasmuch as these proposals postulate a course of co-operation between the Commission and the local authorities in several respects.

4. It is common ground that the question in dispute with reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the accession of the State as a whole to Pakistan or India, and that this question is to be determined by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

5. With regard to the conditions of the plebiscite the Commission has explained that it will be guided by the terms of the Security Council Resolution of the 21st April, 1948, setting forth the conditions for a plebiscite subject to such modifications as the Commission might determine with the agreement of the Governments of Pakistan and India. In interpreting the terms of the Security Council's Resolution the Commission will no doubt be guided by the explanations offered by the sponsors of the Resolution during the course of the discussion of the Resolutions in the Security Council.

6. As a result of the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission, the Government of Pakistan understand that the

Commission's resolution of the 13th August, 1948 seeks to achieve the objectives outlined below:

First, a ceasefire order in accordance with the proposals set out in part I of the resolution, so that the fighting may be brought to an end.

Secondly, that the conditions of a truce, the period of which the Commission is anxious to reduce to a minimum, be agreed upon in accordance with the proposals set out in Part II of the Commission's resolution. These proposals contemplate the actual determination of the ceasefire line and the synchronisation of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Governments of Pakistan and India shall be arranged between the High Commands of the two Governments and the Commission, and that all territory under the authority or control of the Pakistan High Command, including Gilgit and the areas under the control of Azad Kashmir, shall during the period of the truce continue to be administered by the authorities which are in *de facto* control of it at the time of the ceasefire, and that no civil or military officer of the Government of India or of the State Government shall enter into or exercise any authority over it. The Azad Kashmir Forces shall remain intact, i.e., shall not be disarmed or disbanded. The surveillance contemplated by the Commission over the local authorities does not imply the exercise of control over or interference with the administration.

Thirdly, that this period be utilised towards restoring peaceful conditions throughout the territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, so that once that was achieved to a reasonable degree, the conditions for preparing and holding a free and impartial plebiscite could be put into effect forthwith. The Commission would also consider during this period, along with the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, any proposals suggesting additions to or modifications of the conditions set out in Part B (articles 6 to 15, both inclusive) of the Security Council's Resolution of the 21st April, 1948.

Fourthly, that the Commission proceed to prepare and hold the plebiscite at the earliest possible date. As soon as this stage is reached the conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite shall be put into operation and shall override all arrangements in operation during the period of the truce which are inconsistent with these conditions.

7. The Government of Pakistan desire to stress that they are interested in and would be affected by the result of the plebiscite at least in an equal degree with the Government of India, and they assume that it will be the constant endeavour of the Commission to bring about and promote conditions in and effecting the State of Jammu and Kashmir which would place the two Governments on a position of absolute equality and advantage *vis-a-vis* the plebiscite, and should leave no

room for any feeling on the part of either Government and indeed of any section of the people of the State that any party or section was subject to any handicap or disadvantage, or enjoyed any position of privilege or advantage denied to any other.

8. In the view of the Pakistan Government the presence of the armed forces of the Government of India in any part of the State would militate against the restoration of peaceful conditions and would also conflict with the establishment of conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite. This is a view that the Government of Pakistan intend to continue to urge upon the Commission for their acceptance.

9. The Commission will recall that the Security Council was firmly of the view that the only effective method of stopping fighting in Kashmir was to provide clear and adequate assurance of Azad Kashmir and to the tribesmen helping them that the structure of a settlement had been erected which would guarantee to the people of the State the free expression of their will in respect of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India, and to this end the Security Council laid down a set of conditions in part B of its Resolution of 21st April, 1948. The considerations that led the Security Council to this view operate with even greater force today. Without these assurances the Pakistan Government could not be expected successfully to persuade the tribesmen to withdraw from the State. It is therefore absolutely essential that as part of the Truce Agreement, the acceptance of the Government of India should be secured to the minimum conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or Pakistan as laid down in Part B (articles 6 to 15, both inclusive) of the Security Council's Resolution dated the 21st April, 1948,¹ and explained by the sponsors of the Resolution in the Security Council. In the view of the Government of Pakistan these conditions are susceptible of improvement, and the Commission would no doubt hold further discussions with both Governments for the purpose of securing their agreement to such additions and modifications as may be urged before the Commission or which the Commission may consider necessary.

10. The Government of Pakistan have not been informed of any clarifications and elucidations of the proposals contained in the Commission's resolution of the 13th August, 1948, that the Commission may have furnished to the Government of India. If no clarifications or elucidations have been furnished, no point in that behalf arises. If any clarifications or elucidations have been furnished by the Commission to the Government of India, it is necessary that they should be communicated to the Government of Pakistan and the latter's

agreement to them secured. It is equally necessary that the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission to the Government of Pakistan should be communicated to the Government of India and their acceptance of them secured. The Commission will recognise that it is of the utmost importance that any agreement between the two Governments should be arrived at on the clearest possible basis, so that there is left no possibility of any misunderstanding of any [of] the matters agreed upon. In other words, it is essential that the two Governments should agree simultaneously to the same thing and in the same sense.

11. Although there are several features in the Commission's proposals which from the point of view of the Pakistan Government are not satisfactory nevertheless as a step towards the solution of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and in the interest of furthering international peace and security, the Pakistan Government have authorised me to inform the Commission that:

Subject to the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission to the Government of Pakistan being accepted by the Government of India, and the elucidations and clarifications, if any, furnished by the Commission to the Government of India being acceptable to the Government of Pakistan, and provided the Government of India accept the conditions laid down in part B (articles 6 to 15, both inclusive) of the Security Council's Resolution of 21st April, 1948, as explained by the sponsors of the Resolution in the Security Council, for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan accept the proposals contained in the Commission's resolution of the 13th August, 1948, as clarified and elucidated to the Pakistan Government by the Commission.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ZAFRULLA KHAN

Minister of Foreign Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations,

Pakistan

¹Annex III to KR-484.

Annexure IV to Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Josef Korbel to M. Zafrulla Khan

FOA, F. 1-35

[KARACHI,]
6 September 1948

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter¹ of 6 September 1948, giving the response of your Government to the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948.

The Commission observes that your Government have found themselves unable to accept without reservation the proposals of the Commission as contained in its Resolution of 13 August 1948, the purpose of which is to obtain the agreement of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India to effect a prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security.

The Commission wishes me to inform you that it will consider the questions which you have raised in your letter at an early occasion. It is, however, desirous to stress that the authentic interpretation of its position is contained in its memorandum of 27 August 1948² and its letter³ of 3 September 1948, both addressed to your Excellency.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEF KORBEL
Chairman

¹Annexure III to Annex VIII to KR-484.

²Annexure I to Annex VIII to KR-484.

³See Annexure II to Annex VIII to KR-484.

Annexure V to Annex VIII to KR-484
M. Zafrulla Khan to M. Josef Korbel

FOA, F. 1-35

[KARACHI,]
6 September 1948

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 6th September 1948¹ acknowledging receipt of my letter of the same date containing the views of the Government of Pakistan on the Commission's resolution of 13th August 1948.

2. I note the assurance of the Commission that it will consider at an early occasion the questions that have been raised in that letter.

3. Your letter goes on to stress that the authentic interpretation of the Commission's position is contained in its Memorandum of 27th August 1948 and its letter of 3rd September 1948, both addressed to me. Since your letter of 3rd September does not contain a precise and full record of the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission in the course of discussion in our meetings of 31st August and 2nd September 1948, may I venture to enquire whether the Government of Pakistan in drawing up the statement of their views on the Commission's Resolution of 13th August 1948 have or have not been justified in relying upon the clarifications, elucidations and assurances orally furnished by the Commission in the course of these discussions.

With assurances of my highest consideration,

Yours sincerely,
ZAFRULLA KHAN
*Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations.*

¹Annexure IV to Annex VIII to KR-484.

KR-485

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel*¹

NEW DELHI,
30 August 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Some days ago I received a personal and confidential letter from Lord Mountbatten. I showed it to the Governor-General today. He was of opinion that as this letter dealt with important and grave matters, all the Members of the Cabinet should see it. I am therefore sending a copy of it to you.

JAWAHARLAL [NEHRU]

¹Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, I, 219-22.

Enclosure to KR-485
Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru

[Extract]

LONDON,
15 August 1948

[Paras 1-3 omitted]

4. Since I have been over here, I have had an opportunity of discussing this [Kashmir] problem with every sort of person and all shades of opinion. I have been struck by the unanimity of thought over here that India was absolutely right to go to UNO. I know that you (and I) have been criticised in India for having gone to UNO because UNO handled the matter in a way that caused disappointment in India. But in the comparatively detached atmosphere of London it is more than ever clear that the alternatives before India were and still are open war or a decision by UNO. There are really no other alternatives except perhaps a continuation of undeclared war with all the risks that entail of eventually turning into a declared war.

5. I think you will agree with [me that] Pakistan is in no position even to declare war, since I happen to know that their military commanders have put it to them in writing that a declaration of war with India can only end in the inevitable and ultimate defeat of Pakistan.

6. Therefore a declared war can only come about by India making the declaration.

7. I know that you will instinctively shrink from taking such a course, but I also know that there are some of your colleagues in the Cabinet and the more noisy and unthinking elements in the country who will press you to declare war. I therefore feel it may be of some use if I enumerate again the disastrous consequences of such an act on the part of India.

8. After all that the leaders of free India have said and stand for, after having won your long battle against Imperial rule, can we honestly contemplate that India's first major international act should be a declaration of war, and the final and open abandonment of all other methods of settling an international dispute? This will inevitably be of the gravest possible prejudice to India's future international position; indeed UNO might well outlaw her, in my opinion, naming her as the aggressor. What a paradoxical tragedy that would be!

9. I am certain I do not need to reassure you as to the sincere friendship which HMG feel towards India. The decisive voices in the

British Cabinet are extremely sympathetic and well disposed towards India. If there was any doubt, surely Attlee's remarks in the recent debate in the House on Hyderabad and Stafford's remarks at the Albert Hall today would reassure you. But whatever their feelings would be, they would have no option, in my opinion, but to conform with UNO's decision if they were to name India as the aggressor.

10. The converse seems equally true to me; if the United Kingdom were named an aggressor by UNO, the Government of India would be bound to conform to UNO unless indeed they were to abandon UNO.

11. I need not remind you that you have 4 crores of Muslims spread all over India to whom communal peace was given by Gandhiji's teaching and finally by his death. Can anyone doubt that all Gandhiji's teaching would be thrown by the board, and that communal massacres which would make the Punjab look mild by comparison would follow open warfare with a Muslim State. A declaration of war would be signing the death warrant of a great number of innocent women and children within India and not merely within the war zone. In this respect I submit that India is in an almost unique position.

12. This would be a most inglorious end to the whole conception of the secular State for which you and Gandhiji and your followers have devoted your whole life's work.

13. Have you asked your Chiefs of Staff Committee to give you the advantages and disadvantages of declaring war? If you had a thousand heavy bombers, or a hundred, or even fifty, which could completely flatten out the Pakistan bases, then I could understand the military temptation to declare war. But what have you got? A few old Dakotas with a somewhat doubtful Harry Tate contraption to drop bombs which I have seen for myself at the Hindustan Aircraft Factory. To hit the target with this arrangement would entail flying at so low a height that the Pakistan anti-aircraft gunners could not miss. And we know from our own experience in England how ineffective even a first-class bombing force can be until after years of training and war experience.

14. If therefore you will agree that no sane man could subscribe to a declaration of war, what is the alternative? Apart from going on with an undeclared war, which is so likely to lead to ultimate disaster, the alternative must be UNO.

15. I think that India should show some patience with UNO, for after all it is the first time humanity has got together to try and find an alternative to war. All my discussions here have convinced me that it

was not malice, power politics or any sinister motive which brought about the unsatisfactory treatment of our case. I admit that they took a long while to send the Delegation; that they failed to deal with India's complaint against Pakistan as you would have wished them to, and that things have dragged on interminably; but now you have the Delegation with you, and now is your opportunity to bring all possible legitimate pressure to bear to make them understand your position. I know that you, unfortunately, did not share my view that the last resolution of UNO was not unfavourable for India, but if you will look at it again, I think you will find that if UNO were to implement it, it can provide a reasonable solution for India. Certainly an infinitely better solution than plunging all the rest of India into the consequences of war.

16. If UNO, as Krishna [Menon] seems to think likely, order a ceasefire, with all the forces in their present positions, you might feel that this was giving an unfair advantage to Pakistan. But is it? If there are enough competent and honest observers, they can prevent the forward movement of troops and ammunitions, and they can prevent any form of consolidation by Pakistan, or at least report any infringement which would finally put Pakistan out of court before UNO and the world.

17. The only satisfactory conclusion that I can see would be for UNO to condemn Pakistan publicly for sending their army into Kashmir on the ground that this is Indian territory. I do not myself see how such a condemnation could precede the acceptance of the order to ceasefire. As I said just now, the act of complying with the ceasefire order could in no way prejudice India's military position, as your military advisers will tell you, but the condemnation of Pakistan by UNO which can then follow would be the justification of the policy which you have pursued from January and the beginning of peace in Kashmir. In effect this would enormously strengthen your position with your followers, and public opinion would certainly establish India's rightful position in the world.

18. For God's sake don't get yourself plunged in 'war' however great the internal pressure, for once in you cannot get out of the consequences.

[MOUNTBATTEN]

KR-486

CEASEFIRE IN KASHMIR¹

A ceasefire in Kashmir, mutually ordered by the Governments of India and Pakistan, came into effect at midnight of 31 December 1-January 1949, in anticipation of the resolution of the U.N.

Kashmir Commission, on the subject of holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. This resolution was adopted by the Commission on 5 January 1949 and was simultaneously released the next day in Karachi, Delhi and at Lake Success. It included the following proposals:-

1. The question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.
2. The plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the ceasefire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts 1 and 2 of the Commission's resolution² of 13 August 1948, have been carried out and arrangement for a plebiscite completed.
3. (a) The U.N. Secretary-General will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to the office by the Government of Kashmir.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such assistants and observers as he may require.
4. (a) After the implementation of Parts 1 and 2 of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
(b) As regards the territory referred to in Part 2 (a) of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.
5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for, and the holding of the plebiscite.
6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the

disturbances will be free to return and exercise all their rights as citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation, there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commissions shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administration. The Governments of India and Pakistan, and the authorities of the State of Kashmir, will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect.

- (b). All persons (other than citizens of the State) who, on or since 1947, have entered it of other than lawful purposes, shall be required to leave the State.
7. All authorities in Kashmir will undertake to ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, (a) that there is no threat, coercion, intimidation, bribery, or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite; (b) that no restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State, that subjects of the State regardless of creed, caste or party shall be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of accession, and that there shall be freedom of press, speech, assembly, and travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit; (c) that all political prisoners shall be released; (d) that minorities shall be accorded adequate protection; and (e) that there shall be no victimization.
8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the U.N. Commission problems on which he may require assistance and the Commission may at its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted.
9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result to the Commission and to the Government of Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has, or has not, been free and impartial.
10. Upon the signature of the Truce Agreement, the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in consultations envisaged in Part 3 of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations.

See *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, 1948-50, Vol. VII, London, 9709 & 9757. For text of Resolution, see U.N. *The Year Book of United Nations* 1948-49, New York, 1950, 280-1.

²Annex VII to KR-484.



M. A. Jinnah with M. K. Gandhi



M. A. Jinnah with Jawaharlal Nehru

APPENDIX I

I. 1

G. Mohamed to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-10

C/O GULAM MOHIDIN & SON,
RESIDENCY ROAD,
SRINAGAR,
24 August 1944

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I hope you are fully recovered by now. The news of your sudden illness caused us all great anxiety and disappointment as we were anxiously looking forward to the historical meeting between you and Mr. Gandhi.

There were some after-effects of the events that took place at Baramula after your departure from there. One of these was that the daily *Khidmat* the National Conference organ, started vilifying and intimidating my brother-in-law for his open 'rebellion' against the National Conference. He has, however, done well in instituting a criminal suit for defamation against the paper to vindicate his honour.

As you must be aware the State Govt. has appointed a sort of Royal Commission to go into all the affairs of the State in furtherance of their idea to grant some sort of Responsible Government to the people and before this Commission some Shia gentlemen made a very strange demand that the Shias must be taken as a separate community and given separate representations as such. This has given rise to some controversy in the local press, some Shias writing against and some in favour of the idea. This, as you will be pleased to see, is highly detrimental to the Muslim solidarity and if this mischief is not nibbed [*sic* for nipped] in the bud, it might cause another rift among Musalmans, there being already one, viz: Muslim Conference Musalmans and National Conference Musalmans. If it is not too much to ask, will your goodself be pleased to put a word of counsel. If you could make your views known even to me in a letter I could write to the press that your goodself writing to a friend has been pleased to remark such and such in connection with such and such matter. Unfortunately your goodself has been dragged into this controversy as the Sunnis allege that there is no difference between Shias and Sunnis and in proof of this and their tolerance mention your goodself as being the accepted leader of

100 million Musalmans of India, irrespective of the fact that you are also a Shia. The Shias reply that it is not because that Sunnis are tolerant but that they have accepted you as their leader because of your unrivalled ability. I know it will amuse you very much and that is why I have mentioned this. Nevertheless, such is the politics of Kashmir.

I shall be very interested to know if you have decided anything so far about your intended visit to this place in October. I need not repeat that I always consider it my highest privilege and utmost pleasure if I can do anything for you. Please consider me always at your command.

I am enclosing herewith photographs of your-goodself that I took, in Pahalgam, Gulmarg and Baramula. I thought these might interest you or in any case Miss Jinnah.

Kindly do let me know, Sir, if I can do anything for you from this end.

With respectful regards to you and Miss Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

I. 2

M. A. Jinnah to G. Mohamed

SHC, Kashmir/K-11

MOUNT PLEASANT ROAD,
MALABAR HILL,
BOMBAY,
30 August 1944

Dear Mohamed,

Many thanks for your letter of August 24th¹ and also for the snaps that you have sent, which are very good indeed.

As regards your Kashmir politics, I think I have repeatedly made clear what my views are while I was there both in my public pronouncements and private discussions, and I can only repeat that your salvation lies in the direction of complete unity amongst the Kashmir Musalmans. Of course, there always will be some whom we cannot either persuade or convert to our point of view, but what is required is a solid body of Musalmans who will stand together united, and stand by the creed, policy, and programme which I have inculcated and impressed so often during my stay in Kashmir.

With regard to my coming to Kashmir again in October, it is not possible for me yet to say whether I shall be able to do so, but I will let you know beforehand and as soon as I decide.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,
[M. A. JINNAH]

¹Appendix I. 1.

I. 3

Ghulam Muhammad Mir to K. H. Khurshid

F. 921/62-5

[*Extract*]

56, MONTMORENCY HALL, LAHORE,
8 December 1944

My dear Khurshid,

I was very much pleased to receive a letter from you a few days ago.

[*Four paras omitted*¹]

And what about the Kashmir politics? I was really pained to read from a letter which some time ago I received from you that due to the inauguration of the Dyarchy system in the government of Kashmir Mirwaiz² party is feeling somewhat disheartened. I enquired about this from Srinagar and got an answer which is quite contrary to the above. Many people have come here from Srinagar since the inauguration of this system and I have learned from them things which do not say the same story as Chaudhry Sahib [Ch. Ghulam Abbas] had to tell you. The people and especially backward and uneducated and moreover unaccustomed to such happenings, are not expected to see the thing through the eyes of a progressive people. They might have felt for a day or two if disheartenedness [*sic*] was told to you but I assure you this is gone now and they have come into their own again. I presume there are some minor differences lurking between Mirwaiz group and Abbas group in the Muslim Conference affairs which are the cause[s] of all this disheartenedness and unwillingness on the part of Mirwaiz or his assistants. What do you think?

I fear the letter has become too lengthy for a busy man like you and I hope you will forgive.

Yours sincerely,
MIR [GHULAM MUHAMMAD]

These paragraphs are related to Punjab politics.

²In a letter to K. H. Khurshid on 5 November 1944, Habibullah Gakhru, a Kashmiri student leader, expressed his lack of trust in Yusuf Shah and his party as their honesty was doubtful. See F. 921/41-2, QAP, not printed.

I. 4

Ghulam Abbas to K. H. Khurshid

F. 782/65-6

JAMMU,
20 May 1945

My dear Khurshid,

Thank you very much for your letter¹ of today. I was all along under the impression that you had received neither of my two² letters.

This is gratifying to note that your English has tremendously improved during the last year.

I am sorry to say that you are too late for your suggestion regarding Mirwaiz's presidentship. The matter has been almost entirely decided by now. I not only appreciate your feelings in regard to the question of the presidentship of the M[uslim] Con[ference] but also am at one with you in what you have written in your letter. But my main difficulty all along has been that the N[ational] Con[ference] has been exploiting the Kashmiri masses by telling them that M.C. means for parochial purposes the Muslims of Jammu city to the utter exclusion of the Kashmiris and that the Kashmiris have been big fools to play in the hands of Jammuvis etc. etc. You probably follow my viewpoint. It was this dire necessity that has led me to take the course which is not liked by you alone but I can assure you that not a single well-wisher of the M.C. who has come across me so far after taking this decision, has appreciated it. But I assure you it could not be helped and it must be endured by all of us. I think there is no harm in trying this experiment just to pin down Mirwaiz's political activities. I intend to get Qureshi appointed as General Secretary.

Your second suggestion is important but may have far-reaching consequences so far as Maharaja is concerned. He has already been

bitterly poisoned against M.C. mainly by facts which have all together been misrepresented to him. If your proposal is materialised, we shall in that case, have to clearly communicate it. Anyhow this suggestion is very material and important and I will discuss it with other friends and it will be kept confidential till the last moment. The Radio is on and I have just heard Professor Laski's speech regarding Pakistan and Mr. Amery's contradiction.³ This does not seem to be a bad affair.

Salaam to Ghulam Mohammad and others.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
GHULAM ABBAS

PS: Saghar Sahib has gone to Riasi and will return after three days. I am going to Bhimber tomorrow in connection with the meeting of Tehsil Conference.

¹&²Not traceable.

³See No. 459, TP, V, 1057.

I. 5

Mohammad Ismail Saghar to K. H. Khurshid

F. 782/51-8
[Original in Urdu]
[Extract]

FIRST BRIDGE, MAHARAJ BAZAR, SRINAGAR,
26 May 1945

My dear Khurshid,

Salaam and respects.

You asked me a few days ago to comment on Mr. Saghar Jamvi's letter¹ and to brief you on the current political situation in Kashmir. An account on the subject is submitted here:

[Three paras omitted]

The political scene in Kashmir is undergoing rapid changes, marked by a notable popularity of Muslim Conference. This is also admitted by its adversary National Conference which willingly cooperated with it on the food shortage agitation in the State. Despite this achievement, there are some dangerous portents. The Muslim Conference is deplorably disorganised and is dangerously short of committed workers,

with many ill-wishers in its ranks. On the other hand, the National Conference is a well-organised and disciplined organisation with an army of faithful workers. It appears that almost the entire leadership of Muslim Students Union has gone under the political spell of Prem Nath Bazaz, and is ostensibly promoting dissension and disunity among the already depleted rank and file of the Muslim Conference. Let me explain to you as to why it is so happening. Moulvi Yusuf Shah passed a verdict of *kufr* against the *Hamdard*, owned by Bazaz, and directed his followers to boycott this newspaper of Srinagar. Bazaz, greatly annoyed, revengefully pounced upon, at the first opportunity, at the Muslim Conference. The Muslim Conference and the National Conference had jointly organised state-wide protests against the food shortage. The *Hamdard* arranged publication of fake and dubious statements against the prominent activists of the Conference. A seven-and-a-half ft. long editorial was published by Bazaz in his newspaper targeting most of them. His main objective was to isolate and make ineffective Moulvi Yusuf Shah, by alienating the Conference workers. In this way, and in the garb of supporter of the Muslim Conference, Bazaz intended to take revenge from Yusuf Shah for his boycott call. I suspect that some Unionists among the MC ranks were supporting Bazaz and even press clippings of the fake statements were reportedly sent to the Quaid-i-Azam. You should know better what to do in these circumstances.

What I want to emphasise here is that the statements published in the *Hamdard* are fake and concocted. I confronted Jalaluddin and Ali Mohammad Zargar about the veracity of statements published in their names in this particular newspaper. Both of them vehemently denied and disclaimed any knowledge about such statements. Ali Mohammad did arrange a contradiction in the *Khidmat* newspaper. Mischievously, this was followed by a counter-contradiction in his name in the *Hamdard*. This nefarious campaign regrettably continued unabated during my absence from Srinagar. However, in the face of my strong stand on the subject it appears to be coming to a close.

Let me tell you, I am not sure how long I can do it and at what moment I might be compelled to fall in line with the disheartened folks in the Muslim Conference ranks. This situation is harmful both to the Muslim Conference and the Union. I understand you appreciate the outcome of present imbroglio which, to me, aims at complete isolation of Moulvi Yusuf Shah on the one hand and disgrace for the Muslims of Kashmir on the other.

On my part, I had advised the Unionists on many occasions to engage in dialogue with the Muslim Conference for a common cause

rather than washing the dirty linen in the press. I had pointed to them that under their constitution they cannot join a political party or take part in active politics and particularly as agents of Muslim enemies. No one could have tolerated their role. It is also in my knowledge that they enjoyed support of some of the Conferencites and have targeted Qureshi and Ghulam Mohammad. These two persons now felt thoroughly disappointed and disgruntled. I have also started to feel the same way and have submitted my resignation to Quaid-i-Millat [Ch. Ghulam Abbas] informally.

Mirwaiz has been elected President for this year with the support of Ch. Ghulam Abbas. The first outcome of this event is that Muslim Conference has become the hand-maid of Prem Nath Bazaz and that the Conference may be slowly dying. This is all that I can tell you in this letter.

Can you advance your proposed July visit to June 1945?

Yours,
M. ISMAIL SAGHAR
Rep. Orient Press of India

¹Not traceable.

I. 6

K. H. Khurshid to Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas

F. 782/63-4

READYMONEY LODGE,
MATHERAN,
28 May 1945

Dear Chaudhri Sahib,

I am in receipt of your letter¹ of the 20th of May, and as I find that you are reluctant to accept my second proposal as put by me in my last letter, I hasten to reply.

As regards the Presidentship, now that it has been decided finally, I think I better keep quiet. But one point is significant viz. it is the propaganda of the National Conference [NC] and the mischievous charge of the NC dubbing the M[uslim] C[onference] as of the *Jam[mu]vis*² only that has been mainly responsible for this change in the presidentship. Does this mean that our policies shall be indirectly guided by the NC? Can anybody not say that the MC has been coerced by the NC. It is quite possible that in view of some other mischievous

and misrepresentative propaganda of the National Conference we may take some other step, which will be undesirable as the present one. I think no attention should be paid, whatever, to their utterings and sayings. Muslim Conference represents the Musalmans. If there is anybody as the National Conference it represents the Hindus, yes only Hindus. It does not matter if their president is a Muslim; is not the President of the Congress a Muslim? They might be Muslims, but their views and their aspirations are certainly not representative of the solid opinion of the Musalmans. They voice the sentiments of the Hindus, when they challenge Jinnah and declare their belief in *Akhand Bharat* and hence they represent Hindu opinion or in other words they represent the Hindus only—we may call them progressive. I am sorry I have rather gone out of the way. It is a pity that Sheikh Abdullah said that the Congress should examine the causes and the reasons as to why Jinnah rules over the heart of the Muslamans, but why does he not ask himself as to why he and others like him lost the confidence of the Musalmans and became a block in the progress of the *Millat*? Hence Muslim Conference must outwardly ignore the NC but inwardly check all their moves and designs.

As you say that it "could not be helped", surely then I must keep quiet, because after all I cannot claim to have a better understanding of the matter than you have and as you think it is worth giving a trial, let me pray, and I do hope that you will succeed. Amen.

But I must express my complete disagreement with you, when you express your intention of appointing Qureshi as the General Secretary. I know you have been associated with him long. But I have worked with him and I find that he is not worth the post or the job. If he is appointed General Sec[retary], believe me he will spoil the whole show. If Mirwaiz can be of any use, you will see that Qureshi will neither let Mirwaiz work nor do anything himself. There is only one man in the whole Kashmir Valley who can do something and he is Saghar. Whatever has been done has been done by Saghar. You will agree with me. Qureshi is like Fazlul-Huq, and he must meet his Waterloo today or tomorrow, and the sooner, the better. He is vain, and not a worker. Given the position of General Sec[retary], he may shout about, but will undo what has been done. You may not agree with me and you can give him a trial, and I think you will be most fortunate, if you see after one year that the Office of the Muslim Conference is still somewhere in the city. But may I suggest that you should ask Mirwaiz to choose either Saghar or Qureshi as his Gen[eral] Sec[retary] and leave the choice to him? So that in the end the responsibility may also be mainly his.

Now towards the main point. If the Maharaja has been poisoned, I think, this should allay his fears. It will be a tip to him. We want independence who can oppose it and on what principle? What will be his position if India were free? Surely I think [he] understands his position well. He will be there. What more does he want? What is Responsible Government then? It should be unreserved. All power must be in the hands of the people. That is Responsible Government and that is independence. If you mean that he should have his veto and special powers to exercise his divine rights I don't think we can call it Responsible Government. At least this must be defined in clear terms.

This proposal will affect the following: The Musalmans, the Hindus and the other Minorities, and the rulers.

As far as Musalmans are concerned I need not go into any details. They will welcome it.

As regards the Hindus, they cannot oppose it on any principle. They cannot say that they do not want independence. If they oppose it then you should ask them to define in clear terms what they want so that we can proceed towards the attainment of independence. They cannot say that we are strengthening the hands of the Pakistanis. Our reply is this, we want Kashmir to be Azad. Our sympathies are with the Musalmans of British India and their aspirations as put forth by the Muslim League. They have our moral support. But this freedom concerns us. We want Kashmir to be free and India to be free—whether united or divided that is for British Indian people to decide. We have our sympathies with them. But we want our independence. We want Kashmir to be free entirely of the bondage of the British even? Who dare oppose you and on what principle? And then we do not mean any wrong to the Maharaja. We are faithful to him. He shall be the Ruler of the free State of Kashmir. We are even strengthening his position; what is the demand of the National Conference, it is the same: Responsible Government. But if Responsible Government does not bring independence what is the use of such a Responsible Govt.? And if it means real independence then I see no harm in adopting Azad Kashmir which, as I said in my last letter, is in essence another name for Responsible Government. Nay, it goes one step further, it demands freedom from the British suzerainty too. This step alone can bring us in line with the rest of India. It is for the good of the Hindus themselves, in one way, as they will think that we are now probably tired of Pakistan and want to live in Kashmir independently.

As regards the Maharaja, it is not against him in any way. It is the same as Responsible Government. It will not give us our freedom but

give him freedom too. He cannot ask the British Government to protect him, as we ourselves are not against him. On what pretext can he approach the British Govt. assuming that he may? I don't think there is any clear basis. Recently Lord Wavell declared that States should give Responsible Government to their people and therefore the British policy is clear. Now what he may do inside the State and what will be his attitude towards the Musalmans? I don't think it will bring any change in their general attitude. Surely we are not unlawful, or unconstitutional even. They cannot ban our organization. I therefore feel that nothing should stop you. We cannot stop for the sake of the pleasure of few individuals, however highly placed they may be. This is the only moment when it should be put forth. It will be good propaganda outside and in the long run a very useful thing.

You may place this portion of my letter also before the Working Committee and I hope they will agree to it. Now as Mirwaiz has been elected President, I think this should come as the first Resolution, moved by you and supported by all prominent members from all parts of the State.

I hope you have returned from Bhimber and the Conference has been successful there. Please write to me as soon as possible but do not say care of Mr. Jinnah or Quaid-i-Azam, I think that is better.

Salaams from Gul Mohammad. Mr. Lobo is in Bombay.

Quaid-i-Azam is much better. My *salaams* to Saghar Sahib.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
[K. H. KHURSHID]

¹Appendix I. 4.

²Residents of Jammu.

I. 7

M. Sameenuddin Khan to M. A. Jinnah¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-13

LONE MANZIL
GAGRIBAL,
SRINAGAR,
28 May 1945

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I was very much pleased when I read in the *Dawn* recently that you

had recovered considerably from your illness. It was as I should say a great day of happiness and rejoicing for all the Muslims of the world.

Gone are the days when the Hindus and the traitors (paid Muslims) had rebuked our Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League.

We had met Miss Jinnah a few days before you had left Delhi. To help you to recollect who I am, I would remind you that I had written to you before some four months ago describing in detail the circumstances at home. I regard you as the greatest man of Asia as Beverley Nichols has rightly put in his wonderful book *Verdict on India*. My mother's aptitude for the Muslim League has greatly increased [sic]. She was very active in enrolling the members of the Muslim League in Delhi. But Miss Shahnawaz who is a very nice person did not respond to her calls and also her letters which my mother sent successfully [sic]. Unless and until Muslims are not going to give up their superiority complex they will never succeed in getting the proletariat and the peasants at their back.

I have come to Kashmir. I was overwhelmed to see depraved condition of the Muslims here. Yet when I enquired about your last year's visit to Kashmir from some jewellers and ordinary folk, I found that they were under the banner of the Muslim League. But when I enquired who was their leader in Kashmir, they wrongly replied jubilantly to the Congress leader Sheikh Abdullah (the lion of Kashmir, the pet of the Congress). I felt that the Muslims of Kashmir needed a local leader who would advise them and exhort them in their local politics and who may be a man having good knowledge of religion and politics, and who may, side by side, be a good scholar of Urdu. Muslims of Kashmir are much backward, clinging to the time-worn religion of their recent ancestors and thus are at a complete discord to us. Not a ray of modern civilisation has reached Kashmir. They are too humble in their customs before the Europeans and also to Europeanised Indians which is anti-diluvian [sic for antediluvian] now-a-days for us. But there is only one thing for which they can shed their blood and thus a planned religious scheme is their only remedy. I am always ready to do any sort of service to the Muslim League and to my adorable Quaid-i-Azam. I am always at your disposal.

I am here for three months and it would be very kind of you if you would introduce me to any important personality so that I may not lag behind with my able classmates, who are much superior to me in intellectual capacity.

I may now conclude as I have wasted much of the precious time of Quaid-i-Azam which might have been spent in planning a scheme to overthrow the yoke of British and the diplomacy of Mr. Gandhi.

The time is coming nearer and nearer when the name of our Quaid-i-Azam will glitter in the arena of the politics of the world as gold glitters in sun-shine, and our Pakistan will be an emerald among pearls in the federation of all Muslim countries united to throw open Marxism and imperialism.

Yours,
SAMEENUDDIN KHAN

On 5 June 1945, Jinnah while acknowledging this letter shared his concern on the deplorable and heart rending conditions of Kashmiri people. He advised the correspondent to approach the Executive of the Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference, headed by Choudhri Ghulam Abbas, with his suggestions for the uplift of the people there. Jinnah assured that such suggestions would be welcome to them. See SHC, Kashmir/K-14. Not printed.

I. 8

Ghulam Mohamed Mir to K. H. Khurshid

F. 782/88-91

C/O H-LASSAMIR ABDULAZIZ, S. R. GUNJ,
SRINAGAR,
8 June 1945

My dear Khurshid,

I am very sorry that I couldn't write to you from Lahore. The reason was that first of all we were engaged in preparing for the exam. and then when the exam. was over we thought of leaving that place more than anything else.

We arrived this place on the first of this month. The weather here is very pleasant. The temperature does not go beyond 80 degrees in spite of the sun which shines for the whole day. Here we feel as if we are in heaven in comparison with the hell of Lahore.

The political atmosphere is somewhat calm and cool. While the N[ational] Conference people are working very hard for coming elections, our Conference workers are quarreling with one another and waiting for opportunity to dishonour and discredit their own comrades in arms. There is no mutual confidence and trust among these people. Everyone of them is actuated by personal motives and consequently they put their person first in any matter of importance. None of them thinks himself to be less than the president himself. The

tragedy of the matter is, that instead of trying to remove their mutual suspicions by mutual understanding and deliberations, they are keen to take refuge in the local press and thereby cause intense damage to their cause and lower the prestige and honour of their Conference which is, at least in the Kashmir province, still in its cradle and requires constant nursing.

A few days ago Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, Saghar Sahib and Mr. Ghulam Moh[amme]d (the city president) in consultation with nobody, I mean neither Choudhri Sahib nor Mirwaiz, entered into a union with the National Conference people and many public meetings were held and speeches were delivered criticizing the govt. policy of rationing of foodgrains and other necessities of life. A few young and enthusiastic students, whom I have not the honour to know personally objected to this union and resorted to the local press to criticize the action of above gentlemen. The *Hamdard* was against this Union from the very start and wrote hundreds of articles against it. The lust for the publicity unnerved many and there was a rush of statementwallas at the office of *Hamdard* who received them with open hands and published the statements in very prominent columns and this was responsible to cause a flutter and anxiety in the rank and file of the Muslim Conference. Then followed counter attacks and then again attacks and counter attacks. All this was done through press which is really very shameful on the part of the persons concerned. No body thought of High Command and nobody seemed to have a sense of honour and respect for their organization. Later on Chowdhri Sahib and Mirwaiz interfered and gave their verdict against the Union. After this intervention, the matter should have been hushed up and those responsible for that act ought to have kept quiet and followed the commands of those whom we, they and everybody has put at the helm of affairs. But instead they again were responsible for such acts which would be shameful for any organization which calls itself responsible. It is reported that Yusuf Qureshi abused Mirwaiz and other leaders in the presence of many of their followers. It is reported that he has sent in his resignation to the President and in the same breath he has put forward the condition that if the Conference wanted him to withdraw it, the Conference should compel some four members whom he has named therein to resign from the Conference! What a pity! For the sake of the Conference and the Muslim solidarity he ought not to have resorted to such coercive methods. Although my own views about the unity with the N[ational] Conference are almost just the same as Mr. Qureshi yet I feel it my duty not to say anything at this critical juncture of our political history against those whom we have endured with responsibility. It will be suicidal to

the organization and will do much harm than any number of enemies can possibly do. So, there is disruption, suspicion and all that which can very easily obliterate any organization within no time. The general elections are impending. The most important need of time is to prepare for that but nobody seems to look at this important point in this hustle-bustle of petty quarrels. Here every Tom, Dick and Harry is a leader, and none a true follower. It is the Dutch army, all generals but no privates. There is no respect for the leaders, no faith in their decisions and no true spirit and zeal to work. There is a lot of work to be done. All that was to do [*sic* for to have been done] and that ought to have been done by now is still waiting to be done. Since the Quaid-i-Azam's departure [25 July 1944] nothing worth mention has been achieved. Not a single speech has been delivered and not a single deputation has been sent out into the villages and towns to popularize the Muslim cause. It is the tragedy of the first calibre that knowing the power, prestige and influence of their opponent[s] they do not take seriously to organization and work among the masses. I am very much disappointed with present affairs and fear that if the same [situation] continues the day will not be far off when there will be no sign of Muslim Conference in Kashmir particularly. It is true there is dearth of good working stock but those also who are already there are not seriously and honestly doing their duty to their organization. It is very heart-rendering [*sic* for heart-rending] to think and write [about] these matters but the facts should not be overlooked and sooner the people concerned to know them the better.

Sheikh Abdullah is having very hard days nowadays. He has been received with black-flag demonstrations at Shopian and publicly denounced a traitor. These were very good signs but there is no one to take advantage of that. What a pity!

Pothan Joseph has left *Dawn*. Is there anybody else who will edit it now? It is edited nowadays by P. Ibrahim perhaps. Please write me on the following address.

Sincerely yours,
[GHULAM MOHAMED] MIR

I. 9

Saif-ud-Din to K. H. Khurshid

F. 782/95-8

[Extract]

SARAI PAYEEN, SRINAGAR,
11 June 1945

My dear Khurshid,

Day before yesterday I received your letter and was glad to see it. I am sorry that I could not reply it on the very day because I was busy with some work here.

Your letter which was nothing but a mixture of advices and retorts, have brought me to this conclusion that if ever I have to go on good terms with you I must never argue with you about any matter whatsoever. Moreover, I accept all what you say, and I feel it that I have no power to disagree with you in any matter. So I leave all what happened in the past and drop this discussion business.

I have not taken any of your writing ill for me. On the other hand, I thank you for information and mistakes you see in me.

[Six paras omitted]

One thing about your Union people. Nowadays they have taken the business of creating disruption among Muslim Conference. They have become tools in the hands of Prem Nath Bazaz, and whatever he wants them to do, they do. So write them that they should give up this business and look to their own work with which they have been entrusted. Otherwise it will be very dangerous for both Muslim Conference and Union. On the other hand, we are seeing that National Conference is going weaker day by day. Abdullah is getting a good beating from every side. Formerly, he used to pick up quarrel with a party who opposed National Conference. But now this is not a thing. The party politics is gone and individuals are gaining much importance. Abdullah picks quarrel not with any party but with individuals that he gets good beating. So write Union people to stop all what they have pitched up. Rest all O.K. Awaiting an early reply.

Yours
[SAIF-UD-DIN]

I. 10

Muhammad Amin Haider to K. H. Khurshid

F. 921/125-6
[Original in Urdu]

SRINAGAR,
8 July 1945

Dear Khurshid Hasan,

Assalaamo 'Alaikum wa Rahmatullah. We have sent you a letter and three copies of the *Hamdard* on National Conference Reception for your information. I hope that you have received it by now. The situation is precarious here. People are indiscriminately put behind bars. The *goondas* of National Conference have let loose a reign of terror in the State. The government seems to do nothing to stop them.

Another thing which causes concern among the Muslim Conference is that the press of the State and the external press particularly *Dawn*, *Inquilab* and *Zamindar* failed to portray an objective account of what is happening in the State. We only trust the Muslim press in the State. The behavior of the Muslim press outside the State has destroyed the image of Muslim Conference. The Muslim Conference did not betray the cherished objective of the Muslims of India but, instead, staged peaceful demonstrations.

We have sent you the factual situation in the State, for information of Quaid-i-Azam and request issue of instructions to the Muslim press, particularly *Dawn*, *Nawa-i-Waqt* etc. to expose the discriminatory behaviour of the government and hooliganism of *goondas* of National Conference. We are sorry that you opted for a complete silence on this issue.

The Indian Muslim press on the contrary encouraged the State government by keeping silence, rather than exposing Govt's malpractices and discriminatory behaviour against Muslims.

We hope that you will pay due attention to these issues and request the press, especially *Dawn* to write about the factual situation. Also we hope you will inform Quaid-i-Azam of the conditions prevailing in Kashmir.

Truly yours,
MUHAMMAD AMIN HAIDER

PS: It is to be remembered that this letter is written to you in front of leaders of Muslim Conference, so it needs your deepest consideration. We have sent you a report about the position and situation here, the State government might have prevented receipt of the same.

I. 11

Ghulam Abbas to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-15

JAMMU,
8 July 1945

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

In the midst of his momentous deliberations I hasten to assure the Quaid-i-Azam that the Muslims of the Kashmir State whole-heartedly support the position taken by the League¹ under his inspired leadership and fervently pray for his success against all disruptionary forces. We feel confident that all attempts to smoke-screen the final goal of the Muslim nation by dubious interim arrangement will be defeated.

I have just returned from the annual session of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference held at Poonch. The Quaid-i-Azam will be pleased to hear that the session was a grand success² and at his leisure will kindly peruse its proceedings.³ Meanwhile, the new developments in the situation in Kashmir cannot have escaped him. Sir B.N. Rau has wriggled out of an untenable situation in the same way as Sir Maharaj Singh had done before him, namely by resigning the Premiership. The arch-intriguer in both these cases, Mr. Ram Chand[ra] Kak, a local Pandit and already Minister-in-Waiting succeeds him as premier, incidentally superseding a senior member of the Council, Mirza Jafar Ali (a non-entity from Lucknow) who too has resigned in disgust. Mr. Kak has evidently ingratiated himself with the Maharaja by anti-Residency intrigues and by harping on Muslim-phobia and raising the Pakistan bogey. As Minister-in-Waiting, he manipulated to bring in the National Conference candidate in the Council to run dyarchy to the prejudice of the Muslim Conference and as Prime Minister he will direct all his energies to the suppression of the Muslims and their organization and will move heaven and earth to bring back National Conference to the forefront. We have stolen a long march on our political opponents since the Quaid-i-Azam's last visit to Kashmir. In this we have been considerably helped by the impartiality of the regime of Sir B.N. Rau. But now our success is in jeopardy again. I have to pray that before leaving Simla the Quaid-i-Azam will find time to take up this matter with the proper authorities. Mr. Kak cannot be in the good books of the Political Department.

I shall tomorrow be going on a tour of political work (to Kishtwar) and shall return on the 20th of July by which time I pray I might hear news from the Quaid-i-Azam.

With the sincerest apologies for this encroachment on highly valuable time of the Quaid-i-Azam.

Yours sincerely,
GHULAM ABBAS

¹During his visit to Kashmir in June 1944, Jinnah backed Muslim Conference as representative body of the State Muslims and was unhappy over Sheikh Abdullah's efforts to turn his predominantly Muslim party, the National Conference into a secular one. In the emerging scenario of political polarisation, the Muslim Conference turned to AIML for guidance while the National Conference toed the line of the Indian National Congress, which had gradually penetrated Kashmir politics. See Hasan Zaheer, *The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951*, Karachi, 1998, 45.

²See Appendix I. 12.

³Not traceable.

I. 12

M. A. Jinnah to Ghulam Abbas

SHC, Kashmir/K-16

1st August 1945

Dear Mr. Ghulam Abbas,

Many thanks for your letter¹ of July 8th, which I received at Simla, where I was absolutely head over heels and had not a moment's time during the Simla Conference developments. I was very pleased to receive your letter and hear that your Session at Poonch was a grand success. I note the new situation in Kashmir, the exit of Sir B.N. Rau and the installation of Mr. Kak as the Prime Minister. Please keep me informed of any further developments, and carry on your work with determination.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH

¹Appendix I. 11.

I. 13

Prem Nath Bazaz to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-18

SRINAGAR-KASHMIR,
4 August 1945

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I hope you have not forgotten me; nor the lengthy talks I had with

you about Kashmir politics. I also hope you remember that I told you about a political agreement which was reported to have been secretly entered into last year between the National Conference Party and Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra Kak, the then Minister-in-Waiting to His Highness, I told you that Rai Bahadur wanted to raise the fallen prestige of the Nationalists by trying to get some share for them in the administration of the State and in return the Nationalists had promised him their support to become the Prime Minister. I further informed you that if this pact matured, God alone could save the people of Kashmir as it would be a very dangerous alliance against the democratic spirit and the people's voice because Rai Bahadur Kak would be the worst Prime Minister that we could have.

I remember you told me that what I said 'had gone in' and you could not forget it. Unfortunately the report about the agreement has proved true and the deal has already been executed. You know one of the Nationalist Muslim Leaders has become a Minister and R.B. Kak has recently been appointed as the Prime Minister. Consequently the reign of terror has begun.

The other day Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and Khan Abdul G[h]affar Khan came to visit Kashmir at the invitation of the National Conference. You know how this Conference is disliked by the Kashmir Muslims. They wanted to make peaceful hostile demonstrations which is their birth right. But they were horribly suppressed. Words fail me to convey to you the *goondaism* which was practised by the Nationalists with the backing of the official bayonets. Virtual lawlessness reined in the city during a whole afternoon and a couple of days after.¹ Yet the hostile demonstrations were held on a huge scale. Some demonstrators indulged in stone throwing which was condemnable. But I believe they were provoked to do so by inflammatory and irresponsible speeches of Sheikh Abdullah which he delivered in a series of meetings² held before the day of reception. It is significant that the Government took absolutely no notice of these speeches. On the other hand unabashed, the authorities have been siding with the Nationalists.

As you know fully well I do not agree with you in politics. I belong to the Radical Democratic Party. I have differences with the leaders of the Muslim Conference. Yet my sense of justice revolts when I see that glaring and grave injustice is being done to any party. Besides, I have every sympathy with the Muslims as human beings in their sufferings.

Friends tell me that I should let you know all about this because you will consider my statement as impartial. I trust you will do so.

Hence I write this to you.

How long will this *goondaism* continue? Can't you help?

Yours sincerely
PREM NATH BAZAZ
Editor
The Daily Hamdard

¹On 5 August, Master Ghulam Mohammad Nasim reported to Jinnah from Sopore that the National Conference held a large public meeting there which was addressed by Sheikh Abdullah and the General Secretary of National Conference. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan hoisted the flag to inaugurate the meeting. Highly inflammatory speeches were made by Sh. Abdullah and his General Secretary targeting the Muslim Conference and its leadership i.e. Ch. Ghulam Abbas and Moulvi Yusuf Shah, as well as Muslim League, Pakistan and M. A. Jinnah. A censure motion was passed to condemn the unruly behaviour of Muslim Conference workers at the Srinagar procession of National Conference on 4 August. See SHC, Kashmir/K-20. Not printed.

²The anti-Pakistan stance of National Conference suited the Congress designs to alienate the Muslim majority in Kashmir from their co-religionists in British India represented by the AIML; later, in 1946 Congress threw their weight around Sheikh Abdullah to extricate him from the serious trouble in which he had landed as a sequel to his Quit Kashmir campaign against the Ruler. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to 9 years in jail leaving a trail of sympathy for the Congress in the State. See Hasan Zaheer, *The Rawalpindi Conspiracy* 1951, 47-8.

I. 14

G. Mohamed to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-21

GULAM MOHIDIN & SON,
SRINAGAR-KASHMIR,
8 August 1945

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am sure you must have heard of what happened recently here in connection with the procession that was taken out by the National Conference in honour of M. Abul Kalam Azad. I am enclosing¹ herewith an editorial article written by *Hamdard*, issue 4th August, and Mr. Khurshid can read it out to your goodself. I need make no comments on it and it is self-explanatory.

I am very sorry that you did not choose this place for your well-deserved rest. I hope after great strain at Simla, you are recouping again. Please for God's sake take care of your health, for your life is so precious for Muslim India in particular and for India in general.

You have made an appeal for funds for the coming elections and I am enclosing herewith draft for Rs. 200 as my humble donation out of my meagre allowance I am drawing. More funds are being collected

and I hope a remittance will shortly go from here to you.

With best wishes and respectful regards to your goodself and Miss Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

¹See SHC, Kashmir/K-22. Not printed.

I. 15

M. A. Jinnah to Prem Nath Bazaz

SHC, Kashmir/K-19

17 August 1945

Dear Mr. Bazaz,

I am very thankful to you for your letter¹ of August 4th. I have noted all that you say and I will consider very carefully as to what I can do in the matter.

Thanking you again and with kind regards.

Yours sincerely,
[M. A. JINNAH]

¹Appendix I. 13.

I. 16

M. A. Jinnah to Archibald Wavell

Telegram, SHC, Kashmir/K-24

BOMBAY,

22 August 1945

Situation Kashmir from all accounts pouring in from reliable sources even non-Muslim source very grave. Your immediate intervention requested. Your letter twentieth December 1943¹ new Prime Minister should be allowed proper interval study local situation and devise administrative measures being reasonable. I refrained from pressing matter further for immediate action encouraged by your assurance that Kashmir affairs will continue receive your very careful attention. Your letter referred above also helped allay feelings. Prime Minister B. N. Rao intrigued out like his predecessor Maharaj Singh. Pandit ring headed by new Prime Minister Kak determined crush Muslims. I therefore appeal to you as representative Crown and Paramount Power please intervene at once. Strong Muslim Prime Minister with authority

or failing that Britisher essential. I cannot believe Maharaja ignorant all this. Hope you will take immediate action as from all accounts raj of *goondaism* prevails and very grave situation has arisen there.

JINNAH.

¹No. 79, Vol. X, 91.

I. 17

M. A. Jinnah to Ghulam Abbas

SHC, Kashmir/K-26

24 August 1945

Dear Mr. Ghulam Abbas,

I have received your letter¹ and the report of the recent disturbances in Kashmir that you sent me. I have also received reports from various other sources and I have already made a strong representation² to the Viceroy in this connection. I am now waiting for his reply.

Thanking you for all the information that you gave me.

With very kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
[M. A. JINNAH]

¹Appendix I. 11.

²Appendix I. 16.

I. 18

Prem Nath Bazaz to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-27

SRINAGAR-KASHMIR,
3 September 1945

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have to thank you for your letter¹ of 17th August. Since I wrote to you last, things have changed rapidly here. Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra Kak's policy has resulted in his clash with the local leaders. It has been forced to [*sic*] all independent papers. A statement was issued by editors of 16 papers belonging to all sects of political opinion. I am enclosing a copy of this statement.

Soon after this statement was issued the action was taken against

my two papers the *Daily Hamdard & Weekly Vitasta*. The District Magistrate has issued orders that I should get all the contents (news as well as editorials) approved by him before publication in the two papers have been black listed and threatened with direct action. Where this will lead the Kashmir Government I cannot say. But I would like to know if it is possible to get some help from you. Cant you issue statement in the matter? It would hearten people here.

With greetings,

P.N. BAZAZ

¹Appendix I. 15

Enclosure to Appendix I. 18
Joint Press Statement on Kashmir by 16 Editors

SHC, Kashmir/K-29

The Kashmir Government having failed to efficiently discharge its duty of maintaining law and order, has now fallen foul of the local press. The Government appears to have become upset by the criticism of its policies and activities made by the press from time to time. A warning has been issued to all the papers to refrain from "making malicious attacks on the Government and its officers". Simultaneously with this warning two out of three dailies in Srinagar have been served with notices by the District Magistrate to show cause why action should not be taken against them under Section 35 of Jammu & Kashmir Rules in consequence of the publication of certain news items and articles in them. Obviously the Government think that they cannot carry out their present policies and activities without muzzling the local press. Yet in their warning to all papers they assure that "they not only have no desire to curb the legitimate criticism in any way but would indeed welcome such criticism as a help". It is significant that the Government which is presided over by a State subject Prime Minister and includes two 'popular' ministers should decide to take shelter under the Defence of Kashmir Rules and that too when the war is over and the period of this extraordinary legislation should normally expire. Out of four non-State subject Prime Ministers none took recourse to this Section of law during the past six years.

We protest against this undemocratic and high-handed action of the Kashmir Government. We feel public opinion is being stifled and independent journalism jeopardised by this method. It can never make the present regime popular. In its own interests we think the Government should proceed more democratically.

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Prem Nath Bazaz | Editor <i>Daily Hamdard</i> and <i>Weekly Vitasta</i> , Srinagar |
| G. K. Reddy | Editor <i>Kashmir Times</i> , Srinagar |
| Mir Abdul Aziz | Editor <i>The Millat & Jawhar</i> |
| Aziz Kashmiri | Editor <i>Roshni</i> , Srinagar |
| P. Kannaw | Editor <i>The Daily Martand</i> , Srinagar |
| L. Kaul Plansoor | Editor <i>The Weekly Punch</i> , Srinagar |
| G. C. Dewan | Editor <i>The Chand</i> , Jammu |
| Gurpurb Singh | Editor <i>Khalsa Gazette</i> , Srinagar |
| Gwasha Lal | Editor <i>The Kashmir Chronical</i> |
| T. C. Kh[e]shu | Editor <i>Amrit</i> , Srinagar |
| Lambodhar | Editor <i>Sudharak</i> , Srinagar |
| Man Jee Suri | Editor <i>Sudhar</i> , Srinagar |
| Moulvi Abdul G[h]affar | Editor <i>Islah</i> , Srinagar |
| M. A. Salam | Editor <i>Alburaq</i> , Srinagar |

I. 19

Statement by M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-31

KARACHI,

11 September 1945

Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, has issued the following statement to the Press:

"I have been receiving communications from very reliable sources that the situation in Kashmir is very serious indeed since Sir B. N. Rao, the late Premier, left the State service. I have made very strong representations¹ to the Viceroy already, as far back as 22nd August, 1945, and I do hope that immediate steps will be taken by the Paramount Power to intervene and hold an enquiry into the recent occurrences in Kashmir, which have resulted in bloodshed and the ruthless measures of oppression and suppression that have been adopted by the Kashmir Government against the people and the Press. From all accounts that I have received, there does not exist in Kashmir, any freedom of thought or speech. I have been assured that immediately after the return of Lord Wavell, he will send me his reply, which will probably be not long delayed."

¹Appendix I. 16.

I. 20

*Statement by Members of Srinagar Bar**SHC, Kashmir/K-30*SRINAGAR (KASHMIR),
12 September 1945

Fifteen distinguished members of the local Bar have issued the following statement:-

The Kashmir Government have under section 35 of the Defence of Kashmir Rules ordered the daily *Hamdard* and the weekly *Vitasta* to get all matter approved before publication. Naturally this leaves absolutely no room for these papers to express any independent opinion about public problems. Even factual news unpalatable to the authorities will be suppressed so long as these orders are in existence. Obviously these conditions are not only most disgraceful and demoralizing but violate against the freedom of opinion which is a right of all civilised people. That a lover of liberty may protest against these most arbitrary and very unjust orders one need not necessarily agree—many of us do not agree with the policy of the two papers that have been victimised.

Section 35 of the Defence of Kashmir Rules allows the Government very wide powers resort to which can be justified only under abnormal conditions such as are created by the existence of a war. A victim of the provisions of this Section is afforded no opportunity to defend himself before a court of law. It is a one sided affair where the accused is virtually strangled. It is extremely regrettable that the Kashmir Government should have taken recourse to this law when the war is over and there is hardly any justification for doing so. It is sad that such measures should be adopted by a Government which is headed by a State subject Prime Minister.

As we feel that this action of the Kashmir Government is a harsh blow to the cherished freedom of independent journalism in the State, we consider it our duty to raise a strong voice of protest against it. We hope the Government will see its way to withdraw the orders immediately.

Mohan Krishan Tikku
Amar Nath Saina
Dr. Ghulam Mohmmad
Hafizullah
J.N. Kachru

Radha Krishan Kaul
Kashi Nath Kaul
Pugh Nath Kaul
Gopi Kishan Kaul
Kanhyaalal Kaul

Jagar Nath Adalati
Triloki Nath
Kunwar Kamal Singh

Sham Lal
Sanaullah

I. 21

Archibald Wavell to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-32

No. 295/2/G

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,
NEW DELHI,
16 September 1945

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You know from my Private Secretary's letter dated August 26¹ the circumstances in which I have not been able to reply until now to your telegram² of August 22 on the situation in Kashmir, for which I thank you.

I am receiving full reports on the situation and I am satisfied that the accounts which have reached you, as described in your telegram, are exaggerated. I take this opportunity to assure you again that the situation will continue to receive my close attention.

Yours sincerely,
WAVELL

¹SHC, Kashmir/K-25. Not printed.

²Appendix I. 16.

I. 22

M. A. Jinnah to Archibald Wavell

SHC, Kashmir/K-32 (a)

QUETTA,
27 September 1945

Dear Lord Wavell,

I am in receipt of your letter¹ of September 16th, and I thank you for it. I quite understand the delay in your reply for the reasons and circumstances indicated in your letter.

I am very glad indeed that you are receiving full reports on the Kashmir situation, but I regret when you say that you are satisfied that

the accounts which have reached me, as described in my telegram, are exaggerated. The situation is much worse than what I indicated in my telegram² of the 22nd August, and I have tried and given you only a short summary therein, which is the result of a very careful examination of all the accounts that I have received and have been receiving. I wonder whether you are getting the correct reports and information, or else, I am sure, you would not have said that the accounts of the situation described in my telegram are exaggerated. May I suggest that you should immediately appoint an independent and impartial committee of enquiry? Last year, when I was in Kashmir, I saw actually with my own eyes that there is unimpeachable, material, cogent and overwhelming evidence of the way in which the people of Kashmir are treated. If you wish, I can send you a complete file of the various accounts that I have received and which, in my judgment, are reliable.

I do, therefore, urge upon you not to take this matter lightly. The condition of the people of Kashmir, nearly 95% of whom are Muslims, is most pitiable, as even a casual visitor can see with his naked eyes. You, as representing the Paramount Power, have a duty to put an end to their misery, oppression and suppression which are reported to in a most vicious and rigorous form. However, I am thankful to you for giving me the assurance again that the situation will continue to receive your close attention. I have already suggested that you should immediately see that a strong Muslim Prime Minister, with full authority, or failing that a Britisher is appointed without delay, which will at least ensure the people against *goondaism*, which is prevalent, and give them freedom of thought and speech and security of life and property, which, believe me, hardly exist under the present regime.

I wish I could personally discuss this matter with you and convince you that I am giving you a true picture of the situation prevalent in Kashmir.

Yours sincerely,
[M. A. JINNAH]

¹Appendix I. 21.

²Appendix I. 16.

I. 23

Ghulam Abbas to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-33

JAMMU,
28 September 1945

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

This is to report further on Kashmir affairs.

The press report of Quaid-i-Azam's demand for interference in the State and the Viceroy's impending visit to Srinagar on October 9, 1945 have led to an intensified propaganda from official and semi-official sources in the State in defence of the State administration. It is likely that by faked demonstrations and inspired statements it will be further sought to exonerate the administration of all blame and neutralize the effect of Quaid-i-Azam's appeal to the representative of the Crown. I am sure the Quaid-i-Azam will take what further steps he thinks necessary in the matter.

I have issued a brief statement to elucidate the situation and clarify the issues and am submitting a copy for Quaid-i-Azam's information.

With best wishes and prayers for Quaid-i-Azam's long life

Yours sincerely,
GHULAM ABBAS

Enclosure to Appendix I. 23

Statement by Ghulam Abbas

In an artful press propaganda it is being made out that the Muslims of Kashmir are making capital out of a single incident viz. the clash on the occasion of the river procession in Srinagar in August last. I wish here to dispel this notion and to unveil the whole picture of the wrongs done to us. There is no religious liberty for us in the State. A convert to Islam forfeits his property and loses his children. Cow-killing is a penal offence entailing ten years' rigorous imprisonment. Certain classes of Hindus can bear firearms whereas the Muslims are bound by the provisions of the Arms Act. Hindi is newly introduced as the medium of instruction in spite of the guarantee of Glancy Commission to the contrary, and in direct violation of the recommendations of a committee of language experts from British India. Out of thirty key posts (of ministers and heads of departments etc.) Muslims forming 80 per cent population

hold only four. The appointment of the new Prime Minister has served as a signal for a campaign of unreproved lawlessness against peaceful Muslims everywhere in the State. Apart from the Srinagar incident there has been a communal clash and plundering of Muslims' property at Jammu. There was rioting at Anantnag and Muzaffarabad in Kashmir, an armed Hindu procession at Kathua and forcible occupation by Hindus of a mosque and demolition of its wall at Samba, in Jammu province. All this happened in one week. The authorities are both unwilling and unable to check lawlessness. Four prime ministers have either resigned in protest or have been made to go in about a year and a half. The fifth runs the administration purely in the interests of his own clique, strangulating public opinion and muzzling the press by unwarranted restrictions and censorship. Many political organizations, several newspapers in the State and fifteen leading lawyers from Srinagar have protested¹ against restrictions on free expression of opinion. The Government plays an altogether partisan's role and needs drastic overhauling. It is a great pity that His Highness' own declarations for the removal of all strangulating restrictions have been so little respected by those who are at the helm of the administration.

¹Appendix I. 20.

I. 24

Prem Nath Bazaz to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-51

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
30 September 1945

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you for your statement¹ about Kashmir. It was timely. The Kashmir Government is now trying to neutralise its effects by getting letters and news items published in the Punjab press. I have therefore written a detailed article on the subject of which I enclose a copy for your information.

I have sent this article to the daily *Dawn* for publication. It is rather lengthy and I am afraid the Editor may hesitate to insert it. I have written to him that I shall have no objection if he splits it up into 3 or 4 installments. If you think it advisable you may also kindly instruct the Editor to insert it. Lord Wavell is coming to Kashmir and the publication

of these facts might help us.

With greetings,

Yours sincerely,
PREM NATH BAZAZ

¹Appendix I. 19.

Enclosure to Appendix I. 24

VERY SERIOUS SITUATION IN KASHMIR

(By a Journalist)

On September 11, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of All India Muslim League revealed in a statement to the press¹ that he had made "very strong representation² to the Viceroy as far back as August 22, 1945 regarding the recent disturbances in Kashmir which had resulted in bloodshed and ruthless measures of oppression and suppression that have been adopted by Kashmir Government against the people and the press". Mr. Jinnah urged the Crown Representative to intervene in what the President of the Muslim League described as "a very serious situation in Kashmir according to various communications which he had received from very reliable sources since Sir B.N. Rau, the former Premier, left the State service".

Not unexpectedly this statement of Mr. Jinnah has unnerved the State authorities, particularly the Prime Minister Rai Bahadur Pandit Ram Chandra Kak and his henchmen. Inspired letters and news items have begun to find prominent place in the Punjab Hindu press in which not only Mr. Jinnah is maligned and abused as usual for his "communalism" but efforts are also made to prove that the League Leader is totally uninformed about Kashmir affairs and has made his representation to the Viceroy without knowing the real facts. It is the intention of the present writer to show, in the light of published documents and proved facts, that what Mr. Jinnah said in his representation is really drawn from "very reliable sources" and undoubtedly "a very serious situation has developed in Kashmir" which needs immediate intervention of the Paramount Power if the matters are not to deteriorate beyond repair.

In order to understand and appreciate the real causes of the recent occurrences in Kashmir one should know a little of the background of State politics. It is well known that during the past two years there has been frequent change of Prime Ministers in Kashmir. As many as five men have occupied this highly responsible chair by turns. In April 1943, Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar laid down the reins of his office after a long period of six years' misrule and maladministration which created

manifold problems for his successor. Sir Gopalaswami's main plank of administration was the suppression of progressive elements, especially Muslims, in State politics. He was succeeded by one of the ablest and most liberal statesman in the person of Sir Maharaj Singh. No sooner had Sir Maharaj taken over than he saw what a mess Sir Gopalaswami had made of things in Kashmir. He realized that to restore peace in the land and to take Kashmir on the path of progress it was essential that justice should be done to all sections of His Highness' subjects, including the Muslims who form about 78 p[er] c[ent] of the State population. He therefore immediately applied himself to this task.

Almost in the twinkling of an eye, Sir Maharaj became very popular. A golden age appeared to have begun in the State. But barely three months had passed when the new premier was disillusioned. He found that iron walls had been raised around him. Although in name he was the all powerful Prime Minister of the Kashmir State, in reality he was important like the peon at his door, and was to receive instructions from others. Disgusted with such state of affairs Sir Maharaj resigned on 26th July and left Kashmir. In a press interview which he granted at Lahore he made sensational disclosures as to why he resigned. He frankly admitted that: "He was not the only adviser to the Maharaja." There were others besides him and they wielded the real power. When questioned Sir Maharaj confessed that he knew nothing about the Royal Commission composed of officials and non-officials which was appointed by His Highness to enquire into the constitutional and other reforms that were needed in the State to fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the people.

Sir Maharaj was followed by Sir Kailash Narian Haksar who was known for his wide administrative experience. He was not new to the State, as he had worked as Special Advisor to His Highness and Guardian to heir-apparent for several years before he became Prime Minister. His grey hair and extensive knowledge of inner working of many Indian States did not help him to prove a success. Sir Kailash met with no better fate than his predecessor. He remained in office for about six months and had to quit the State for good. It was known as early as September that he could not continue as Premier of the State.

At this stage not many people could be found to apply for the post of the Prime Minister of Kashmir. To go to Kashmir meant to volunteer for sure defeat which no one in his senses would risk willingly. Things had taken a scandalous turn so a desperate hunt for suitable a man was started. An offer was made to Sir B.N. Rau who was on a pleasure trip to the happy valley. From what Sir B.N. Rau had come to know about Kashmir politics he was reluctant to accept the "attractive

offer." He however made searching enquiries from all concerned and after obtaining assurances from His Highness that there would be no interference in his work he accepted the post. When he assumed charge of his responsibilities every one asked: "Can it be that where Sir Maharaj Singh and Sir Kailash Narian have failed Sir B.N. Rau will succeed?" only time could answer.

In a press conference which he held on 15th Feb., 1944, the next day of his appointment as Prime Minister, Sir B.N. Rau expressed his high ambition to make Kashmir a "Model State." He said, though a Hindu State, he would like to see that non-Hindus were treated in Kashmir in the same manner as the Hindus. In fairness to him let us admit that he tried to be true to his word. But he could neither transform Kashmir into a Model State nor do substantial justice to all sections of His Highness subjects. During whole of the summer last year rumours were afloat that Sir B.N. Rau had resigned and he wanted to go. But he was requested to remain for a little more time as his departure so soon would prove extremely scandalous. He agreed but it was known that Sir B.N. Rau had met his doom. The forces working behind scenes which had made Sir Maharaj Singh's path uneven and difficult to traverse had brought about Sir B.N. Rau's downfall too. He found that he could not carry out his laudable traditions. The assurances given to him had proved unfounded. There were others more powerful than him, who carried on the administration as they liked, while he was there to bear the brunt of public wrath. It is said that important administrative changes were effected without his knowledge. Sir B.N. Rau had been appointed for three years. He remained nominally in office for less than 16 months.

In his, now historic, press statement referred to above Sir Maharaj did not name the person who created stumbling blocks in his way of serving the Kashmir people. Sir B.N. Rau who is very shy by nature did not even grant any press interview to say what made him resign the post he had accepted after a good deal of deliberation. But those who have met both these gentlemen after they relinquished responsibilities of their office know quite well that the man who was behind these intrigues and machinations was no other than Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra Kak, the then Minister-in-Waiting to His Highness. It is thus that we find the very man himself in the chair of the Prime Minister which he did not allow others to occupy for long.

While on the one hand Rai Bahadur R.C. Kak had been playing this mischief inside the Government, on the other he tried to enlist the support of some sections of Muslims on his side. Kak has never enjoyed any popularity with any section of His Highness' subjects. As I

shall presently show, he is, without a doubt, the most hated man amongst the high officials in the State. He had ill-reputation from the very beginning of his official career. No political party was willing to offer him their co-operation. But this state of affairs did not continue for long. The National Conference of Sheikh Moh[amma]d Abdullah, having become discredited among the State Muslims required official support to gain a fresh lease of life. Mr. Abdullah and his colleagues offered their support to Kak. Thus an unholy alliance was formed between them to suppress all progressive elements in the State. When in October last year during the nominal regime of Sir B.N. Rau, His Highness announced the so called constitutional reforms to appoint two of his Ministers from among the members of the Kashmir Assembly. It was through the manipulations of R.B. Kak that Mirza Afzal Beg, a colleague of Sheikh Abdullah, was appointed as Public Works Minister. Having received this sop Sheikh Abdullah raised the demand of a State subject Prime Minister. The stage having been set for the purpose, His Highness agreed. Obviously in view of what has been said above, the Maharaja made a great mistake. Recent events and occurrences have confirmed this opinion. The best course for him would have been to strike at the root of the trouble by demanding the resignation of his Minister-in-Waiting. But perhaps that would be too much to ask as Kak had spread tentacles all around the Maharaja from which it was too difficult for him to extricate himself. So he had no other alternative but to make the choice. R.B. Kak was appointed Prime Minister on 25th June 1945. The unholy alliance between Kak and the National Conference having ripened to its fruition, Sheikh Moh[amma]d. Abdullah invited P[andi]t Jawaharlal Nehru and M. Abul Kalam Azad to visit Kashmir. The Congress leaders were only too willing to oblige Mr. Abdullah by accepting the invitation. Both sides wanted to achieve their own ends by the event if it could prove successful. Having failed to hoodwink Mr. Jinnah in the Simla Conference the Congress leaders were determined to smash the Pakistan idea. No place could prove more suited to start this movement than Kashmir. Apparently all the Congress leaders—there were others besides Nehru and Azad—came to the happy valley to improve their health but in reality they wanted to prove as Nehru later on admitted at A.I.C.C. session in Bombay³... that the Muslims of Kashmir were for the Congress ideology and against Pakistan. As for Sheikh Abdullah he wanted to exploit the presence of the Congress leaders to attract crowds to the annual session of the National Conference, a party thoroughly discredited among the State people particularly the Muslims.

Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues decided to give a public

reception to the Congress Leaders on August 1st. No sooner was this known than the Muslims started to prepare for peaceful hostile demonstrations to express their resentment against the Congress. These preparations were so spontaneous and universal that though the Muslim Conference Party did not officially and formally assume the leadership of the hostile demonstrations some of the leaders were forced, under pressure of popular enthusiasm, to issue statements instructing Muslims to take peaceful part in them.

The reports that the hostile demonstrations would be held on the day of reception appeared in the local press a few days before the 1st of August. Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues were enraged at this. They decided to suppress the hostile demonstrations by brute force. They knew the Government would help them or at any rate remain neutral. So it turned out to be.

Five days before 1st of August Sheikh Abdullah started a series of public meetings in different parts of the city where he and his colleagues delivered furious speeches against those who intended to hold peaceful hostile demonstrations. In one of these speeches delivered at Nauhata on the 29th of July, he openly instructed his followers to break the bones of the man who would move to make any demonstration. In this very meeting one of his lieutenants declared that "we do not believe in remaining silent. We want a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye". In another meeting held at Habba Kadal on 30th July, Sheikh Abdullah said: "Those who will hold hostile demonstrations will be "humiliated". Other speeches were also couched in similar language and tone. It is well to remember that no public meeting had been held by any opponent of the National Conference Party during these days; nor had any Muslim suggested in any statement that there should be any thing but a perfectly peaceful and decent hostile demonstration against the Congress leaders. Sheikh Abdullah's threats were therefore entirely unprovoked.

In his last speech on the eve of the fateful reception day, Sheikh Abdullah advised his volunteers to remain in readiness to deal with the hostile demonstrators. It was decided by National Conference Party that the labour of the Government Silk Factory and other mills under the influence of the party should be utilized to suppress the Muslims on the ghats of the River Jhelum. This was a sure signal for riots. Obviously the Government was fully aware of all this but yet they neither took any action against Sheikh Abdullah for his inflammatory speeches nor did they take any steps to keep National Conference volunteers under check. There is reason to believe that the Congress leaders who were in Kashmir a few days before the 1st of August

were informed of the anticipated trouble but they were reluctant to displease Sheikh Abdullah who was intent upon "finishing the communalists" as he himself put it.

First of August saw the storm troopers of the National Conference Party ready to carry out the behests of their leader, Sheikh Abdullah. Northern part of the city which is densely populated by the adherents of the Muslim Conference became the chief scene of their main operations. The volunteers with *lathis* in their hands without any rhyme or reason began to belabour every Muslim passerby. Mr. Moh[amma]d Yusuf Qureshi and Ch. Abdullah Khan Bhalli, two foremost leaders of the Muslim Conference, were going in a tonga at a little distance from the Pather Masjid, the headquarters of the National Conference. They were dragged down and beaten by a group of volunteers who were headed by an eminent "Nationalist" leader. Seriously wounded, Mr. Qureshi ran to the nearby police station. The volunteers pursued him there and again maltreated him inside the premises of the station under the very nose of the guardians of law and order till he fell down unconscious. Later he was sent to the State Hospital where he remained as an indoor patient for several days. Some shops known to belong to the adherents of the Muslim Conference were looted when, it is said, policemen stood by. The head office of the Muslim Conference at Zaina Kadal and branch offices in the city were raided and heavily pelted. The green flags of the Muslims were pulled down, torn and trampled under feet. Hooliganism and *goondaism* reigned supreme. The authorities took no action and not a single National Conference volunteer was touched. In such circumstances, all Muslim opponents of National Conference went into hiding. And the storm troopers appeared triumphant. Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues felt proud of their achievements. For the moment, they felt satisfied that the river procession would prove a great success and the Congress leaders could not witness a shred of the hostile demonstrations on their way. They were mistaken. It was lull before the storm. When the procession started, tens of thousands of Muslims appeared on the ghats as if from the river water, with black handkerchiefs, black flags and black mottos in their hands. There were cries of *Maulana Azad Murdabad*, *Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad*, *Muslim League Zindabad*. It is true that old shoes and stones also were thrown by some people at the procession. It is also correct that a few demonstrators misbehaved themselves by remaining naked. But it should not be very difficult to explain this, in view of what has been said above. If the people had not been ruthlessly suppressed by Abdullah volunteers with the connivance of the authorities there is no reason to believe why they should not have confined themselves to the

peaceful demonstrations which is a legitimate and civilized way of expressing one's resentment. In the statement which was subsequently issued to the press by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he condemned the "vulgar and even obscene hostile demonstrations". But he had not a word to say about the brutal attacks of the National Conference volunteers on peaceful citizens which invited the "vulgarity and even obscenity" complained against. Jawaharlal Nehru cannot plead ignorance of facts as he was fully informed of the *goondaism* of the volunteers in all its details.

The river procession of the Congress leaders was accompanied by rioting on a large scale in which many people received injuries and one Muslim was fatally wounded who subsequently succumbed to his wounds. The dead man was reported to belong to the Muslim Conference Party but the National Conference volunteers took him away to their headquarters and declared him as their own.

For a long time past the District Magistrate of Kashmir Province has under Defence of Kashmir Rules, banned taking out of any procession in the city of Srinagar. Last year, when Mr. M. A. Jinnah had been invited to Kashmir by Mr. Abdullah and there was no question of any hostile demonstrations, the District Magistrate did not allow any procession to be taken out in his honour. This year in spite of the previous knowledge of the coming events, the District Magistrate granted permission to the National Conference to take out the river procession. Not only that Mirza Afzal Beg, the Public Works Minister, was seated in the main boat in front of the Congress leaders just to tell people that the whole show had official satrap and approval. This difference in treatment, not unusual, is significant and should be marked.

Reporting the occurrences of the 1st August under the caption "*Goondaism* in the city" the special correspondent of the daily *Martand* the official organ of the Sanatam Dharam Yuvak Sabha said:

"The volunteers of the National Conference looted shops in Zaina Kadal which caused hartal in the whole area from Khanqah Muallah to Chhatabal. The adherents of the Muslim Conference were severely beaten—there was a wide-spread hostile demonstration against the C[ongress] leaders when they were taken out in a river procession. At certain ghats the demonstration was very strong. The ear-drums appeared to burst with the cries of "Mualana ... *Murdabad*". National Conference workers forced people belonging to other parties to join the reception. On their refusal to do so, they fared badly.

More than a hundred people, mostly members of the Muslim Conference Party, were arrested in connection with the disturbances by the police and cases are pending against them in different courts at

present. As the matters are sub judice, it is not advisable to comment on them.

In the evening, on 1st August a public meeting was held by the National Conference Party to present addresses of welcome to the Congress leaders. Speaking at the end of the meeting, Sheikh Moh[amma]d Abdullah said: "We are determined to take revenge for the hostile demonstrations and you must be prepared for it."

With haste that was indecent, the Kak Government issued a press communique early on 2nd August, laying the entire blame on the Muslim Conference Party for what had happened. The communique said:

"A river procession in honour of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Khan Abdul G[h]affar Khan, and Jawaharlal Nehru was taken out at Srinagar by the National Conference last evening with the previous permission of the District Magistrate. In a part of the city (between Ali Kadal and Zaina Kadal) adherents of the Muslim Conference Party started throwing stones on the procession and on the adherents of the National Conference Party. As a result of this, several persons belonging to both sides received injuries and one injured person belonging to the National Conference Party subsequently died in hospital."

This statement was not only manifestly unjust, one-sided and incorrect but also contradictory because if the stones were thrown only by the adherents of the Muslim Conference Party on the river procession it was not easy to understand how persons belonging to both the parties were injured as no person belonging to the Muslim Conference Party could have formed part of the river procession. This statement was bitterly criticized in the local press so that only a few days later, on the 16th of August, the Kashmir Government was forced to admit in a statement which it issued to the representative of the Associated Press of India, that "the adherents of both the parties received injuries from stones thrown by their opponents."

In their press communique the Government without making any enquiries declared that the man who succumbed to the injuries belonged to the National Conference Party.

Thus an important point in a murder case now pending before a court was prejudged and is bound to prejudice the public mind against the accused who of course belong to the Muslim Conference Party.

The dead body of the deceased was post-mortemed and then handed over to National Conference Party on the 2nd August who held a big demonstration before its burial in the graveyard of Naqshband Sahib. Speaking on this occasion to the excited mob Mr. Abdullah uttered words of fire and blood. He explained what he meant by "taking

revenge" about which he had spoken on the previous night. All his opponents were to pay for their "misdeeds". One by one he named and included among his enemies Pundit Shiv Narain Fotedar, President Yuvak Sabha, Pt. Jial Lal Kilem, Vice President of the Yuvak Sabha, Pt. Prem Nath Kanaw, Editor, the daily *Martand* Mir Waiz Mohd. Yusuf, President Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, Prem Nath Bazaz, Editor, the Daily *Hamdard* and others of lesser importance. He used most vulgar, indecent, inflammatory and filthy language while attacking his opponents. A cautious report of this speech was published in Mr. Abdullah's own paper the Daily *Khidmat* the official organ of the National Conference Party. But even in this report some of the indecent and vulgar words were inserted; Sheikh Abdullah after naming his enemies in unbecoming language advised his excited audience to be ready for open and unmitigated violence. According to the report of the *Khidmat* he said, "like parts of a strong and powerful organisation you should act without objection at the order of massacre from your commander". Needless to say that no notice whatsoever was taken of this speech by the Kak Government.

Sheikh Abdullah went to the State Hospital to meet the injured persons. There in the very presence of the Superintendent of the Hospital he threatened Qureshi Moh[amma]d Yusuf with violence if he again opposed the National Conference... Qureshi was physically weak enough not to reply. Meanness and cowardliness could go no further.

Sheikh Abdullah did not stop at this. He or his lieutenants had no time to take revenge immediately as the annual session of National Conference was to be held at Sopore on 3,4 and 5th of August. The session was attended by the Congress leaders with the exception of Maulana Azad who probably profiting by the experience of the river procession considered discretion better part of his valour remained away. But Jawaharlal Nehru in his zeal and enthusiasm to smash Pakistan, attended and paid glowing tributes to Abdullah and his storm troopers for "their selfless service to the Muslim masses". Selfless service indeed?

In his speeches in the annual session Sheikh Abdullah continued to threaten the opponents and encouraged his followers to violence. Speaking on a resolution condemning the 1st Aug. demonstrations he said: "Be prepared for a struggle. Do not sit like docile creatures before your opponents, I am not a believer in the philosophy of "forgive and forget" tooth for tooth is my creed".

Warning us a little he added, "we possess power enough not only to set right the Muslim Conference but also the Government if it

stands in our way”.

If we do not forget the instructions of Mr. Abdullah to his followers “to be ready for a massacre” we can easily understand what he wanted to convey by these words.

Sheikh Abdullah did not continue his threats to the people of Kashmir. He accompanied Pt. Nehru to Pahalgam. According to M. Moh[amma]d Yusuf Khan’s letter which appeared in the *Tribune* on 27th Sept. Mr. Abdullah “threatened the visitors opposed to his political creed with open violence. If they dare express their views he warned them in public speech, he would make their staying in Kashmir impossible. At the Conference session the threat was repeated”.

All this while the Kak Government remained indifferent. Its responsible officials actually conniving at the lawlessness of the National Conference workers and the incendiary speeches of Sh. Abdullah. In fact Mirza Afzal Beg the Public Works Minister also attended the Annual Session at Sopore and spoke, paying high tribute to the great deeds of the organisers of the session and the ideals of the Conference.

Quite naturally, barring the few “Nationalists” all sections of the public both Muslim and Hindu felt aggrieved at this very objectionable and most partisan attitude of Government. Loud protests were raised in the local press. Rai Bahadur Kak’s policy was bitterly condemned and an open enquiry into the whole matter was universally demanded. Kak shook in his shoes. What was the remedy? To do even handed justice to all and bring the offenders to book. No. That is not the way Kak would go. His methods are different. The people having been suppressed by the joint efforts of the authorities and the volunteers of the National Conference, Kak now started an offensive against the press. On 20th August he issued a circular warning to all the State papers to behave. Though couched in guarded terms the warning was a threat to those who had criticised him for his partisanship and connivance at *goondaism*. Journalists resented this but Kak thought this was not enough. Only a couple of days later he blacklisted a number of papers depriving them of the right of getting official advertisements for publication. On 23rd August the Government issued orders that no copies of two journals, the *Daily Hamdard* and the *Weekly Vitasta* should be published before getting all matter (news, views, advertisements etc.) approved by the District Magistrate. It is significant that all the papers whether Hindu or Muslim who have fallen a prey to their wrath are opponents of the National Conference. In this offensive the few papers that have escaped punishment are either the supporters of the National Conference or born henchmen of the Government.

This suppression of independent journalism was not taken lying

down by the people of Kashmir. Numberless telegrams were sent to His Highness by various religious and political groups strongly protesting against the high handedness of Kak. Out of 20 journals in Srinagar the editors of as many as 16 issued a joint statement:⁴

[*Three paras omitted*]

The whole country resented this onslaught on the press. Meetings were held at various places protesting against the precensorship orders. It is not possible to give details of all these meetings and the resolutions passed in them. But mention may be made of a joint statement which was issued by fifteen distinguished members of the local Bar. They said:⁵

[*Three paras omitted*]

I have said above that for a long time the District Magistrate has banned taking out of processions in the city of Srinagar. There are other important towns in the Kashmir Province such as Anantnag, Bijbihara, Shopian and the whole district of the Muzaffarabad where not only taking out of processions but holding of any public meetings has been banned under the Defence of Kashmir Rules. According to the District Magistrate's orders no procession can be taken out except for marriage or funeral nor any public meeting held (except for purely and exclusively religious purposes within the recognised places of worship) in all those towns and in the whole district of Muzaffarabad without previous permission. It has been found in actual practice that whereas the District Magistrate has willingly granted permission to the National Conference Party to hold non religious and even political meetings on various occasions other parties have never been allowed to do so. Not only that. There are recorded instances when the National Conference Party openly defied these orders of the Government but no notice was taken by the authorities. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru accompanied by Abdullah went to Shopian on his way to Kaunsarnag. The Muslims of the *illaqa* are deadly against the National Conference. There was danger of breach of peace. Undoubtedly a big hostile demonstration was sure to be held. The District Magistrate issued orders banning processions and meetings. The local people obeyed but not the National Conference party. Sh. Abdullah and his colleagues managed to send volunteers and workers from outside the town and a reception was held in defiance of the District Magistrate's orders. Next day the news appeared in all the Srinagar dailies including the official organ of the National Conference. The *Hamdard* raised a voice of protest against this open connivance of Government at lawlessness. It was for this that the paper was ordered to undergo

presensorship indefinitely. Supreme justice indeed!

On August 19 three leaders of the Kashmir Socialist Party went to Anantnag to meet their local comrades. The Socialist Party is popular in Anantnag and for this reason it has become an eye sore to the "Nationalists". As soon as the three leaders reached Anantnag the storm-troopers were collected and a procession was taken out raising hostile slogans. Police watched the show indifferently. Resentful people but not the guardians of law and order dispersed the defiant processionists. Undaunted, a few volunteers came late at night under cover of darkness and heavily pelted the house where the socialist leaders were putting up. This happened with the full knowledge of the police but no action was taken.

On 31st August there was a riot in Anantnag. The National Conference volunteers looted some Kashmiri Pandits' houses. Immediately after, a big public meeting was held in which a Nationalist leader, Kh. Gulam Nabi, delivered a lengthy speech. Obviously the meeting was not held for religious purposes and was an open defiance of District Magistrate's orders but as the offender belonged to the privileged party his crime was overlooked. I can go on multiplying instance like this but I think for the present these will suffice.

Now let us return to Mr. Jinnah's charges. He says that as far back as August 22 he made a very strong representation to the Viceroy regarding the "ruthless measures of oppression and suppression that have been adopted by the Kashmir Government against the people and the press". From what has been said above, can there be any doubt about it? Is any further proof needed to substantiate this charge? The writers of inspired letters and news items appearing in Punjab Hindu press to pooh-pooh Mr. Jinnah's statement and neutralise its effect, are at pains to prove that (a) Mr. Jinnah's representation was prompted by communal considerations as he wanted to degrade a Hindu State in the eyes of the Paramount Power, (b) Mr. Jinnah is misinformed about Kashmir and his informants are not reliable and (c) that Mr. Jinnah has started an intrigue to defame the State subject premier.

That at least in the present case, Mr. Jinnah is not guided by communal considerations is evident from the very words of his statement. He says "the people of Kashmir are oppressed and suppressed" and not only the Muslims. This is amply borne out by the facts mentioned by me. The unholy alliance of Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra Kak and the National Conference is not directed against the Muslims alone but has victimised all the people without distinction of caste or creed. The

National Conference party workers have repeatedly threatened with violence the workers of the Yuvak Sabha, the representative organisation of Kashmir Pandits no less than workers of the Muslim Conference, the Kashmir Socialist Party and the Rajya Sabha of Jammu Hindus. Newspapers victimised by Kak belong to all shades of political opinion. The victims include besides all the newspapers of the Muslim Conference Party, the *Daily Martand*, official organ of Kashmir Pandits, the *Amar* accredited organ of Jammu Hindus, the *Daily Hamdard* and the weekly *Vitasta*, the socialist journals. The only and the common fault of these newspapers is that though poles apart in their ideologies, they are enemies of the unholy alliance between Kak and the National Conference Party which has encouraged *goondaism* and hooliganism at the expense of civil liberties of the people and their independent journalism.

The signatories to the two joint statements above referred to are mostly non-Muslim. How then can any reasonable man say that Mr. Jinnah has been prompted by communal considerations to make the representation to the Viceroy. Nor is it right to state that the League leader is misinformed about the real situation. As a matter of fact he appears to be well posted with the details of occurrences, more than most of those who talk glibly about Kashmir. And lastly it is absurd to say that of all people Mr. Jinnah should be interested in starting an intrigue against the State subject premier to defame him. Do the propagandists of Rai Bhadur Kak seriously suggest that a large section of the non-Muslims of Kashmir besides the Muslim Conference Party have joined hands with Mr. Jinnah to make Kak Government a failure? That would be a damaging admission. Rai Bhadur Kak's administration is full of corruption. It is not within the scope of my present survey to discuss this side of the matter, otherwise it can easily be proved that jobbery and nepotism are the order of the day in Kashmir at present. Rai Bhadur Kak has sown the wind and is now reaping the whirl-wind: No Prime Minister of Kashmir in the past has become so unpopular and has been so hated by all sections of public within so short a time (less than three months) as he. Having suppressed people and then their independent press Rai Bhadur Kak is now trying his utmost to suppress the truth going out of Kashmir. He has employed the Government Publicity Office to send letters and news items to the Punjab Hindu press. The representative of the United Press, another Mr. Kak, is also helping his Publicity Office in this dirty job.

Kashmir is seething with unrest. Its internal problems were never so serious as now. To solve them will tax the energies and exhaust the

patience of any high class statesman and administrator. Only a man endowed with imagination and liberal attitude of mind who can ring the best qualities of head and heart to bear on the problems can efficiently and successfully cope with the job. Kak is certainly not that man. His narrow outlook, partisanship, die-hard mental make up, hatred of progress, communalism and above all aptitude for intrigues make him totally unfit for the grave responsibilities he has been called upon to discharge. His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur did a grievous wrong and a great injustice to his people by appointing such a man as his Prime Minister when more gifted people had failed him.

Lord Wavell, the Crown Representative, will be in Kashmir next month. He will enjoy this Paradise on earth to his heart's content. Will it be too much to expect that he will pay a little attention towards this oppression of those living in this Paradise and suppression of their press? Will he care to find now this Paradise has been turned into a virtual hell by the first State subject Prime Minister of Kashmir?

¹Appendix I. 19.

²Appendix I. 16.

³21-3 September 1945.

⁴For text of Statement, see Enclosure to Appendix I. 18.

⁵For text of Local Bar Statement, see Appendix I. 20.

I. 25

*Muhammad Yusuf Qureshi to M. A. Jinnah
SHC, Kashmir/K-39*

No. 221

SRINAGAR,
16 December 1945

Quaid-i-Azam,

I do not at all like to be a source of trouble to you at this critical juncture. I venture to say that the Central Assembly elections¹ have wrought tremendous change in Kashmir politics. Quaid-i-Azam, you are the chief sole [*sic* for soul] responsible for it. I take pride in rendering heart-felt greetings to you. I hold that the provincial elections will positively change the destiny of the Muslim Nation—no doubt, I include Kashmir too.

As far present day Kashmir affairs I would like to say something provided I am asked to do the same. I am conscious enough and very well realise your present day responsibilities and engagements. So

need not repeat Sir [B. N.] Rao's exit, Mr. Kak's succession, Lord Wavell's stay at Srinagar. Quaid-i-Azam, Kashmir is quite changed now. Due to your keen interest in Kashmir affairs, Day of Deliverance is bound to come sooner or later. In this behalf, Quaid-i-Millat Ch. Gulam Abbas is highly anxious to see you in near future, probably during your stay at Lahore.²

Yours sincerely,
[MUHAMMAD YUSUF] QURAISHI
General Secretary, Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference

See Appendix XIII. 1-3, Vol. I, Part II, 608-13 for election results.

²On 16 January 1946 Choudhry Ghulam Abbas and A. R. Saghar met with Jinnah to discuss the anti-Muslim Measures taken by the Kashmir Government. See Waheed Ahmad, ed., *The Nation's Voice, Deadlock, Frustration and Riots*, Vol. V, Karachi, 2001, 387. Not printed.

I. 26

G. Mohamed to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-40

GULAM MOHIDIN & SON
SRINAGAR-KASHMIR
4 January 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I have refrained from writing to you so far as I did not like to waste your most precious time unnecessarily, though I have been expressing my humble feelings by telegrams on occasions, as Id days, on your success in the elections and on your auspicious birthday.

Today, however, I have something to write to you and have thus taken the liberty of intruding on your valuable time. I am pleased to inform you that the Kashmir Muslim opinion towards the National Conference has undergone a tremendous change. The Muslims are getting conscious of the anti-Muslim policy of the National Conference and resent it and its leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah allying with Jawaharlal, Azad and the Congress, and showing open hostility towards the Muslim League and your goodself. Of course, the very first seed of this consciousness was sown by that wonderful speech which your goodself delivered here at the annual session of the Muslim Conference.¹ This was implemented by the remarkable popularity of the Muslim League and the Central Assembly elections did the job almost to the finish. With this, however, I have to sound a word of pessimism and that is about the dearth of good workers in the Muslim

Conference. The ground is ready but there is no one to plough it.

I have, therefore, decided to join and take an active part in the Muslim Conference and I am confident that with the help of God I will be able to do my bit in many respects. As I must admit that I received the first inspiration from your goodself and that it was my association with you here that first kindled this fire in me, I venture to request you to give me your blessings so that your message may act as a beacon-light for me in future.

With respectful regards to Miss Jinnah and your goodself.

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

See Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi, *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, Vol III, Lahore, 1996, 1905-7.

I. 27

Ghulam Abbas to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram, SHC, Kashmir/K-41

SRINAGAR,
26 January 1946

Telegram to Leader, British Parliamentary Delegation reading [sic] thirty lacs Musalmans of Jammu and Kashmir State Parliamentary delegation would not be visiting Kashmir the premier Muslim State. This would deprive the distinguished members to learn at first hand the terrible conditions as entailed by the repressive measures of the present Government of the State, namely total denial of freedom of speech, of association, of press and religion to the thirty lacs of Muslims forming eighty two per cent of the total population of the State. If the voice of these suppressed people is to reach the ears of the British Parliament it is of paramount importance that the accredited representatives of this august body should make it convenient to witness with their own eyes the squalour, misery, dirt, disease, hunger and nakedness under which the Musalmans of the State have been groaning for nearly hundred years. Kashmir the paradise of East is today the only medieval state whose statute book even today stands disfigured by certain barbaric laws. I therefore pray that the delegation may visit Kashmir and contact the accredited leaders of Musalmans to hear the tale of woes. If visit to Kashmir not possible kindly allow interview Kashmir Muslim deputation.

PRESIDENT ALL JAMMU AND KASHMIR
MUSLIM CONFERENCE

I. 28

*Agha Shaukat Ali to M. A. Jinnah**SHC, Kashmir/K-42*AKHNUR, JAMMU,
1 February 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I have decided to resign from the Kashmir Civil Service. The conditions here are going from bad to worse everyday. The spectacle of League successes in the contiguous provinces on the borders of Kashmir is too distressing for the Hindu regime. Abdullah's nationalism is the staunchest ally of Hindu feudalism and together they are oppressing the Musalmans. This diabolical conspiracy has to be broken. It must be exposed thoroughly. The liberation of the Musalmans from this double yoke is now the only mission of my life.

I want your blessings.

Yours sincerely,
AGHA SHAUKAT ALI

I. 29

*Amin Haider to K. H. Khurshid**F. 921/129-30*SRINAGAR,
23 February 1946

Dear Khurshid Hasan,

Till now I wrote you four letters. But sorry to inform you that I did not receive any reply. Any how I do not mind about it. I know how much busy you are. But are you not able just to spend three or four minutes in a month so as to write me the acknowledgment of my letters when you are writing letters to other people regularly?

You might have heard about the recent riots which took place at Jammu between Muslims and Hindus. In this connection, S.M. Abdullah in his speech said that Muslim Conference has no solid programme, so Ch. Ghulam Abbas and Mr. Saghar are creating these disturbances for their leadership and to use it as their election stunt.

While opposing Pakistan, he said that "I did not want neither to support nor help Pakistan, but now when Mr. Jinnah spoke against me at Jamia Masjid, though I had received him, now it is my duty to oppose his Pakistan." Dear Khurshid, this time he is opposing a bit louder. He is saying much more about the personality of Mr. Jinnah, Ch. Ghulam Abbass, Mir Waiz, G. Mohamad Jeweller and Abdul G[h]afar Chapon. About Mr. Jinnah, he said an interesting thing that he has not heard and Mir Waiz is following such a man. Just think of it what does he speak nowadays. At Baramula a clash took place between the Muslim Conference Party and Nationalist Party. Police has played its usual part. Muslim Conference followers have been injured to a large extent. Two days ago, Qureshi Mohammad Yusuf with Moulvi Mohammad Amin and other people went there and saw the situation.

[Rest of the para omitted]

Yours truly,
[A.] HAIDER

I. 30

Prem Nath Bazaz to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-43

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
27 May 1946

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You must have read in the press about the present movement launched by Sheikh Abdullah and his followers in Kashmir. You must have also noticed the tremendous support that the Hindu Nationalists and their various papers are giving to the movement. Among top leaders, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Kh[an] [Abdul] G[h]affar Khan have issued statements supporting Sheikh Abdullah and condemning the Kashmir Government.

By strange process of events Sheikh Abdullah has come into clash with the authorities. By his short sightedness he got Rai Bahadur Kak installed in the *gaddi* of Prime Ministership but finding his party interests not being fulfilled to the extent he expected at the hands of R.B. Kak, he took up cudgels against him. This landed him into present trouble.

The movement is not against the feudal Maharaja as the Hindu nationalist press and leaders want to tell the world to make a hero of

Sheikh Abdullah. It was started because the Maharaja accepted Mirza [Afzal] Beg's resignation from his Council and appointed Mian Ahmad Yar in his place. Beg is a favourite of Abdullah and Mian is not.

This lowered the prestige of Abdullah and his National Conference, and feeling thus insulted and aggrieved he has started the present campaign. He abused the Maharaja. As the first Government communique about the present disturbances says: "Unmentionable abuse was heaped upon His Highness and his ruling family" in these speeches.

In this connection I am reminded of your statement which you issued on the eve of your departure from here on 26th July 1944. It contains the following:

I regret that although Sheikh Abdullah and his Party and the Muslim Conference discussed matters with me in Delhi and in Lahore before my arrival here, and were good enough to accord me great reception, and were anxious that I should hear both sides and bring about a settlement, when I, after careful consideration, suggested that the Musalmans should organize themselves under one flag and on one platform, not only my advice was not acceptable to Sheikh Abdullah, but as is his habit, which has become a second nature with him, he indulged in all sorts of language of a most offensive and vituperative character in attacking me. My advice to the Musalmans is that the differences can only be resolved by argument, discussion, exchange of views, and reason, and not by *Goondaism*, and one thing that I must draw the attention of the Kashmir Government about is that *Goondaism* must be put down at any cost, and there should be a constitutional liberty of speech and freedom of thought, which is the elementary right of every citizen under any civilized Government.¹

The Muslims as a community have kept themselves aloof from Sheikh Abdullah's present move. So have the others. The agitation has therefore almost come to an end. But the Hindu nationalist press of British India wants to keep it alive. They publish entirely false news and misleading comments. It is a pity that the leaders of the eminence of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Khan Abdul G[h]affar Khan also play the same tune.

Unfortunately some of the Muslim League papers of Punjab are also joining this wrong chorus. This has made a few members of the Muslim Conference, not very important though, to waver in their decision about their attitude towards the present agitation.

If it is not inconvenient to you and if you can spare some time may I

know what is your advice for the Muslims of Kashmir at this critical juncture.
I hope you will also permit me to publish your reply, if necessary.

Yours sincerely,
PREM NATH BAZAZ
Editor, Daily Hamdard

¹See Yusufi, *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, III, 1915.

I. 31

M. A. Jinnah to Prem Nath Bazaz

SHC, Kashmir/K-44

10th June 1946

Dear Mr. Bazaz,

I have received your letter of the 27th May,¹ and I was not able to reply to your letter earlier, as I was very much pressed with the immediate developments that were taking place here, but you must have read in the papers that Choudhri Ghulam Abbas and some other leaders of the Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference had been to Simla to see me. They presented to me the facts of the serious situation that has arisen in Kashmir, and I wanted them to go back on the spot and send me fuller information of the situation, and I am expecting to hear from them very soon. In the meantime, they had decided to meet and examine the situation for themselves and adopt such policy and take such action as they may deem proper.

I thank you very much indeed for giving me the background and the causes of the struggle, and I shall bear in mind all that you have said. But I don't think it advisable that you should publish my reply to your letter until I get more information from Choudhri Ghulam Abbas and the leaders of the Muslim Conference. I don't think it will serve any useful purpose, therefore, I request you not to make it public.

Yours sincerely,
[M. A. JINNAH]

I. 32

*Muhammad Yusuf to K. H. Khurshid**F. 921/149-52*
*[Original in Urdu]**Extract*

[SRINAGAR,]

29 June 1946

Respected Khurshid Hasan,
Assalaamo 'Alaikum wa Rahmatullah

You did right to show my letter¹ to Choudhri Sahib [Ghulam Abbas] which should have verified what I had said in my statement.

In fact I intended to see Quaid-i-Azam in Delhi to personally brief him about the correct position of Kashmir politics, but was prevented by my indisposition and the extreme weather of Delhi. I am confident the Quaid-i-Azam knows much more about Kashmir than I do.

[One para omitted]

The enemies of Muslim Conference and the paid agents of Hindu Congress had raised the bogey of Quit Kashmir agitation in order to gain the lost political ground in Kashmir, in view of impending state elections. The agitation met premature death and the last nail in its coffin was the statement of Quaid-i-Azam.²

[One para omitted]

Insha Allah, Kashmir can in no way become N.W.F.P [for the Congress]. We had repeatedly invited the Quaid's attention to this fact.

Qureshi has betrayed Muslim Conference, joined the nationalist camp and has indulged in press campaign against me and the Conference activists. He is doing it as M.C's general secretary, although Choudhri [Ghulam Abbas] has relieved him of this office and has entrusted his work to Muhammad Yusuf Saraf. An enquiry committee has been constituted to investigate the charges of his indiscipline. Qureshi is so much overtaken by his brand of nationalism that he has started issuing slanderous statements not only against me, Choudhri Sahib but also against the Quaid-i-Azam.

Before I conclude I would like to invite your attention to an important matter. When we needed the services of a good barrister from outside the State to plead the case of Abdus Salam Dallal, Shaikh

Karamat Ali was hired on the pointation of Quaid-i-Azam himself, and his fee of Rs. 1,000 paid in advance. He failed to turn up on the date of hearing which created a sense of disappointment among the local Muslims. Karamat Ali was incidentally nominated by Muslim League. Despite several reminders, this gentleman has failed to refund the money. Can you help us in recovering Rs. 1,000 from this barrister so that the outstanding dues of other lawyers could be paid. I hope you will take interest in settling this matter.

News about your forthcoming visit to Kashmir is reassuring and we hope to see you soon.

Praying for you,
MUHAMMAD YUSUF
Mirwaiz

¹Not traceable.

²See Yusufi, *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, IV, 2304-5. Not printed.

I. 33

Agha Shoukat Ali to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-49

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
19 August 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I hope you have received my previous letter.¹ We are eagerly looking forward to your visit. I hope you will somehow manage it even if for a short while. I wrote to you also about the boats and of course my house is always at your disposal.

Mr. Jinnah, the Muslim Conference is now beginning to live. It no longer merely exists. Its peaceful emancipation from the yoke of spiritual reactionaries has been achieved without antagonising anyone. Younger and more progressive elements have been given responsible positions in the Conference. But the stupor and inaction of several years will take some time to go. The desperate urgency of the situation will goad us to complete our preparations more expeditiously. Mian Khursheed Enver has been here for sometime. I have sent a sufficient number of young men to him for necessary training. We are determined to train and enrol at least twenty five thousand volunteers in

the Muslim National Guard for Kashmir. This is the only effective reply we can give to Abdullah's *goondaism*. We have already made an excellent start. Kindly send us a message, for we are formally inaugurating this new movement. We shall fix the date accordingly. Mr. Jinnah, pray remember us occasionally. In the beginning we need encouragement badly. Since I have taken over as General Secretary, I have realised how very weak we are organizationally and financially. We cannot afford a single paid worker. We have not got a penny in the name of our organization. God knows what has been happening to the vast sums collected from the people. We need a little financial assistance to put us over various plans on our feet. When we have actually done something and not talked, the people will not fail us. Any appeal for funds to start with never succeeds.

For the present our policy is to strengthen ourselves for the fight which may come sooner than we expect. Anglo-Hindu conspiracy on the exacerbation of Muslim feelings, which even burst the banks of discipline because of uncontrollable and insensate fury, is a warning for the Congress if they are not drunk with the prospect of power already. Don't you think that we can profitably develop contacts with Russia to counteract and smash the unholy capitalist alliance? We have nothing to lose but our chains. At this time even a hint from you will awaken the Labourites to the reality of the Indian political situation, particularly our demand for Pakistan. Besides when ultimately an alliance with Russia can both geographically and politically be of very great advantage to us? We cannot look at America or China. Britain already seems to have made her choice. But am I not over reading myself? You are a master of all this great art. You have led us to our present greatness in the past, you will lead us to still greater heights in the future.

I hope to hear from you at your earliest convenience. Your message will infuse a new life into our infant movement.

With kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
AGHA SHOUKAT ALI

¹Appendix I. 28.

I. 34

Mir Abdul Aziz to K. H. Khurshid

F. 921/158-61

SILK FACTORY ROAD, RAMBAGH,
SRINAGAR,
23 August 1946

My dear Khurshid,

I am in receipt of your letter¹ dated 14 August 1946. It was very kind of you to reply the letter.

In fact I did not demand your opinion about the recent undesirable happenings inside the Muslim Conference (I refer to the Qureshi-Saghar affair) because you have no direct contact with the affairs here nor is it necessary for you to get curious about the local duels. Something worse has happened between me and Saghar. You might have read about it in the papers. I do not want to write much about this disgraceful episode. One thing I want to make clear is that Messrs Saghar and Qureshi have been accusing myself and my other colleagues in the Union, Mr. Dallal and the grand Moulvi in the Muslim Conference of being the agents of Pandit R.C. Kak, the present Premier of Kashmir. This mud slinging started from the day when Abdullah was ousted and I and others, because of our political views, disagreeing with his politics opposed him. Mr. Qureshi and Saghar, with their "young men" hurled abuses and blames upon us. God bless Ch. Abbas, the Quaid-i-Azam of the Muslim Conference W[orking] C[ommittee], who ratified our views and Mr. Qureshi and company had to cut a sorry figure in the end.

Of course no body can condemn a man for looking at things from an angle of vision, different from his own, but mud slinging, backbiting and a show of *goondaism* is more than a man can bear. Mr. Saghar and the Qureshites are not leaving any stone unturned to malign the Muslim Conference. Posters with slanderous captions are pasted at night time on house-walls by the secret Youngmen's Muslim Association. There is evidence more than enough to show that our Saghar Sahib is writing those nasty things. I regret to write all this, but I cannot hide facts. The Muslim Conference has decided to adopt a policy of direct action when necessity arises. Mr. Saghar and his camp followers are trying to precipitate it just to stimulate the National Conference agitation. I am not against direct action—In fact I am all for it? But why should we do

it without the sanction of our organisation and without making sure that our action is not going to stimulate the cause of our enemy?

I am doing my best to cooperate with the new General Secretary [Agha Shoukat Ali]. He is enthusiastic and active. I have advised all my friends and comrades to cooperate with him fully. But there are difficulties of Herculean magnitude in his path (which is also our own path). Still we are trudging on and on.

In a sense, you are quite correct when you say that the Muslim Conference in Kashmir has gained nothing but lost much during the last two years. Keeping aside that due to the popularity of Muslim League politics in India, many Muslims have become League-minded in Kashmir, the Muslim Conference has not made any considerable progress in the sphere of organisation. In fact, we are where we were. But still there is hope. I am gradually recovering from the dangerous malady. We are going to hold a session of the Union this year. What help can you give?

With best wishes,

Yours most sincerely,
MIR [ABDUL] AZIZ

Not traceable.

I. 35

Agha Shoukat Ali to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-49 (b)

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,
1 September 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I hope you have received my letters. This is just to inform you that the Kak Govt. after having crushed the National Conference is now taking the initiative to crush the Muslim Conference also. So far the Muslim Conference was an inactive and a lifeless organization. There was hardly any chance of their coming into conflict with us. But now when we are beginning to show signs of a new life, and I unfortunately am supposed to be the moving spirit behind this new life, the Govt. is contemplating to incapacitate me by effecting my arrest. I understand reliably that my warrants of arrest have been issued. But why they have not been executed, I do not know. Perhaps they do not

realise that this will be a signal for a show down with the Muslim Conference. I trust that even in our hour of trial, we shall continue to enjoy your active and practical support. The ostensible indifference of the League in the affairs of Kashmir perhaps encourages Kak to embark upon his suicidal policy. If the Kashmir Govt. are made to realise that the Punjab League will not sit still, and that they must expect serious trouble from that quarter, should they touch us, the Govt. here howsoever tyrannical it may be, dare not interfere in our activities, much less take the initiative and provoke a quarrel with us. The Conference has not missed a single opportunity to strengthen its position or extend its influence in Kashmir. Why must we let the initiative pass into their hands? I have mentioned to you in my previous letter, how desperate our finances are! I have further written [about] our endeavours to organise the Muslim National Guards on a large scale. Mian Khurshid has helped us greatly. Since that is what I am immediately concentrating upon, I think that is the immediate cause of the Govt's contemplated action against me. How long can we hold on against overwhelming odds alone? Faced as we are against such a powerful feudal-cum-Nationalist Hindu combination, I am not sure if we can make much headway. To begin with, we do need your support, financially and organisationally, so that we can stand on our feet. In the beginning this assistance is indispensable. I shall not paint a bright picture before you and lull you into a false sense of security. The facts are as I have told you. The elections are coming. Abdullah is sure to be released before that date. We shall not succeed in arresting the success of his party, backed as he will be with Congress money and press unless we too can rely on a similar help from our parent organisation, if not on a similar scale.

I know how busy you are, but in Kashmir it is a question of our survival. It appears that Kashmir is being sold to the Congress and the League cause will suffer irretrievably. National Guard organisation has made a great appeal in our young men. But we need money. This will eventually set right the *goondalism* of Abdullah and the brutality of the Govt. Pray write me, and even if am arrested, the letter will be delivered to proper persons. A directive from you to Mr. Mamdot and Daultana Sahib would be most helpful. I have written to Daultana Sahib too, but a couple of weeks ago.

With kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,
AGHA SHOUKAT ALI

I. 36

Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana to K. H. Khurshid

SHC, Kashmir/K-53

HOTEL IMPERIAL,
NEW DELHI,
14 October 1946

My dear Khurshid,

On the 12th of October, Agha Shaukat Ali, General Secretary of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, had an interview with three members of the All India Muslim League Committee of Action. He placed before the members of the Committee of Action the present political situation in Kashmir and the nature of the assistance that the Muslim Conference requests from the All India Muslim League. I have been directed by the Chairman, Mohammad Ismail Khan Sahib, to prepare a summary of Agha Shaukat Ali's talk, which I am enclosing and which I shall be grateful if you place before the Quaid-i-Azam.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
MUMTAZ MOH[AMMA]D DAULTANA

Enclosure to Appendix I. 36

*Summary of Agha Shoukat Ali's Interview
with AIML Committee of Action*

SHC, Kashmir/K-54

NEW DELHI,
13 October 1946

Summary of the position placed by Agha Shaukat Ali, Secretary General, All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference before the members of the All-India Committee of Action on the 11th of October 1946.

I. *Background.* Sheikh Abdullah's 'Quit Kashmir' slogan was originally adopted under communist influence and was intended as a revolutionary struggle for the liberation of Kashmir from Dogra Raj.

Congress influence which has always dominated and guided Sh. Abdullah and which was naturally for the maintenance of the Hindu rule in Kashmir led to a reinterpretation by the National Conference of

the slogan of "Quit Kashmir". In his defence statement, Abdullah resiled from the original position and interpreted 'Quit Kashmir' as "Quit Autocracy". He made it clear that no attack was made on the personal position of the Maharaja, but that the movement was merely aimed to reform the abuses in the administration and to give it a more representative and responsible character. This repudiation had a serious effect on the prestige of the Kashmir National Conference and has led to demoralisation in its ranks.

The Muslim Conference kept aloof from the "Quit Kashmir" movement although it was not opposed to it on principle and was actually more interested in the liquidation of the rule of the Maharaja than Abdullah's party, but because association with this movement would have only strengthened the influence and importance of the Congress in the affairs of Kashmir.

The Muslim Conference now is faced with a critical situation. To capitalise the demoralisation in the ranks of the National Conference, it is necessary for the Muslim Conference to give revolutionary lead to the Muslims of Kashmir and to canalize their freedom urge in an immediate agitation and movement against the autocracy and oppression of the State. If the Muslim Conference remains inactive now, it will permit the National Conference to recover from the shock of Abdullah's betrayal and will stand condemned as a party of inaction, which is too timid and timorous to lead the people against the *Durbar*.

Taking stock of the situation, Muslim Conference passed a resolution on the 9th of June in pursuance of which immediate demands were placed before the *Durbar* and it was decided that "Direct Action" should be resorted to unless those demands were met immediately. No reply of this resolution or to later reminders was received from the *Durbar*. The policy of "Direct Action" was endorsed by a convention on the 28th of July. A Committee of Action was appointed which prepared a programme of "Direct Action", which was to be approved and adopted at the open session of the Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference to be held on the 20th of October in Srinagar. The slogan of the Muslim Conference was "Azad Kashmir", which meant that it is for the people of Kashmir to freely choose and decide their own destiny.

The open session is due to take place on the 20th of October as scheduled in spite of the fact that Section 144 is in force nearly everywhere in Kashmir and also in Srinagar.¹ The Muslim Conference is resolved to hold the Conference even though defiance of section 144² may result in the immediate launching of the "Direct Action" as envisaged by

the resolutions of 9th June and 28th July. However, it is possible that the *Durbar* may be reluctant to provoke and precipitate the struggle and may take no action on the defiance of Section 144.

II. *Assistance from Muslim League.* The Muslim Conference seeks the active assistance of the All India Muslim League in the event of struggle. It suggests the following forms of help:

a. The policy of the Muslim League with regard to Kashmir should be reorientated. Kashmir with its overwhelming Muslim majority and vast natural resources is bound to play a decisive role in the establishment and consolidation of our cherished goal of Pakistan. The policy of non-intervention consistently followed by the Muslim League, whatever its justification in other cases, is inapplicable to Kashmir and should be discarded. The Congress has always boldly championed and assisted the National Conference. Unless the Muslim Conference is similarly supported and patronised by the All-India Muslim League, it will lose credit in the eyes of the Kashmir people, who, if properly encouraged, would prove second to none in their fight for Pakistan.

b. Close political collaboration should be developed between the Muslim Conference and the League in the Punjab and the N.W.F. Provinces. The leaders of the Punjab and the Frontier Provincial Leagues must increasingly participate in the political activities of Kashmir Muslims and must encourage and support the Kashmir movement both in Kashmir and outside.

c. In the event of struggle being launched in Kashmir by the Muslim Conference, *jathas* from the Punjab and the Frontier should participate directly in the Direct Action by courting imprisonment.

d. Prominent League workers, in particular Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and Mian Mumtaz Moh[amma]d Daultana, should be directed to attend the Conference's open session at Srinagar on the 20th of October. This may involve defiance of the ban on their part.

e. Elections to the Kashmir Assembly are forthcoming. They will probably take place in January next. (Total Muslim seats 19—9 in Jammu and 10 in Kashmir. It is expected that the Muslim Conference can, if proper work is done, win all the 9 seats in Jammu and up to 6 seats in Kashmir). The Muslim Conference seeks financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 50,000 to fight these elections. This assistance would not have been necessary, if the Congress was not prepared to spend large sums of money in support of the National Conference. During the elections, workers from adjoining provinces should help the Muslim Conference in election propaganda work.

f. A statement on behalf of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee or Committee of Action should be issued forthwith about the

tyranny of the administration in Kashmir with particular reference to the newly promulgated "Public Securities Act", which is a direct negation of even the most elementary civic liberty and would choke and strangle every shape and form of political activity of the Muslims in Kashmir.

¹The session was held on 26 October 1946.

²A provision of law in the Criminal Procedure Code prohibiting assembly of five or more persons at a public place.

I. 37

Mohammad Yusuf to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-55

SRINAGAR,
KASHMIR,

1 November 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am so sorry for writing to you after such a long time but I deliberately refrain from writing to you knowing as I do how busy you are with the vital issues. I am now taking the liberty to write to you in view of the very serious matters that are facing the people of Kashmir. You are aware of the political situation prevailing here and our weaknesses and shortcomings. You also know that the Hindu Congress is so vitally interested in Kashmir and the National Conference. The elections are going to be held in the month of Dec. or January 1947. We are holding our annual session in October.¹ We have always had such a dearth of workers, but we are so happy ever since Agha Shoukat Ali has joined us and has shouldered a very big responsibility which he is discharging selflessly and sincerely. Choudri Ghulam Abbas Sahib who is mostly in Jammu cannot be expected to remain in Srinagar. At the same time, the affairs of Kashmir are so important that they demand constant attention. Congress would be sure to play a decisive part in the forthcoming elections. In this respect we also hope that the League will assist us. Agha Shoukat Ali is being sent by the President to see you personally and he has been instructed to place the whole matter before your goodself and we hope you will kindly give your very sympathetic consideration to it. It will not be out of place to mention that without that assistance we do not hope to hold our own against the combined might of the Hindu Congress and the National Conference.

I always pray for the long life and success of our beloved Quaid-i-Azam.

With respects,

Yours Sincerely,
MOHAMMAD YUSUF
Mirwaiz

¹In the light of this statement, the date of this letter appears to be incorrect.

I. 38

Mirwaiz Muhammad Yusuf to M. A. Jinnah

Telegram, SHC, Kashmir/K-57

SRINAGAR,
1 November 1946

Hamidullah, Acting President, has been expelled by me from Muslim Conference by orders¹ from Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, President, Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference because he allied himself with National Conference and Kashmir Government through Niaz Ahmad, his cousin who is Chief Secretary to Government. Have sent details separately. Await my letter.

MIRWAIZ MOHAMMAD YUSUF,
*Chairman,
Committee of Action, Kashmir Muslim Conference.*

¹Annex, para (h).

*Annex to Appendix I. 38
Report by Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference,
Committee of Action
SHC, Kashmir/K-61*

[Extract]

SRINAGAR,
15 November 1946

The Committee of Action of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference met in Srinagar under the chairmanship of Hazrat Maulana Mohammad Yusuf on 13th and 14th of November, 1946. Besides the members M. Moh[amma]d Amin, Member of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary

Board, Mr. Abdus-Salam Dallal, General Secretary of the City Muslim Conference, Srinagar and M. Abdullah Shah Shopiani, President Kashmir Provincial Muslim Conference attended the meeting on special invitation. The Chairman appointed Mir Abdul Aziz, B.A. (Hons). Editor of the *Millat* as the Convener of the Committee since this post had fallen vacant due to the arrest of Moulvi Noor-ud-din, Convenor of the Committee. The following problems were on the agenda:

1. The expulsion and dismissal of Chaudri Hamidullah Khan Acting President, Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and the dissolution of the Working Committee.

[*Rest of 3 items omitted*]

5. Elections of the Kashmir State Assembly.

(Item 1) The President of the Committee of Action had recently given a statement to the press in connection with the dismissal and expulsion of Chaudri Hamidullah and the dissolution of the Working Committee, the Committee¹ considered this statement and confirmed it.

The meeting came to the conclusion that:

(a) Since the Constitution of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference says:

If any post (in the organisation) falls vacant after the annual election, the Working Committee will have the right to fill it up except for the post of the President. If at any time the post of the President falls vacant it is only the General Council which can fill it up. (Muslim Conference Constitution Article 7 clause d).

In the light of this argument the appointment of Chaudri Hamidullah as Acting President was unconstitutional. In his second letter² Chaudri Ghulam Abbas has admitted that he had committed a blunder—both tactical and constitutional—in appointing Mr. Hamidullah Khan as Acting President.

(b) It is certain that Chaudri Ghulam Abbas, President of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference did this act in haste. Any how the Committee respects the order of the Quaid-i-Millat but Hamidullah misused his powers and did such things as would spoil and destroy the Muslim Conference. All this was done in defiance of the Constitution of the Muslim Conference.

(c) Hamidullah Khan chose such people as his counsels who had recently been expelled from the Muslim Conference on grounds of grave allegations and whose political position and honesty is questionable. As, for instance, Hamidullah Khan, instead of consulting his Working Committee sought counsels from men like Messrs

Quraishi Moh[amma]d Yusuf and Ismail Sagar and instead of coming to the Muslim Conference Headquarters and promising the General Secretary of the City Muslim Conference in writing that he would come to the office, Hamidullah kept on conspiring against the Muslim Conference in the Majestic Hotel, Srinagar.

(d) Although responsible Muslim Conference workers requested Mr. Hamidullah incessantly to come to the central office and tell the people there as to what was the next step after the Muslim Conference leaders had been arrested yet he did not come to the office. The Muslim masses were at a loss to understand as to what they had to do. Thousands of Muslims had assembled at the *Pindal* since Chaudri Abbas had asked them to come there the day before, but Hamidullah did not come. Hamid sent his message instead and that too in an irresponsible manner.

(e) Instead of giving the nation a lead at that critical juncture Hamid went to Baramula town [and] spoke there against Muslim Conference Committee of Action in order to destroy the organisation.

(f) Recently Hamidullah Khan has given an interview to the representative of the *Khidmat*, the organ of the National Conference. In this connection, the following words of Mr. Hamidullah are significant in its issue of the first November: "*Sher-i Kashmir* Sheikh Abdullah (President National Conference) is the most farsighted, the greatest and real leader of Kashmir". Besides at Baramula town a public meeting was held under the chairmanship of Hamidullah where slogans of "Long live Abdullah" were given. This and the rest of the activities of Mr. Hamidullah go to prove that he has allied himself with the National Conference and he is betraying the very objective of the Musalmans of Kashmir and behind the back of *Quaid-i-Millat*, Chaudri Abbas he is disrupting the Muslim Conference.

(g) The letters which Chuadri Ghulam Abbas has written from Srinagar Central Jail to responsible leaders in the Muslim Conference support the view that Mr. Hamidullah Khan is betraying the Muslim Conference.

(h) The second letter of Chuadri Ghulam Abbas revealed that Chaudri Hamidullah directed the former not to [go to] Delhi but in spite of this Chaudri Hamid went to Delhi. There he misinformed the Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim press and particularly the *Dawn* and aroused them against the Committee of Action, the only authoritative body of the Muslim Conference.³ Hence the Committee of Action confirms the decision arrived at by the President of the Committee with regard to the expulsion and dismissal of Chaudri Hamidullah, acting President and the dissolution of the Working Committee of the

Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.

¹Not traceable.

²Annexure.

³On 30 October 1946, Hamidullah Khan had met Jinnah at Delhi, heading a 4-member delegation and acquainted him with latest political situation in Kashmir. See Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam 1942-47*, Lahore, 1989, 59.

Annexure to Annex to Appendix I. 38
Ghulam Abbas to M. Mohammad Amin¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-62

[Undated]

Dear Maulana Sahib,
Assalamo Alaikum

Thank you for the letter. You know that the bridle of Mr. Hamidullah is in the hands of the Premier through the Chief Secretary. By appointing him acting president I doubtless committed a mistake, but when the Committee of Action was there and after the arrest of the President all his powers went to the Committee of Action, you people could rectify my mistake. In his capacity of the Chairman of the Committee of Action, Hazrat Maulana Mohd. Yusuf had all authority to dismiss the Acting President, dissolve the Working Committee and then assume all the powers himself. He must do this even now. When Hamid met me in jail, I did not direct him to go to Delhi. My direction was that he should go to the Mirwaiz Sahib directly and get his mistake redeemed and work according to Mirwaiz Sahib's advice. Whatever he did against this has been done under the directions of Chief Secretary or Moh[amma]d Yusuf Qureshi, who is doubtless a paid agent of the National Conference. Do send to the Quaid-i-Azam all the details telegraphically. It is futile to write letters at such times. If you acquaint the Quaid-i-Azam with the situation by telegram I am sure that the efforts of the opponents shall meet with failure. Therefore, give a telegram at once and get directions as soon as possible. A statement should be sent abroad by the Mirwaiz Sahib through the A.P.I. in which it should be made clear that the programme of the Muslim Conference was only this much that the men should court arrest in protest against the ban on the session and the rest of the Muslim Conference should remain in the field and contest elections and after achieving success prepare programme for Direct Action as I have declared in the session. By means of a hundred men being in prison you can get as much help in the elections as by that of only the four of us being in prison. No body else should come to the prison now.

Workers are needed outside for the elections. Therefore not a single volunteer should be transferred from the election front to the jail front because it will be nothing short of suicide.

I do not even allow you to begin the stage. Once you started it you will have to confine it and under the excuse of that the Government will crush the Muslim Conference so much so that our success in the elections shall be made impossible. I have my suspicions about Saghar Halwai and Rahbar. These people are spending most of their time in the company of National Conference like Syyid and Budh Singh etc. These people have been bought. Do not attach any importance to their arrest.

As regards the interview, my suggestion is that no interview with us should be sought, because at that time there are Government people present here and it becomes impossible to have a talk which is important. By the grace of God and your blessings our correspondence shall continue and in this manner we can confer more safely.

The rest is O.K. Convey my greetings to the Mirwaiz Sahib.

Yours
ABBAS

Maulana Mohammad Amin had written a letter to Choudhry Ghulam Abbas with reference written to Noor-ud-din [Annex to Appendix I-45] This is in reply to that letter.

I. 39

MUSLIM CONFERENCE FACES A CRISIS: INSPIRED ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT THE PARTY¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-59
(Through Muslim eyes)

“What is the outcome of the recent ‘Quit Kashmir’ agitation?” is a question that is so often asked in this State these days. The answers are naturally many and varied. But the most conspicuous one is the voluntary liquidation of the all Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference as a political entity. It has miserably failed to rise to the occasion and give an intelligent lead to the Muslims of this valley in their hour of decision and peril. Its indecision and the resultant oscillation from one extreme to another spread confusion among its ranks and eventually crumbled the entire structure with the result that today it is neither a party nor a political entity but a group of wrangling political novices aspiring for leadership. Today it is divided in two camps: the Jammu party and the Kashmir party—both fighting bitterly for the leadership

of the organisation.

FOOLED BY NATIONAL CONFERENCITES

Ever since the "Quit Kashmir" agitation fizzled out, the National Conference underground leaders and those at large in British India have been trying their best to precipitate a clash between the Muslim Conference and the Kashmir Government and thus use the followers of the Muslim Conference as cheap lathi fodder in order to further the National Conference propaganda that there is oppression and repression in this State. A section of the Muslim Conference fell victim to the National Conference hush-hush communal propaganda and thus became a willing tool in the hands of underground leaders. The confusion was scrambled to such an extent that at the time of Pandit Nehru's arrest at Kohala the Quereshi group welcomed Jawaharlal's visit whereas the Mir Waiz opposed it and Abbas and party adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality. And today Abbas is in jail, Quereshi is reported to be underground with the National Conferencites and the Mirwaiz has withdrawn the movement and called upon his followers to fight the forthcoming elections.

The National Conferencites are taking the utmost advantage of this division. They are happy that the Muslim Conference leaders have fallen out among themselves and that their chief opposition is being weakened. They are goading the Muslim Conference by persuasion, ridiculing and tauntings to start direct action which its leaders have promised to launch.

JINNAH'S WHOLESOME ADVICE

During the last six months the leaders of the Muslim Conference called on Mr. Jinnah several times and acquainted him with the local conditions—of course from their own point of view. Yet the shrewd politician Mr. Jinnah is, he saw through the interplay of the various forces in this State and advised them to concentrate their labours on building up their organisation and working for the educational and economic uplift of the Muslims of this State. Referring to the "Quit Kashmir" movement Mr. Jinnah told them that it was a tactical blunder and the Muslim Conference should have nothing to do with it, other than protecting the State Muslims from [the] imposition of collective fines etc. he sent [words illegible...] session, which resulted in the arrest of the Muslim Conference President and General Secretary, besides others:

My message² and earnest appeal to the Muslim leadership in Kashmir is to organise your people, educationally, socially, economically and politically and set your hand to constructive nation-building

programme.

Stand united, work selflessly, perseveringly and in a disciplined manner and I assure you no power on earth can prevent you from the attainment of 'Azad Kashmir' and the realisation of your just and legitimate rights. Our sympathies are with you in your struggle and I wish you all success."

Mr. Jinnah laid great stress on organisation and discipline. And yet the Muslim Conference have thrown both these to the winds and made their party and politics into a first rate farce. They suffer from an illusionary and self-deceptive complex and they feel that they are the natural leaders of the 32 lakhs of State Muslims, who are presumed to be prepared to lay down their lives at the bidding of the Muslim Conference High Command. How self-deceptive and fatal was the belief that there would be armed uprisings in Poonch, Mirpur and Jammu if the Muslim Conference leaders were arrested was amply proved by the complete fiasco that has followed the arrest of Abbas, Agha Shaukat and others.

HAMIDULLAH GROUP'S SABOTAGE

Chaudri Hamidullah has apparently become the self-appointed successor of Chaudri Abbas and he has called upon the Muslim Conference to give up all talk of direct action and fight the elections. Mir Waiz too has done the same thing. He has warned his followers not to fall victims to the National Conference propaganda but concentrate all their efforts on fighting the elections. Abbas too is reported to have appealed to his party just before his arrest to carry on election work.

If the Muslim Conference leaders are so anxious about fighting the elections, then why did they precipitate a crisis last week resulting in the arrest of their President and General Secretary and other prominent workers, who could have really done some work during the forthcoming elections? If they had to fight elections it was nothing short of suicide to have courted arrest at this juncture.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS

At the time of the fall of the Moghul Empire, several *ch[h]ota* chieftains of the Moghul court began posing as the natural successors to the crashed throne. The Muslim Conference is today exactly in the same predicament. Chaudri Hamidullah has assumed the role of Acting President of the Muslim Conference on the strength of a letter of authority alleged to have been given by the President, Chaudri Abbas, just before his arrest as though he should preside over [words illegible] Conference. He doesn't seem to bother or give credence to the fact that Chaudri Ghulam Abbas had no powers to do so,

even presuming that he had given such a letter. Only the Working Committee has the power to appoint an Acting President or any other office bearer. Such a resolution, either authorising Chaudri Abbas to appoint an Acting President of his choice or electing Hamidullah as the Acting President, is not on record and nobody has heard about it as yet. Under the circumstances nobody can naturally recognise Hamidullah as the Acting President and so the various *firman*s he has issued appointing, dismissing, suspending and superseding the various office-bearers and committees are, to put it mildly, unconstitutional [and] are *ultra vires*.

LIKE DUTCH ARMY

The whole game of the Hamidullah group seems to be to capture the key posts in the organisation by hook or crook and put up their own favorites as the Muslim Conference nominees for the forthcoming elections. With this objective in view, they are literally wrecking their organisation by internecine wranglings and dissensions. They are apparently anxious to do away with the moderate elements led by the Mir Waiz and then reach a bilateral understanding with the National Conferencites some of whom are fooling them with false promise of joining the Muslim Conference at a later stage.

These self-appointed leaders are like the Dutch Army—all officers and no soldiers. They are all leaders without any following and all these years they have been trading and thriving on the personal prestige and following of the Mir Waiz in Kashmir. And now they want to do away with him, thus losing even the few followers the Muslim Conference now has in Kashmir.

THE ONLY WAY OUT

If the Muslim Conference has to survive the present internal crisis and emerge as a powerful mass party, the leaders must immediately give up their personal quarrels and avert the organizational crisis which their party is now facing. They should have Mr. Jinnah's words as their motto and success will be theirs in a short time. Patience, perseverance, discipline and toleration are badly wanted in the Muslim Conference. If as Mr. Jinnah advised them, they begin organising the State Muslims—educationally, socially, economically and politically—it will not be long before they will realise their just and legitimate aspirations.

For the present, there is no other way left to the Muslim Conference except to compose their internal differences and fight unitedly the forthcoming elections. Elections alone can prove whether their lofty pretensions that a great majority of the 32 lakh of State Muslims

follow them is correct or not. If they fail in the forthcoming elections, they will be politically liquidated like the Punjab Unionists and their future political existence will be on the sufferance of a third party—whether it be the Kashmir Government or Pandit Nehru who dominated National [Conference]...

¹Editorial, *The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1947.

²The message was sent on 26 October. See Waheed Ahmad, *The Nation's Voice*, V, 333-4.

I. 40

REBIRTH OF GOONDAISM¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-59 (a)

What wonder that, when the Muslim Conference leaders were arrested and taken to the Srinagar Central Jail² on Saturday last, [26 October] the National Conferencites detained there abused Agha Shaukat Ali, General Secretary of the Muslim Conference, in the most foul and filthy language and attempted to assault him? But for the timely intervention of the jail staff he would have been severely beaten. The jail authorities, instead of punishing those guilty of such a gross misbehaviour towards a fellow prisoner, did their best to hush up the incident and even went to the extent of contradicting it. Such an official apathy—which in actual practice amounts to not only shielding criminal elements who operate under a political cloak but also aiding and abetting them in their nefarious activities—has been unfortunately giving fresh lease of life to political *goondaism* in this State from time to time.

This kind of criminal activity, born out of political intolerance and jealousy, is nothing new to Kashmir; it has, particularly during the last six years, taken deep roots in the public life of this State. The people of Kashmir have been bullied, blackmailed and exploited, politically and economically, not so much by the so-called feudal autocracy as by a clique of power-hungry and corrupt-to-the-core *goonda* hierarchy that has arrogated to itself the political leadership of ignorant people. Nationalism to them is more of a catchy signboard for their lucrative business—that is what they have made of politics—than a political ideology, much less an article of faith and a matter of conviction. These mis-called National Conferencites have blackened their faces by assaulting and intimidating their political opponents in a cold-blooded manner and by such cowardly acts they have brought shame and

disgrace on the noble name of their organisation and literally dug its grave with their own hands.

The Kashmir Government is well aware of the fact that lawyers, journalists, students, Muslim Conferencites, Kisan Conferencites and even Government servants were beaten by the storm-troopers of the National Conference and ransoms were exacted from innocent and helpless shopkeepers at the point of hockey sticks. And yet the police did nothing and with supreme indifference they allowed gangsterism to get along unchecked. It was only when the climax of this *goondaism* was reached and the power intoxicated leaders hurled unmentionable abuses at the person of His Highness and the members of the Ruling Family that the Government was forced to call off this bluff and humble the insolence and arrogance of these *goonda* leaders.

Prime Minister Kak has, no doubt, blunted their teeth and clipped off their once sharp and deadly claws, but still they retain plenty of husky bark which may at an opportune moment develop into a thundering roar. This is a danger that must be met in time, if the semblance of order that has been restored in Kashmir is not to be thrown to the winds. Only the other day an old Muslim shopkeeper from Mahraj Gunj, Srinagar, told the Prime Minister that during the last ten years he dared not go [to] Amira Kadal area for the fear of being molested by the National Conferencites. Such a feeling of insecurity is still widespread in this State and the Government has not yet succeeded in restoring confidence and a sense of personal security among the people.

The Kashmir Government has unfortunately a policeman's conception of its fundamental responsibility to protect its people from intimidation. Organised *goondaism*, which is backed by money and political patronage from outside and official connivance from within, cannot be curbed by private litigations in courts of law, which only add insult to injury. The Government must deal with it boldly and with foresight in the same way as civilised Governments all over the world do to protect their people. The Government knows very well that innocent people are being beaten up, false cases including murder charges are being concocted, lawyers and witnesses in cases are being threatened and intimidated, and yet it is closing its eyes to this primary problem. The repercussions of this policy will be disastrous; either people will eventually submit to *goondaism* or they will look forward to outside political leaders for

help. The Government must make its choice before it is too late.

¹Editorial, *The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1946.

²On 2 November 1946, Jinnah, in a press statement, deeply regretted Kashmir government ban on the Annual session of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and the arrest of foremost leaders of the Conference. He termed this action as opposed to the elementary principle of liberty. See Waheed Ahmad, *The Nation's Voice*, V, 349.

I. 41

CONSPIRACY AGAINST YUSUF SHAH¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-59 (a)

Congress money and communist brains are at work to disrupt the Muslim Conference and destroy it as a political entity. A diabolical conspiracy has been hatched up by the communist-guided National Conferencites to split up the Muslim Conference, support wholeheartedly the Hamidullah group in its attempts to discredit the Mir Waiz and finally destroy the Muslim Conference itself as an organised opposition to the National Conference.

The National Conference workers have received secret instructions from their bosses in British India asking them to suspend election propaganda temporarily and concentrate all their efforts on damning the Mir Waiz in a subtle manner, taking advantage of the present rift in the Muslim Conference ranks.

Under instructions from Moh-iud-din Kara, the National Conference elements outside the jail had had a secret meeting in Srinagar two or three days back and earmarked a sum of Rs. 40,000 out of the Congress donated election funds for propaganda and bribery to drive a deep wedge into the Muslim Conference organisation and destroy it part by part in Hitlerian style. About one hundred trusted workers have been selected who will pretend as Muslim Conferencites, and "work" for it in towns and villages. The *modus operandi* is to praise Ghulam Abbas and others in jail, declare open allegiance to Hamidullah as the new President and bitterly attack Moulvi Yusuf Shah calling him a Government agent who has sabotaged the Muslim Conference from inside. These one hundred volunteers are to be paid regular salaries and T[ravelling] A[llowance] and they will function as wholtime spies of the National Conference touring all over the Kashmir Valley attacking Yusuf Shah. Of these 100 paid workers, at least 25 to 30 are Hindus some of whom are communists. They will pretend as more fanatic Muslims than Muslim Conferencites themselves, prepare posters, write articles in different names and try to get them published

in the local papers—all supporting Hamidullah and attacking Yusuf Shah bitterly. Already the National Conference official organ the *Khidmat*, is devoting itself almost entirely to anti-Yusuf Shah propaganda.

¹*The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1946.

I. 42

FUTILE EFFORTS¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-59 (a)

Chaudri Hamidullah has fallen like a ripe mango into the hands of the National Conference and will be exploited like G. M. Syed in Sind. Secret instructions have been issued by the National Conference to its agents in different parts of the State to join hands with the Hamidullah group and damn the Mir Waiz for the time being.

The National Conferencites are much afraid of the Mir Waiz, who has some real following. Once it is shattered by clever propaganda that the Moulvi is a Government agent, they feel that it will be quite easy to destroy the Hamidullah group and liquidate the Muslim Conference before Abbas and others come out of the jail. The National Conferencites are secretly assuring the Hamidullah group that after the elections they will join the Muslim Conference. But it is precisely before the elections they are counting upon destroying the Muslim Conference.

Already some mysterious persons, posing as Muslim Conference workers who can hardly speak English are visiting newspaper offices with well written and typed articles bitterly attacking Moulvi Yusuf Shah. When a few questions were put to them they got bewildered and left the place, clearly showing that a third party is using them as dummies.

But these tactics will not lead the National Conferencites any further. They will not become really strong by the weakness of their opponents. What they should do is to subject themselves to a critical self-analysis, try to find out why they have become so unpopular and are detested in public estimation and then try to correct their shortcomings.

Even Pandit Nehru had to admit that *goonda* methods and political intolerance have cost them dearly in public estimation and he advised them to give up these tactics. If only they follow the spirit of Pandit Nehru's advice and recant, it will not be difficult for them to stage a

come-back in Kashmir politics. The Muslim Conference's misfortune need not, therefore, mean a windfall to the National Conference.

¹*The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1946.

I. 43

Statement by Muhammad Yusuf Shah¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-59 (b)

Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah, President, Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference Committee of Action, in a statement to the press, says:

"The events that have taken place as a result of the recent annual session of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference have been communicated to Mr. M. A. Jinnah. A detailed letter has been sent to him in this connection and I have requested the Quaid-i-Azam to give us his directions at this critical juncture. The Muslims of Kashmir must await the Quaid-i-Azam's lead² with patience. For the time being they should act upon the directions that Chaudri Ghulam Abbas has given them in the course of his presidential address [25 October 1946] just before his arrest, when he appealed to the followers of Muslim Conference to fight the forthcoming elections to the State Assembly which are going to be held in the near future and establish itself as the sole representative body of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslims.

As I have said in one of my previous statements the most vital thing for the State Muslims is to win the forthcoming elections. They must devote all their attention in this direction. They must girdle their loins and mobilise all their resources and defeat the agents of the Hindu Congress.

I have come to know that the agents of the National Conference are trying their best to prove that the 'Quit Kashmir' demand and the demands of the Muslim Conference are identical. This is entirely unfounded. They are also trying to creat[e] some Hindu-Muslim tension in order to discredit the Muslim Conference. The Muslims of this State should realise that true Muslims detest communal trouble and so they should do their best to frustrate such attempts. I hope in this hour of trial the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir will behave with discipline and restraint and keep their party flag flying with honour and dignity.

I warn the Government against attempting to suppress Muslim aspirations and thus forcing them to follow a dangerous path which will be disastrous.

I hope the *ad hoc* parliamentary board appointed by the Muslim

Conference Working Committee will exercise its great responsibilities in such a manner that the Muslims of this State do not fall in the trap of the National Conference, which is thriving in this State on the Congress subsidy.

As I have said in one of my previous statements the most vital thing for the State Muslims is to win the forthcoming elections to the State Assembly. The elections are coming very soon and there will be a great tussle between the National Conference and the Muslim Conference in these elections. The State Muslims will have to decide whether they follow Pandit Nehru's stooges or their own accredited leaders.

¹*The Kashmir Times*, 2 November 1946.

²See statement by Jinnah, 2 November 1946, Waheed Ahmad, *The Nation's Voice*, V, 348-50.

I. 44

M. A. Jinnah to Conrad Corfield

SHC, Kashmir/K-60

7 November 1946

Dear Sir Conrad,

Perhaps you have seen the statement¹ I issued about Kashmir a few days ago. I am enclosing a copy for ready reference.

Since then I have been receiving very alarming reports about the reactionary policy followed by Mr. Kak, the Prime Minister, and I am sending you herewith a telegram² that I have received this morning for your consideration.

Yours sincerely
M. A. JINNAH

See Appendix I. 43, note 2.

²Not traceable.

I. 45

Muhammad Yusuf Shah to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-64

SRINAGAR, KASHMIR,

17 November 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I hope you have perused the piece of information¹ I sent to you recently. In my telegram to you dated 14th instant² I promised you more and that is attached herewith.

You know that the resuscitation of the Muslim Conference has cost us much and as such it is the duty of everybody concerned to act cautiously lest the whole structure of the Muslim Conference collapses.

Recent happenings in Kashmir have created a very difficult and delicate situation in Kashmir. I am being accused of treachery because the Government did not arrest me in spite of my defying law on 25th October. Why the Government did not arrest me is obvious from the first letter of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas.³ The Government know that arresting me is courting disaster and provoking mass resentment, otherwise the Government can arrest me at any time. Furthermore my brother M. Noor-ud-Din, Chairman of the Reception Committee, who was the first man to defy law on 25th of October, is in Riasi Jail with Chaudhry Abbas and others.

The National Conference people, henchmen of the Congress, are hatching dangerous schemes to discredit me in the public eyes and thus to inflict a death blow on the Muslim Conference. This has been discussed by favourable local press. I am attaching herewith the cuttings of the *Kashmir Times*⁴ for your perusal. Chaudhry Abbas also has referred to the disrupting tactics to which Chaudhri Hamidullah, whom the former had nominated acting President, fell a prey. As soon as the leaders were arrested Mr Hamidullah started "negotiating" with the National Conference agents and fell into their hands like a ripe mango. He approached you to get recognition although Ch. Abbas had asked him not to come to you without consulting me when he met him in Srinagar Jail before he left Kashmir to see you. He has been successful in deceiving the *Dawn* staff by giving incorrect and mischievous information. Had Ch. Hamidullah carried on his work honestly I would have had no objection in recognizing him (although it was against our Constitution), nor would Abbas have repented his nomination of Mr Hamidullah. But Mr Hamid [ullah] is on the one hand conspiring

with the Nationalists and on the other hand he is a puppet in the hands of his brother Niaz Ahmad, Chief Secretary to Premier Kak. This double dealing does not behove an Acting President of the Muslim Conference and that is why we are against him.

In 1944 the Maharaja of Kashmir proclaimed the establishment of the so-called Dyarchy in Kashmir. Muhammad Afzal Beg, Mr Abdullah's man was appointed Public Works Minister. It was so difficult for me and Abbas to dissuade Hamidullah, then our Assembly group Leader, from accepting the seat in the Cabinet, for he, before the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference, had had time to consider the question, had welcomed the Dyarchy by giving a statement in the Assembly. It is said Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak is going to corrupt the Muslim Conference man, Ch. Hamidullah, as he did it recently with Mian Ahmad Yar, leader of the National Conference Assembly party whom he got appointed Public Works Minister. The letter of Ch. Abbas confirms this view.

Your statement⁵ regarding Kashmir, the articles and the newsletter that have appeared in the *Dawn* have made the situation so complicate[d].

I hope that after reading all that I sent you, you will issue a statement that will bring the Kashmir Muslim Conference to its own.

I have attached photographs of Ch. Abbas's letters herewith.

Yours very sincerely,
MIRWAIZ

^{1&2}Not traceable.

³Annex.

⁴Appendices I. 39 to I. 42.

⁵See Appendix I. 43, note 2.

Annex to Appendix I. 45
Ghulam Abbas to Noor-ud-din¹

SHC, Kashmir/K-67

[Undated]

Dear Noor-ud-din,
Assalamo Alaikum

I am in receipt of all the details sent by you. I very much resent the attitude of Hamidullah Khan. It seems that he has fallen prey to the trap of his brother, the Chief Secretary to Prime Minister and this too is possible that Kak should have entangled him by promising him a seat in the State Cabinet. I in every case confide in the Mirwaiz Sahib, do whatever he orders you to do. When arrests have been made and I

have been arrested in my capacity of the President, a Working Committee and an acting President have no meaning. As a rule, all the powers go to the Chairman of the Committee of Action after the President has been arrested. It is only the Committee of Action which is a sort of War Council, an authoritative body. By making the Mirwaiz Sahib the Chairman of the Committee of Action our aim was that since the Government dare not arrest him easily, he would run the organisation according to the need of the hour. I deplore that Hamidullah should have betrayed the nation and then by misusing his powers should have expelled Kh. Abdus Salam Dallal etc., for three years from the Muslim Conference. Hamidullah has never upto this time given any sacrifice while the whole life of Mr. Abdus Salam is a record of sacrifices. I think Hamidullah has taken this step on the instigation of the Government.

Convey my greetings to the Mirwaiz Sahib and request him on my behalf to dissolve the Working Committee and dismiss the Acting President and assume all powers himself. Acquaint me with further developments today.

Yours
ABBAS

This letter was conveyed to a responsible leader of the Muslim Conference, M. Mohd. Amin, member of the emergency Parliamentary Board. See SHC, Kashmir K-62 Not printed.

I. 46

G. Mohamed to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-65

C/O GHULAM MOHIDIN & SON,
RESIDENCY ROAD,
SRINAGAR,
25 December 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I wrote you a letter¹ on the 2nd Nov. 1946 giving you some details of the local political situation. I hope you have received it. I sent [it] per registered post. I have not received any acknowledgment for the same and I quite understand how difficult it is for you to attend to so many things. Nevertheless knowing as I do the interest you so very kindly have for the Kashmiri Musalmans, I am taking the liberty of writing to you again and placing before your goodself the

position as it is now.

I gave you all the possible details for the period covering the start of "Quit Kashmir" agitation by Sh. Abdullah and the arrest of Ch. Ghulam Abbas. I now want to write to you as to what happened after that in particular reference to the elections.

After the arrest of Ch. Abbas, as you must be aware, an open conflict started between the Muslim Conference headed by Ch. Hamidullah and the so-called Muslim Conference of Mirwaiz. Allegations started against each other, Ch. Hamidullah expelling the Mirwaiz and his assistants and the Mirwaiz in return expelling Ch. Hamidullah. The Mirwaiz claimed to have received letters from Ch. Abbas from his detention disassociating himself with Ch. Hamidullah. While the Jammu Muslims and those who knew the Mirwaiz in Kashmir made no mistake about the fraud of the Mirwaiz yet the common man was bewildered and the whole thing became very ridiculous and as was expected, the National Conference made as best a use of this bankruptcy of our leadership and our organisation and, as I wrote to you in my last letter, the Muslim Conference stood fully exposed and discredited.

The pity of it all was that the government announced elections when the Muslim Conference was in such plight. You will be surprised to know that not that this situation was in Kashmir alone but another Mirwaiz was created in Jammu as well and disruption started there too. However, it is not so dangerous there as Musalmans of Jammu Province are solidly behind the Muslim Conference. Even there, counter expulsions and counter claims of Ch. Abbas's recognition started. However, as I do not claim to know much about that place I want to confine myself to Kashmir situation.

As I wrote to you the elections came over us in environment described above. Government being fully in the know of Muslim Conference internal dissensions and the condition of the National Conference rightly felt that this was the best opportunity for elections when they could expect all their own men to come. Whatever it was our endeavour was to make the best of the worst position. The first problem was to avoid a domestic conflict viz: two candidates fighting against each other in Kashmir each claiming to owe allegiance to the Muslim Conference, one standing on the ticket of the Muslim Conference and the other on the ticket of the so-called Muslim Conference of Mirwaiz. In the event of such a thing happening, I need not tell you of the consequences. They are obvious. The position was this, that out of 12 elected Muslim seats in Kashmir Province there were only three applications received by the Central Parliamentary Board of the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference in Jammu. But of these three applications

also one candidate insisted that his name should not be announced before the scrutiny. Out of these the nomination papers of two have been rejected and the third has been elected unopposed. For five seats in Srinagar, there was no application with the Central Parliamentary Board but there were some applications with the Mirwaiz. For one of these constituencies my father stood as an independent candidate but with the fullest approval and support of the Muslim Conference Central Parliamentary Board. This particular constituency is the stronghold of the National Conference. After fully considering the various circumstances and after fully satisfying themselves about the whole position, the Central Parliamentary Board made an exception in the case of my father and announced specially that in this particular case they were not putting up any candidate against my father but had decided to lend their full support to him. With regard to other four constituencies a compromise was arrived at, that the four names given by Mirwaiz were accepted by the Central Parliamentary Board and their announcement was made by it and their applications and pledges also were taken possession of by the Board.

To be brief, the last date for filing the nominations was the 11th of December and accordingly the candidates so announced by the Board and other independent candidates filed their nominations. In my father's constituency as arranged there was no other candidate excepting the National Conference candidates.

After the nominations were filed in Muzaffarabad the nomination papers of all the candidates both Muslim Conferencites and National Conferencites opposing the Independent candidate Mian Ahmad Yar were summarily rejected. This was a first big blow for the National Conference as they wanted to defeat Mian Ahmed Yar at any cost. Mian Ahmed Yar was their one time leader of the Assembly party and after deserting his party now [is] the P.W.D. Minister. The scrutiny of the nomination papers was fixed for 21st for some constituencies and 23rd for others. In the first scrutiny the nomination papers of all other candidates excepting that of the Muslim Conference were rejected. So like this the Muslim Conference got one seat and in the other the nomination papers of all excepting an independent candidate were rejected. So the Muslim Conference candidate lost there. So the result of the first scrutiny was that out of 12 seats in Kashmir 3 were lost to the National Conference already and out of 9 seats in Jammu Province they did not expect even a single one. So out of 21 seats, 12 already having gone and some more being in danger, the prospect for the National Conference was most disappointing. They could hardly have

got about five Muslim seats and not a single Hindu or Sikh seat. So on the 22nd of December i.e. on the eve of further scrutiny, the National Conference announced their boycott.

Now there was another biggest and astounding surprise in store for us all on the morning of the 23rd December when we went in the offices of Returning Officers. Along with the National Conference four other candidates from four constituencies in Srinagar, who were the nominees of Mirwaiz and accepted by the Parliamentary Board as mentioned above, also withdrew their nomination papers. When I heard and saw this I felt earth failing my feet and I could not understand what it was. We had absolutely no instructions from Jammu and I immediately went and booked an urgent telephone call for Jammu to enquire what it was all about as my father also was about to withdraw his nomination paper. I found from Jammu that the Muslim Conference was contesting and there was nothing about boycott.

From the morning of the 23rd till yesterday evening, different stories went around and the final position, it appears, is that the National Conference have greased the palms of either Mirwaiz himself or his lieutenants and induced him to join the boycott with them. On the other hand, out of these four constituencies from where he had withdrawn his candidates he got Muslim Conference pledges signed by the independent candidates who are no doubt staunch Leaguers and also got Rs. 500 from each as security deposit. The situation was so delicate and the whole thing looked so surprising that it was not even readily grasped. By his action he had put the Muslim Conference in the wrong and as well as the Government. But he gave another biggest surprise yesterday evening when he issued a statement to the API, stating therein that some National Conference quarters had spread this malicious lie that the Muslim Conference had boycotted. In fact, some Muslim Conference candidates withdrew in favour of independent candidates for reasons which he says he will explain later on. So he has doomed the National Conference, as it appears that they took the decision of boycotting the elections only when they had got full assurance from the Mirwaiz that he too was joining them.

Now I heard yesterday that Ch. Hamidullah was coming to see you along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed act[ing] President of the National Conference and as Ch. Hamidullah himself is unaware of all these developments I sent you a telegram today reading as under as I thought that before you give your final advise to Hamidullah I must give you the latest position:

“Understand Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and Choudri Hamidullah coming for interview Mus[lim] Conference withdrawal elections

undesirable. Rare opportunity organising strong Muslim block in Assembly. Pray defer decision till sufficient data available. Detailed letter posted. Please accept humble felicitations your birthday. May God Bless you with long life and perfect health"

I sent this telegram to you as the position now is as under:

1. There are 9 out of 21 Muslim elected seats in the Jammu Province and out of these the Muslim Conference is expected to capture all.

2. Kashmir Province: There are 12 seats. Out of these there are 5 in Srinagar alone. Out of these five, three are definitely joining the Muslim Conference as they are both staunch Muslim Leaguers and have also given their pledges. The other two may join the Muslim Conference and even if they do not, they will not be like the National Conference people opposed to the Muslim League and our cherished goal of Pakistan.

3. There are 7 seats in Kashmir Province *muffasil*. Out of these Muzaffarabad is gone to Mian Ahmad Yar and hence lost to the Muslim Conference. Second, Baramula has been declared elected unopposed and the candidate is on the Muslim Conference ticket. Third is Pulwama, there an independent candidate has been returned unopposed and he will join the Muslim Conference party. Fourth is Badgam, that has gone to an independent candidate. He is not likely to join the Muslim Conference but will not oppose the Muslim cause as a Nationalist would have done. Fifth is Shopian, there is a contest and most probably the independent candidate who will surely join the Muslim Conference party will be returned. (This gentleman was the President of the Kashmir Provincial Muslim Conference but due to hopeless position of the organisation he had to stand on an independent ticket, but if returned he will join the party in the Assembly). Sixth is Handwara and there is the contest. Most likely a candidate who is likely to join the Muslim Conference party will be returned there. Seventh is Islamabad. There are two candidates fighting; one is virtually a Muslim Conference candidate as he has signed his pledge but is fighting on independent ticket for reasons which I need not repeat.

To consolidate the results the final position after the elections would be that there would be a party of 15 members sure out of 21 elected seats and there would be 2 or 3 more most likely to join. Under these circumstances the National Conference has been virtually eliminated from the Assembly and what is more, even those who though may not be with the Muslim Conference Party are uncompromisingly opposed to National Conference due to its hostility towards our dear organisation, the All India Muslim League and our dearest leader your own goodself. It is, therefore, that I mentioned that a rare opportunity

has arisen for the Muslim Conference to establish its hold and to eliminate this nationalist menace from Kashmir.

I have given you all the possible details and I am very sorry I could not be brief. I must have taxed you a lot in going through this letter and wasted your most precious moments. I apologise for it.

With very respectful regards to Miss Jinnah and your goodself.

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

PS:- If you desire that I should personally meet your goodself and explain the whole position, I will be prepared to start immediately you summon me.

SHC, Kashmir/K-58. Not printed.

I. 47

G. Mohamed to M. A. Jinnah

SHC, Kashmir/K-67

C/O GHULAM MOHIDIN & SON,
RESIDENCY ROAD,
SRINAGAR,
28 December 1946

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I have sent you a telegram to-day reading as under:

My letter and telegram twenty fifth. Position somewhat different. Writing.

I have sent this telegram as I found that I had made a little haste in drawing conclusions and that I was a little more optimistic. I sincerely beg to apologise for the same and frankly admit my mistake which was, however, made with bona fide intentions. As I cannot even imagine putting your goodself in wrong impression and as I know you have been so good enough to put some trust in me I have taken the earliest opportunity to rectify the impression I may have given you.

I have written to you that the three independent candidates elected from Srinagar constituencies have given their pledges to join the Muslim Conference. I have met two out of these and I have found that it is wrong as they denied having given anything in writing. Besides I was very much disappointed in my personal contact with them. Though it is a fact that they are uncompromisingly opposed to National Conference

but I found that they are stooges of the government. I have also met a candidate returned from Islamabad constituency. I was very much disillusioned there as well. In fact all of these returned unopposed are men [of] absolute nonentities who could never have dreamt of becoming members of the Assembly. They have been returned only by the courtesy of their master, the government and by the boycott of the National Conference and the last time betrayal of Mirwaiz in withdrawing his candidates from Srinagar.

However, I must say it is more or less in a melting pot and nothing can be definitely said as yet. May be perhaps when these gentlemen go to the assembly they might realise that they are above collectors or deputy collectors and they cast [off] their inferiority complex and join the opposition. In any case, I am still of this opinion that this position is better than National Conference people being there. Perhaps, with good sense of our leaders and co-operation from the government the Muslim Block may be able to achieve something substantial. If, however, they fail this time, God forbid, the Muslim Conference will be wiped off as the general public after the boycott of the National Conference are watching with suspicion every move of those who have not boycotted.

In this supreme hour your advise is of utmost importance and I implore you to take pity over 36 lakh of Musalmans of this State and devote some more time to our problems than you can afford. I must plainly state that our leadership is incapable of managing in these troubled times. Besides their mental make-up is made up of their own particular nature and their own particular views. For example, our leaders have never so far thought of constructive co-operation with government or entering into some sort of negotiations with them on certain honorable terms. Even to see the Prime Minister is a sin.

Nationalists are very much perturbed and I believe they are very repenting as to why they took to boycott. They feel that they have been conveniently eliminated and at such a time when the Indian politics is moving so fast and far-reaching events are expected to take place within these few years. I understand they had earmarked Sh. Abdullah for the membership of the Constituent Assembly. I also understand that they are trying now to patch up with the government. Your goodself will well appreciate how more difficult the whole situation becomes.

I do hope you will pardon me for taking such liberties with you and to tax you with all these letters.

With profound respects to your goodself and Miss Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
G. MOHAMED

I. 48

Mohammad Ishaq to K. H. Khurshid

SHC, Kashmir/K-69

JAMMU,
20 February 1947

My dear Khurshid,

Thanks for the letter. I am really sorry that I did not write earlier to relieve you of suspense. One reason for this omission was that there was little to write about as you will know from the following twice-told tale:

We have captured 7 out of 9 seats in Jammu and Poonch losing Bhimber and Kathua, through official interference. We have filed election petitions for both of these constituencies. In Poonch, Udhampur and Jammu district, our opponents forfeited securities. In Jammu, Sheikh Amin polled merely 500 votes as against 1400 polled by Ch. Hamidullah. From Kashmir we have received offers of allegiance from Maulvi Abdullah of Shopian, Mr. Inayat Ullah Kakru of Baramula, Mr. Gilkar of Srinagar and Mr. (A Shia member)—4 certainties. Mr. Ghulam Ahmad Jeweller (Srinagar) is another but a doubtful ally. We have not been able to tackle the rest so far due to excessive snowfall in the valley and a virtual locking of the country-roads. We should have 12 if not more out of 21 elected Muslims with us in the Assembly, not bad considering the odds particularly the elimination of our candidates at the scrutiny. By the way we filed a petition against the return of Mian Ahmad Yar to the Assembly from Muzaffarabad. We have been pestering the government with the demand for release of Abbas, Saghar, Shaukat and others. Today we are meeting the Prime Minister in this respect. In case the government finally refuses their release—and the chances are fifty-fifty each way—we are committed to boycott the next Assembly session in March or to resign from the Assembly altogether. We might also decide to convene a meeting of the party at Plundari (a storm-centre) in Poonch and decide upon some form of direct action. Before that, however, Ch. Hamidullah will try to contact the Quaid-i-Azam as suggested by you. We might know something definite

in a couple of days. I shall keep you informed of developments.

We are doing some organizational work too, beginning from Bhimber, in our fitful way.

Javed is still facing pre-censorship and hence they deny its appearance. *Pakistan Times* has asked me to work as a correspondent from Jammu and I have sent it news. The Orient Press continues to ignore me.

It is a great consolation for all the friends that we have one so near the Quaid-i-Azam who has the cause of Muslims of Kashmir uppermost in his mind.

Yours sincerely,
MOH[AMMA]D ISHAQ

P.S. We have also demanded that out of 4 representatives from Kashmir for Constituent Assembly, 3 should be Muslims selected by single transferable vote of elected Muslims in the Assembly. We can get two Muslims Conference men in this way out of three.

I. 49

HOW MOUNTBATTEN BENT THE RULES AND THE INDIAN BORDER' Simon Scott Plummer Hears a Retired Judge's Verdict on Gerrymandering as the Raj Ended

Earl Mountbatten manipulated in India's favour the findings of the commission responsible for determining the new frontier between India and Pakistan across Punjab in 1947, according to Mr. Christopher Beaumont, Secretary to the head of the commission.

Mr. Beaumont, a retired circuit judge, said in a statement that Sir Cyril Radcliffe had yielded to what he thought was overwhelming political expediency by agreeing, after he had decided the line, to the transfer of the Ferozepur and Zira sub-districts from Pakistan to India. But no change was made in the north Punjab line in the Gurdaspur district, which abutted Kashmir.

The boundary commission's deliberations were supposed to be secret, impartial and isolated from political pressure.

Sir Cyril, its Chairman, later headed inquiries in Britain into the Vassal spy case and into the *Daily Express* and D Notice System. He was created a Viscount in 1962 and died in 1977.

Mr. Beaumont, 79, who lives in Boroughbridge, Yorkshire, said in a statement that Radcliffe was persuaded to change his mind about Ferozepur and Zira at a lunch with Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, from which Mr. Beaumont was "deftly excluded."

“Mountbatten interfered and Radcliffe allowed himself to be overborne. Grave discredit to both” his statement said.

Although the drawing of the Punjab line was a separate issue from the future of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. Beaumont’s revelations cast fresh doubts on Mountbatten’s impartiality over the partition of British India, in particular his attitude to the question of whether Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan.

In a book published last year, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, Mr. Alastair Lamb produced new evidence to suggest that Mountbatten wanted Kashmir to join India despite the fact that most of its population was Muslim and had connived with Indian politicians to force the ruler’s hand on this issue.

As far as Punjab is concerned, the statement made by Mr. Beaumont has caused Mr. Phillip Ziegler to reconsider the conclusions reached in his official biography of Mountbatten in 1985.

Mr. Ziegler wrote at the time “To argue that Mountbatten tampered with the awards is to suggest that Radcliffe, a man of monumental integrity and independence of mind, meekly allowed his recommendations to be set aside by somebody who had no official standing in the matter.

“The most likely explanation seems to be that at one point Mountbatten, under pressure from Nehru, did contemplate asking Radcliffe to amend the awards”, he continued.

“In the end, however, common sense and the counsels of [Lord] Ismay [Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff] must have convinced him that the risks were too great, the game was not worth even a small part of the candle.

“He must have been guilty of indiscretion but not of the arrant folly as well as dishonesty of which his enemies accused him.”

In his biography, Mr. Ziegler wrote that a nugget of doubt remained.

However, he still could not understand why Radcliffe should have succumbed so readily nor why Ismay, a man who knew India really well, should not have advised Mountbatten to call Nehru’s bluff.

Mr. Beaumont said he thought this was a good point. Not having been present at the lunch he could not say who had said that it could be that Ismay had advised against any change in the line, but that his advice had been disregarded.

In his statement, Mr. Beaumont said that “with the death of Sir George Abell, Mountbatten’s private secretary, in 1989, he remained the only one who knows the truth about the 1947 partition of India and the consequent creation of [it?] Although in the early 1980s he had

told his close friend the Historian of India, Sir Penderel Moon and his brother-in-law, Sir Robin Latimer, what had happened. After drawing up his statement in 1989, Mr. Beaumont lodged the original at All Souls College, Oxford, with the request that the contents not be divulged until after his death and to selected persons and only by agreement between the warden of All Souls and the head of the Foreign Office. "

He said he had been led to reconsider the whole position after his grandson had been given the partition of India as a special subject in the History Tripos at Cambridge University.

"This made me realise belatedly that the event had passed into history and that the time had come for the truth to be revealed," said Mr. Beaumont.

In his statement he said Radcliffe had objected to an order from Mountbatten, Nehru and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and later first Governor-General of Pakistan, to complete his findings by August 15, 1947.

"It was clearly impossible properly to complete the task in one month nine days. Mountbatten, Nehru and Jinnah must share the blame for this irresponsible decision."

It was also a serious mistake "to appoint a Hindu, Rao Sahib V.D. Ayer, to the confidential post of assistant secretary to the commission. The job should have gone to some one brought out from Britain.

Mr. Beaumont said he, Radcliffe and Ayer were the only people who knew about the progress of the lines being drawn across Punjab and Bengal the other part of British India partitioned at Independence.

He said he had "little doubt" that Ayer kept Nehru and Mr V.P. Menon, who handled the accession of states to India, informed of progress.

Evidence for this came at a meeting chaired by Mountbatten on August 12 the day before Mr. Beaumont handed the Commission reports to the viceregal lodge when Nehru complained about the award of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bengal to Pakistan.

Mr. Beaumont notes that Mr. John Christie, one of Mountbatten's assistant private secretaries, wrote in his diary for August 11: "H.E. [His Excellency] is having to be strenuously dissuaded from trying to persuade Radcliffe to amend his Punjab line."

Mr. Beaumont said, "This was on a date when H.E. ought not to have known where the line was drawn."

He said he had not kept a diary, so could not be entirely sure about dates.

However, the facts were as follows.

Radcliffe had completed the Punjab line, allotting the Ferozepur and Zira sub-districts to Pakistan. Mr. Beaumont showed the map to Abell, following a request from Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of Punjab, who wanted to station troops in the spots where violence was most likely to break out.

Shortly after that, Menon turned up at Radcliffe's residence towards midnight and asked to see him. Mr. Beaumont said he could not. Menon said Mountbatten had sent him to which Mr. Beaumont replied that it made no difference.

"He departed with good grace", Mr. Beaumont said in his statement.

"I think he anticipated the rubuff. He was a very able and perceptive person."

The next day Radcliffe told Mr. Beaumont that he had been invited to lunch with Mountbatten by Ismay.

Radcliffe added that he had been asked not to bring his private secretary with him because there was not enough room at the table for an extra guest.

"Having lived for six months in the house occupied by Ismay, I knew this to be untrue," Mr. Beaumont's statement said.

"But my suspicions were not aroused as they should have been. I was leaving India the next week, had many preoccupations and welcomed the chance to get on with my own affairs.

"This was the first time, however, that Radcliffe and I had been separated at any sort of function.

"That evening the Punjab line was changed."

Mr. Beaumont said he thought the alteration took place under pressure from Mountbatten who was in turn under pressure from Nehru and almost certainly from the Maharaja of Bikaner whose State would have been adversely affected if the canal headworks in Ferozepur had gone to Pakistan and who is said to have told Mountbatten that unless Ferozepur was allotted to India he would have to accede to Pakistan.

However in both the case of Mountbatten and Radcliffe there were "mitigating circumstances if not excuses".

Mountbatten was overworked and overtired and was "doubtless" told by Nehru and Menon that to give Ferozepur to Pakistan would result in a war between the two newly independent countries.

Radcliffe was probably persuaded by Mountbatten at the lunch that civil war, or at least something like it would result from the award of Ferozepur to Pakistan.

"Radcliffe had only been in India six weeks, "Mr. Beaumont's statement said.

“He suffered much from the heat.

“He probably did not know that Nehru, Menon and Bikaner were putting pressure on Mountbatten.”

Daily Telegraph, 24 February 1992.



M. A. Jinnah with Rajagopalacharia



M.A. Jinnah with Ardeshir Hormuzjee Mama,
President, Parsi Anjuman, Karachi



M. A. Jinnah with Abdur Rab Nishtar

Glossary

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Ahmisa</i> | Non-Violence |
| <i>Akhand Bharat</i> | United India |
| <i>Allah Hafiz</i> | May God protect you |
| <i>Assalamo 'Alaikum</i> | Peace, mercy and blessing of God be upon you (Muslim salutation) |
| <i>wa Rahmatullah</i> | |
| <i>Azad Fauj</i> | Rebel army of Junagadh |
| <i>Azad Hind Fauj</i> | Indian National Army |
| <i>Bapu</i> | Father of Indian nation |
| <i>Brahmins</i> | High Cast of Hindus |
| <i>Congress Murdabad</i> | Down with Congress |
| <i>Darbar</i> | Court |
| <i>Daulat-i-Jamhuria</i> | Long live the State of Pakistan |
| <i>Pakistan Zindabad</i> | |
| <i>Dewan</i> | Chief Minister of a State |
| <i>Dogra Raj Murdabad</i> | Down with Dogra rule |
| <i>Firman</i> | Declaration |
| <i>Gaddi</i> | Throne |
| <i>Ghaddar</i> | Traitor |
| <i>Goonda</i> | Bad Character, Gangster |
| <i>Guru</i> | Hindus spiritual leader |
| <i>Hindu Muslim</i> | |
| <i>ittehad Zindabad</i> | Long live Hindu Muslim Unity |
| <i>Hindu Muslim</i> | |
| <i>Sikh ek ho</i> | Hindus Muslim and Sikhs are one |
| <i>'Id</i> | Muslim festeval after the fasting month |
| <i>Idgah</i> | Congregation place for 'Id prayers |
| <i>Ilaqa</i> | Area |
| <i>Insha Allah</i> | God willing |
| <i>Jamadar</i> | The lowest rank of commissioned officer in the Indian Army |
| <i>Jammuvis</i> | Residents of Jammu |
| <i>Jatha</i> | Armed group |
| <i>Jehad</i> | Holy war |
| <i>Khaddar</i> | Coarse cotten cloth |
| <i>Khuzu Hizrakum</i> | Defend yourself against your enemies |
| <i>Lashkar</i> | Band, Armed Coloumn |
| <i>Lathis</i> | Heavy sticks |
| <i>Majlis</i> | Party, meeting |
| <i>Maulana Azad Murdabad</i> | Dawn with Maulana Azad |
| <i>Mofassal</i> | Semi-urban rural area |

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| <i>Mohallah</i> | Street, Ward |
| <i>Muslim League Zindabad</i> | Long live Muslim League |
| <i>Pakistan Zindabad</i> | Long live Pakistan |
| <i>Panchayat</i> | Village Council |
| <i>Pashmina</i> | Woolen cloth |
| <i>Pawindas</i> | People of NWFP and tribal Areas, came to Punjab for trade and business purposes in winter season |
| <i>Pindal</i> | A conopy under which a meeting is held |
| <i>Pranams</i> | Hindu Salutation |
| <i>Purdah</i> | Veil |
| <i>Quaid-i-Millat</i> | Leader of the nation |
| <i>Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad</i> | Long live Quaid-i-Azam |
| <i>Rabbul-Alameen</i> | God of the Universe |
| <i>Rama hoon</i> | Rama the wolf |
| <i>Razakar</i> | Volunteer |
| <i>Sadh'u</i> | Holy man |
| <i>Salaams</i> | Muslim salutation |
| <i>Sher-i-Kashmir</i> | Lion of Kashmir |
| <i>Swami</i> | Hindu religious leader |
| <i>Talukdari</i> | Dependence |
| <i>Tehsil</i> | Area administered by the Officer of Revenue department |
| <i>Toshakhana</i> | Store room for state gifts |
| <i>Vakil</i> | Pleader, Advocate |
| <i>Wazir</i> | Minister |
| <i>Zaildari</i> | Tax collected by Zaildar (Revenue Officer) |
| <i>Zamindar</i> | Landlord; owner of an estate |

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